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
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A CRITICAL HISTORY
OF THE
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION
AND RECONCILIATION.

By ALBRECHT RITSCHL,

PROFESSOR ORDINARIUS OF THEOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN.

2. 1. 1872-74.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN, WITH THE AUTHOR'S SANCTION,

By JOHN S. BLACK, M.A.

EDINBURGH
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1872.

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A CRITICAL HISTORY

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FOR

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DEDICATED

TO

THE REV. GEORGE EDWARD STEITZ,

DOCTOR OF THEOLOGY

AND ONE OF THE CITY MINISTERS IN FRANKFORT-ON-THE-MAIN ;

MY DEAR BROTHER-IN-LAW,

TRIED FRIEND, AND THEOLOGICAL ASSOCIATE.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

IT is now almost thirty years since, in the third session of my university course, I began clearly to perceive that the first prerequisite of theological culture is a clear understanding of the Christian idea of Reconciliation. At that time I tried to get special help towards such an understanding, but failed to find what I sought; and, as I now see, after methodical examination of the later German Theology, I had not any ground for expecting efficient aid towards the solution of the problem from any one at that time. Other problems came before me for scientific investigation; but as soon as I had brought these to a conclusion satisfactory to myself, I resumed the question of my youth in an independent way. Since 1857 my whole attention has, directly or indirectly, been devoted to the doctrines of Justification and Reconciliation, save in so far as I have been hindered by official duties and personal affairs. As result of these studies, I have already published a program, *De Ira Dei* (Bonn, 1859), as well as the following articles in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*;—"On A. Osiander's Doctrine of Justification" (1857, No. 4); "Studies on

the Ideas of Christ's Satisfaction and Merit" (1860, No. 4); "The Declarations of the New Testament upon the Saving Worth of the Death of Christ" (1863, Nos. 2 and 3); "Historical Studies on the Christian Doctrine of God" (in three articles, 1865, No. 2; 1868, Nos. 2 and 3). As a preparation, however, for the dogmatic presentation of these doctrines, I held it necessary to gain insight into their whole history from the beginning of the middle ages; and on this account the present volume has been written. It is published because my friends desire me to do so, and because I recognise their claim to share in my scientific acquirements. In a second volume I purpose to undertake the dogmatic presentation of the doctrines in question along with the necessary biblico-theological substructure; and for that volume I reserve many details which may seem to have been overlooked in the historical part. Where, however, certain germs or relations of thought have not attained to any historical continuity in public teaching, I have for the present left them undiscussed, in order that the historical survey might not be burdened with their treatment. In so far as they deserve attention at all, they will be taken up in the theoretical presentation of the second volume.

ALBRECHT RITSCHL.

GÖTTINGEN, *Sept.* 17, 1870.

PREFATORY NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR.

THE work which in a translation is now laid before the British public has already been received in Germany with the keenest interest, alike by friends and opponents of the author's views; and it has served to raise the previously high reputation of a theologian who is second to no University teacher of that country in dialectic acuteness and broad historical grasp of Reformed as well as Lutheran and Pre-Reformation dogma. Dr. Ritschl is not altogether unknown even in this country; and the favour with which his work, in its original form, has been already welcomed, leads to the hope that it may meet with still wider notice, and find still greater usefulness in its present shape. Those who are best acquainted with the literature of the History of Dogma will be the readiest to recognise its importance as a contribution to that branch of theological literature.

I desire to acknowledge my obligations to my friend and fellow-student under Ritschl—the Rev. W. R. Smith, Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in the Free Church College, Aberdeen—for invaluable advice and assistance, generously given throughout the whole course of my work, in the many difficulties inseparable from the task of translating from a language so rich in theological and metaphysical distinctions as that of Germany. I may add that both to him and to me the task has been one not of scientific interest merely, but also of gratitude for what we feel we owe to Professor Ritschl.

JOHN S. BLACK.

KIRKCALDY, *May* 16, 1872.

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ERRATUM.

Page 113, line 11—After *commendante* insert the sentence : *Sicut enim omnia hæc ad justificationem nostram, quæ tamen finaliter in solo consistit proposito Dei, ita etiam gloria nostra est in solo Deo suam in nobis caritatem commendante.*

INTRODUCTION.

1. THE Christian doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation, which I purpose to unfold in a scientific manner, constitutes the real centre of the theological system. In it is developed the determinate and direct result of the historical revelation of God's purpose of grace through Christ—the result, namely, that the Church founded by Christ has freedom of religious intercourse with God, notwithstanding the fact of sin, and at the same time, in the exercise of that freedom, directs the workings of its own will in conformity with God's expressed design. To the religious discernment this implies in itself the moral restoration of man, and all religious blessedness.

The title I have chosen certainly presents an unusual collocation and order of ideas, and so demands a preliminary explanation, although the adequate vindication of its suitableness to describe the contemplated theme can result only from the full working out of the subject to the end I have in view. In that part of the system of Christian doctrine to which these ideas belong, many other additional conceptions have been developed in the course of the history of theology; while, on the other hand, the practice of theologians has not yet given them a fixed or self-consistent arrangement. Thus, while all other theological doctrines are provided with distinct and definite titles, here, in the entire absence of a fixed terminology, we are not only warranted but compelled to exercise freedom of choice. At first sight it seems as if the difficulty could easily be got over if one were to have regard simply to the historical fact to which the above-mentioned saving operations and kindred ones are referred, and were to name it accordingly the doctrine *of the death of Christ*. In this way it would be left an open question what reference

to God and what effects upon men might be grounded upon this fact, and upon which class of these references the emphasis ought to be laid. Yet weighty objections to such a title readily present themselves. While the apostles mastered the first impression of the death of their Lord by recognising in it His sacrificial act for the salvation of men, they included along with it, in this view, Christ's resurrection also, and referred to His death and resurrection together the effects resulting from the finished sacrifice. Further, in the doctrinal method of the Reformation, value has been assigned not only to the suffering and death of Christ, but also to the whole compass of His active life as a ground of the saving operations in question. And, although this theory has not been permitted to pass unchallenged, it has gained so much weight that on account of it we must avoid making it appear as if the death of Christ were regarded only as an external and isolated event, so far as the salutary effects dependent upon it are concerned. But, further, I cannot help expressing my opinion that our religious assurance of such results as are the justification and reconciliation of men can be based upon the death of Christ only on condition that the value of His life and of His resurrection be taken into consideration in inseparable connexion with that fact. But on this account, the title, "Doctrine of the Death of Christ," would fail to convey clearly and completely all that ought to be denoted by it. On the other hand, such a title as "*Doctrine of the saving work of Christ*," would comprehend more than our intended subject. For it would embrace the whole sphere of the three offices of Christ, the prophetic, the priestly, and the kingly; but I have at present to do only with the exhibition of so much of the saving work of Christ as corresponds to His *priestly office*.

It seems then as if *this* conception might furnish the appropriate title for our task. As all know, it is derived from the Epistle to the Hebrews. Yet, we may with some propriety attribute to it a general currency in the New Testament: for the idea (common to the greater number of New Testament writers) of an offering for which Christ consecrated Himself necessarily involves the analogy of a priest. The biblico-theological portion of the following treatise will show that I can appreciate to its full extent the constitutive importance of the

Old Testament conceptions of sacrifice and priesthood for the formation of a worthy view of the death and resurrection of Christ. I readily acknowledge also with Schleiermacher¹ that the threefold attributes of prophet, priest, and king, when taken together, do secure, in a special manner, completeness to our view of the saving work of Christ. At the same time I cannot get rid of the objections raised by Schleiermacher himself against the use of these *metaphorical expressions* in systematic theology. Schleiermacher pronounces for the continued use of these dogmatic terms in order to maintain continuity with the original modes of representation, inasmuch as the earliest Christian terminology proceeded upon the co-ordination of the new kingdom of heaven with the old. But the fact is, that neither our Lord Himself nor any one of the New Testament writers, has made use of the three offices as the comprehensive and only forms for expressing the saving operations of Christ, and that this use was not introduced into systematic theology until the Reformation period.² Besides, in the New Testament these official titles are in part superseded in their application to Christ by designations which are peculiar to it; or where they are used, occur only in a metaphorical sense in such a way that the idea contained in them can also be conveyed independently of them. The character of Prophet, although Christ Himself lays claim to it, is surpassed by his designation as Son of Man and Son of God. His Kingship pertains to a sphere entirely different from that which is assigned to the expected Son of David. His Priesthood, corresponding to His sacrificial character, has, when viewed more closely, more of dissimilarity than of resemblance to the type. And, therefore, although our solution of problems in biblical theology will be dependent on our consideration of these typical notions, the framing of our leading conceptions in systematic theology cannot be regulated by such regards. These conceptions must proceed throughout upon specifically New Testament views, and not upon those which, being used in a tropical sense, are easily seen to be merely subsidiary representations so far as the New Testament sphere of thought is concerned. If the old school, in its mechanical use of Bible

¹ *Der Christliche Glaube*, 3d Ed. § 102.

² Eusebius, it is true, had already referred the three types to Christ.—*Hist. Eccl.* i. 3.

authority for its theological system, has disregarded this distinction in the construction of New Testament thoughts, it has set us no example that we should imitate. Rather, inasmuch as even the old school has in a great majority of instances fashioned its dogmatic heads of doctrine in accordance with the fully developed ideas of the New Testament, the introduction of the three offices of Christ as a head produces, even in the old theology, an inharmonious and strange impression which ought to serve as a warning against the continued use of such titles.

For the designation of our task there remains only one other way of looking at it, namely this,—as a survey of *the moral effects of the Life, Passion, Death, and Resurrection of Christ towards the founding of the Church*. In this understanding of it, only the notions of justification and reconciliation, which we have already mentioned, are sufficient. This affirmation, however, proceeds upon such an understanding of the foundations of the doctrine in the New Testament, and of its progress in Church-theology, as cannot be had now except in hints and in a provisional way. Of course the New Testament itself, as well as the History of Dogmas, presents us with a rich abundance of conceptions that are closely connected with those already mentioned. Amongst these there occur in the New Testament the following: Sanctification, Bringing to God, Purchasing for God (*ἀγοράζω*), Purification, Redemption. The last-mentioned of these seems especially to recommend itself, inasmuch as *redemption* expresses the whole compass of conceivable effects of the death of Christ, and is expressly used in this sense by Paul (Rom. iii. 24; Col. i. 14; Eph. i. 7). Moreover, the comprehensive personal title of Christ as the Redeemer has been sanctioned by the ordinary language of the Church. The word, however, is less suitable as a title on account of its purely negative meaning, and also from the circumstance, that in the period of Patristic theology (where the notion is an independent one) it received an erroneous, purely dramatic, thoroughly non-ethical application; while, on the other hand, in the doctrinal system of the middle ages and of the Reformation it comes up only in subordination to other notions; and finally, in modern usage, is not employed as an exhaustive designation of the thing we now wish to denote by it. It is well known that a

number of Greek and Latin Church Fathers view the death of Christ as a transaction in which God (from the motive of His justice) delivered over the life of the God-man as a price to the devil, who is recognised as the rightful lord over sinful humanity, and who could be induced to make surrender of his rights only on condition of receiving that as an equivalent. In this theory sin is represented merely as a *mechanical subjection to the devil*, and the idea of redemption remains entirely out of relation to the notion of human will. Moreover, it is found in carrying out this thought, that the issue of the legal transaction comes into collision with the idea of God's justice which had led to it: for the price paid to the devil as an equivalent for man cannot, from the very nature of the case, remain in his possession. The significance which in this connexion attaches to the resurrection of Christ from the dead is, that thereby the devil lost possession of the compensation which he had received. But while the supposition that the devil had been deceived as to the effects of the legal transaction he had entered into was inevitable, it was impossible to believe with regard to the other party to the transaction—the omniscient God—anything else than that He had intended the deception. But such an intention is inconsistent with the justice of God, which is presupposed; thus the theory is self-contradictory, and is therefore untrue.¹ On this account even Gregory Nazianzen wandered away from the fundamental idea of the theory, because, regarding the devil as the despoiler and oppressor of mankind, he did not consider him entitled to claim any price for the surrender, much less one of infinite value. But this consideration falls short of its full effect with him, because he was not able consistently to explain from what necessity arising out of the very nature of God it was needful that He should receive the life of Christ by His death as a ransom.² The theologians of the middle ages were the first who succeeded in thoroughly uprooting the theory we have mentioned, while they at the same time lifted the problem of the saving efficacy of the death of Christ to a higher sphere—that in which sin is viewed in its legal and moral aspects. Diverse as are the views of Anselm and Abelard on this question, it is at any

¹ Compare Baur, *Lehre von der Versöhnung*, pp. 30-87.

² As above, pp. 87-90.

rate conclusive as regards the position of the problem of the death of Christ in their theological discussions, that they wholly reject the idea that a redemption of mankind from the power of the devil was legally requisite. While Anselm represents man's sin as an injury done to the honour of God, and explains the death of Christ as arising out of the need for satisfaction to be given to God, he denies that the devil has, as over against God, any independent sphere of right, from which alone any claim against God's justice for an equivalent of his peculiar property could be inferred. While Abelard regards the death of Christ as that demonstration of the love of God whereby men are awakened to reciprocal love, and so reconciled with God and freed from the slavery of sin, he excludes every reference in this to the devil, inasmuch as neither at any time had he the elect in his power, nor could he by his seduction of mankind have acquired any rights over them. And even Bernard, although out of deference to theological traditionalism he brands as heresy Abelard's repudiation of that theory, only so far gives adherence to it that he in the same breath superadds the altogether diverse thought of a satisfaction to God which Christ as the Head gave for the Body—the Church—when He bore its sins in His death.¹ But it is decisive, so far as the theology of the middle ages is concerned, that Peter Lombard converted the mechanical idea of the devil's power into the idea of an *ethical attachment* to sin on man's part, and, following closely upon Abelard, explained the subjugation of the devil through the death of Christ, as meaning only that the reciprocal love of man to God, which is awakened by that death, cannot co-exist with a continuance in sin—the two being mutually exclusive.² In the same sense Thomas Aquinas also recognises the redemption of men from sin and from the devil only as a consequence of the *reconciliation of men with God*, which was brought about by means of Christ's death.³ The Reformation doctrine treats of the bearings of the redemption wrought in the death of Christ upon the wrath of God, as well as upon our sins, and upon the devil. But, as this combination is only placed alongside of the leading thought of the *reconciliation of God with men*, one sees that the

¹ *Ut supra*, pp. 155, 191-194, 202.

² *Ut supra*, p. 209, *et seq.*

³ *Summa Theol.* P. III. qu. 49, art. 2.

notion of redemption is not treated in this quarter as an independent one. For, being a *negative notion*, it could not, at the time of the special scientific elucidation of the problem of the death of Christ, acquire any independent significance. If, accordingly, I shall appear to be justified in refraining from the use of this term to designate my work, I shall be only strengthened in my resolution by the contrary procedure of Schleiermacher. He distinguishes *redemption* and *reconciliation*, in the order in which I have placed them, as co-ordinate operations of Christ upon believers. By redemption he understands the taking up of believers into the powerful influence of Christ's God-consciousness; by reconciliation, the taking up of believers into the participation of His uninterrupted blessedness.¹ But, inasmuch as he does not succeed in carrying out the co-ordination of the two ideas, the choice of these designations appears, when more closely viewed, to be merely an arbitrary adoption of expressions which in the New Testament and in theological tradition had other meanings, and were placed in a different relation to each other.

Were the designation of our task to be determined by regard to New Testament usages of language alone, then, of all the above-mentioned notions, that of *sanctification* would seem to be the simplest, and, at the same time, the most comprehensive to denote the salutary fruits of the death and resurrection of Christ (John xvii. 19; 1 Cor. i. 30; Eph. v. 26; Heb. x. 10, 14, 29; xiii. 12; ii. 11)—the others, on nearer view, being seen to be synonymous. But then, as the notion of sanctification has in the theology of the Evangelical Church found its place in another part of the system, it would lead to the utmost confusion and misunderstanding if in our title we were to adhere only to the purism of the New Testament idiom. And further, in speaking more explicitly of sanctification through Christ's life, death, and resurrection, I might seem to be giving my adherence precisely to a phase of doctrinal development which I purpose to put aside as altogether indifferent in the moral aspect of the problem. I refer to the period of the patristic theology, where, in close connexion with the theory of redemption from the power of the devil, there is to be found a series of suggestions and additions which Baur treats as "*mystical*"

¹ *Der Christliche Glaube*, 2d Ed. § 100, 101.

doctrine of reconciliation " preparatory to a later mode of apprehending the problem.¹ The defenders of the Divinity of Christ, Athanasius, Gregory of Nyssa, and others, lay stress upon this, that the Incarnate Word must needs have been like unto God, inasmuch as only a person of such dignity could have brought men to God, annihilated the death of men by His own death, and by His own resurrection raised mankind to immortal life. These designs in reference to man have really as little to do with the usual notion of reconciliation as, by Baur's own confession,² has the theory of redemption from the power of the devil. For a doctrine of reconciliation between man and God can be constructed only where a contrariety of *will* between the two, or on the part of the one against the other, is presupposed. The leading thought, in accordance with which the operations of the Divine Logos are estimated, and to which also the seemingly exaggerated expression of Athanasius is to be referred—that Christ has made man divine (*θεοποιεῖν*)—is only the thought of *sanctification*, i.e. the setting apart of men for God. On this account Cyril of Alexandria finds himself constrained to account for this influence of Christ upon men by the communication of the Holy Ghost.³ Where, on the other hand, it is desired to make clear the immediate effect of the historical appearance of Christ in changing man and raising him up to God, then sanctification is carried back to the analogy of a *chemical process of nature*, while the human nature which undergoes it is regarded only as a *natural unit*. Hilary of Poitiers enables us to see this kernel of the "mystical atonement-doctrine,"⁴ as, generally speaking, the so-called mystical form of religious ideas is wont to rest upon the reduction of relations which pertain to the will, to the forms of a natural process.

Now, in the selection of a title, I am led by this very consideration—that the bearing of Christ's saving work on the mutual relations between the Divine and human *will* must be expressed. For this purpose the notions of justification and reconciliation at once present themselves as specially adapted. For justification removes the guilt, and reconciliation the

¹ *Ut supra*, p. 111.

² *Ut supra*, p. 89.

³ *Ut supra*, p. 117.

⁴ De Trinitate, ii. 24. Humani generis causa Dei filius natus ex virgine est et Spiritu sancto,—ut homo factus ex virgine naturam in se carnis acciperet perque hujus admixtionis societatem sanctificatum in eo universi generis humani corpus existeret. Compare Baur, as above, p. 116.

enmity, of sin towards God: both notions thus include in themselves an effect upon the human will just as certainly as guilt and enmity towards God can only be understood as belonging to the human will. But now, since these effects must be conceived as proceeding from the Divine will through the instrumentality of the doing and suffering of Christ, our title does not preclude the view that Christ's work can be regarded as efficacious in the justification and reconciliation of men only in so far as we at the same time recognise a reference of that work to God. Nay rather, His saving operations upon men cannot be understood except it be presupposed that His doing and suffering for that end had also a value for God, whether that be expressed in the notions of satisfaction, merit, propitiation, or somehow otherwise. Nevertheless, by this statement of the problem, I design to place myself in opposition to a certain way of shaping the doctrine which some may look for. It does not seem to me accurate theology to limit to God—to the satisfaction He receives or to the propitiation of His wrath—the direct saving efficacy of the action and passion of Christ: and to deduce the forgiveness of men's sins, or their reconciliation with God, merely as consequences from that result, and so to make the saving efficacy of Christ's work as regards man dependent only indirectly or secondarily upon His doing and suffering. This mode of putting the doctrine has indeed in its favour the weight of almost all the traditions of dogmatic theology; but it has against it the whole idiom and way of thinking of the New Testament. Moreover, it does not in the least degree suit the purpose which ought with peculiar distinctness to lead every theologian in his doctrine of Christ—this, namely, of setting forth Christ as the direct Revealer of God's saving purpose towards men, not merely in His words, but also in all His works. We come short of this task, if we refer the value of Christ's passion directly only to a pacification of God or change effected in His mind, and set forth in an altogether separate part of the system the saving graces of God which *thereby* were first made possible. Such a mode of procedure tends towards a mutilation of the character of the Person of Christ as Revealer. This method I renounce; and along with the Reformers, particularly with Melancthon, I attach justification and reconciliation to the doing and suffering of Christ as

His direct operations, which are necessarily presupposed in order to the awakening in us of our consciousness as believers.

It is true that since the beginning of the middle ages, history has for the most part treated of these doctrines in the reverse order—reconciliation of God and justification of men.

But not invariably : for there is also tradition in favour of that manner of viewing the question which waives all inquiry as to a reconciliation of God, and finds in the manifestation, life, and obedient suffering of Christ the pledge of God's self-subsistent grace towards men. And even though this view makes its appearance after the Reformation as the heterodox one, yet in the middle ages, for a much longer period, it had equal currency and equal recognition from the Church with that which alone finds place in the subsequent scheme of orthodox doctrine. Thus no well-founded objection to the title we have chosen can be derived, even from consideration of the way in which these doctrines have been presented in history. Their history, which we are just about to enter upon, would be too narrowly and therefore untruly apprehended were we to restrict it to the unfolding of the thoughts of reconciliation of God and justification of men.

2. The discharge of my historical task brings me into contact with the work of Baur—*The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation in its Historical Development from the earliest to the latest times* (1838). This work has naturally lightened my labour by pointing out to me the literature that has been brought under review in it ; yet at no point have I been spared the necessity of thorough investigation of authorities. My willing recognition of the epoch-making importance of this book to the history of dogma, cannot prevent me from frankly saying that it has almost utterly failed to help me to an understanding of the historical course of the doctrine of reconciliation. I can very well appreciate the fact that it was Hegel's *Philosophy of History* that gave Baur the impulse and ability to conceive and execute on so grand a scale his great undertaking ; but I cannot doubt that such a standard for historical writing really involves failure of its end at the outset. And though it might be thought that, in spite of the untenableness of the general scheme of the work, its statements and judgments on particular matters would yet be found trustworthy,

I can only say that my own expectation has not been realized in this, except in subordinate and comparatively unimportant parts of the work. In fact, even the grouping of its individual parts in the framework of the Philosophy of History not unfrequently falls short of the artistic style of division that might be expected from the writer.

In particular, Baur has at times failed to take up the matters of which he has to treat in so exhaustive a way as is presupposed in his arrangement of them; and at other times he has included in his work and in his arrangement of subjects, matters which do not fall under his general title. The Christian notion of reconciliation can only be understood as a removal of the one-sided or mutual contrariety between the Divine and human *will*. Accordingly, the fancies of the Church Fathers (which we have already characterized) about the redemption of the human race from Satan, and about the deification of the human race as a natural unity, do not fall under that notion; and, therefore, these views, along with that of Scotus Erigena regarding the abolition through Christ of the distinction between Divine and created Being, ought at most to have been considered only by way of introduction to the history of the doctrine of reconciliation—not as particular parts of it. Taken by itself, this is precisely a part of the book which shows great learning and merit; but it mars its orderly unity.¹ And unity ought to be guaranteed in the distribution of subjects. Baur founds his mode of dividing his work on the following consideration (p. 12):—“As the spirit throughout the whole of its development in time proceeds onwards from objectivity to subjectivity, and from subjectivity to objectivity, in order to raise itself, by means of the various tendencies by which its inner development is wrought out, from the unreflectiveness of natural being to true spiritual freedom, so the history of Christian dogma in general, and of each individual dogma in particular, divides itself into various periods, according as the tendency to objectivity or that to subjectivity is the prevailing one, or both in the higher unity of the notion include and mutually interpenetrate each other.” The Reformation and

¹ Baur himself half confesses this when he says that the first section contains, properly speaking, only the preparation and transition to the Theory of satisfaction.

the practical philosophy of Kant accordingly are indicated as the turning-points respectively to a mere subjectivity, and to a subjectivity which embodies the object in itself; and three periods are supposed:—that of predominant objectivity of doctrine, that of gradually prevailing subjectivity, and that of subjectivity returning to objectivity. But, according to this scheme of history, Baur was able to base the significance of the Reformation only on this, that the Reformers took the doctrine of reconciliation into the service of the thought of justification by *faith*. It results from this that the doctrine of reconciliation could enter into such a scheme of distribution only on condition that the business of the historian should embrace at the same time the doctrine of justification. But, as no consideration is given to that doctrine in any direct or thorough-going way, the consequence is that the theme of the whole work is too narrow for the scheme proposed, and does not fill it up. Moreover, Baur cannot conceal, even from himself, the fact that the Reformation circle of ideas by no means bears the stamp of mere subjectivity, especially in reference to the idea of reconciliation. On the one hand, he cannot deny (p. 13) that the Reformation-theology defends the objective form of the atonement in a very energetic way; and, on the other hand, he confesses that faith, in the Reformation-sense, is indeed the spirit's consciousness of its finitude and neediness, but also at the same time the expression of its infinite nature (p. 287). He might have discovered here, in the very heart of the development of thought which had to be surveyed, a manifestation of subjectivity interpenetrated with objectivity, on which the historical accuracy of his whole system breaks down. If he had further observed that the mediæval doctrines of Christ's satisfaction and merit are also accompanied by a doctrine of subjective justification, he would then have been compelled to confess that even the period of prevailing objectivity in the doctrine of reconciliation presents an aspect of subjectivity interpenetrated with objectivity as the realization of the task of Christianity. If, on the other hand, the doctrine of reconciliation should, in accordance with Baur's favourite principles of method, come to be expounded without regard to any doctrine of justification, then it is not the Reformation but Socinianism that forms an epoch; and that, too, just in so far as

it comes most directly into conflict with the Reformation theology. But in that case it will be asked, whence is the material for our third period to be derived? For the distance of Kant and his school from the "Illumination" which Socinianism introduced into Lutheran theology, seems slight enough according to Baur's own representation. Of Schleiermacher's view again, he judges that it is not essentially superior to that of Kant; that it has its centre of gravity in the subjective consciousness, and only manifests an uncertain oscillation towards the pole of objectivity, by widening that consciousness into the spirit of church-fellowship; while the development of the necessary consequences of the Hegelian philosophy by Strauss, which is approved of by Baur, presents us with nothing other than the absorption of the objectivity of God, and so also of the objective factor of the idea of reconciliation, by the subjective self-consciousness in its elevation to absoluteness. These developments cannot properly be dis-joined from the movement that originated with Socinianism, and therefore the principal contents of the "third period" fall under the second when that is rightly defined. Thus neither does the material of the book fit itself into the dialectical and ostensibly historical framework which Baur brings with him to the examination of details; nor can a justification for the method pursued be derived afterwards from the examination of the material.

The historical presentation of this doctrine demands that the change or progression which is brought about in the mode of viewing Christ's atoning work by the taking up of new matter, or by the influence of new ideas, should in every case be established by means of a strict comparison of the successive schools of thought. This task also is for the most part unsatisfactorily performed by Baur. I call attention, for example, to his whole investigation of the Reformation-doctrine of reconciliation especially as laid down in the *Formula Concordiæ*, as compared with the doctrine of the Schoolmen, pp. 291-304. Not only is Baur satisfied with bringing forward for direct comparison only Anselm's theory, altogether disregarding the historically much more important teachings of Thomas and of Duns (although he again and again speaks in a general way of Anselm and the Scholastics), but he also contents himself with

the utterly unmeaning phrase that the theory of satisfaction in the *Formula Concordiæ* is in one of its most essential conceptions the "natural climax and completion" of the theory of Anselm (p. 291). Besides, the "sharper and more many-sided" definition which the idea of Satisfaction receives in the *Formula Concordiæ*, as compared with that of Anselm, is only hinted at in p. 296, and is not given till we come to the end of the whole excursus; nay rather, attention is diverted from the discrepancy in the *conceptions* of satisfaction to the consideration of a difference between the *things* to which expiatory value is attached—in that Anselm gives weight only to the suffering of Christ, while the *Formula Concordiæ* brings into consideration, as contributing to this end, not only His suffering but also His active obedience as well. One could never learn from Baur's book that the satisfaction of Christ was regarded by the Schoolmen as a necessity arising from the arbitrary will of a mighty possessor of private rights, while the Reformers sought its explanation in the Public Law of the law-ordered community in which God and man are constituent parts,—that in the one case it is regarded as the arbitrary compensation for a personal injury, and in the other as the necessary punishment of a violation of law. The great critic, moreover, has in this work fallen short of the composure and clearness of view which are needful for the analysis of any set of ideas foreign to one's-self. His analyses are never directed towards the reconstruction of another man's train of thought out of its fundamental ideas. He never has patience to allow any inconsistencies that may exist in a theory to come to light in the course of such a reconstruction; but he lays hold of every doctrinal statement at any point which seems to present a self-contradiction, and carries out his criticism in a line of argumentation which almost never bears with it the evidence of justice.

Neither does the grouping of subjects in his intermediate divisions present so favourable a specimen of the art of exposition as one might fairly expect. If in the mediæval period it is right to embrace in one chapter the two antipodes—Thomas and Duns,—then Abelard ought not to have been separated from Anselm, and classified with other teachers who came far short of his position as a leader in the theology of

our subject. Piscator's controversion of the value of the active obedience of Christ as a satisfaction for sin does not deserve the honour of a special chapter,—an honour which is given to it, apparently because it is the only episode known to Baur in all the rich development of the doctrine of the atonement in the Reformed theology. Of course, when violently separated from that connexion, Piscator's peculiar teaching could not be introduced anywhere else as a secondary matter. Further, it is impossible to see why the theory of Grotius regarding the death of Christ as a penal example should be separated from the views of the other Arminians. But the chapter that follows, in which the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf, and also incidentally the Mystics, are considered, presents a collocation which can be explained only by supposing that Baur was utterly at a loss what to do with these appearances in the course of history. The Mystics really belong to the same school as the Socinians; the influences of Leibnitz and Wolf, on the contrary, ought to be connected with the theology of the "Illumination."

It is impossible to understand either the history of man's spiritual life as a whole, or the history of the doctrine of the atonement, by means of the change of relation between the logical determinations of subject and object. The history of any single Christian doctrine must be based upon the history of Christian theology; but this is influenced in its course just as much by the turns that are taken in the practical development of the Church, as by the influences which originate in the development of the general ethical tone of society and in free scientific culture,—particularly in the variety of philosophical systems. Thus one cannot carry through a history of the isolated doctrines of justification and reconciliation, without having a general understanding of the changing conditions of theology at each of the separate steps in the development. Now it betokens no very encouraging condition of our science, that I am not able to borrow from anybody the general *points d'appui* which the history of theology ought to have afforded me for the discharge of my special task, and find myself compelled, when they must be found, to seek them for myself. It is hard upon my *esprit de corps* as a theologian to be compelled to say that one is left in the lurch by everybody when one

tries to ascertain, in a plain and intelligible way, how it is that the Reformation, notwithstanding its antagonism to the mediæval Church, is rooted in mediæval Christianity; or to find out who was intellectually the author of the theological scholasticism and of the ecclesiastical particularism to which the Reformation so soon fell a prey; to discover what were the causes which led to the so-called "Illumination," or why again the magnificent impulse given by Kant spent itself in "Illumination" philosophy and theology; and finally, on what it is that Schleiermacher rests his claim to be leader of the German evangelical theology of this century, which is now being aimlessly frittered away and so threatened with extinction.

Dorner's *History of Protestant Theology* (1857) has also failed to present me with an answer to these questions. The course of his exposition follows in every essential point the same method as that of which Baur makes use. He tries to make us understand the history, in its changes and its oneness, by showing how two very thin threads of thought unloose themselves from their original connexion, and find it again in such a way as to acquire a peculiar strength. The logical regularity of this course is taken for a discovery of the law of the history,—in the recognition of which, therefore, the history comes to be understood. The difference, however, between the two theologians (related though they be) seems to be very strongly marked by this, that Dorner does not, like Baur, find the key to the history of theology in the logical scheme of subject and object, but in the theological principles of the Reformation. Besides, he vindicates for the beginning of the development, that is, for a standpoint of the Reformers, a character of completeness, and not one of elementary onesidedness. According to Dorner, the conception of justification by faith, and the exclusive authority of Scripture (the two principles with which he has to do), were linked together by the Reformers with delicate tact as principles of their theology, placed in a position where they mutually supported each other, and held with equal regard to the importance of both. But further, he continues, these mutually connected elements of a sound theology were separated again, from the beginning of the seventeenth century; and by this separation a second period of development was introduced. This breaking up of the Reformation synthesis was, according

to him, brought about "unwittingly" by what appeared to be a strengthening of the principle on its intellectual side. The consequence was a preponderance of the doctrinal element in theological scholastics, as in the school of Calixtus; and the reaction of Christianity on its practical side, in Pietism and Mysticism, does not restore the synthesis, but is only a testimony to the unfortunate consequences of its ever having been broken. Now, in order that the synthesis of Reformation principles might be accomplished in free self-conscious command over the means employed—that is to say, in scientific perfection—it was still necessary that special conditions should be matured—namely, historical criticism and philosophical speculation. But these, in the first instance, ran their course in the eighteenth century with such a preponderance of subjectivity over the historical grounds of Christianity, that in the period of the "Illumination" there appeared points of resemblance to Pagan naturalism and Jewish legalism. Since, however, theology of this description does not claim to stand in any positive relation towards the principles of the Reformation, the consequence is either that it must be cut out from the history of Protestant theology as a heresy, or else that it proves the point of view which determined the distribution of periods to have been too narrow. This dilemma is resolved in favour of the second alternative by Dorner's own declaration that the problem how scientifically to unite the material and the formal, the subjective and objective principle of theology, is only a more concrete expression, in reference to the sphere of Christian religion, for the philosophical problem of subject and object, of thinking and being. In accordance with this, we find that in estimating Schleiermacher (whom Dorner considers to be the person who scientifically revived the Reformation synthesis) no further thought is given to the question *how* he traced out the idea of justification by faith and the exclusive authority of Scripture in their relations of mutual dependence, and on this foundation built his system. On the contrary, in virtue of the very elastic interpretation which he puts upon the principles of the Reformation, it becomes possible for the historian to be content with the following statement, in order to justify himself in recognising Schleiermacher as the finished theologian of his scheme:—"By his return to the fundamental views of the

Reformation he reconciles freedom with authority, personal appropriation with tradition, the ideal with the historical, upon the foundation of religion or faith in the evangelical sense of the word" (p. 790 [vol. ii. p. 376, Eng. transl.]). And again, "The actual experience of redemption through Christ accredits the authority of Holy Scripture, so that by the help of Scripture we believe in Christ, and again for Christ's sake believe in the divine authority of Holy Scripture" (p. 807 [vol. ii. p. 387, Eng. transl.])

I do not at present discuss the questions whether it be historically accurate to assume the above-mentioned material and formal principles of the Reformation, and whether Schleiermacher's importance as a theologian depends on the conformity of his theology with them. I venture simply to point out that the divergence as to historical method between Dorner and Baur, which I have spoken of above, is only seeming and superficial. Were it the case that the theological principles, of which Dorner speaks, are only equivalent to more concrete expressions for the logical scheme of subject and object, of thinking and being, the unification of which is the aim and issue of philosophical knowledge, then theology loses all its independence, and the unquestionable fact, that religion is a thing quite by itself, is denied in this estimate of the theological knowledge which has religion for its foundation and object. But this is just Baur's standpoint, and that of the Hegelian philosophy of religion! And although it may be useful for finding one's bearings at the beginning of the investigation to assume in the alternation of periods such variations as that in the seventeenth century the factor of the authority of Scripture has a preponderating weight over the doctrine of justification by faith, which had previously stood in equipoise with it, yet it is the task of the historian to trace to all its sources the error into which people at that time universally and "unwittingly" fell, and which assuredly is not sufficiently accounted for by the intellectual striving after a firm basis for systematic theology; for certainly every change in theology presupposes changes in the religious and church consciousness. Although these influences may have been hidden from people then, it is the business of history to reveal them to us now. On this point Dorner has altogether neglected his task; and his contri-

butions towards an explanation of the other important turning-point in theology—the appearance of the theological “Illumination”—again by no means exhaust the historian’s task. The Wolfian philosophy is responsible for this phase of thought in virtue not of its logic, but of its individualistic ethics: but Leibnitz in his *Theodicæe* gave the first impulse in that direction. When, then, Dorner says no more of this philosopher than that he took a very friendly attitude towards theology, it is clear that he must have read that work with an artlessness of which every historian ought at the very outset to divest himself. But he utterly abandons the procedure proper to a writer of history, when at the outset he teleologically heralds in the historical and philosophical tendencies of that epoch of theology as the preliminary conditions of a happy solution of the theological problem, yet all the while gives no explanation whatever of that subjective tendency in which the peculiar defect of the “Illumination” lay. Historical investigation is one thing, philosophy of history is another.

3. The history of the doctrines of justification and reconciliation has its sphere within the Western Church alone. The theology of the Greek Church has not, as a whole, set before itself the problem which is involved in these ideas. In particular, John of Damascus contents himself with stringing together the results of patristic theology, upon which we have already touched—namely, the so-called mystical atonement theory, and the theory of redemption as modified by putting death in the place of the devil.

In common with Gregory Nazianzen, John strongly repudiates the customary reference to the devil, the unlawful lord of men, of the redemption price that was paid on the death of Christ; and explains that death, in so far as it had the character of an offering and ransom, to have related to the Father, against whom men had sinned, and from whose condemnation they needed deliverance. But he gives no further grounding whatever to this connexion of ideas. He rather supplements it off-hand by a mythical mode of representation, borrowed from Cyril of Alexandria,¹ and presenting features derived from the theory of a fraud practised on the devil, to the effect that death, as he eagerly seized the body of Christ, was caught as by a bait upon the hook of God, and in tasting the sinless and life-giving body

¹ Baur, *ut supra*, p. 102.

was destroyed, whereupon he again gave up all those whom formerly he had devoured.¹ Moreover, John carries out in all rhetorical fulness of detail the thought that the Son of God became man in order by grace to restore man to that destiny unto which he had been created, namely, the image of God, that had been lost by sin. The Son of God, by His participation of human nature, has raised men to the sphere of the incorruptible and abiding; by and in Himself has renewed in them the image of God; has, by His resurrection, delivered us from the realm of the transitory; and finally, by awakening the knowledge of God in us, as well as by His discipline and patience and meekness has redeemed us from the power of the devil.²

In the circle of the Greek theology of the middle ages, we certainly find indications that men were not altogether secluded from the influence of the ideas which the theologians of the West were engaged in working out in reference to the problem now before us. Nicolaos Kabasilas, archbishop of Thessalonica in the fourteenth century, interprets the significance of Christ's suffering unto death for the deliverance of men at one time as a satisfaction due to the honour of God, and, at another time, also as a vicarious punishment—that is, under points of view which could hardly have been derived from any others than Anselm of Canterbury and Peter the Lombard. Of course we must not expect to find incorporated with the rhetorical representations of Nicolaos' book *περὶ τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ ζωῆς*, that process of proof in which more particularly the first-mentioned thought is worked out by Anselm. Nevertheless, from two passages of this work (i. 78, *et seq.*, iv. 18, *et seq.*) we gather the following train of reasoning:—That men by themselves were neither able to do away with their guilt before God, nor yet to make reparation to His injured honour. Men had no power to do so: God, who had the power, did not as God lie under the obligation that fell on men, for which cause it fell to Him in whom both natures met to discharge these functions towards God.³

¹ *Περὶ τῆς ὁρθοδόξου πίστεως*, iii. 27.

² *Ut supra*, iii. 31.

³ Compare Gass: *Die Mystik des Nikolaos Kabasilas*, p. 77.—Gass (*l.c.*) in agreement with Ullmann (*Die Dogmatik der griechischen Kirche im 12. Jahrhundert*.—*Stud. u. Kr.* 1833, Part 3, p. 736, *seq.*) finds also in Nicolaos of Methone coincidences with the theory of Anselm, which however Ullmann limits to this point, that the necessity of the Incarnation in reference to the atonement is indicated, while the Greek is thinking not of a satisfaction rendered to God, but of a redemption out of the power of death. But this theory

But the following sequence of thoughts (unnoticed by Gass) is more closely thought out (i. 57-59): "We have been declared just *in the first place* as having been freed from prison and accusation, inasmuch as He who had done no wrong vindicated us by His death on the cross, whereon He bore the punishment for our violation of the law: *in the second place* we are represented as friends of God and as righteous persons on account of that death. For not only did the Saviour free us, and reconcile us with the Father when He died; but He also imparted to us the power of becoming children of God—the former, inasmuch as He united our nature to Himself through the flesh which He destroyed,—the latter, inasmuch as He unites each one of us to His own flesh through the power of the sacraments." The latter part of this paragraph certainly has a thoroughly catholic ring. But the justification of individuals through the sacraments is here grounded on a justification and reconciliation of the Church with God, which justification is immediately connected with the bearing of punishment by Christ in His death. To be sure, the course of thought is by no means clear and unambiguous, for it is not dialectically arranged. Nevertheless, in the Byzantine's apprehension of the matter, a tendency which goes beyond the mediæval development of the doctrine finds expression.

In my historical studies, preparatory to the particular investigation I have in hand, however, I do not occupy myself with such casual and rhetorical formulæ as have not been thought out in an independent manner, even although they should have an appearance of riper development. I take up only those trains of thought which have been actually worked out in a methodical way, and which strive after conclusions which are logically necessary. But such trains of thought have been constructed only by the theologians of the West. The doctrines of reconciliation and justification are precisely those which have found their development exclusively in this portion of the Church. Whereby we may discern—what indeed is a conclusion warranted by everything else—that Western Christianity in general stands on a different *niveau* from that of the East, and that the separation of fellowship between the two groups has not its explanation in politics alone.

has no historical connexion with Anselm, but is derived from the tract (attributed to Athanasius) *De incarnatione Verbi Dei*: compare Baur, p. 94, f.

CHAPTER I.

THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION THROUGH CHRIST ACCORDING TO ANSELM AND ABELARD.

4. WHEN the theologians of the West raised the problem of reconciliation into the sphere of legal and ethical consideration, the free movement of their thought was not hampered by any fixed decision of the Church. Consequently there followed, one upon another, a series of diverse and even antagonistic attempts at a solution of the problem, of which, however, none, during the middle ages, gained the sanction of the Church's authority. On the contrary, at the very height of the theological development of that time, Thomas Aquinas bears witness that the antagonistic hypotheses of earlier teachers were allowed to pass current side by side in the Church. This fact is not without importance towards our understanding of the different mediæval theories, when we bear in mind, on the other hand, that these same theories, as soon as they are transplanted, with certain modifications, to the Reformation period, are immediately looked upon as too sharply opposed to exist side by side, and exercise a separating influence upon the Church. The quite opposite attitude assumed in the middle ages towards theories bearing on the idea of reconciliation, depends on the fact that people were under the impression, even with regard to the most conflicting essays in this department, rather that they were mutually complementary, or that they only differed from one another as varieties of one species. In other words, the problem was still at that time regarded as exclusively an affair of *the School within the Church*. When we reflect that since the Reformation the theories which formerly might be taught side by side have been brought into direct collision,—that about the method of reconciliation between God and man there has been stirred up the irreconcilable conflict of church against

church, of church against school, of school against church, we may well contemplate with sympathetic joy the peaceful course which this development of thought took in the Church of the middle ages :—and yet we ought to be on our guard against supposing that the subsequent conflict of views was in itself a fault. For the new form which men's interest in the doctrine assumed, simply shows that it was the Reformation that first gave rise to a lively perception of the peculiar importance of this doctrine, as being that on which turns the question whether Christianity is to be a thing of the Church, or only of the sect and of the school ; whether or no Christianity is the broad common basis of a scheme of life which shall be at once religious and moral. The mediæval attempts at a construction of this doctrine were uninfluenced by interests of that sort. This explains at once the fact that divergent and even conflicting hypotheses draw together in order to support and supplement one another, and also the fact that the first attempts have an appearance of fortuitousness of which even the later ones, which stand connected with the development of complete theological systems, do not entirely divest themselves. But it seems to be especially incumbent on us to take together, in the way of direct comparison, the theories of Anselm and Abelard, which were the earliest, chronologically, while their tendencies pointed in exactly opposite directions. If we were not to do so, it would not be possible for us rightly to discern the importance of their views to the theology of the middle ages ; and the conventional and unhistorical over-estimation of Anselm's theory would receive a continuance of support which I think it right to withdraw from it. For the modern pietistic tendency in theology, which in this century is reacting against rationalism, has shown a partiality for the theory of Anselm which is quite misdirected ; and has made that theory appear as if it were a model for everybody—which it was not considered to be, either in the middle ages or in the period of Reformation orthodoxy.¹ And Baur, too, both by his presentation of the theory itself, and by his classification of other

¹ The first who to my knowledge, without any qualification, identified the Protestant view of satisfaction with that of Anselm, is Steinbart [*System der reinen Philosophie oder Glückseligkeitslehre des Christenthums*, 2d Ed. 1780, p. 144], a man who does not in other respects rank among the authorities of "believing" theology, and whose learning, also, is by no means exemplary.

analogous attempts of mediæval theologians, has given countenance to this opinion. Now unless the history of the doctrine of reconciliation is at the very outset to lead us in the interests of a party, we certainly ought not to overlook the fact that, in the middle ages themselves, through the influence of Peter the Lombard, the preference is given to Abelard over Anselm. But further, apart from the fact that they were almost contemporaries,¹ their kinship in this question is manifest both in their common opposition to the theory of a buying of men out of the power of the devil (see above, p. 6), and also in their respective ways of treating the question, which, though at first sight directly antagonistic, yet are not without traces of mutual relationship. For Anselm develops the thought of a reconciliation of God in the death of Christ by means of legal conceptions—Abelard the thought of a reconciliation of men with God, in respect to the moral disposition of the parties towards each other. But Anselm after all transfers the consideration of the relation between man and God to the sphere of moral judgment; and Abelard does not forget to point out that Christ's work in the act of reconciliation has also an important bearing on God. Now if Anselm has the advantage of Abelard in artistic exposition of his theory, the latter certainly excels his elder contemporary in that he elevates the problem into a higher sphere than that of law, and indicates fruitful points of view which the positions of the former never come up to. Finally, it should also be premised that the one comes only indirectly, and the other, as it were, accidentally, to set forth the theory of the atonement: Anselm, namely, in the answer to the question *cur Deus homo*; Abelard, in the Exposition of Paul's Epistle to the Romans. But in connexion with this, again, the characteristic difference shows itself, that fundamentally the doctrine of Anselm has no relation to Scripture, but moves entirely amid considerations of the natural reason,² while on the other hand Abelard's doctrine, on certain sides of it, bears the direct Pauline or Biblical stamp.

Anselm develops the traditional idea of redemption into that

¹ Anselm born 1033, died 1109. Abelard born 1079, died 1142.

² *Cur Deus homo*, ii. 22: sic probas Deum fieri hominem ex necessitate ut etiam si removeantur pauca, quæ de nostris libris posuisti (ut quod de tribus personis Dei et de Adam tetigisti) non solum Judæis sed etiam paganis sola ratione satisfacias.

of atonement, or legal propitiation of God. He controverts the patristic treatment of the death of Christ as a ransom paid to the devil, inasmuch as neither he nor sinful humanity has any right outside of the power and will of God (i. 7, see above, p. 6). Now, while Gregory Nazianzen had already referred to God the payment of the ransom involved in Christ's death, yet without either clearly explaining his idea, or vindicating its necessity, Anselm among the various possible references of the thought of redemption as from sin, from hell, from the power of the devil, from the wrath of God or His will to punish sinners, gives prominence to the last point of view as the decisive one (i. 6). Following this line of thought, he develops the idea that God is reconciled to sinful man, and that His will, which had declared itself for his punishment and condemnation, is changed into a purpose of grace, through the satisfaction rendered to Him by the God-man Christ.¹ This thought is methodically unfolded, so that the *necessity* of such a satisfaction is shown to arise generally from the honour and glory of God, and specially from His justice,—the *possibility* of it is discerned in the peculiar Personality of the God-man, and the *reality* of it is traced to the relation between His death on the one hand, and the value of His Person and voluntary Passion on the other.

As an attribute, the glory of God expressly implies the unconditional subordination of every rational created will to the Divine will and sovereignty. The glory of God is our guarantee that the order of the universe shall issue in the destination of the rational creature to a state of blessedness in the love and contemplation of Him. The glory of God should thus come to be recognised by men as their absolute end, which it is their bounden duty to follow, by fulfilling all the commands and requirements of God. On the other hand, sin, as being the contrary of what we owe to God, involves an infringement of His honour. Accordingly, as in the path of duty blessedness

¹ Simply in order that the admirers of Anselm may not complain of any omission, I here mention his assertion (which is quite unimportant to the theory of satisfaction), that mankind was created in room of the angels that had fallen, and that, when man also fell into sin, not merely was a number corresponding to the fallen angels elected and redeemed through the satisfaction of Christ, but also a few more (ii. 16-18). This supposition is essentially taken from Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, xxii. 1, *Enchiridion*, cap. 29); only the last clause does not belong to him.

would have been attained, so the honour of God makes it necessary that in consideration of its universal sin, the human race should be punished by the withdrawal of blessedness—by condemnation. For in suffering punishment men would, however unwillingly, be brought to acknowledge that they are completely subject to God's will and purpose. Further, the honour of God does not permit Him to forgive sinners out of His pity; for thereby not only would the unrighteous be made equal to the righteous, and all order in His kingdom overthrown, but even unrighteousness itself would be put upon a level with God, if, like Him, exempted from the authority of the law. So that, the government of God being so conditioned in conformity with His honour, the fact of human sin would frustrate the completion of the Divine world-plan, unless by some other means the penal annihilation of men should be rendered unnecessary, and at the same time satisfaction on behalf of sinners given to the honour of God.

Such means must be devised in conformity with the rule of God's *justice*, that "man should or could receive from God absolutely nothing that he had resolved to give him, unless he previously restore to God all that of which he had deprived Him, so that just as God suffered loss by him, even so by him He may receive amends" (i. 23). That is to say, men as sinners having offended the honour of God, their deliverance from the punishment of condemnation depends upon the restoration of that honour. But for such an end it does not suffice that sinners should cease to do despite to the honour of God, and that they henceforward should fulfil their duty towards God in its utmost extent. For the rendering of dutiful service is a matter of course as regards God's honour, and can never therefore compensate Him for previous neglect of this service. To make amends to Him, there is needful rather some performance that shall be well pleasing to Him, and in excess of the requirements of mere duty—something which God could not constitutionally have demanded had the violation of His honour by sin not occurred. But the sinful human race is not able to give this *satisfaction* prescribed by Divine justice. For all the good works, by means of which it might perhaps be sought to make satisfaction for bygone sins, pertain to that service which is already due to the honour of God. But further, since it

would be unlawful to commit even the smallest sin to preserve the whole world, since therefore the smallest sin, not to speak of the whole mass of sins, is of as great moment as the world; since, accordingly, the satisfaction given for sin must excel the whole world in value, man is plainly in no condition for such a task, even irrespective of his sins. But this inability is by no means a reason why God should waive his claim to satisfaction for the sins of men. When regard is had to the firmly maintained purpose of bringing sinful men to the state of blessedness, *satisfaction to God is necessary*—generally, on account of His honour: particularly, on account of His justice.

Since then satisfaction to the honour of God cannot originate with man, God from His side proceeds to render it *possible* in the person of the God-man. If the value of the satisfaction is to exceed in value the whole universe, that is to say, the whole of that which is not God, then the satisfaction must be given by One who Himself is greater than the universe. But only God Himself is greater than all that which is not God; wherefore God alone can give the satisfaction. But inasmuch as, properly speaking, man ought to give it, it can on that account only be achieved by God as Man, or by Him who is at once perfect God and perfect man, without mingling or changing of the two natures in the peculiarity of the person. Now this is realized in the incarnate Word of God.¹

The act in which the God-man *achieves* satisfaction must, in the first place, be a voluntary one; in the second place, it must

¹ The question, *cur Deus homo*, properly speaking, had been already thrown out by Augustine: it was not however answered from the Divine demand for a satisfaction in order to the sinner's restoration to blessedness, but directly from this purpose of making the sinner blessed. Compare *De Civitate Dei*, ix. 15. *Si omnes homines, quamdiu mortales sunt, etiam miseri sint necesse est, quaerendus est medius, qui non solum homo, verum etiam Deus sit, ut homines ex mortali miseria ad beatam immortalitatem hujus medii beata mortalitas interveniendo perducatur.*—In the writings of Augustine the elements of most diverse theories of atonement are to be found; but these are, for the most part, so entangled one with another, and marked off from each other with so little precision, that they can be compared with the theological questions that have been under discussion since the beginning of the middle ages, merely in respect of their subject-matter, but not in respect of their form. On that account I have purposely abstained from undertaking an exposition of them in my work. Were it not that in every way a treatment of Augustine's theology as a whole is an urgent necessity, I might call attention in particular to the fact that the notice taken by Baur of Augustine's ideas respecting the atonement is as unsatisfactory as could well be imagined.

not come under the category of duty ; and finally, it must be such as to embody the full value of the Personality that outweighs the whole universe. Now, that endurance of death for the honour of God, which Christ undertook, meets all these demands. For it was voluntary, and not imposed upon Him by way of duty. Christ, that is to say, as a rational being, was bound to all positive obedience towards God ; but not to die, since as sinless man He was not liable to death. His endurance of death is, however, more than equivalent to that which sin had rendered due. For as it is a greater sin to take away the life of the God-man than are even all the sins that we can think of, so the complete surrender of this life unto death for God's sake is an action which outweighs the sins of all men. So that in it is contained that satisfaction for the sins of men which was necessary to the honour of God. On account of that satisfaction God, out of His pity, forgives those sins, and permits men to attain their final blessedness in accordance with His honour.

The immediate effect of Christ's endurance of death is thus confined to God alone. His satisfaction for the sins of the human race, in removing the obstacle which had hindered God in that work of perfecting mankind which was a necessity to Him (ii. 4), affords the condition by which the glory of God immediately becomes again operative towards the beatification of men. Nevertheless, the prospect of the attainment of this end does not disclose itself at this point without a further condition. This is made clear in a general way by the consideration that if men were to go on sinning, the satisfaction already made for them could not determine God to pardon them the injury done by them to His honour. Accordingly, the act of Christ which, looked at from the side of God, is satisfaction, must also exercise an influence on the side of man, apart from which the satisfaction avails him nothing. This is accomplished in that *the suffering of Christ affords to men an example* how, under all the ills that befall them, they should adhere to that righteous conduct which they owe to God ; in particular, how they should give back to God their own life when occasion requires it. As now we must presuppose that all men do not take this example, it follows that the validity of the satisfaction which Christ made for the whole race of

men restricts itself to those persons who seek conformity to Christ, or who, according to the similitude in Mark iii. 35, are his parents and brethren (ii. 19).

5. Intending to come back upon a peculiar line of thought which is involved in this concluding part of Anselm's treatise, I now apply myself to the elucidation of the *notion of satisfaction* in relation to the two leading ideas of the glory and justice of God. The glory of God expresses the absolute chief end of man in such a way as to imply his destiny to blessedness, to the love and enjoyment of God. On this account the glory of God does not, as appears at first sight, stand in exactly the same relation to the beatification of the obedient as to the damnation of the disobedient. On the contrary, from that point of view it necessarily flows from the nature of God, that He should accomplish even in sinners that destiny of man which He began to work out at his original creation; and if this is not otherwise possible, it must be accomplished by means of the satisfaction to be devised by Himself. Of course God is free: in this sense, that He is not subject to any law, but that whatsoever He wills is right and proper. But this freedom is not independent of the notion of moral propriety, and nothing that is improper, if God were to will it, would on that account become right. Accordingly it lies entirely within Anselm's range of vision, that the idea of God's glory as the ultimate end guarantees the order of the moral world only in so far as the end proposed—blessedness in the enjoyment of God—is common to Him and to men. Furthermore, on the presupposition of human sin, it would be inconsistent with that which is proper or necessary in God, inconsistent therefore with the glory of God, if He were to exercise His pity in an arbitrary way in the forgiveness of sins; because thereby sin would be withdrawn from the law's authority and put upon a level with God.

But now, in so far as satisfaction is thought of as the *only* method which adjusts man's need of forgiveness with God's glory, the idea of satisfaction is not regulated directly by the honour of God, but by His justice. But this conception denotes a narrower and even (as shall be shown) differently conditioned relation of God to men. When Anselm expresses the rule of this justice as implying that man can receive from God his

purposed gift only after he has restored to God what he has taken away from Him, this principle belongs solely to the sphere of *private right*. It is the principle in accordance with which the creditor treats a doubtful debtor who applies for a new loan, in order to secure his individual right to the debt that remains unpaid. Now, private law regulates the exchange of things or of personal services in matters material, in so far as these serve as means towards the respective private ends of individuals; and the persons who have these private ends are quite on an equality in the form of contract which is regulated by private law. Thus, in Anselm's theory we come upon features that are logically incompatible. The relation of men to God cannot be determined at once by the glory of God, in which God is the superior of the latter (as containing within Himself the absolute end of man), and, at the same time, by the justice of God implying a legal co-ordination between man and God. If from the glory of God there follows as consequence only this,—that the forgiveness of sins cannot be granted to men by God without further condition: if, again, the positive condition of satisfaction—as the only possible means towards that end—follows only from the altogether disparate idea of God's justice, then it is conceivable that in relation to the idea of the honour of God there might be discovered yet another condition of the forgiveness of sins than that already mentioned. Thus, Anselm's theory has already broken down.

Still, we must not consider our elucidation of the meaning of the theory which we have entered upon to be exhausted by this. For, though Anselm did not see the inconsistency which we have shown between his deductions from God's justice and the conception of the honour of God, it is still worthy of notice how the relation of private right between God and man which he asserts is modified by the predominance given by him to the view-point of honour. For that rule of private right is applied not to decide a suit about a material claim or individual act of service, but in a question turning on the value of this *personal attribute* of honour. Thus reparation to the injured honour of God is analogically compared to a civil action for damages, or referred to the method whereby the compensation that might perhaps have been got by an action is fixed by mutual understanding of the parties, and given on that

ground. But this only shows more clearly that, by this rule of justice which has been set up, and from which the necessity of satisfaction has been deduced, God is brought down to a co-ordination in point of law with man. For compensation—be it by money payment, be it by spontaneous apology and begging of pardon for the offence committed, be it by pledging one's own life for it—is only conceivable as towards a private person who has been injured in his honour, but to whom one stands in no regular or definite relation of subordination. On the other hand, insult to the majesty of a sovereign, to whom universal obedience is due, cannot be wiped out by satisfaction, but, as a public crime, necessarily involves punishment. As then Anselm, at the outset, sets God over man as Him to whom the absolute end of man looks, and asserts man's universal obligation to obedience, and his liability to punishment in the case of disobedience, he ought to have concluded not merely that sinners are not capable of giving any satisfaction to God, but also that the idea of satisfaction cannot be admitted at all in this relation. Still, while he establishes the necessity of satisfaction by means of the altogether different conception of God's justice, Anselm is certainly quite self-consistent when he argues, that if men were not capable of giving satisfaction, it was in that case competent to another to undertake it. For when a compensation for injury to a private person is fixed by mutual agreement, it also depends upon the pleasure of the parties to determine what arrangement they shall make as to the nature and form of the satisfaction. In this way the injured party may allow that a third party should ask pardon in behalf of the aggressor, or should stake his life in single combat with him. If, then, satisfaction to God is altogether satisfactorily explained by the presupposed private relation between Him and mankind, then Christ's undertaking of that satisfaction is also quite rational. If, on the other hand, the conception of the justice of God is not consistent with that of His honour, then the solution of the problem by the idea of satisfaction is altogether irrational.

The satisfaction of the God-man consists, according to Anselm, in an act which was free, and which went beyond His own proper obligation—the yielding up unto death of His life as a good which outweighs the evil of all sin, being superior to

it in value. Here surely is denoted a moral personal act, and not a mere external material prestation.

On this account Anselm's idea falls away from the analogy of the *Wergeld*, or "blood-money," which, in the German criminal law of his time, is admitted as an expedient for the expiation of murder—an institution by means of which it has been occasionally thought that one might understand the theory in question. But now it becomes clear, that if the giving up of His life unto death is to be regarded as a performance on Christ's part to which He was not in duty bound, then it cannot be conceived as a personal payment, but only as a material one; but, on the other hand, if it is conceived as personal, it must be regarded as a matter of duty. That is to say, we must not stop merely at the superficial impression of the equation—that all men by reason of their sins had become justly liable to death, but Christ as the Sinless One not; that on that account His voluntary dying was an equivalent for the death of sinners that was due, and therefore for the act of satisfaction that was needful. For death is in the case of sinners *ad interitum*, but in the case of Christ *ad honorem Dei* (ii. 11). Christ was not bound to die in the way that sinners are; i.e. He the Sinless One had of course no personal relation to death *ad interitum*, to death as the punishment of sin, in the way that sinners in the consciousness of their guilt have the assurance that to suffer death is for them a penal infliction personally due. If then death as penal has the value of a personal prestation, and if Christ was not bound to undergo it as such—if therefore, in particular, it was impossible that His purpose to die should be determined by *this* idea of death, then His death was no personal payment, but only a material one, and its equivalency to the sinner's punishment is only of a material sort. Whereas if Christ's death is, on the contrary, *ad honorem Dei*, and if it is this purpose that secures to His prestation the character of free will and personality, then it is not an *opus supererogationis* going beyond the sphere of His own obligation to God. For the God-man is constantly bound, even on Anselm's own assumption, to the honour of God: and since He as the sinless one was exempt from death only so far as it is the punishment of sin, then nothing more is required in order to make out the necessity of His death as due to the honour of God,

than a right definition of the duties of Christ flowing from His peculiar vocation. Not only, then, are the premisses which lead to the conception of satisfaction, namely, the honour and the justice of God, in contradiction to each other, but also the marks by which (according to Anselm) we are to recognise in Christ's death the veritable act of satisfaction, namely, personal voluntariness and exemption from the idea of duty, are irreconcilable with each other. ?

This criticism on Anselm's theory receives important confirmation from Anselm himself. For towards the close of his book (ii. 19), where he undertakes to exhibit the efficacy of the death of Christ towards the salvation of man, he exchanges the idea of satisfaction for the altogether different idea of merit. In the doctrine of satisfaction by Christ, there is implicitly contained as a consequence the thought, that, after this previous condition of the forgiveness of sins was fulfilled, God *for His own glory's sake* would lead, in the way of blessedness, those men who follow the example of Christ in His self-surrender to God. But yet, instead of this, Anselm gives expression to the idea that it was proper for God to meet by a reward the great and spontaneous gift of Christ; but that Christ, in His Godhead, not having need of anything, applied this fruit and reward of His death to men, for whose salvation He had become man, but who could not possibly be His followers unless at the outset they had a share in His *merit*. } This representation is not understood in Anselm's sense, if his meaning is assumed to be that Christ's death as satisfactory has taken away sin in general, but as meritorious determines God to impute to individuals the wiping-out of sin that has been accomplished.¹ For we are now speaking of the whole number of followers or kinsmen of Christ, who only, as partakers of His merit, could follow His example: and in this connexion we are not now any longer treating of satisfaction and the Divine honour. Now, by the idea of merit, the importance of Christ towards the end of rendering mankind blessed is enhanced, and a more intimate relation between Him and mankind is indicated than would follow from the doctrine of satisfaction. For in the latter it is laid down that the death of Christ, as an act of satisfaction, relates to God only, and on the other side concerns men merely as an

¹ Hasse: *Anselm von Canterbury*, ii. p. 606.

exemplary act. That the satisfaction made to God should be valid for men, it was not necessary that they should be aware of this meaning of the death of Christ: all that was necessary was their imitation of that self-surrender to God which was perfectly realized in Him. The forgiveness of sins on the part of God, which follows upon the satisfaction made, does not come through the very person who made the satisfaction, but it comes, so to speak, alongside of him. On the other hand, when Christ's action is considered as merit, He is then also shown to be the direct procurer of the forgiveness of sins for men. That is to say, the many individual men who take example by Him are taken together as a whole, under the collective appellation of His spiritual kinsmen, just in so far as by their recognition of Christ's merit towards God they become partakers of the same. It would be impossible for them to pass as His followers, except they previously had *from Him* the forgiveness of sins which He has merited for them. The divergence of these two lines of thought lies here then: that the *satisfaction of Christ* only denotes the condition under which the original motive of the beatification of men—God's honour—again takes effect even in sinners: while, on the contrary, in the *merit of Christ*, the condition of the forgiveness of sins is itself regarded as God's motive thereto. Thus, if the latter line of thought means that the purpose of the forgiveness of sins is called forth only by Christ's action, then it follows that this purpose can also take effect on men only according as the motive that prevails with God is recognised by them as such. This is not the place for a thorough review of the conception of merit in this application; but it does not admit of doubt that in the foregoing train of Anselm's thought it serves to transfer the question from the forensic to the ethical manner of treatment, and at the same time to bring into greater prominence the value of Christ's death *for the Church* than was otherwise possible. And in the feeling of this lies no doubt the reason why Anselm took the point off his doctrine of Christ's satisfaction; and thereby himself indirectly characterized it as unsatisfactory. Although then Boso, Anselm's interlocutor, should be quite correct in saying that Anselm's proof satisfies the demands of Jews and Pagans for a rational explanation of the necessity of God's incarnation, we may still venture as an offset to this opinion to

say, that his explanation of Christ's death as an act of satisfaction that was necessary for God, does not satisfy the Christian reason any better than it satisfies Anselm's own perception of the value of Christ's death for the Church.

6. As even Anselm advances from the thought of the reconciliation of God to the beatification of men in such a way as to substitute the ethical for the juridical manner of treatment, it will therefore be the less surprising that Abelard, who directs his attention principally to the subject of justification and reconciliation of men, confines himself entirely to ethical ideas. He does not, in the first instance, inquire how God's honour and justice can be satisfied with reference at once to the purpose of beatification of mankind, and also to the fact of human sin: his problem is to find how it is that the God-man by His perfect life and by His death has accomplished the justification and reconciliation of believers, who, as sinners, could not have attained this result by previous merits. For he is led to take up this subject by the text, Rom. iii. 22-26. Moreover, since Abelard does not, like Anselm, first go in search of the auxiliary notion of the incarnation, but already possesses it in the recognition of Christ; since, accordingly, he expresses the distinctly Christian view, and does not set himself to find a merely rational concatenation, it follows that the limits of the problem are otherwise defined by him than by the older theologian. Instead of the honour of God and His legal conservation of His rights in relation to man, Abelard holds fast by the love and ethical righteousness of God; and instead of taking into view the whole human race that misses its blessed destiny by reason of sin, he, from the beginning, limits his consideration to "us" who are chosen of God unto blessedness and sooner or later believe in the atonement through the God-man. Thus estimating God's leading purpose of grace by the conditional result of His work of salvation, he gains a balance in the intermediate connexion, the want of which in the theory of Anselm avenges itself by the harsh alternation between the two points of view—the satisfaction and the merit of Christ.

Abelard explains the above-mentioned text of Paul by para-

¹ *Commentariorum super S. Pauli Epistolam ad Romanos libri V.* (Petri Abelardi et Heloise opera. Paris, 1616.)

/ phrasing it in the following way (pp. 548, 549):—Inasmuch as no one can be justified before God by fulfilment of the ceremonial law, God has accordingly by His alliance with human nature in Christ, and by the surrender of Him to suffering and death, given proof of the highest love towards us, and awakens in those who by faith discern, or have in former times waited for this deed of reconciliation, such a degree of love to God and their fellow-men as forms an indissoluble bond of union with God, and constitutes the ground of forgiveness of sins formerly committed.¹ Now Abelard certainly starts the question by what necessity it was that God took this way—the incarnation and death of Christ—for our reconciliation; why it is that He has showed towards us this greater degree of grace, when, as it would appear, He might have been able to forgive us our sins with a less degree of grace without such means (pp. 550, 552). But the solution of this question, and others connected with it, which naturally could not be accomplished in the Commentary, is not to be met with in any of his writings that have come down to us. Only this may be further adverted to, that he incidentally controverts the idea of redemption out of the power of the devil by the death of Christ, not only on the ground that Satan has not acquired any right over mankind which had to be provided for by an equivalent, but also on the ground that redemption by Christ is valid only for *the elect*, who as such could never in any way have been in the devil's power. Since, accordingly, in justification and reconciliation through Christ, it is only this class of men that is treated of, Abelard allows the said operation of the highest love of God to be conditioned by the free reciprocal love of individual believers.

¹ Compare Augustinus de catechizandis rudibus, cap. 4: Quæ major causa est adventus Domini, nisi ut ostenderet Deus dilectionem suam in nobis, quia cum adhuc inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Hoc autem ideo, ut et nos invicem diligamus, et, quemadmodum ille pro nobis animam posuit, sic et nos pro fratribus animam ponamus, et ipsum Deum, quoniam prior dilexit nos et filio suo unico non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit eum, si amare pigebat, saltem nunc redamare non pigeat. Nulla est enim major ad amorem invitatio, quam prævenire amando." For subsequent sins Abelard lays down the usual church-rule, that they are covered by *pœnitentia* and *satisfactio*, inasmuch as the eventual consequence, punishment in hell, is averted by the former, while the purifying pains of purgatory are averted by the latter. Abelard's expression with regard to this (p. 558) has been utterly misunderstood by Baur (as above, pp. 195, 196), because he thinks that this disciplinary sense of *satisfactio* is similar to the use of the idea by Anselm.

Had Abelard set himself to show that the process of reconciliation of men, actually adopted, possesses a necessary character, even for God, then perhaps we might be able to detect a weakness in the chain of thought, in so far as the operation of the love of God remains dependent on a voluntary and contingent requital by the love of men.

Yet, even in this respect, Abelard's view is at no disadvantage when compared with that of Anselm. For, inasmuch as the satisfaction made by Christ to God avails only for those who take example to themselves from Christ's free self-surrender to God, Anselm, too, counts upon the free contingent decision of men, in order to the realization of their re-established happiness. The appearance of dissimilarity between the two in this respect arises merely from the circumstance, that the point referred to falls, with Anselm, into the background in comparison with his elaborate theory of satisfaction, which has reference to God alone ; while the same point immediately comes into notice in connexion with Abelard's simple declaration of the love of God. But Abelard himself suggests to us, by his own view of the matter, that we should regard the free choice which is necessary for personal appropriation of the reconciling act, under the same point of view which he has taken in controverting the combination of redemption with a pretended right of the devil, namely, that Christ has freed only the elect. Herein we have at least a hint of the religious view, that the men who are to be reconciled, although their resolution to love God be free, are yet from the very first the objects of the Divine decree of salvation.

To this, however, we must add the following further line of thought (p. 590) which Abelard links on to the antithesis between Adam and Christ :—"God, by the incarnation of His Son, has brought it to pass that not only His pity but also His justice should through Him come to the aid of sinners, and that what is impossible by reason of our transgression, should be supplied by His righteousness. That is to say, when God caused His Son to become man, He made Him subject to that law which is common to all men. He thus was bound by Divine command to love His neighbour as Himself, and to exercise towards us His loving grace, whether by instruction or by *intercession* for us. Thus by God's command He was

constrained to pray for us (sinners), and especially for those who cling to Him in love. But the highest justice of God demanded that in nothing should His prayer meet with a repulse, since His Godhead did not permit anything in Him, except what it was His duty to will or to do.¹ What was wanting in our *merits* he supplied from His own. And as He was alone in holiness, so was He also alone in procuring the salvation of others." This argument chiefly proves that though the love of God, by awakening counter love in men, is the ground of their justification, yet the justice of God is not without influence on the objects of His grace. For so far as their displays of love arising out of the love of God are imperfect, and therefore unsatisfactory to the justice of God, they are supplemented in the judgment of God by Christ's merit: that is, the value of the atoning work of Christ does not limit itself to the fact that it is the occasion of meritorious works wrought by the elect in return; but it shows its supereminent power herein—that it accompanies the counter works throughout their whole duration, and, by supplementing them, makes their value with God to be possible. That is much more than what Anselm has expressed in the idea of satisfaction to God. The idea of God's justice, which is the dominant one in this connexion, is now also of an ethical and not legal sort—does not stand in opposition to grace, but is subordinated to it; on which account, too, it does not need to be reconciled with the grace (honour) of God as Anselm reconciles it by means of the idea of Christ's satisfaction. But this thought lies beyond Abelard's sphere of vision, because he does not conjecture any obstacle in the way of God's exercise of reconciling love towards His own elect. And not less weighty is the thought which gives a wider import to the work of Christ in accomplishing the reconciliation of believers, than is implied merely in His having by His incarnation and death *been the representative of the love of God towards us*. By His never fruitless intercession for us, who required reconciliation with God and who by means of love are united to Christ, He has at the same time been *our representative before God*. As the mediator

¹ The same thought occurs in another application in Tertullian (*De Penit*: 10), to explain that the intercession of the Church united to Christ is sufficient to restore an excommunicated person.

of our reconciliation He assumes a double function that operates on both parties. Anselm, indeed, also indicates such a function, inasmuch as he recognises in Christ's surrender of life for the honour of God, at once the value of satisfaction to God and that of example for men. But the relation of the two parts of the double function to each other is expressed by the two theologians in opposite ways. The part of Christ's work that relates to God is ranked by Anselm above that which relates to men. But, in Abelard's view, God's love towards men as displayed in Christ—in His incarnation, in His teaching, in His passion—is the leading thought upon which depends the effect of the intercession directed to God by the incarnate God. Further, these *momenta* have in Abelard's thoughts a more harmonious relation to each other than is the case with Anselm. In the twofold function of Christ towards the two parties, Abelard brings together ethical effects. Anselm, if we consider simply his proper intention of working out the idea of satisfaction, and not his divergence into the idea of merit, brings together a legal effect upon God and an ethical one upon men. Further, while, according to Anselm, the satisfaction to God is valid for the whole sinful race, whereas the example of Christ is only efficacious upon his "kinsfolk," Abelard's view of Christ's twofold work fixes our attention exclusively upon the number of the elect. Lastly, the following advantage of Abelard's view over that of Anselm is also worthy of notice: the former in establishing the idea of reconciliation gives value to the whole life, doing and suffering, of Christ, just in so far as all these are comprehended in His duty to God; while the latter, on the other hand, takes into account, towards the satisfaction and example of Christ, only the *opus supererogationis* of His death, which was not a matter of duty.

To be sure, all Abelard's positions, as they lie before us, are merely assertions, supported but slightly on exegetical grounds, not at all made good by necessary presuppositions concerning God's nature and will, and concerning the nature, destiny, and actual condition of man. In point of form his theses come far behind the theory of Anselm, although Abelard also had the ability to give an artistic dialectical exposition to his apprehension of the matter. But as Anselm diverged from his elaborated conception of Christ's satisfaction into the idea of Christ's

merit, without defining or establishing that more accurately, it seems to me impossible to avoid the opinion that he himself characterized his skilfully wrought work as unsatisfying, even before it was completed. And in that case his suggestions about the merit of Christ and its results, the meaning of which I have ascertained above (p. 33), are at most on a level with Abelard's lucubrations; for Anselm, too, by them places the saving work of Christ in the sphere of moral relations. But we do not need a complete definition of the idea of merit in order to see clearly that the love of God gives a much richer moral motive towards the beatification of men, than does the merit of Christ. In like manner, that intercession, the prevalence of which with God is founded upon the Divine Nature of Christ, is a guarantee that raises the salvation of men to a far higher degree of security than does a merit which God is pleased to accept as such. In fine, if we for the present leave out of account the circumstance that both determine the appropriation of the saving work of Christ in the Catholic way, by making practical love or imitation of Christ's righteousness serve to that end, it appears that the advantage in respect of typical character is to be ascribed to Abelard's view, and not to that of Anselm.

CHAPTER II.

THE IDEAS OF CHRIST'S SATISFACTION AND MERIT ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS AND JOHN DUNS SCOTUS.

7. THE special result of mediæval theology as regards the problem of reconciliation between God and men, is found only in one aspect of it in the line which Anselm and Abelard deliberately entered upon. The effect of the death of Christ upon men—which they both virtually unite in describing as counter-love, and as imitation of His surrender of Himself to God—is laid down in the Catholic doctrine of justification, with the aim of conserving, in the Divine work of grace, the claims of moral freedom and of human spontaneity. But, when the idea of reconciliation is followed out in its reference to God, the thought of Christ's merit, which Anselm and Abelard had employed only in a cursory way, becomes the predominant one. It is manifest that Anselm was not distinctly aware of the diversity of that thought from the idea of satisfaction, for he exchanges the one for the other; still, the rupture with his own premisses at the critical point of his theory indicates a feeling on his part that the idea of Christ's merit would be a more serviceable one than that of His satisfaction. Although, therefore, the latter idea was taken up by Hugo of St. Victor,¹ on the authority of Anselm, it is highly significant for the culminating point or scientific acme which the scholastic theology reached in Duns, that Peter Lombard, in his *Book of Sentences*, the leading manual of that time, exhibits the death of Christ under all possible categories, except that of a satisfaction to God, while he attributes the chief importance to the idea of merit. This procedure is, of course, quite in accordance with the fact that Anselm could not be reckoned among the fathers of Church doctrine; and certainly, therefore, does not imply the intention

¹ Compare Baur *ut supra*, p. 207.

of combating his theory. Yet, if the use of the idea of satisfaction was not suppressed by the ascendancy of the Lombard's text-book, at least that of the idea of Christ's merit was favoured thereby. Doubtless, it is in consequence of this that Thomas felt himself led to distinguish the two ideas. But Duns, in methodically perfecting that distinction, declared for the idea of merit as against that of satisfaction, which still has the preponderance with Thomas. This relation of succession between the two men suggests the convenience of considering their teachings in conjunction.

The very attitude which the Lombard assumed towards the problem secured for its treatment the utmost possible scientific freedom (see above, p. 22). In the third book of the *Sentences* (*Dist.* xviii. xix.), side by side with the point of view of merit whereby Christ has earned grace for us, he also gives a place to the thought of redemption from the power of the devil. The latter head was recommended to him by the unanimous testimony of all Christian antiquity, the former by the authorities of Augustine and Ambrose. In his representation of the transaction with the devil, he does not shrink from stating, without any circumlocution, the intentional fraud practised upon him, in the death of Christ. This, however, is merely by the way. The Lombard's main view is that redemption from the devil depends upon liberation from sin; but this he carries back in Abelard's style to the idea that Christ's death, as a proof of God's love, justifies by awakening the counter-love which excludes sin. This is only the one side of Abelard's view, which was foreshadowed by Augustine; the other side of it has exercised no influence on the doctrinal tradition of the Church. In direct connexion with Augustine too (*De Trinitate*, xiii. 11. 16), he repudiates the representation as if Christ by His death appeased the wrath of the Father, who was thereby first induced to love us. On the contrary, he continues, God had loved us before from all eternity; and since sins were hostile to God, the suitable way was to forgive this enmity (Christ covering the sins from God's notice), and to reconcile the sinner by justification. But in connexion with this the Lombard hints, at one time, that Christ in His death was the sufficient sacrifice for our reconciliation, at another time that He bore in Himself the punishment of our sins—certainly without adding any explana-

tion of the way in which these thoughts are connected. Christ's position as Mediator he refers back to the fact that He was of human nature; but then that only means that His suffering and dying could not be predicated of His Divine nature. For the rest, he makes it emphatic that Christ, by His righteousness, stood just in as close a relation to God as that in which He stood to men by His suffering and dying; and declares that the reconciliation of men with God would not have been possible through Him, had it not been for the union between the Divine and human natures in Him. Here the Lombard takes up a line adopted by Anselm only because he is following Augustine. For he again abandons the former, in order to affirm with Augustine (*De Trin.* xiii. 10) that some other method for our deliverance from sin than that by the death of Christ might also have been possible to God, but that a better method cannot be supposed to exist (*Dist.* xx.). He makes use of this proposition, indeed, only again to throw light upon the transaction with the devil, by showing that it was planned and determined not merely by Divine power but also by Divine justice; the thought, however, has a more extended influence on the development of the doctrine in the middle ages.

In common with the Lombard, Thomas Aquinas recognises all these points of view for the interpretation of the death of Christ, and besides these, that of satisfaction. But in their distribution he distinguishes their relative importance, and particularly presents some as mere corollaries of others. In the first rank, according to him, stands the value of the suffering of Christ in relation to God as merit, as satisfaction, as sacrifice, as redemption-price (*Summa Theologiæ*, Pars iii. Qu. 48, art. 1-4). And, after that, he treats of the relation of Christ's death to men and to the devil. With regard to its effect upon men, he repeats the dictum of Abelard and the Lombard, that the death of Christ stirred men up to that love which works the forgiveness of sins; but at the same time he makes this effect dependent upon the fact that the death of Christ is the redemption price paid to God (Qu. 49, art. 1). But the effect upon the devil he, in common with the Lombard, describes as the indirect consequence of the forgiveness of sins which is connected with Christ's death (art. 2), without prosecuting further (as the other did) the mythico-dramatic exposition of the

thought. But further, he brings back the thought of the redemption price to that of satisfaction to God, and that of sacrifice to the idea of merit. With regard to *redemption*, that is, he says that in so far as the Passion of Christ was satisfaction for the sins and punishment of the human race, it was the price, *as it were*, whereby we have been released from that double obligation (Qu. 48, art. 4). But Christ's quality as a sacrifice in which God's hatred against sinners is appeased and He is reconciled to men, depends upon the freeness of the love and obedience of Christ; which last, however, rank as specific tokens of His merit towards God (Qu. 47, art. 2; Qu. 48, art. 3; Qu. 49, art. 4). Thus, in the end, Thomas has to deal only with the two heads of satisfaction and merit.

8. The application of these notions to the relation of Christ's Passion to God depends quite essentially upon the general definition of the idea of God. However obvious this maxim may seem to be, it is by no means made use of by the recognised masters of historico-critical analysis of theological systems—Baur and Schneckenburger. Baur's *History of the Christian Doctrine of the Atonement*, leaving out of account its nihilistic conclusion, would have been much more instructive than it is if the course of his delineation had been accompanied by constant attention to developments or changes in the doctrine of God. Schneckenburger's labours towards an understanding of the Lutheran and Reformed doctrines (though, in other respects, they bear evidence of an incomparably greater historical sense and more loving devotion to the subject of investigation than all Baur's contributions to the history of dogma put together) still suffer from the erroneous notion (shared as regards the matter by Baur also¹), that the root of systems is to be found only in subjective dispositions, needs, and aspirations. While Schweizer would, at least, have the deterministic acceptance of the idea of God to be recognised as the principle of the Reformed system of doctrine, this element in the Reformed theology has, according to Schneckenburger, only the importance of a subsidiary notion, by means of which the practical impulse of the Reformed subjectivity guards itself against deviation into

¹ *Ueber Princip und Charakter des Lehrbegriffs der reformirten Kirche.—Theol. Jahrb.*, 1847, pp. 309–390. "The fundamental principle of Protestantism is the self-consciousness of the subject at peace as regards its eternal welfare" (p. 376).

a false feeling of freedom : while, according to Baur, it denotes even a corruption and enfeeblement of the common Protestant principle of subjectivity. Still more distinctly does Schneckenburger's method display itself in the criticism of Socinianism, when he explains its conception of God merely as the reflection of the moral standpoint of this system, in which the human will is paramount.¹ A man so acute, doubtless, laid hold of this method in order to secure the separation of the theological systems which found religious parties from the construction of philosophical knowledge, and to guard against that intellectualistic misapprehension of the theological problem—that confusion of it with the problem of philosophy—which was becoming so prevalent in his time. Yet, without intending it, he has thereby promoted that opinion of Feuerbach concerning religion—that the idea of God is in all cases only the fantastic image of the subjective self-consciousness of man, and of the subjective needs of man. If, now, we are to avoid all appearance of this ; if, too, the history of theology and of the theologically distinct tendencies and parties in the Church is not to be resolved into an incoherent atomistic succession of impulses which have their origin and method only in subjectivity—nay more, if, in the understanding of the history of theology, a pledge is to be given that its individual systematic products, particularly in so far as they lead to the formation of parties, shall be ranked in subordination to the purpose and development of the religious commonwealth—then we must count upon the tradition of the idea of God (which of course does not necessarily exclude the possibility of an eventual change in it) as upon a decisive factor which all along will stand *en rapport* with the subjective needs and dispositions of the period when these press forward into activity. The aspects of theological knowledge which lie before us in history will be preserved in all their separateness from philosophical knowledge, if we give heed to the religious need that lies at their root. But at the same time the claim to objective truth on behalf of the products of theological knowledge will be secured, and the coincidence of historical criticism upon theological systems with Feuerbach's misapprehension of religion will be prevented, if we establish it as a fixed position, that we are never in any case conscious

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¹ *Vorlesungen über die kleineren protestantischen Kirchenparteien* (p. 40).

of a subjectively religious disposition as active towards the production of particular theological knowledge, except under the influence of the previously established idea of God, which has been handed down in the Church, and gives form, and measure, and aim to all our discussions.

Thus it is certain, for example, that in all forms of the doctrine of reconciliation, the common Christian subjective craving after assurance of the forgiveness of sins, as also of growing sanctification, is at work; but it would be perfectly absurd if on this account one were to describe this craving, the feeling of which *conditions* our subjective persuasion of the value of reconciliation, as the *sufficient cause* of the doctrine and of the satisfaction of the craving which is implied in the truth of that doctrine. A confusion between condition and cause—the sophistry of which is obvious to every one when the relation between the craving after sustenance of the bodily life, and the means or causes of its satisfaction are spoken of—is equally sophistical when it is extended to the facts of our spiritual life. It is the conception of God current in the tradition of the Christian Church, which constitutes the ground of the form of the Christian doctrine of reconciliation:—the conception, namely, in which the Divine purpose of forgiveness, or also of sanctification of believers, is placed in connexion with the means suitable thereto—to wit, the peculiar personality of Christ at the least, and its twofold relation to God and man. Now it will certainly be possible to make out that the particular theological interpretation of the contents of that Divine purpose, and of the standard according to which the person and work of Christ are subservient to it, will be modified just in proportion as the feeling of the evil of sin appears to be slighter or deeper. But this change never appears in history in such a way as to be plainly recognisable as the previous occasion of alteration in the idea of God; nay, rather even the converse assumption may be made—that the sense of the greater or less evil of sin is regulated by the higher or lower estimate of God's authority. The latter will have to be regarded as the rule, at all events in those cases where that subjective feeling comes so definitely into consciousness as to admit of being expressed at all. So much the more may we venture to assert that although the genetic occasion of a train of theological thinking may indeed

be afforded by a peculiar subjective disposition of the theologian, yet the definite idea of God always contains in itself the leading ground and standard of the knowledge that actually results.

The doctrines of Thomas and of Duns concerning God are, accordingly, the standards to which their respective doctrines of reconciliation must be referred. Both start from the tradition of the pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite; and both modify it by means of the conception of the relative will founded upon the Aristotelian notion of final cause.¹ When that abstraction from the world, which passes with the Areopagite as the right notion of God, dominates the structure of our doctrines concerning God, the absolute transcendence of God over the world is thereby secured, yet only in an essentially negative way. Moreover, that indeterminate Being which had to be regarded as in itself indifferent towards the world, is at the same time described as the Spirit which takes knowledge of itself, and in itself knows every other possible entity, and as the will which causes another entity to arise out of nothing; and thus the world, its existence, and arrangement, are derived from God. But then, as this side of the idea of God, which regards the world, is dominated by His fundamental transcendence, the consequence is that in the works of both of these schoolmen God's relation to the world, and to all that which in the world is ordered by God, bears the aspect of contingency. In carrying out this thought, however, they differ from each other in the degree of boldness and comprehensiveness with which that contingency in the ordering of the world is asserted.

Thomas subordinates the whole extent and connexion of these purposes which, when realized, form the universe, to the (good pleasure of God, who must be the original object of His own volition (*Summa Theol.* P. i. Qu. 19, art. 1, 2). God wills Himself to be the ultimate end; everything else He wills as means to that end. But on this account the whole existence and course of the world, which God wills, is to Him nothing necessary. For means to an end are necessary objects of His will only when it is seen that there is no alternative—that without the particular means the end cannot be realized

¹ Compare my *Geschichtl. Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott*, Art. 1., *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* Bd. x. (1865) pp. 277-318.

(art. 3). But for Thomas it is no matter for investigation whether, perhaps, in the course of the world, such *conditiones sine quibus non* must be recognised; for it is at the very outset a fixed condition with him that God, who would be perfect even if there were no world, whose good pleasure is *immeasurably* above all the ends proposed in the world (Qu. 25, art. 5), and to whom no perfection accrues from the world, brings nothing to pass in the world, and in the course thereof that were necessary and not merely contingent to Him. God's absolute freedom, according to Thomas, shows itself hereby, that He is in a position to do something different from what He actually does; and this (negative) independence of God in relation to the world is his highest point of view, and had to be maintained as such, out of deference to the Areopagite. In this way the incarnation of the Logos, as well as the reconciliation through the death of the God-man, have in the world's course the significance of only relatively necessary events. It is only a deceptive appearance¹ when Thomas would fain exclude God's incarnation from the region of His free choice. It is quite true that he characterizes that act as befitting (*conveniens*) to God, just as thinking befits a rational creature. According to Thomas, it befits the highest goodness of God that He should unite Himself with the creature in the highest way (P. iii. Qu. 1, art. 1). But he limits the purpose of the incarnation to the taking away of sin—but sin is contingent in the world, and thus also the means used by God for taking it away can only be contingent. In this view he also denies that the incarnation was necessary for the taking away of sin as a *conditio sine qua non*, and concedes to it in this regard only the appropriateness of an expedient, *per quod melius et convenientius pervenitur ad finem* (art. 2). Finally, on the question whether the incarnation would have taken place if Adam had not sinned, Thomas decides against this hypothesis—founding his conclusion on Scripture—and while he admits that God had the *power* to become man even if sin had not entered, he thereby at once excludes the idea that this relation had any necessary foundation in the being of God

¹ By which Baur has allowed himself to be misled (*Veröhnungslehre*, p. 267: *Trinitätslehre*, ii. p. 789), completely ignoring that aspect of Thomas's conception of God which is divergent from the Areopagite's view, and amounts to arbitrary freedom. Cp. *Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie*, x. p. 297, f.

(art. 3). In accordance with this Thomas comes to the conclusion also that the giving of satisfaction to God by the death of Christ is to be considered only as the most suitable course, but not as the course which, to the exclusion of all others, was necessary; inasmuch as the very justice of God, in relation to which Christ's satisfaction is necessary, is no unchangeable and essential characteristic of God, but is simply dependent on His free will. A judge indeed who has to punish the fault that has been committed against another, cannot rightly let a crime pass unpunished. But God *has no superiors*; on the contrary, is the chief and general good of the whole universe; on which account He would commit no unrighteousness if He were to forgive a fault committed against Himself; just as a man acts mercifully but not unjustly, when, without receiving satisfaction, he forgives a fault committed against himself (Qu. 46, arts. 1, 2).

From this view of Christ's satisfaction it will be seen that though Thomas in words attributes the force of a *punishment* to the death of Christ, and sees in it the fulfilment of the law of the old covenant (Qu. 47, arts. 2, 3), he yet does this only in a superficial and unconcerned manner, and does not come near the sense in which the Reformers assert both these positions. For the doctrine that God's good pleasure is immeasurably superior to all the institutions of the universe excludes the Reformers' assumption that the public institution of the moral law (for the honour of which Christ had to endure the punishment that had been merited by men, and accomplish the fulfilment that had been obligatory on them) corresponds just as fully to the *Being of God* as to the destiny of men to become images of God. But, by laying the chief emphasis on God's arbitrary will as the point of view from which the value of Christ's satisfaction ought to be regarded, Thomas puts himself also in opposition to Anselm; and the teachings of these two, therefore, although nominally the same, are really quite different. The thought in favour of which Thomas pronounces, that God, since He has no superior, could have forgiven sins even without satisfaction out of His pity, is expressed in Anselm's work by Boso. Hereupon Anselm admits that God is subject to no law, or rather that everything right and proper is so because God wills it; thus letting us see that this thought, towards

which the subsequent theology of the middle ages gravitates more and more strongly, had already in his time the prepossessions of men in its favour. But for the case before him he sets about such a limitation of the fundamental proposition as takes away its meaning. He says (*Cur Deus Homo*, I. 12) that God's freedom of will and God's goodness are apprehended in a reasonable way only when they are not placed in conflict with God's dignity. That freedom has reference only to that which is profitable and seemly, and that goodness would cease if it were to do anything unworthy of God. The dictum that a thing is right because God wills it, is not to be so understood as if in the case of God willing something improper it would therefore be right. God, for example, cannot will to lie. Thus the righteousness of what is willed by God does not extend itself to that which would in any case be unbecoming in God. And in this last category Anselm places the idea of an arbitrary forgiveness of sin. Thus satisfaction is regarded by him as a condition of the forgiveness of sins which is necessary on account of the nature of God. Against this line of thought the authority of the Lombard (p. 43) had already pronounced; but the thought of God's arbitrary freedom is expressed still more strongly by Duns than by Thomas, and is used as a thorough-going principle for criticism of the doctrine of reconciliation.

Duns (*Quæstiones in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum*) at the outset conceives of God as a Will that works contingently. For as he presupposes that there is such a thing as contingency in the world, his presupposition would be null if it were to be assumed that God works necessarily and in a predetermined direction. Thus God in all cases works only contingently, and, therefore, as Will. Wherefore God has ideas, anticipatory knowledge of His own operations, only on the ground of His willing; and on that account He thinks even of that which is opposite to the actual course of the world as possible for Himself and His working. We ought not to seek in God for a ground or motive of the direction which the will of God actually takes, or any explanation why a world the very opposite of that which actually exists has not been brought into being. Even the contents of the law prescribed to men are entirely dependent on the arbitrary will of God, and have no necessary standard in God Himself. Accordingly the affirmative answer

of Duns (in opposition to Thomas) upon the question whether God would have become man even if sin had not entered the world, does not rise beyond the sphere where the arbitrary choice of God has its place,¹ and is very far from expressing any necessary relation between God and mankind. Finally the idea of merit (which is preferred by Duns) serves also to place the reconciliation connected with the death of Christ in the light of the full freeness of God's choice. Indeed it is just in this highly consistent development of the conception of God peculiar to the Catholic middle ages that a tendency is disclosed which will ultimately broadly deny the reality of Christ's divinity as well as the importance of the idea of reconciliation.

9. To that arbitrary choice of God, to which Thomas subordinated his view of the doctrine of reconciliation, corresponds in a certain measure the arbitrariness of Thomas himself, with which he decides between two modes of viewing sin, which are referred to by him, in order, by means of that decision, to establish the one presupposition that is requisite to the conception of satisfaction by the death of Christ. "In sin are comprised two things: on the one hand it implies departure from the unchanging and infinite good, wherefore sin is in one aspect infinite; on the other hand, it implies a disorderly devotion to the changeable good, and in this respect sin is finite, especially because even the devotion itself is something finite. For the acts of the creature as such cannot be infinite" (P. ii. Prima, Qu. 87, art. 4). Now, under the last point of view, it would certainly be impossible to show that satisfaction is a necessary condition of the forgiveness of sins, or at least it would be impossible to show that there was need for the God-man in order to give it. This will appear in the system of Duns, who judges sin to be a finite thing, and rejects the other view for reasons given. But Thomas declares for assuming the infinite import of sin, because to him the truth of the satisfaction by the God-man was a thing decided, and the presupposition had to be established in a way suitable to this proposed consequence. His declaration, therefore, is made thus vaguely, —that sin as committed against God has a "sort of" infinitude according to the infinitude of the Divine Majesty; for certainly an offence is all the graver according to the greatness of him

¹ Compare Baur, *Trinitätslehre*, ii. p. 834, f.

against whom it is committed (P. iii. qu. 1, art. 2). The "sort of" infinitude (*quædam infinitas*) of sin appears all the more clearly to be surreptitiously introduced into this argument, because it is not reconciled with the fact recognised by Thomas himself, that sin as an act, *i.e.* in its essence, and at all events in a more important respect, is finite. The infinitude of sin in respect of its merit or demerit, as assumed by Thomas, does not prevent him from holding that as *offence against God* it is finite, or at least is not pronounced to be of the highest conceivable gravity. This, of course, results from the relation of indifference which is assumed to subsist between God and the moral order of the world. In other words, if it is acknowledged that God can forgive sins without anything further, because He, as the highest good, is subordinated to no universal ordinance of law, and thus is justified like any private individual in forgiving an offence committed against Him (p. 49), then there is attributed to sin, even as it comes into collision with the infinite God, the character not of crime against the public order of morally-ordered society, but only of violation of the personal rights of a subject of higher rank, which violation can, at the option of the latter, be withdrawn from the sphere of public litigation. The sin which, as *injury to God*, has the "sort of" infinitude which immeasurably transcends the idea of crime, nevertheless as *injury* to God, who can at pleasure overlook it, or also can suffer it to be wiped out by means of a satisfaction to be appointed by Himself, comes far short of the idea of crime.

Now, Thomas assumes that, with a view to the forgiveness of sins, God chooses the latter procedure as the more suitable. He decrees to grant to the sinful human race the forgiveness of sins only on condition that satisfaction be given Him for the injury He has endured—which satisfaction must consist of something which the injured person loves as much as and more than he hates the injury (Qu. 48, art. 2). Now, Thomas distinguishes between the possible degrees of congruity between a satisfaction and the judgment of God. "If the satisfaction is to be complete, *i.e.* suitable (*condigna*), by reason of a 'certain' adaptation for compensation of the fault committed, then the satisfaction offered by a mere man is not sufficient, inasmuch as the whole of human nature is destroyed by sin, and the goodness of one person, or of several, cannot make up for the

injury which has been caused by the whole race. For this, a prestation of infinite efficacy alone suffices, *i.e.* such a one as only the God-man can accomplish. But, on the other hand, if satisfaction of *an imperfect* sort were to be sufficient through the acceptance (*acceptatio*) of him who is satisfied with it, notwithstanding its insufficiency in itself, then would the satisfaction of a mere man be adequate" (Qu. 1, art. 2). Thomas; however, in deciding, just as Anselm does, in favour of the validity of the perfect sort of satisfaction as given by the God-man, did not bar the way to that opposite view which we see Duns afterwards adopting. In this distinction, it fares with Thomas just in that other one regarding the infinite or finite gravity of sin. Precisely as by his decision in favour of the latter he by no means renders the former altogether untenable; so in like manner his recognition of the complete satisfaction which must be given by the God-man, but which even yet includes in itself only a "sort of" compensation for the fault committed against God, leaves open the conclusion that here too must come in the "acceptation" of God, wherein he overlooks the deficiency wherein the satisfaction falls short of perfection; that is to say, the two sorts of satisfaction distinguished by Thomas have no fixed mark of distinction between them.

While Thomas in these premisses to his doctrine follows in Anselm's track indeed, and yet in the above-stated vague declarations regarding the idea of sin and of satisfaction in general, abandons the close dialectical style of his predecessor, thus inviting and preparing the way for the loosening of all the joints of the doctrine by Duns, his successor, he in so doing brings out on one point of divergence from Anselm a thought which is of great importance. It is this: the God-man being considered to be, in virtue of the infinitude of His Divine Nature, properly qualified to give such a satisfaction as would be a full compensation for infinite sin, Anselm had held it was sufficient that He should be at the same time designated as member of the human race, so as to represent that race in His atoning passion. The value of His work for man thus arose, according to this view, only from His Divine nature, which separated Him from men, and was the ground of His sinlessness and of the specific value to God of His death. So that in order to explain the operation of this satisfaction *for men*, Anselm had to resort at one time to the thought that the God-

man had thereby given the example of surrender to God; at another time, to a substitution of the idea of merit in room of that of satisfaction (p. 33). Thomas escapes these difficulties by at once designating the God-man, both in so far as He gives satisfaction and in so far as He acquires merit, as *the Head of the human race that is to be renewed*, i.e. *of the Church*.¹ "As a natural body is a unity, so is the Church, the mystical body of Christ, reckoned along with Christ her Head as one Person" (Qu. 49, art. 1; Qu. 48, art. 1). By this definition of the Person of Christ as the subject of the expiatory Passion, it becomes possible to comprehend in one act the double efficacy of that passion towards God and towards men.

10. Complete satisfaction for the injury to God implied in the sin of the human race is thus given, according to Thomas, by the suffering and death of the God-man. This Person does not merely belong to the human race in virtue of His nature; even before His exaltation He was already also the ruling Head of the Church—of that portion of the human race upon which the Divine forgiveness of sins actually comes to take effect. This Person possesses, at the same time, in His Godhead that infinite value which counterweighs or rather overweighs the demerit of sin, although the Godhead of Christ as being incapable of suffering does not directly take part in His Passion (Qu. 46, art. 12). But it is not merely on this estimate of the value of His Person, it is also on the motive which led Christ to endure suffering, on His love and obedience, and finally, also on the extent of the pain endured by Him that Thomas grounds the expiatory work of Christ (Qu. 48, art. 2). Thus Thomas is in this matter essentially at one with Anselm (p. 28). Nor is there any surprising innovation in the assertion made by Thomas that Christ's Passion was *non solum sufficiens sed etiam superabundans satisfactio pro peccatis humani generis*. Rather this follows as a necessary consequence from the accessories of the idea of satisfaction, and of the application of that idea to Christ. For if satisfaction implies

¹ In this he follows St. Bernard, *Tractatus contra errores Abaelardi*, cap. vi. 15. Si unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt (2 Cor. v. 14), ut videlicet satisfactio unius omnibus imputetur, sicut omnium peccata unus ille portavit, nec alter jam inveniatur qui forefecit, alter, qui satisfecit, quia caput et corpus unus est Christus. Satisfecit ergo caput pro membris, corpus pro visceribus suis.

the giving of such a thing as the injured party loves as much as or even more than he hates the injury, as Thomas says; and if the passion of the God-man is fitted to give satisfaction to God because it outweighs the evil of sin, as Anselm says, then it follows very naturally that the required perfection of that satisfaction evinces itself not merely in a "sort of" compensation of the injury done, but also in an excess of God's complacency over His displeasure on account of sin. This becomes clear, according to the premisses of Thomas, from the circumstance that Christ's Person (by virtue of His Godhead), and the love and obedience shown by Him, possess a really infinite value, while only a "sort of" infinity is attributed to sin. It should not, however, be overlooked that a modification upon Anselm's view is, after all, involved in the doctrine of the superabundance of Christ's satisfaction, which is laid down for the first time by Thomas. For Thomas expressly says that the *voluntariness* of Christ's Passion rendered to God more than would have been needed as compensation for all sins. But Anselm had given prominence to this very circumstance as just the condition of the equivalence of that satisfaction. Now, Thomas in this way succeeds in keeping quite clear of an inconsistency in which Anselm got involved. It has already been pointed out (p. 32) that Anselm connects Christ's satisfaction with His Passion in so far as that was personally spontaneous, and in so far as it was not a matter of duty; but that either the personally spontaneous character of the action implies its obligatoriness, or the circumstance of its not having been a matter of duty, excludes its personal value. But Thomas proceeds with logical consistency; for in any satisfaction whatever he counts only upon *an equivalence of material value*, thus recognising in the voluntariness of Christ's Passion (which was not matter of duty) something in excess of the satisfaction which would have been equivalent. But now the idea of satisfaction has really its natural force only when it bears the stamp of equivalence. When this is excluded in the particular instance before us by the assertion of Christ's *satisfactio superabundans*, the circumstance proves that the idea of satisfaction does not occupy any fixed position at all amongst the various aspects of Christ's death which were brought into comparison with each other. I refer back to a criticism which has

already been made upon the applicability of the idea *à propos* of the theory of Anselm (p. 30), and now give prominence only to the fact that the lawfulness and regularity of God's procedure with a view to the forgiveness of sins, though seemingly arrived at by means of that idea, are traversed at every point by the premisses of Thomas. Thomas, it is true, like Anselm, traces the demand for satisfaction on account of injury caused by sin to the relation which is assumed to exist between God and man as private parties; but then Thomas admits (what Anselm had repudiated) that God might have forgiven injuries even without receiving satisfaction. Now, even Thomas is concerned to prove a perfect satisfaction, the adequacy of which to the injury should be grounded on the nature of the thing; but inasmuch as he does not venture to affirm more than "a sort of" equivalence in these, he makes out no fixed distinction between perfect and imperfect satisfaction (p. 53); and hence also his assertion of the perfection of Christ's satisfaction leaves us to infer that its deficiency is to be supplemented by the assertion of God's arbitrary acceptance, which, of course, is an element in the imperfect sort of satisfaction. Thomas, to be sure, does not avow this as his doctrine; but, on the other hand, the unsuitableness of the idea of satisfaction to the end proposed is involuntarily admitted in his recognition of superabundant satisfaction founded upon the voluntariness of Christ's work. In all these combinations of ideas there betrays itself a hesitancy in carrying out the legal manner of viewing the subject which is intended in the idea of satisfaction. From this, as I think, we can see an inner longing on the part of Thomas to maintain regard to the justice of God in the forgiveness of sins by some other method.

This he now undertakes to accomplish by applying to the life and passion of Christ the idea of *merit*—an idea laid to his hand by tradition. "If any one," says he, "out of a just will deprive himself of that which he was entitled to possess, he then deserves that something should be superadded to him as the reward of his just will (*justæ voluntatis*). But Christ in His Passion humbled Himself beneath His dignity, wherefore by His Passion He merited exaltation" (Qu. 49, art. 6). But "Christ received grace not so much as a single person, but rather as Head of the Church, in order that grace might be extended

from Him to His members. Every one standing in grace who suffers for righteousness, merits salvation for himself. Wherefore, Christ by His Passion merited salvation not merely for Himself, but also for all His members. Christ from the moment of His conception merited for us everlasting salvation; but on our side there were obstacles in the way which hindered the efficacy upon us of His first merits, wherefore, in order to remove these, it was necessary that Christ should suffer" (Qu. 48, art. 1). To this we must now append the general explication of the idea of merit taken from P. ii. Prima, Qu. 114. "Merit and reward (*merces*) are interchangeable ideas founded on the idea of justice. As in justice (*simpliciter justitia*) the price is according to the goods received, so the reward is according to the work. But this rule is valid only for the relation between such persons as stand over against each other with equal rights; on the other hand justice is modified (*justitia secundum quid*) where this is not the case. Between parties of equal rights, therefore, the relation of merit and reward holds good simply and unconditionally; but between parties who are not of equal rights this relation holds good only on condition that regard be had to justice, as in the case of a slave who acquires merit towards his master, or a son (who by Roman law is subject to the *patria potestas* in the family) towards his father. Now, between God and man there subsists the greatest, yea, infinite dissimilarity; therefore, between the two no right holds good in the proper sense of the word, but only according to a certain measure, so far as each works after his own fashion. Now the manner and measure of man's strength both come from God; and thus merit of man towards God is possible only *on condition of a Divine arrangement*, so that man by his efforts obtains as reward that for which God has given him strength. So that in as far as man on this presupposition acts freely and to the glory of God, his works have that which we mean by merit; but God assigns their reward to them not as if He were man's debtor, but, so to speak, as debtor to Himself, in order that His own arrangement may be carried out" (art. 1). Now the special point under consideration is, the manner in which eternal life is gained. The merit which earns this as a reward is only possible under the previous assumption that the free will (or love as its principal power) shall be operative in accordance with the

previously received grace of the Holy Ghost. Only under this condition does the "condignity" of merit find any place, for without it there would be the greatest disparity between man and God. Through the supply of grace man becomes partaker of the Divine nature, and is adopted as God's son; thus put in parity with God, in virtue of which parity the reward follows the merit according to strict justice. Out of a state of grace, on the other hand, a voluntary act has only the character of *meritum de congruo*, which, on account of the existing disparity, can only expect some sort of consideration from the reasonableness of God (art. 3). Since now this fundamental grace cannot be merited on account of its distance from human nature (art. 5), it is connected as a result with the merit of Christ, who having merited *ex condigno* exaltation for Himself, did, at the same time, as Head of the Church, earn for its members everlasting life (art. 6).

In explaining Christ's work as merit, Thomas describes it in a manner that differs little from the way of viewing it as a satisfaction. Even as merit, it has not for God a purely ethical, but only a legal value. Nevertheless this explanation of the fact to be explained secures certain advantages in the presentation of it which were not gained by means of the idea of satisfaction. In the first place, its spontaneousness on Christ's part, which in the judgment of Thomas exceeds the limits of the idea of satisfaction, is included in His merit as its distinguishing mark. Further, under this name, the whole life of Christ acquires its proper significance for the beatification of the Church, while under the idea of satisfaction in the writings of Thomas, as well as in those of Anselm, the death of Christ is isolated from His life, and put in contrast with the value of it. Lastly, the idea serves to carry out to the positive bestowal of everlasting life upon the Church, the merely negative result of forgiveness of sins which is obtained by satisfaction. Yet we must not omit to notice how insecure is the footing on which the idea of merit in relation to God is placed. Merit *ex condigno*, as it is conceded through the bestowal of Divine grace on Christ's account, and afterwards on account of believers themselves, is regarded as a claim for the highest conceivable reward, according to that justice which presupposes an equality in point of law between the parties, in the very same way as

such equality is implied in the legal transactions of private individuals. But yet the possibility of such a valuation of merit in accordance with the rules of private transactions, has been created by God Himself through the bestowal of that grace in which alone has any one, according to Thomas, the ability to acquire merit. How dull is the dialectic which allows judgment on the effect to be isolated from consideration of the cause! which would have us imagine a parity between parties of which the one stands in absolute ethical dependence on the other! Is that justice—is it not rather arbitrariness of God—which concedes parity with God in point of law to him, who, in the grace bestowed on him, ever carries within him the evidence of dependence upon God—and thus of disparity with Him? Can, then, the specific superiority of God over Christ and over Christ's people be got rid of on these terms? This is possible only with the same degree of truth as that wherewith Thomas deduces from the purely negative conception of God's independence as the supreme good, the inference that God can forgive sin without receiving satisfaction, just as a man who, in forgiving injuries at pleasure, acts mercifully but not unjustly (p. 49). If the deduction be right, "God being the Supreme Good can therefore act as a private individual," then we may also consider it to be a convincing argument that God bestows grace on men to the end that, in rewarding their voluntary good works thereby rendered possible, He may be fulfilling an obligation of private law; and that He proceeds on the same principle in rewarding Christ's merit by the exaltation of His person, and by the bestowal of grace upon His Church.

11. Nothing more clearly shows the want of close reasoning in the declarations made by Thomas upon the satisfaction and merit of Christ, than comparison with the consistency of inference which distinguishes the teaching of John Duns Scotus on the latter point. Like Thomas, he gives the supreme place to the free choice of God as the determining cause of the saving work connected with Christ's death: while by means of that view of sin which Thomas states as a possible one—thus not repudiating it though he did not adopt it,—and by accurately defining the idea of merit, he reaches a result, which in details is at variance with the opinions of Thomas, but yet, as a whole, carries out the tendency that lies in the views of that theo-

logian. The attitude assumed by Catholic Christendom in the middle ages towards our problem is therefore seen much more clearly in the scientifically rounded doctrine of Duns than in the doctrine of Thomas, which, although it has been received by the Church, cannot thereby conceal the arbitrariness of the distinctions and the lameness of the definitions by means of which it has been established.

Thomas had admitted that sin as a turning towards changeable good, and as the act of the creature, is finite. But for the doctrine of satisfaction he had availed himself of the other view, that as a turning away from the unchanging good, and as injury to God, it has a sort of infinitude (p. 51). Now Duns lays hold of the first thought and tries it against the other (*Comm. in Sent. Lib. iii. dist. 19, qu. i, sect. 13*):—"If thou sayest that sin is infinite, and intendest thereby that evil, according to the very idea of it, is intrinsically infinite, then that is untrue; for in that case it would be necessary to assume a supreme evil and a Manichæan God. And if thou allegest in proof, that sin is just as great as He against whom it is committed, then that is untrue if intrinsic equality in magnitude is ascribed to the notions of the two things compared. Although, in respect of the object from which sin revolts, it may be called infinite in a superficial sort of sense, it notwithstanding is still in itself, according to its idea, a finite act. That is to say, sin against God is graver than sin against any other being, just as sin against an earthly king is greater than sin against his soldier; but it is impossible that there should exist an evil infinite according to its very idea. In like manner (sect. 14) is the punishment of mortal sin infinite only in the superficial sense, if the will persist unchanged in sin: not in any sense implying that God could not punish sin in any other way." These considerations show the assumption by Thomas of a "sort of" infinitude of sin to be simply a mode of expression, and refute that way of looking at the question whereby Anselm and Thomas established the necessity of a satisfaction of infinite value on account of sin.

Duns, moreover, completes and alters the idea of merit, both in general and in its application to Christ, far beyond the line taken by Thomas, in a perfectly convincing manner. Thomas had thought of the essence of merit as consisting in the marks

of spontaneousness, and an intention of honouring God; but had grounded the correspondence between merit *ex condigno* and the reward upon the objective parity in law between the parties (p. 57), upon which Duns comments as follows (Dist. xviii. qu. 1, sect. 5):—"Merit as the good act of the will has its root in an affection of the will by justice; not in an affection of the will by utility, or by justice, in so far as that ordains what is advantageous. This is clear, inasmuch as the first object in respect to which one acquires merit for himself is God Himself, in so far as one through an affection of justice wills that which is good for God. But the will which is determined by the thought of utility, strives after its own good. Wherefore merit is that deliberate movement of the will whereby one strives after good for God, and also, respect to the circumstances being had, after this end that one by one's-self or in connexion with others, should be allied to God." "So far as Christ in a certain sense was a pilgrim, and capable of suffering in His feelings and in the inferior part of His will, there were a multitude of objects, corresponding to His faculty of feeling and desiring, from which He was able to turn away His will contrary to His advantage. Wherefore, by fasting, watching, prayer, and many other such acts, He was able to acquire merit, either by the practice of these, or by intention of them for God's sake." Then over-against the objective legal view of the idea of merit he sets the moral subjective standard in the definition *Meritum est aliquid acceptatum* (sect. 4). "Merit is anything which is accepted as merit, and for which he who accepts it as such is in a certain sense bound to give something in return." This definition to which Duns carries back his judgment upon Christ's work, calls for supplementary notions which Duns has omitted to develop. Yet these readily occur to one on comparing the analogous thoughts of Thomas, which he certainly tries hard to keep away from any application to Christ. For Thomas also recognised *acceptatio* as the mark of *imperfect* satisfaction with which he that receives it expresses himself satisfied, even although it be not materially adequate—no equivalent for the injury (p. 53), and it is by this subjective arbitrariness in the judgment of the value of what is offered, that he explains the value of a merit *ex congruo* (p. 58). As the standard for this arbitrary judgment he points to that

relative justice (*justitia secundum quid*) in which the idea of "reasonableness" had to be admitted. Now it is plainly this very mode of viewing the matter that is made by Duns to be the foundation of his general idea of merit. And so far as ordinary clear use of language is fitted to influence our understanding of such thoughts, Duns, in his opposition to the exceptions and saving clauses of Thomas, certainly has reason on his side. By a merit is never understood a performance which is estimated according to the standard of a legal contract, as Thomas asserts of merit *ex condigno*. On the contrary, a performance is thought of as meritorious, just in proportion as it does not admit of being tried by that standard. Nor do we ever understand by merit a performance for judging of which a fixed objective standard is presupposed as available, but only a performance which, in so far as it is merit, is judged of according to one's good pleasure *secundum acceptionem*. And certainly our judgment, in so far as it recognises a merit, is fixed upon a moral value of the performance, though originally perhaps in a given instance that performance may have originated in a legal contract. Let us suppose that a certain service has been fixed by stipulation, and at the outset brought under the standard of law by previous agreement upon equivalent reward. If that service be given under circumstances which manifest the special regard of him who renders it to the interests of the recipient, then the latter will recognise in these moral accompaniments of the legal performance a merit towards himself which he is impelled to reciprocate by a special recognition. But then, as it may also happen that through a deficiency in moral delicacy of feeling, a man may disregard this consideration, as a man is not bound to take notice of a favour as such, the recognition of merit is thus laid upon the good pleasure, and more particularly the reasonableness, of men. The judgment of reasonableness can be applied only however to the ethical value of such acts as, from the circumstances of the case, do not come under the notion of moral duty—do not come under *that* point of view according to which a man's every action in his intercourse with his fellows *ought* to be directed to the good of his neighbour. In other words, a deed done from ethical motives can be recognised as meritorious only in cases where an exclusively legal relation is assumed to

exist between two parties, or where we take for granted a complete ethical indifference between him who acquires for himself a merit and him who recognises it as such. Where, on the other hand, two persons stand morally related to each other, in such a manner that the one is superior and the other subordinate—in such a manner that the one has nothing but rights, the other nothing but duties—then, according to our ideas, the assumption of a merit can find no place. In view of this, our judgment is entirely opposed to the opinion of Thomas, that a son can possess any merit *ex congruo* towards a father (p. 60). We assume without any question that the son lies under unconditional moral obligations to the father; and in this we follow the unambiguous meaning of the Christian principles of social life. Thomas was led to the opposite opinion, because he assumed the absolute legal subordination of son to father, as that is laid down in Roman law, to be the *sole* positive relation between the two, thus supposing to subsist between them in all other respects an ethical indifference, which is, in a measure, qualified only by the merit of the son and reasonableness of the father respectively.

12. In harmony with the doctrine of the finitude of sin and with the subjective standard of merit, is the doctrine also of the finitude of the merit of Christ. As Duns does not consider the Divine nature of Christ to be the subject of suffering and of merit, any more than Thomas did, he therefore restricts Christ's capability of either to his human nature; and in fact does so in such a way that neither the one nor the other can for a moment be predicated of the higher spiritual powers, inasmuch as these are connected with the Divine nature—for in this Christ from the very beginning was in the enjoyment of blessedness—but only of the lower faculties of His soul, according as these were ordered and appropriated by His will to the service of God. But on this account "the merit of Christ is finite; for it essentially depends on a principle which is itself finite, even if we take it in all its bearings, whether in respect of the Divine Word that entered into the constitution of the person of Christ, or in respect of the end that was proposed by it. Or else (if the principle were infinite) there could be no merit at all; for merit can be attributed only to the created will, but not to the uncreated will of the Word.

What then was the value of that merit in respect of its sufficiency? Since everything that is distinct from God is good in virtue of its having been willed by God, so is that merit good just to the extent to which it was accepted by God as such. It was *ideo meritum quia acceptatum*. In its very idea it could not be accepted as infinite in itself and for an infinite number of persons, but only as available for certain persons limited as regards number. Yet from the circumstances of the suffering and meriting subject, and from a reasonable regard to that subject Himself, the God-man, there was, according to Duns, a certain external respect, according to which God was able to accept it as infinite in regard to its extension to an infinite (innumerable) number. "But as is the number of those on behalf of whom God chose to accept that passion or that good-will, so great is the number of those for whom it is sufficient. Yet, according to the idea of the thing to be accepted, when regarded in itself, it did not admit of being accepted on behalf of an infinite number, as it was not in itself infinite" (Dist. 19, qu. 1, sect. 7). The transition in these last sentences, and their conditional tone, make it clear that Duns assigns to Christ's merit a limited effect, just as he assigns to it a limited power; and that here, as in his judgment on sin (p. 60), it is only superficially, and with an important difference of meaning, that he accommodates himself to the Thomist formulæ of the infinitude of sin and of Christ's satisfaction. Thomas understood the infinitude of Christ's satisfaction to arise from the intrinsic value of his work as estimated by the Divine standard. Duns understands the infinitude of Christ's merit to arise from the unmeasurableness of its outward efficacy when estimated by the human standard. In this way Duns finds himself unable to concur in the statement of Thomas, that the *sufficiencia* of Christ's work exceeds the *efficacia*, its intrinsic value counterbalancing the sins of the whole world, while yet its operation is restricted to believers (*Summa*, P. iii. qu. 49, art. 3.) Duns, logically carrying out to its consequences his assumption that the Divine Incarnation, as having relation to those who had been elected unto salvation, would have taken place even if sin had not entered into the world, decides against this opinion of Thomas (p. 51). On this view, not the entire human race, as

an apparently unlimited natural unit, but the Church of the elect, limited as to number by the will of God, forms the body to which God looked from the first, in determining, on the supposition of sin, the operation of Christ's merit. "The Incarnation of Christ was not foreseen by God as an incidental occurrence (*occasionaliter*), but as the ultimate End was immediately and from all eternity contemplated by Him, so Christ, in His human nature, as standing in immediate contact with that ultimate end, was foreordained earlier (in the logical order) than the rest. As then the elect are predestined before the passion of Christ is foreseen as a means of saving them after their fall into sin, it follows that the whole Trinity chose the elect unto grace and blessedness in view of the execution of this decree, before foreseeing the passion of Christ as a means of salvation that was to be accepted on behalf of the elect who fell through Adam. Thus the whole Trinity actually accepted Christ's passion on behalf of these; and for no other has that passion been made effectual, or from all eternity been accepted. Wherefore, so far as the efficacy of His merit is concerned, Christ earned initial grace (*gratia prima*) only for those who are predestinated to eternal blessedness" (Dist. 19, qu. 1, sect. 6). "As the merit in itself was finite, so the reward in accordance with the justice that awarded it was also finite. Wherefore also Christ did not earn merit for an infinite number of persons in respect of the sufficiency of that merit to be accepted by God" (sect. 4).

In this representation also Duns succeeds in giving the religious view of the universe in a more precise form than does Thomas in his corresponding positions. The declaration of the latter, that Christ's satisfaction and merit proceed from Him as Head of the Church, is indeed a very significant one. It means that even in the setting forth of Christ, as the personal instrumentality on whom God makes the work of reconciliation to depend, regard is had to the result which actually, as matter of experience, does ensue—this, namely, that reconciliation is not actually brought about in the case of all men individually, but takes effect only upon the narrower circle of Christ's Church. If then Thomas's distinction between the infinite value and the limited efficacy of Christ's satisfaction has no practical application to that line

of reasoning in which what actually in experience takes place supplies a test for our knowledge of God's purpose, it would seem to follow that the assertion of the infinite value of Christ's satisfaction is superfluous when taken along with the fact of its limited efficacy. But it appears, moreover, to be even *questionable*, if we consider that all the conclusions of Thomas respecting the infinitude of the human race, of sin, of Christ's satisfaction, do not rest upon any positive meaning attached by him to the idea of infinity, but only upon the negative ground that we men cannot measure either the extent of the human race, or what is contained in that divine essence, which is presupposed to be in Christ, and which causes such a degree of demerit to be assigned to sin. As however this remark passes beyond that circle of vision which is common to Thomas and to Duns in their idea of God, the divergence of the latter from the former, on the point immediately under consideration, is seen to amount to this, that Duns represents God's *revelation of salvation* to be limited by Him both in respect of its end (the Church), and in respect of the means employed (Christ's merit), while Thomas seeks to gain a guarantee of the *divineness* of that revelation of salvation by involving the *possible end* and the *power of the means* in the nimbus of an infinitude, the assertion of which, however, implies only the limited nature of our knowledge of God. Duns does not say plainly that it is as Head of the Church that Christ earns merit, and he by no means comes up to the full meaning of this thought of Thomas, when (like Anselm, p. 33) he declares, that since Christ, being already perfect, did not stand in need of the reward of His merit, He earned that merit for the benefit of others, and the reward due to Himself is applied to them (Dist. 18, qu. 1, sect. 4). Of course by these "others" must naturally be understood the predestinated, the community of those who believe in Christ. But he does not see at all more clearly than does Anselm, that as matter of course Christ must be conceived of, on that account, as having at the very outset that general character in relation to them. According to Duns, they are first of all united to Him by His merit (Dist. 19, qu. 1, sect. 5). As we proceed we shall also see the reasons for which he did not adopt this thought of Thomas, which seemingly lay so to his hand. Duns, in this connexion, is thinking

of Christ only as of a divine-human *individual*, denying (on account of the blessedness which Christ had from the beginning) that His merit earned blessedness for Himself, and declaring that He merited for Himself only the glorification of His body, namely, the removal of that impediment which in His earthly life checked the overflow to His body of the blessedness of His soul (Dist. 18, qu. 1, sects. 12-15). But now, if the whole relation between merit and reward is made to depend on the good pleasure of the party who accepts that merit, we at once understand why it is that Duns does not consider it a thing to be proved, or a matter for closer examination, either that the reward of Christ's merit accrues to others than Himself, or that the greatness of the reward—which is the blessedness of the predestinate—exceeds in value that degree of merit which has its ground only in the lower powers of the soul of Christ. Both are simply asserted by him as facts (Dist. 18, qu. 1, sect. 4; Dist. 19, qu. 1, sect. 8).

As, moreover, Duns applies to Christ the idea of merit only, but not that of satisfaction, the result for those who are Christ's is consequently represented as being not the negative benefit of forgiveness of sins, but the positive benefit of grace and the prospect of glory (opening of Paradise). The respective connexions of these references will at once be obvious. When an action is judged to be a merit on the ground of its moral value (ethical indifference and legal equality being presupposed to have existed up to that point between him who merits and him who rewards), the reward of that merit can be represented only as a positive good, but not as the cancelling of a legal obligation, the idea of the existence of which is excluded by the previous conditions of merit which have just been specified. It is quite true that if the reward of the meritorious person result in the good of other parties who lie under an uncanceled legal obligation to the rewarder, then the positive reward can in that case be made to consist in the cancelling of a pressing legal obligation towards the rewarder: thus, in the instance before us, the forgiveness of sins can come in as a result of the *prima gratia* merited by Christ. This sequence of thought, however, throws a peculiar light upon the position of the ideas of merit and satisfaction in the system of Thomas, and also in that of Anselm. It now begins to be seen why it was that neither the

one nor the other of these was able to work with the single idea of Christ's satisfaction without having resort to that of His merit. For satisfaction denotes merely the means whereby the formerly subsisting legal obligation of sinners towards God is taken away, but it does not lay the foundation for the establishment of such a relation between man and God as shall render impossible the recurrence of the old complication between human sin and divine right. The conception of such a positively and ethically-ordered fellowship is reached by means of the idea of merit, in the application of which the divergency between Thomas and Duns, in their estimate of that idea, is unimportant. This particularly confirms the criticism already made above (p. 34), when it was said that Anselm withdrew his laboriously developed theory of satisfaction, and substituted for it the thought of Christ's merit, because he was unable to reach by the other theory the idea of the Church, which, in the forgiveness of sins through Christ, gains a standing-ground whereon the contrariety, which formerly prevailed between human sin and divine right, shall no more find any place, because the legal standard, formerly applicable to the relation between the Christian and God, has now been completely merged in the moral. But since, finally, it is clear that the idea of Christ's merit practically amounts to the founding of the community of believers as the supernatural development of humanity, and since therein is suggested Duns' thought that such a result can only correspond to the eternal purpose of God (*ultimum in executione primum in intentione*), the genius of Abelard is put before us in a strong light. His short hints (p. 39) point in the direction of this line of thought, and they even reach beyond it, so far as it has been developed by Thomas and by Duns.

13. That good pleasure of God to which Duns attributes the acceptance of Christ's merit, and the rewarding of it upon those who receive initial grace, is regarded by him in accordance with His premisses, as the sole ground for the necessity of redemption through the God-man. In his twentieth distinction (Qu. 1, sect. 10), which is specially directed against Anselm's theory, Duns explains that "everything performed by Christ in order to our redemption, is to be regarded as having been necessary only on the previous understanding that God

had ordained that it should so fall out. And accordingly His passion was necessary only in virtue of its place in the chain of events ; but the whole chain—that is to say, the previous decree of God along with its results—was purely contingent.” That this is the state of the case, he proves to his own satisfaction by the assertion that not merely a good angel but even a mere man, had he been conceived without sin and furnished with the utmost grace, would have been able to merit the abolition of sin and the bestowal of all blessedness for men (sect. 9). For it depends simply on the question, how highly will God be pleased to appreciate as merits the performances that are well-pleasing to Him, which are rendered by such subjects as those that have been mentioned ; and what reward He in His reasonableness will be pleased to render them. Anselm, arguing to prove that a satisfaction required to be given by the God-man, had controverted the admissibility of either of the cases supposed, on the ground that we should then owe to creatures those obligations which are due only unto God. Yet Duns effectually repels this objection by pointing out that the duty of thankfulness for such deeds would still be referable to God alone, who should accept as meritorious for the end proposed the performances of those creatures. If the achievement of redemption by the God-man be thus a fact merely, but no necessity grounded in the nature of God and in the moral destiny of men, then the indifference of Duns to the thought of Thomas, that the God-man is the subject of merit as being Head of the Church, becomes very easy of explanation. Duns goes even further. He declares it to be possible that, if to each man initial grace had been given even without merit, each might then have been able to earn for himself the remission of sins (sect. 9). Nay more, as it was not necessary that satisfaction for the sin of the first man should, in its very idea, exceed the whole creation in greatness and perfectness (it being enough to offer to God a greater good than was the evil of the sin of that man), Duns goes on to say, “ If Adam, by means of the gifts of grace and love, had exercised one or more acts of love to God for God’s sake, with a stronger impulse of the free will than was that which he had experienced in sinning, such love would accordingly have sufficed for the forgiveness of his sins. So that just as by love of a less worthy

object he had sinned infinitely, so also might he by love of a more worthy object, have given an infinite satisfaction : and this would have sufficed ; that is to say, possibly, if God had willed to have it so " (sect. 8).

These conjectures are by no means designed to weaken or destroy the common belief of the Church in the fact of redemption by the God-man. As hypothetical deductions from the fundamental idea of the freedom of the Divine will with reference to its own determinations, they were intended in the first instance to maintain this theological principle in scientific security. Still, inasmuch as that principle was established by the Lombard in opposition to Anselm (p. 43), and received currency from Thomas and Duns (who are essentially at one on this question), the principle that lay at the foundation of scholastic theology in the most flourishing period of its history indicates also what was the religious interest of the Christian middle ages. Those expressions of Duns may indeed have a questionable sound therefore to ears that have been disciplined under Reformation influences, and yet they are quite correct when judged according to the principles of mediæval religion. We are led by this to remark, however, that the theological interpretation of the reconciliation wrought by Christ which Thomas and Duns give, has no firm foundation in that idea of God which we have mentioned. A beginning is made with the absolute elevation of God, not only above the world, but also above everything which God does therein, and yet in explaining the atonement, God's position with regard to man is reduced to the standard of a relation of equality between private persons, or of a relation regulated by "reasonableness," such as holds good only in the ethical relations of private life. It is true that we take higher ground in looking at the matter as determined by reasonableness, than we do when we regard it as determined by private law ; for in the former case we move at least within the sphere of directly ethical ideas. But even the notion of reasonableness can here lay claim only to a limited application, and not to the subsumption under it of all conceivable ethical relations. The moral ordering of human actions in general is accomplished by means of the moral law and the idea of moral duty ; in which last the inward compulsion exercised by social feeling and moral law harmonizes with

the spontaneousness and unselfishness which are the distinctive marks of moral action. If now it is the task of theology to take up the relation which subsists between God and man, and treat it in accordance with the highest standards of life which are recognised for men; and if the atoning work of Christ must also be viewed in conformity with that standard; then it cannot be conceded to the mediæval system of doctrine that it has adequately solved the problem of reconciliation through Christ with reference to this end. In the application of his idea of merit to Christ, Thomas does not at all get beyond the idea of religious relations regulated by the principles of private law; and Duns finds the moral standard for all that is expressed by the word "merit" in the good pleasure of God (for which there is no rule), as if he were a reasonable private person. Surely it is possible to develop the doctrine of atonement in other forms than these!

The fact that the Roman Catholic Church, since the time of the counter Reformation, has expressly favoured Thomism as regards the doctrine we are now speaking of, while, as a publicly acknowledged form of doctrine, Scotism has been set aside, does not hinder me from affirming that Duns has only logically carried out the premisses which were common to both, and at the same time replaced the uncertain and vacillating assertions of Thomas with precise expositions that cannot be misunderstood; and that if, in regard to this doctrine, Thomas represents the interests of the Catholic Church, Duns does not at least override them in any way. His greater scientific precision accordingly enables us to recognise more clearly in his view of reconciliation through Christ than in that of Thomas, what was the mediæval type of doctrine. Between this mediæval type of the doctrine and that of the Reformation there exists a complete difference in kind. We can therefore on this point perceive no influence of the mediæval school of doctrine upon that of the Reformation save in the formal reception of the ideas of satisfaction and merit. There is certainly, however, a real connexion between the mediæval type of the doctrine of reconciliation as that is apprehended by Duns Scotus, and the entire rejection by the Socinians of the doctrine of reconciliation through Christ. In the Socinian school, the Scotist notion of God is so carried out as to exhibit

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the clear characteristics of finite restricted arbitrariness; and amongst the possibilities stated by Duns this one also is suggested, that God, had He so chosen, might have allowed each man to merit the forgiveness of sins for himself (p. 69). This possibility could first indeed present itself to the Socinian as being the actual state of the case only under conditions which cannot yet be fully expounded here. For the present we desire only to call attention to the department of Church history in which we are to look for the consequences of the mediæval doctrine of reconciliation, if we consider the influence it has exerted beyond the limits of Roman Catholicism.

CHAPTER III.

THE MEDÆVAL IDEA OF JUSTIFICATION.

14. THAT change in the attitude of God towards the sinful human race, which Anselm had explained by pointing to the merit earned by the God-man in His work, was subsequently limited by the thought that it took place only with regard to those men who, through imitation of the active self-surrender of Christ, should evince themselves to be His spiritual kinsmen. But men could be thought of under this category only in so far as they should recognise the forgiveness of sins applied to them by Christ, to be the ground of their connexion with Him (p. 33). Still more directly had Abelard connected the reconciliation of men unto God through Christ with their own spontaneous activity, in so far as the proof of God's love which He has given in the manifestation and passion of Christ has stirred men up to such counter-love, as forms an indissoluble bond to unite them to God, and brings in its train forgiveness of the sins they had formerly committed. Since, however, according to him, this spontaneous activity is realized only in the case of the elect, we see also that Abelard regards it as governed by the special act of God's grace (p. 37). However diverse, then, these theories of the theologians on the threshold of the middle ages may be, they yet coincide with one another in this point, that while they connect the thought of the individual appropriation of redemption with the specific ethical action of the individual, they yet at the same time make this to depend on a definite form of the grace of God. For, by the self-surrender to God, of which Anselm speaks as an example given by Christ to be followed by all His spiritual kinsmen, we can only understand a life of practical religion; and the counter-love in which, according to Abelard, the elect are to gain that forgiveness of their sins, which by the love of God is

pledged to them in Christ, necessarily includes the active exercise of love towards their fellow-men. But as Anselm views that attitude of Christ's spiritual kinsmen as arising only out of the forgiveness of sins granted to them by Christ, and consciously felt by them, while Abelard assigns the active love which results in the forgiveness of sins to the elect only, there is postulated in both cases the dependence of man's activity upon God's antecedent work of grace.

These two elements, then, are taken together in the mediæval doctrine of justification, which ought to be considered as the completion of the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction and merit, although through the influence exercised by the arrangement followed in the Lombard's manual, it is wrought out quite separately, and indeed precedes the doctrine which dominates it, not only in the commentaries on the *Sentences*, but even in the systematical form of the *Summa Theologica*. The idea of justification is understood to mean—in the sense sanctioned by Augustine, and accordant with the Latin etymology—that God by His grace makes righteous the unrighteous man—the sinner, and really or substantially changes him. In subordination to this leading view, there is recognised by Augustine himself, in the idea of merit, a measure of spontaneous activity conducive to salvation in the subject that is made righteous. The dialectic of the schoolmen subsequently fixed in a special way the relation of these two ideas to each other. It suffices for my present purpose to unfold the doctrines of Thomas and Duns, the realists, and those of Occam and Biel, the nominalists, in order afterwards to bring into contrast with them that mode of looking at the matter which, while it belongs to the middle ages, yet does not fit in with the mediæval scheme of doctrine, but lies in the line of thought which was subsequently worked out by the Reformers.

Thomas's doctrine of justification, which is set forth in the *Summa Theologica* at the close of the *prima secundæ*, is led up to not merely by an exposition of the idea of grace, but even from the very beginning, by a definition of the idea of freedom. The principal ideas are as follows:—The actions which are peculiar to man as such, and which distinguish him from the other creatures, have it as their distinctive feature that they are elicited by the deliberate contemplation of an end.

Herein lies the condition under which man is the master of his own actions or is free in them. *Liberum arbitrium dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Quæ rationem habent se ipsa movent ad finem cum cognoscant rationem finis.* By the contemplation of an end is meant that man directs his energies towards a general aim and towards good in general (*bonum universale*), or that he regulates his action by the thought of an ultimate end, even in cases where the thing which he is immediately pursuing is a particular end, even in cases where he mistakes the value of an end, or of the good which he proposes to himself. The irrational creatures, on the other hand, are only impelled towards particular ends as such, though, of course, under the guidance and protection of the divine reason which thereby designs the general good (Qu. 1, arts. 1, 2, 7). But neither is the spontaneous effort of man towards his ultimate end in the perfection of his own being excepted from the sphere of divine guidance; on the contrary, the ground of its possibility rests wholly in God. For man reaches his highest, his perfect self-satisfaction—that is blessedness—in the contemplation of the Being of God (Qu. 3, art. 8). But inasmuch as this transcends the sphere of created being, it can be granted only by God (Qu. 5, art. 6). Yet since man's final end demands at the same time the exercise of his own activity, that blessedness which ultimately rests on God's gift is attained only by means of a number of performances called merits rendered by man himself (art. 7). It is obvious that the attribute of spontaneity is inseparably connected, so far as man is concerned, with the distinguishing mark of movement towards the deliberately recognised end. But this does not mean that knowledge is the sole basis of volition; rather knowledge moves the will only in respect of the particular activity, while, on the other hand, it is the will that stirs up all the faculties (and consequently also that of knowledge) to their general activity. But if the will of the creature alternates between capability unexercised and activity, then the latter presupposes as a universal law that the human will is set in motion *ab extra* just like the mechanism of material nature. Since, however, no movement can be originated in the last-mentioned sphere, unless the outward cause stand in some sort of connexion with the universal cause of all nature, in like manner

the movement of the will can arise from no outward cause other than that which is the cause of the will as a whole. This then is God : on the one hand as Creator, or the universal operating cause of all things, but on the other hand as the highest final cause, as that universal good which puts the will in motion in the manner appropriate to it (Qu. 9. art. 1, 6,) in so much as it necessarily strives after the highest good (Qu. 10, art. 1), while only as respects the particular good which it sets before it as such does it possess freedom of choice (Qu. 13, art. 2). Amongst these general postulates upon the relation between God and free will, there is introduced as a third, under the name of grace, that influence of God upon men which is laid down as indispensable for the bestowal of blessedness.

Since now that end—blessedness in the contemplation of the essence of God—lies far beyond the limits of what is attainable by man in virtue of his actual destiny and powers, Thomas asserts the necessity of grace for men from the very nature of the case, and quite irrespective of the fact of sin. Reason is sufficient only for knowledge of such intelligible beings as man comes to know by sense-perception. The human reason can rise higher only when supplemented by the light of grace, as by something which is superadded to the being of man (Qu. 109, art. 1). So that even before the fall man was by himself capable only of attaining the good proportionate to his proper nature, which is the good of *virtus acquisita* ; but for that higher good, which is the good of *virtus infusa*, whereof the ground is love,¹ he required grace over and above as the *donum superadditum*. Much more is this needful to sinful humanity, which looks to the grace of God, first for healing and thereafter for that movement towards supernatural virtue, which is meritorious (art. 2). So that, unsupported by *gratia gratuita*, man can neither merit everlasting life, nor yet forsake sin, nor yet of his own strength prepare himself to receive grace (arts. 5, 6, 7).

¹ This distinction is explained, even if not rendered more intelligible to us, by art. 4, in which it is said, Implere mandata legis contingit dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad substantiam operum et hoc modo homo in statu nature integræ potuit omnia mandata legis implere ; alioquin homo non potuisset in illo statu non peccare. Alio modo . . . etiam quantum ad modum agendi, ut scilicet ex caritate fiant, et sic ne in statu nature integræ quidem potest homo absque gratia implere legis mandata. As if the fulfilment of the moral law did not necessarily depend upon having love for its motive !

Now grace, in the first instance, is that special love of God whereby He draws man out beyond the restrictions of his natural being into participation of the divine good; it is that permanent eternal act of predestination which is not determined by any consideration of merit. But the result which is wrought in men by this act, that supernatural gift which is infused into the soul and becomes in it a habit or quality, is also called grace. For, as God's working upon His creatures in general is not atomistic—as, on the contrary, their movements are brought about by God by means of fixed forms and definite properties, so also, with a view to the attainment of the good that is above nature, He bestows upon men certain forms and properties, in accordance with which they are gently and promptly (*suaviter et prompte*) impelled towards that end. In this sense is the gift of grace a quality of man (Qu. 110, arts. 1, 2). Another distinction is that between *gratia operans et cooperans*, and this applies to both sides of the distinction which has just been drawn. In so far as grace is represented as an act of God's love, or as that which moves the will towards the end proposed; and also in so far as grace is understood to mean a human habit as the power which heals and justifies, grace is in either case *operans*. But in so far as the soul stirred by God's act of grace is represented in a particular action as at the same time bestirring itself, and also in so far as the habit of grace is stated to be the ground of a meritorious work proceeding from the free will, grace is in either case *cooperans*. For in the domain of will we must distinguish between the inward and the outward act. In the inward act the will maintains a passive attitude, inasmuch as it is moved by God, especially when the will that had formerly been evil *begins* to will the good; but in the outward act the free will dominates the means of its accomplishment, and although it is God who in this case also upholds the power of the will, and prepares the external conditions of its exertion, yet, nevertheless, His grace therein is only *cooperans* (Qu. 111, art. 2). The glimpse given in this distinction of a measure of co-ordination between the human will and the grace of God is certainly kept in sight only in a limited degree. Thomas has it in view to establish on as wide a basis as possible the supremacy of the thought of *gratia operans*. In accordance with his fundamental position,

that no form can become active in a material that has not been previously prepared to receive it, it might appear as if it were necessary that man should dispose himself to receive *gratia habitualis*. But the act of free will whereby the gift of grace is appropriated, that is, faith whereby we turn to God, can itself be traced back only to an impulse from God (Qu. 112, art. 2; Qu. 113, art. 4).

That habitual grace which is implanted in men by God's gracious act is *justification*, as being the proper regulation of our spiritual powers in subjection to the divine reason, that is, love. In him who formerly had been a sinner, this process takes place through the forgiveness of sins. But inasmuch as a movement can be better denoted by reference to the terminus *ad quem* than by reference to the terminus *a quo*, this change in the sinner is better called *justificatio* than *remissio peccatorum*. For remission of sins never takes place without grace being at the same time infused; so that, in conjunction with the ideal change in man's position as before God, there is simultaneously wrought a real change in his personal characteristics (Qu. 113, art. 1). This connexion of *gratia habitualis* with the forgiveness of sins is shown by Thomas in the succeeding article to result necessarily from the relations of God's love to men. The forgiveness of sins is God's pacification with us; this last means the Divine love towards us. But (Qu. 110, art. 1) *gratia habitualis* was recognised to be the effect in us of God's love. *Ideo non posset intelligi remissio culpæ si non adesset infusio gratiæ* (Qu. 113, art. 2). From our point of view we must fully recognise that in the concrete instance before us no forgiveness of sins can be thought of apart from regeneration. But then, from the way in which Thomas had begun his elucidation of the idea of justification there should have been given in the first article under this question a proof of the proposition that *transmutatio a statu injustitiæ* results *per remissionem peccatorum*. But this connexion of ideas¹ is not brought out when it is only shown that the two must appear together where the love of God asserts itself. Instead, however, of remedying the defectiveness of this scientific procedure, the develop-

¹ Which is in some measure suggested by Augustine (*de Trin.* xiii. 14) : *Justificamur in Christi sanguine, cum per remissionem peccatorum eruiamur a diaboli potestate.*

ment of ideas which follows is rather a divergence from the problem itself as it had been originally apprehended. In the first place, for example, the circumstances of justification are described without the forgiveness of sins being taken into account at all as the specific instrumentality; the sinner's being made righteous, results because God moves man to righteousness. Now God moves all things in a manner suited to their special nature; and man is endowed with free will. God accordingly infuses the gift of justifying grace in such a way as at the same time to set the free will in motion towards the receiving of this gift (art. 3). And while man is made righteous by that motion of his free will that was elicited by God, he abandons sin with loathing, and through desire draws near to righteousness (art. 5). In justification, therefore, four points are involved—the infusion of grace; the movement of the free will towards God through the awakening of faith; the movement of the free will against sin; *the remission of guilt as completion of justification* (art. 6, 8). So that the component momenta of the idea take at the end of the discussion an order just the reverse of that in which they were presented at its beginning. But besides, the position due to the idea of grace is shown in the subsequent doctrine of merit by the plain declaration of Thomas: *si gratia consideratur secundum rationem gratuiti doni, omne meritum repugnat gratiæ* (Qu. 114, art. 5). If, notwithstanding this the doctrine of merit (p. 57) proceeds on the assumption that by virtue of God's appointment the acts of free will and of love proceeding from the *gratia habitualis* bestowed by God are in justice repaid with a reward (art. 1), and that accordingly the justified person can merit to have his love increased, and finally can merit life everlasting (art. 8): all this is possible only because the whole of the life of man in the state of grace which, *properly speaking*, can be thought of rightly only under the idea of *gratia operans*, is conceived under the laxer notion of *gratia cooperans*. But in this there is implied a characteristic shifting of the relative position of the idea of grace. As the unconditioned principle of justification, as the power which stirs up the free will to strive after the supreme good, it is (in the synthesis we have mentioned) the form, while the will is the matter. But as a habit and quality in men, as love infused, grace is represented as the matter,

as this very phrase "infused" indicates; while the will, which is set in motion by means of justification, and yet at the same time, by its very nature, moves itself, is represented as the form. It is impossible to avoid looking at the matter alternately from the one side and from the other, from the religious point of view, and from the empirico-ethical; but everything depends on the amount of prominence we give to the latter as distinguished from the former, and on the question whether the *necessary* dependence of the latter on the former is secured by clearly defined conceptions.

Thomas has not taken any care about this. After he had made preparation for the particular doctrine of grace, by completely putting the will in a position of dependence on divine influence, we might have expected him to specify what are the distinguishing marks of the movement of the will that is brought about through grace. The general subjection of the human will to God had been recognised as twofold—He is the operating cause and also the final cause, the universal good (p. 76). The relation of grace to the will is not however so expressed by Thomas as would suit the latter higher point of view; it is merely indicated to be the *operating cause*. But under this idea the freedom of the will does not get full justice. If it is to be maintained we must, by means of the distinction between *gratia cooperans* and *operans*, tone down into a *conditio sine qua non* that which was at first stated to be the sole operating cause; but in doing so we have no theoretical principle to guide us in accentuating these two thoughts alternately. When accordingly practical motives came into play for laying the emphasis on the point of view of *gratia cooperans* and of human merit, those Augustinian premisses (to which on the whole the mediæval theology remained faithful) were not strong enough effectually to counteract the conclusions developed in an opposite direction, which Augustine himself had already formulated.¹

¹ For those who judge of Augustine merely by his doctrines of original sin and of predestination, and who on that account regard him principally as the patron of the Reformation system, it is not unnecessary to say that, taken as a whole, he is the patron and even the immediate founder of Western Catholicism, more particularly that from him comes all the material for the mediæval doctrines of grace and freedom, of justification and merit; and that the deductions drawn by the Reformers from his doctrines of sin and of predestination, as also their doctrine of justification, had never once occurred to him. This is not to deny that the Reformation is the logical result of that highest standard of piety which Augustine upholds.

The second objection that must be raised against the doctrine of Thomas is that he has treated the doctrine of justification out of all connexion with the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction and merit, and on that account has failed to make use of the means for the correction of his idea of justification which are offered by his own apprehension of these notions. Superficially considered this defect is occasioned by the circumstance that Thomas, even in the professedly systematic arrangement of the *Summa Theologica*, did not abandon the plan of Lombard's "Sentences," and on that account took up the doctrine of justification before that of Christ's work. But what is the use of the latter doctrine if the thought of the justification and bestowal of grace upon the individual is introduced and disposed of without any attention whatever being paid to the facts that Christ is the procurer of grace, above all of the grace of forgiveness of sins, and indeed in such a sort that, as Head of the Church, He has rendered satisfaction for it, and earned merit? These are considerations by reference to which the bald notion of grace, as a mere operating cause, would necessarily have been qualified and completed; by due attention to which the commanding importance of the forgiveness of sins before the imparting of actual righteousness would have been maintained. And finally, something else would probably have been made of the position held by the Church of the redeemed constituted by the work of Christ, in reference to the bestowal of grace on the individual, than the doctrine that the sacraments as administered by the clergy are the instrumental causes of grace (Pars. iii. qu. 62, art. 1), and are so, as being the means which are best adapted to man's sensuous constitution (Qu. 61, art. 1).

15. Duns Scotus explains the ideas of justification and of the merit consequent thereupon for the purpose of controverting the idea, which seemed to be expressed by the Lombard in his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, that he is in men the *immediate* cause of the meritorious action of the will.¹ In opposition to this he maintains the common mediæval opinion (which he then makes out to be the Lombard's meaning also) that the love which in man is the source of meritorious actions is a habit in-

¹ Sent. L. i. dist. 17, B. "Spiritus sanctus amor est Patris et Filii quo se invicem amant et nos. Ipse idem Spiritus sanctus est amor sive caritas qua nos diligimus Deum et proximum."

wrought by God. While by the assumption of this *gratia habitualis* or *justitia infusa* he combats the validity of the first interpretation of the Lombard, he vindicates that assumption and defines the ideas of it as follows (*In Sent. Questiones*, L. i. dist. 17, qu. 3): Since unrighteousness is essentially a negation, it can be done away with only by means of the opposite habit. Thus he who from being an unrighteous person has been made into a righteous person, takes on the habit that is opposite to that negation. Moreover, God admits to everlasting life not the sinner, but the righteous person. To admit one to everlasting life, means that God finds one to be worthy of that reward by reason of his present disposition whom formerly He did not find to be worthy of it. Now this change cannot have its origin in the will of God, for that is unchangeable: it can arise therefore only from a change on the part of man. We must accordingly trace it to God's eternal fore-ordination (which had been already postulated by Duns, as the effectual ground of the validity of a merit) that justification takes place as something essentially new, as a real change in man; and that too not in the subjective forms of faith and hope (for these continue to be exercised even where justification has been lost), but as love towards God and towards one's neighbour. Secondly, a refutation of the Lombard's doctrine follows from the idea of merit. As meritorious acting is a thing of the will, it follows that the essence of merit consists in the thing in virtue of which one acts meritoriously. But this cannot be mere human nature, for in saying so one would fall into the error of Pelagius; something supernatural therefore is required, that is love, and not faith or hope, which continue to exist even in the sinner. This habit now, according to the already mentioned view of Duns (p. 61), lies at the foundation of all merit, as the ground on which God in His reasonableness accepts the appropriate action proceeding from it, and allows it to be considered as worthy to be rewarded with eternal life. It is as a habit, that is to say, that grace inclines the will to particular actions.

Although, accordingly, Duns does not bring the synthesis of grace and human will under the category of *gratia operans* (on the elucidation of which idea he does not enter at its appropriate place in the Sentences: Lib. ii. dist. 26), still he is unable to avoid the thought of it when he recognises *gratia*

habitualis as being the *forma operationis meritoriae*. But this mode of viewing the matter emerges only in a casual way. What he is really driving at is rather to make us see that in the joint operation of *actus* and *habitus*, the former idea is the superior one. For this purpose it is that he propounds, previous to the above-mentioned determination in the third question regarding justification and merit, the second question, which is, *utrum habitus sit principium actuum circa actum*, while the third question is specially directed to this, *an habitus moralis, in quantum virtus, sit principium activum respectu bonitatis in actu*. He decides negatively on both points. As against Henry of Ghent, who answers the first question affirmatively, he remarks that if the will operates through habit, it has no higher dignity than the wood which warms by means of the heat that accidentally inheres in it; but thus the idea of will would be altogether nullified. Moreover, habit would operate on the will as a natural force, and so the action of the will would not be free. And if love were once implanted in men, it would (on that supposition) be no longer possible for men to sin—an inadmissible assumption. Nor is it more allowable to consider will and habit as both partial causes of the action, as Thomas does. For they are not similar in kind, one must needs, therefore, be superior to the other. Now, habit seems to be the highest cause, inasmuch as it determines and inclines the power of the will to act. But then the will makes use of the habit, and not *vice versa*; for the habit would be power, if it were the highest cause. Against this, therefore, Duns affirms that the position of supremacy belongs to the power of will, for *it* does not absolutely need habit in order to act: without habit the will merely operates less perfectly than with it. The four distinctive marks of habit, which are that by means of it one acts easily, pleasantly, surely, and quickly—are explained simply by the inclination which habit imparts to the will as capacity for action. He compares moral habit especially to gravity, which as an attribute of the body is not the sufficient reason of its motion, although by it is expressed the tendency of the body in a downward direction. As accordingly the motive power must come from some other quarter, it further follows that goodness, as a habit, makes the action good only if there

be conjoined with it the habit of wisdom, or the act of just moral judgment. But in that case also all depends upon the act; for wisdom, as a habit, imparts to the act its rightness only in virtue of a special act of wisdom.

Starting from these principles, Duns decides that, as regards the relation of *gratia habitualis* to the will as the *potentia operans*, the former is not (as he had previously admitted) the first cause of a merit; because it is the power that makes use of the habit, and not *vice versâ*; and also because grace would operate as a physical force, and the will would not be free. And although the idea of merit compels him to tag on to this declaration a sort of qualifying counterpoise, he is yet skilful enough to protect his practical interests in the freedom of the will against that limitation. Merit, he says, of course, has not its root in any natural quality of man, for it first comes to be anything at all only through God's acceptance; it is thus grounded entirely in the association of reward with a human act by the will of God. "It is true that merit is attainable by me upon the general conditions that I have the use of free will, and that I possess grace. But complete realization of the idea of merit is not in my power, except by Divine institution. The principal thing in merit thus proceeds from God, though this is not equivalent to saying that it is God Himself who merits. For merit is an act of the free power of volition, elicited by gracious inclination, well-pleasing to God, so as to be worthy of the reward of blessedness; but such an act is not possible for God. Thus the principal thing in merit proceeds from God, if by the principal thing is meant its final complement. But if the principal thing means the first or more perfect actuality, then the assertion that it proceeds from God must be negatived, for *the act is an absolute thing, and by its very nature takes precedence of the passive acceptance, and is something more real than it*.¹

As regards Duns' idea of justification, the following divergence from Thomas is also worthy of notice. Whilst the latter regards the forgiveness of sins primarily as the means of justi-

¹ Lib. i. dist. 17, qu. 3, § 25. Saltem principalis in merito est a Deo. Respondeo; si principalis dicatur ultimum completivum, concedatur; si vero dicatur prima realitas sive perfectior realitas, negetur, quia actus est absolutum quid et prius natura ista acceptatione divina, et magis ens ea.

fication, but afterwards as a consequence of it, Duns treats it as an indifferent circumstance preceding the effectual bestowal of grace (i. 17, 3, sect. 19.) Further on (iv. dist. 16, qu. 2, sect. 6, 7) he explains as follows: "The taking away of guilt and the bestowal of grace do not constitute *one* real change, for the former is not a real change at all. They would, it is true, possess that oneness, were actual sin an essential corruption of nature, or the negation of anything properly positive in man. In that case the removal of guilt would be equivalent to the restoration of that reality which had been taken away by guilt. But sin does not take away any existent good thing, it only does away with what ought to have existed: thus also the liability to punishment on account of guilt is nothing actual in the soul after the act has been committed, but is only an ideal relation (*relatio rationis*) in the object as it is willed (as it ought to be). Hence also deliverance from that liability is no actual change. For confirmation of this line of thought, use is made of Duns' declaration (arising out of his idea of the originally unlimited power of God), that God in virtue of that power could have forgiven sins without bestowing habitual grace (i. 17, 3, sect. 29; iv. 1, 6, sect. 7, 9). But thereby nothing positive would be acquired. For he who through pardon of an injury is no longer an enemy, still is not on that account a friend, but only indifferent. And he who through forgiveness of sins is reconciled with God, still is not in virtue of that acceptable to Him, as being in a special state of grace, as was the case with man in the original state of nature. This consideration, however, serves the purpose only of bringing out clearly the difference between the merely negative and ideal abolition of guilt, and the positive real change on man in the state of grace. According to that regulated power of God which follows laws that have been fixed by His wisdom and His will, and which may be ascertained from Holy Scripture and the utterances of the saints, God cannot free any one from guilt on whom He does not bestow effectual grace.

Although this doctrine is not placed in any immediate connexion with that of Christ's merit, it is nevertheless unmistakably in strict harmony with it. For while the idea of satisfaction proceeds upon the negative conception of forgiveness of sins as the chief thing, the thought of Christ's merit, on the other hand

(which alone is maintained by Duns), requires that a positive value be assigned to it in the complementary idea of reward. Now, inasmuch as from the circumstances of the case the reward earned by Christ is transferred to the elect, on behalf of whom Christ acquired merit, it is the inevitable consequence of Duns' view that we should think of the bestowal of grace on individuals as being a real positive qualification for eternal life, and, in particular, for the merits that lead thereto (p. 82). The forgiveness of sins, at the same time, has a place in this view as a subordinate preliminary, since those on whom the merit of Christ comes to be positively effectual had previously to be freed from the debt due to God. As in all the instances that have hitherto been noticed, so here also on this point of doctrine Duns stands in opposition to Thomas, and at the same time excels him in the strict logical accuracy of his thinking. For it was certainly involved in Thomas's doctrine of satisfaction and merit that, as he himself says, real justification was to be accounted for by the forgiveness of sins as the means (p. 78); but he has not told us how, and consequently the forgiveness of sins is placed in a subordinate position behind justification. I would also point out, at the same time, that the Catholic interests involved in a realistic conception of justification are theoretically much more securely placed by Duns than by Thomas; for the distinction which the latter draws between satisfaction and merit, in such a way as to make the former idea the superior one, is calculated on the assumption that, on their application to individuals, absolution from sin dominates the real change to a state of grace wrought in individuals, or their actual qualification for eternal life.

In the consideration of human merit, for which the justified person appears to be qualified by the general appointment of God and the bestowal of *gratia habitualis*, but yet by means of which he is in a position also to increase his state of grace, Duns shows a higher measure of practical interest in the spontaneity of man than does Thomas. Theoretically, he was unable to escape the admission that it is the supernatural habit of love that is the ground of merit (p. 83). But as he does not avail himself of the conception of *gratia operans* (which, as one of Thomas's premisses, properly speaking, excludes any idea of merit), the principal stress, so far as Duns is concerned, lies

theoretically upon the consideration of grace as the matter, and free will as the form of merit. And what is the praxis in view when the consciousness of the person who is seeking to achieve merit is regulated by belief that the will that acts is always something unconditioned and something more real than the acceptation, which also, as the corresponding act on God's part, recognises only the preponderance of the will over the habit? In this dictum of Duns is asserted that claim to righteousness through works, against the prevalence of which in the religious life the Reformers declared war, and that, too, simply on behalf of those views of Divine grace which had been laid down by the mediæval theologians themselves.

The impulse given by Duns Scotus took effect on the theoretical views of that school of Nominalists that is dependent upon him. The following sentences contain a *résumé* of what William of Occam began in the fourteenth century, and Gabriel Biel¹ after him, set forth in full logical consecutiveness:—Since the idea of merit essentially rests upon the free and optional acceptation of a good work by God, it appears that so far as God's absolute omnipotence is concerned, no supernatural habit of love, no gift of grace, no *forma inherens* would be indispensable for the acquirement of merit. In virtue of the law laid down by God, however, no one can be acceptable to Him, so as to have eternal life conferred upon him, unless he possess infused love. It certainly cannot be made to appear by natural reason that there is any such thing as an infused habit, but the fact stands established by Holy Writ. But, even upon this condition, the bestowal of eternal life upon the recipient of grace is a free and contingent act of God, which might be left undone without any injustice; yea, rather, as He infuses grace in free goodness, He bestows blessedness under this condition purely out of His pity (Lib. i. dist. 17, qu. 1). This line of thought is modified, however, after Duns' fashion, in the second question. Nothing is meritorious which is not in the entire control of our will. But free will does not spring from habit; *firstly*, because habit is a natural cause; therefore the essence of merit, so far as we are concerned, consists *principaliter* in will; *secondly*, because no habit in itself

¹ *Epitoma et collectorium circa quatuor sententiarum libros.* Lugduni, 1514.

is worthy of praise (for neither also is it in itself blameworthy) —not the acquired habit, much less the infused habit, which, still less than the other, lies under the control of the will. The ground of this view of the free will is that God has full power to accept, as meritorious unto everlasting life, a voluntary act of love to Him, even though a habit be not presupposed. For here also the dictum holds good, *quod sine gratia nullus actus potest esse meritorius*; not, of course, in the sense of grace as a habit in the creature, but in the sense of uncreated grace, the active mercy of God, which alone is the essential basis of merit. The two lines of thought pursued in the first and second questions respectively are placed (outwardly) in equipoise by the dictum (Qu. 3, dub. 2, *responsio*), that in a meritorious work two things have to be considered, *substantia actus et ratio meriti*. *Quantum ad substantiam meritum est principaliter a voluntate libere producente, quantum ad rationem meriti est principaliter a caritate (infusa) ex divina ordinatione. Principalissime tamen est vere a Deo libere acceptante.* In order to the acquirement of merit, therefore, the complete fulfilment of the law is by no means necessary; all that is required is merely that any one command or counsel whatever be carried out, and that no law be transgressed (Qu. 2). Good works, which are brought forth by means of free will and the state of grace, are *merita de condigno*—they merit the reward of eternal life, in accordance with the justice of God, wherein He fulfils His promise of that reward. This sort of obligation is in no way inconsistent with the entire freedom of God; for, His will being the first rule of all righteousness, He wills and performs everything righteously, and yet not as being bound to any one. Moreover, it is possible by the act of the free will, aided by grace, to merit *de condigno* the increase of the latter. *Quia habens gratiam habet unde potest proficere in merito præmii beatifici, ergo etiam habet, unde potest proficere in gratia.* *Prima gratia*, on the other hand—the bestowal of grace—one can merit only *de congruo*, in so far as God, out of His liberality, accepts, unto the bestowal of initial grace, a good act of the man who does what lies in his power (Lib. ii. dist. 27). For (as is developed in the following distinction—the 28th) free will has the power to produce of its own nature works morally good, to avoid mortal sins, and to fulfil the commandments of God—not, indeed, according to the intention of the Lawgiver

(directed as it is to the achievement of our salvation), but yet so far as the essence of the action is concerned.

From these representations Biel (Lib. iii. dist. 19, concl. 5) draws the appropriate conclusion. Although *principaliter* Christ's passion merited salvation for all Adam's posterity, the activity of the subjects of salvation was nevertheless co-operative either as *meritum de congruo* or *de condigno*. For in order that any one, through the merits of Christ's passion, may have his sins forgiven and grace infused into him—whether the grace which virtually makes righteous, or the grace which follows upon the first and increases it—there is requisite, in the case of adults, a good disposition of the will, and a good motion towards God, either incipient or complete repentance for the sins of past life, or love towards God and longing after salvation, or voluntary receiving of the sacraments—all which are *merita de congruo*—or for the increase of grace, there is requisite a good activity proceeding from previous grace; and this is *meritum de condigno*. But in the case of children and of those who are not in the use of reason, it is not possible to be cleansed from original sin without the sacrament; there is necessary, therefore, the co-operation of those who present the child and administer the sacrament, and their action is *meritum de congruo*. Hence it follows that, even although Christ's passion is the chief merit in virtue of which grace and blessedness are bestowed, it is yet never *the only and the complete meritorious cause*. For there is always operative in conjunction with the merit of Christ, either as *meritum de congruo* or *de condigno*, some activity on the part of him who is the recipient of grace and blessedness, as merit of his own if he be an adult, as merit of other persons if he is not yet in the exercise of reason.

This view, which in point of clearness leaves nothing to be wished for, separates itself in form from the mode of treatment employed by the earlier theologians, in that it brings the doctrine of justification into direct connexion with that of the merit of Christ. But this circumstance gave rise to a divergence from preceding theologians, rendering it not possible to assert the merit of Christ as the sole and sufficient cause of salvation, but only as the chief one which had to be supplemented with *merita de condigno*, even if they, in virtue of their origin in the gift of grace, are subordinate to Christ's merit.

Here the dilemma which the Realists were unwilling to look in the face must be resolved. Either grace is to be taken strictly as the cause of Christ's work and of the justification of the individual, in which case the idea of *merita de condigno* has no place and no meaning; or else we are to admit the idea of *merita de condigno*, and in that case the bestowal of blessedness is not to be attributed exclusively to grace and the merit of Christ, but to that *and* to the merits of believers. Biel, in deciding for the latter alternative, only affirmed plainly what Thomas in making the opposite assertion did not really wish to exclude. But, over and above this, the Nominalists exceed deliberate tendency of the Realists, by their assertions that *merita de congruo* have their value towards the acquisition of *gratia prima*. It was not Thomas alone who had found it to be inconceivable (the distance between human nature and God being too great) that from the mere power of the will without the aid of grace, merits fit to be regarded by God's reasonableness should proceed (p. 58): Duns also regards it as improbable that God in His absolute omnipotence should accept works performed *in puris naturalibus* as *merita de congruo*; for such an opinion would be an approach to the error of Pelagianism (Lib. i. dist. 17, qu. 3, sect. 29). The Nominalists overcame this timidity. Of course, therefore, their doctrine on this subject is removed as far as possible from being the common doctrine of the mediæval Church; it is merely the tenet of a particular school of theology. Yet, since after a little fruitless opposition that school was not prevented by the Church from propagating its view, the Catholic Church of the middle ages has a share in the responsibility for this theory, and for the practical consequences involved in it, and even bears it as a distinctive feature that this view could have had currency within it for so long a period.

16. We shall on the other hand search in vain to find in any theologian of the middle ages the Reformation idea of justification—the deliberate distinction between justification and regeneration. Instances indeed occur in which, by the word justification is specially meant the Divine sentence of absolution from sins—particularly when certain unambiguous expressions of the apostle Paul are laid hold of;¹ but we must

¹ *Bernardi Tractatus de erroribus Abaelardi* (Opp. ed. Mabillon, Paris, 1890,

not lay stress upon these instances so as to fancy in them an anticipation of the conscious thought of the Reformers. Their deliberate treatment of the idea of justification proceeds rather on the principle that a real change in the sinner is thought of as involved in it;¹ in other words, the Reformation distinction between the two ideas is at the outset rejected, and the explanation of justification in the forensic sense is seen to be only a preliminary statement that requires to be corrected and filled out. But this implies an essential difference of meaning in those formulæ in which mediæval theologians seem to utter the watchword of the Reformers, and the work of collecting such utterances with a view to the defence of the doctrine of the Reformation,—such an attempt, for example, as may be seen in John Gerhard's *Confessio Catholica*—exposes him who undertakes it to a strong suspicion of having suffered himself to be misled by careless observation. It was understood in the middle ages that faith alone pertains to justification; that justification is bestowed freely by grace; that it does not depend on *merita de congruo* as conditions: it is only the Nominalistic theory that forsakes these positions; nevertheless, from a theological point of view, what is meant by them is something entirely different from what is meant by the formulæ of the Reformers that sound so like them. In the time of the Reformation itself men had occasion to learn that contradictory senses could be attached by the conflicting parties to words that had the same sound.

vol. i. p. 655), cap. viii. 20 : Ubi reconciliatio, ibi remissio peccatorum. Et quid ipse, nisi justificatio? Sivi igitur reconciliatio, sive remissio peccatorum, sive justificatio sit, sive etiam redemptio, intercedente morte unigeniti obtinemus, justificati gratis in sanguine ipsius. In *Cantica*, sermo xxii. 6 (l. c. p. 1336) : Christus est factus nobis sapientia, justitia, sanctificatio, redemptio. Sapientia in prædicatione, justitia in absolutione peccatorum, sanctificatio in conversatione, quam habuit cum peccatoribus, redemptio in passione.

¹ De error. *Abael.* cap. vi. 16 : Alius, qui peccatorem constituit, alius, qui justificat a peccato; alter in semine, alter in sanguine. . . . Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita et in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Si infectus ex illo originali concupiscantia, etiam Christi gratia spiritali perfusus sum. Quid mihi plus imputatur de prævaricatore? si generatio, regenerationem oppono. . . . Sane pervenit delictum ad me, sed pervenit et gratia. . . . Terrena nativitas perdit me, et non multo magis generatio cœlestis conservat me? Nec vereor sic erutus de potestate tenebrarum repelli a patre luminum, justificatus gratis in sanguine filii ejus. Nempe ipse, qui justificat, quis est, qui condemnat? Non condemnabit justum, qui misertus est peccatori. Justum me dixerim, sed illius justitia. Quæ ergo mihi justitia facta est, mea non est? Si mea traducta culpa, cur non et mea indulta justitia?

Notwithstanding this, the leading thought of the Reformers regarding the conditions of justification rests upon a broad basis in the Church. Marked anticipations of it are to be met with in trains of thought expressed and indeed deliberately emphasised by certain men of the middle ages, and even by men who deliberately and unambiguously professed their adherence to the Catholic doctrine of justification.¹ For in the thought of justification, so far as the Reformers are concerned, what is aimed at primarily and chiefly is by no means an objective doctrine of systematic theology, but simply a supreme standard whereby the subject who is a member of the Christian Church, and who, as such, is active in good works by the influence of the Holy Spirit, may judge for himself of his true religious condition. And what in fact the Reformers wish to establish is that the regenerate person does not owe his position before God and his assurance of salvation to the good works which he really does perform, but to the grace of God, which to his believing confidence pledges his justification through Christ. This assertion, which will be proved in the following chapter, I am compelled to make here by anticipation, in order to test by this criterion these expressions of mediæval piety which are justly regarded as offering analogies to the religious standpoint of the Reformers and which in the same proportion overpass the limits of the Catholic doctrine of justification and of the doctrine of merit mixed up with it.

It is certain that theologians, from Augustine onwards, always assume only the causal connexion between grace as justification on the one hand, and merit on the other. Nowhere do we find it stated that justification must be just what it is according to their doctrine, *in order that* merit may be possible. I cannot, however, fully account for the practical interest in that dogma displayed by those of the Roman Catholic confession, except on the understanding that the causal relation which in their doctrine is affirmed to subsist between justification and merit is at the same time a relation of purpose. For

¹ This qualifies the similar assertion made by Melancthon,—*Apol. Conf. Aug.* p. 99. Antonius, Bernhardus, Dominicus, Franciscus et alii sancti patres elegerunt certum vitæ genus, vel propter studium vel propter alia utilia exercitia. Interim sentiebant se fide propter Christum justos repntari et habere propitium Deum, non propter illa propria exercitia. Yet just this last statement finds its warrant in the following exposition.

it is only the impression (even though it be an unconscious one) of relations of purpose that dominates the feelings as an immediate motive of practical conduct. When, accordingly, in that positive religious interest which invariably controls all negations of opposing theologoumena, justification is asserted in the Catholic sense, it is in the full belief that merits avail with God. The sinner must not only be really changed into a good man; he must also act by the freedom of his own will if he would attain to merit. With respect to both these points the Catholic conception of justification is fitted to be the appropriate premiss for the consciousness of merit, and especially inasmuch as, according to it, it is possible for the justified person to merit an increase of grace; while the Reformation distinction between justification and regeneration, and the placing of the former over the latter, renders entirely inadmissible the idea of merit. But then the idea even in the Catholic system itself holds an ambiguous position. For the thought of grace, whereby merit first becomes possible, excludes, *when taken in a strict sense*, the meritorious value of all works proceeding from grace, for it directly denies the independence of the regenerate man in his relation to God. *Si gratia consideratur secundum rationem gratuiti doni, omne meritum repugnat gratiæ*, says Thomas. Now this view of the entirely derivative character of all the moral and Christian worth of our person and our works is the properly religious one. It is inevitable therefore, that as soon as a man living within the sphere of Catholic Christianity gains such a stage of development as to try himself by the purely religious standard, the idea of merit so laboriously wrought out in the theory is without further consideration at once set aside. The countless expressions that have been uttered by Augustine with this tendency have naturally been no less operative in the Western Church than has been the connexion assumed by him in theory, to exist between grace and merit.

Wherever, then, in the middle ages, devotion, so far as it has found articulate expression, rises to the level of the thought, that the value of the Christian life, even where it is fruitful of good works, is grounded not upon these as human merits, but upon the mercy of God, inasmuch as by it are these good works first rendered possible, while also by it must the guilt of remaining sin be taken away; wherever this immediate

assurance of the grace of God in the domain of the Christian Church is realized as the title of believers, which rises above all conceivable or actually existing means of grace—then the same line of thought is entered on as that in which the religious consciousness common to Luther and Zwingli was able effectually to break through the connexion which up to their time had subsisted between the Catholic doctrine and the Church institutions for the application of salvation. That this estimate of self by the religious standard, which denies merit and affirms grace exclusively, had throughout the centuries of the middle ages, a continuous and constant existence in the *public* consciousness cannot certainly be proved by documentary evidence. Only, just as surely as the Catholic Church of the middle ages was strictly and properly attached to Augustine's school, there must have continued to exist within her along with the theory that turns upon grace and merit, a marked tendency also to the devotional feeling which relies exclusively upon God's grace. We must not, however, expect to find that this tendency always realized itself fully, for we shall see that there were causes at work which were able in some instances to keep piety down below the level of the position just described, and in other instances to exaggerate it far beyond that limit. And, after all, the appreciation of themselves arrived at, even when grace was exclusively kept in view by those men of the middle ages, in whom such an appreciation can be traced at all, is as far as possible removed from being of a Reformation character. It had not with them the result of shaking a single part of the officially recognised doctrinal system or Church constitution; it neither leads them to suspect the doctrine of justification, nor does it enable them to dispense with the sacrament of penance, or with obedience to the Pope. But that this religious estimate of self, which practically denies to merit that value which is theoretically affirmed, should appear in a very pronounced form among the heroes of the mediæval church, serves to show that the same way of thinking when adapted by the Reformers was a product of the Church; and that the Reformation use of that line of thought, to bring about a complete change in the doctrine and ordinances of the Western Church, is simply a logical result of the idea of grace which came to be practically operative on all hands when the time came and the proper men were raised up.

17. The first both in time and importance to be considered in this connexion is St. Bernard of Clairvaux. He is in theory, as is shown by a passage cited above (p. 91), a Catholic of a thoroughly correct type; but not only do we very frequently find in his sermons expressions of the sense of absolute dependence on God that go far beyond the limits of Catholic dogma; but even in his treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio* he addresses himself to the task of neutralizing the conventionally received idea of merit, by practical appreciation of the exclusive value of grace. Some one had objected that Bernard, by laying stress upon grace as the immanent principle of the entire Christian life, had done away with the idea of merit. This opponent had emphasized the then current Catholic apprehension of the matter, according to which grace gives the impulse and beginning to man's own activity, whereby the continuance of the gifts of grace is merited even unto perfection. *Da, inquit, gloriam Deo, qui gratis te prævenit, excitavit, initiavit, et vive digne de cetero, quo te probes perceptis beneficiis non ingratum et percipiendis idoneum.* The discussion which Bernard raises in opposition to this principle proceeds entirely in the line of the traditional dogmas of Catholicism, in so far as it asserts the state of grace to be based upon the concurrence of grace and human freedom. It is the free will that is saved by grace. *Tolle liberum arbitrium et non erit quod salvetur; tolle gratiam, non erit, unde salvetur.* Since thus it is the free will that is the recipient of grace, the bestowal of grace is brought about through the active consent of the will. *Ita gratiæ operanti salutem cooperari dicitur liberum arbitrium dum consentit, hoc est, dum salvetur. Consentire enim salvari est* (cap. i. 2). If now grace be indispensably necessary in order that man may have a good will, it is at the same time implied in the very nature of free will, that the good acts of the will are merits by means of which good men enter into blessedness (vi. 18). Looked at as originating in grace, merits are themselves also gifts of God bestowed upon men out of His eternal decree, but yet they are called by the name of merits too, and deserve to be rewarded with blessedness on account of the co-operation of the free will with grace. *Deus namque ante secula, cum operatus est salutem in medio terræ, dona sua, quæ dedit hominibus, in merita divisit et præmia, ut et præsentia per liberam possessionem nostra interim fierent merita, et futura per*

gratuitam sponsonem expectaremus, imo expeteremus ut debita. . . . Ibi itaque Deus homini benigna merita constituit, ubi per ipsum et cum ipso boni quippiam operari dignanter instituit (xiii. 43, 45).

The claims of Catholic dogma once satisfied, however, by this method of rhetorical antitheses—a method for which the model was offered by Augustine—Bernard, by the help of the same master, rises to the purely religious view of the entire practical life of the Christian as a continuous work of Divine grace. Although, indeed, the meritorious character of a good work depends, so far as man is concerned, on the concurrence of his will with grace, yet even that act of concurrence is not, properly speaking, one that comes of man, *cum ne cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex nobis sufficientes sumus. . . . Si ergo Deus bonum cogitare, velle, perficere operatur in nobis, primum profecto sine nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium per nos facit. . . . Ita tamen, quod a sola gratia cœptum est, pariter ab utroque perficitur ut mixtim, non singillatim, simul, non vicissim per singulos profectus operentur. Non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium, sed totum singula opere individuo peragunt. Totum quidem hoc, et totum illa, sed ut totum in illo, sic totum ex illa* (xiv. 46, 47). In these sentences the religious insight passes beyond the limits within which the Catholic theory moves, the scheme of an indissoluble contiguity of grace and freedom, which contiguity always at the same time, however, implies and expresses their separateness. Putting this view aside, Bernard refers the good work in its entirety to God's grace when viewed from the religious point of view, and to the freedom of the will rendered free by grace when viewed from the moral point of view. He has intuitively seized the twofold thought upon which evangelical Christianity is practically based, and in which evangelical theology must ever recognise it as her task to show the harmony, or at least non-contradictoriness, of its two members. For as religiously we attribute the goodness of our will entirely to God, and give it no scope for meritorious value towards God, on that very account we become conscious of our position of moral independence as towards any tutelage that is not divine, and therefore, especially, as towards that of the hierarchy.

The quotations just made from Bernard betoken a temporary elevation above that sphere of vision in which the idea of meri has its place. He soon recurs to the recognition of this ide

in such antitheses as those we have already seen. Fasts and vigils, continence and deeds of benevolence, and all the other exercises of virtue wherein the inner man is renewed from day to day, are gifts of God as being produced in us through the operation of His Spirit; but, as being wrought with the concurrence of our wills, they are merits. In God's justice they merit blessedness; that justice, however, proceeds more upon the free promise of the reward of grace which God has made than upon any absolutely binding obligation on His part towards men. Yet even on this point Bernard at the close of his treatise reverts to that purely religious manner of thinking, which does away with the idea of merit. *Si proprie appellantur ea, quæ dicimus nostra merita, spei quædam sunt seminaria, caritatis incentiva, occultæ prædestinationis indicia, futuræ felicitatis præsagia, VIA REGNI NON CAUSA REGNANDI. Denique quos justificavit, non quos justos invenit, hos et magnificavit* (xiv. 49, 50, 51). The fact that Bernard was able to reach this thought, while yet he did not repudiate in its favour the Catholic doctrine, but, on the contrary, always recurred to it, is to be explained by the circumstance that in this particular work he waived that characteristic point of the Catholic doctrine which was insisted on by his opponent. He completely disregards the supposition that by those who are in the state of grace the continuance and increase of grace are merited. For as soon as this inference is drawn from the then prevalent scheme of grace and freedom, it is no longer possible fully to carry out that superiority of grace above freedom which results from a religious estimate of self; nor is it possible to neutralize, in a practical way, the freedom that is theoretically conceded to be the formal cause of the state of grace. And as matter of fact, the anti-evangelical tendency of Catholicism, as commonly taught, does not originate in the idea of merit as a whole; for, as even Thomas shows, that idea can at any moment be caused to disappear by falling back on the strict conception of grace: the main root of that tendency is rather the bearing that merit is supposed to have upon the increase of grace. That supposition inevitably imparts to the consciousness that allows itself to be possessed by it, the impression of a reciprocal action between grace and free-will; and the human tendency to self-assertion that corresponds to such a supposition will rise in rebellion

against the dominion of the general notion of grace as long as the idea prevails that the possession of special grace is dependent on the meritorious effort of its own will.

In Bernard's sermons¹ passages are to be found that harmonize with the views laid down in the tractate we have just been considering. The 105th, *de diversis*, distinguishes between justification and glorification as degrees in the state of grace. *Neque enim poterit obtineri magnificatio, nisi justificatio præcesserit, cum ista meritum, illa præmium sit.* Both are wrought by God; but beatification exceeds our powers, while justification directly demands them. *Sic enim adimpletur justificatio dum ab interdictis vitiis abstinere, et bona, quæ præcepta sunt, fideliter exercent.* In his sermon in octava Epiphaniæ Bernard exhorts *adimplere omnem justitiam* in order that the joy of beatification may be attained. For that is the reward, *justitia vero meritum et materia. . . . Nunc videtur laboriosa justitia, sed veniet quando sine omni labore fruemur justitia. . . .* In the fourth sermon *pro Dom. 1 Novemb.* he interprets the aspect of the seraphim, who cover their faces and feet with their wings, and thus suffer only the middle part of their bodies to be seen, as indicating that the beginning and completion of the state of grace are exclusively works of the grace of God, but that in the interval between them the free will has a measure of efficacy *meriti gratia*. Thus currency is given to that idea, although what purpose it serves does not appear, when at the same moment it is declared that the accomplishment of salvation is purely the effect of grace, *nec est mihi in hac parte vel cum gratia sive in ea gloriari, quasi coadjutor videar aut cooperator.* This does not prevent him in another place (*in Quadragesima, sermo 4*) from recommending the practice of fasting as a means of averting eternal punishment:—*non solum obtinet veniam sed et promeretur gratiam, non solum delet peccata quæ commisimus, sed et repellit futura, quæ committere poteramus.*

Notwithstanding these fundamental views (which are genuinely Catholic), Bernard is very far indeed in his sermons from countenancing any trust in the present works of the free will aided by grace. Nay rather, while taking for granted that his hearers are actually busying themselves in good and meritorious works, he is constantly exhorting them simply to disregard

¹ *Sermones de tempore, de sanctis ac de diversis.* Opp. vol. i.

their own contributions to these merits, and to take into account only the operation of God's grace in them, or, generally, to direct their attention away from these particular works to God as the founder of every hope of salvation.¹ Paradoxically, he says that the humility which renounces all claim to merit, and trusts in God alone, is the only merit which has any value.² But not only does he affirm God's grace to be the sole sufficient foundation on which the state of grace depends in all its stages, in order to counteract every temptation to self-righteousness; he gives prominence also to the mercy of God, in the sense that it alone in the constant imperfection of all good works and merits can be a ground of confidence that we are in a state of grace.³ In this matter Bernard reaches precisely

¹ In psalm. xci., sermo 1. 1: Timeo ne forte sit in nobis, qui non habitat in adjutorio altissimi, sed confidat in virtute sua et in multitudine divitiarum suarum. Forte enim fervorem habet aliquis potens in vigiliis, in jejuniis, in labore, et in ceteris hujusmodi, aut etiam multorum, ut sibi videtur, divitias meritorum longo tempore acquisivit, et in his confidens remissior est in timore Dei. . . . Tanto siquidem amplius timere Deum et magis sollicitus esse debuerat, quanto majora ejus munera jam percepit. Neque enim, quæ habemus ab eo, servare aut tenere possumus sine eo.—Sermo 9. 1: Quid quod bona omnia non modo propter eum constat fieri, sed per eum? Deus enim est, qui operatur in vobis et velle et perficere pro bona voluntate. 5. Præstendat alter meritum, sustinere se jactet pondus diei et æstus, jejunare bis in sabbato dicat, postremo non esse sicut ceteros hominum gloriatur; mihi autem adherere Deo bonum est, ponere in Deo meo spem meam.—In octava Pasche, sermo 1. 2: Quoties tentationi resistis, quoties vincis malignum, noli propriis tribuere viribus, noli in te sed magis in domino gloriari.—In festo annuntiationis Mariæ, sermo 1. 1: Testimonium spiritus in tribus consistere credo. Neceesse est enim primo omnium credere, quod remissionem peccatorum habere non possis, nisi per indulgentiam Dei; deinde, quod nihil prorsus habere queas operis boni, nisi et hoc dederit ipse, postremo, quod æternam vitam nullis potes operibus promereri, nisi gratis tibi detur et illa.

² De diversis, sermo 26. 1: Insuper est et insanus, quicumque in aliis vite meritis, quicumque in alia religione seu sapientia nisi in sola humilitate confidit. Apud Dominum jus habere non possumus, quoniam in multis offendimus omnes, sed nec fallere eum; ipse enim novit abscondita cordis, quanto magis opera manifesta. . . . Quid ergo restat, nisi ad humilitatis remedia tota mente confugere, et quidquid in aliis minus habemus, de ea supplere.—In psalm. xci., sermo 15. 5: Hoc totum hominis meritum, si totam spem suam ponit in eo, qui totum hominem salvum facit.

³ In vigilia nativitatis Dom., sermo 2. 4: Nolite timere, si perfectionem, quam desideratis, nondum potestis adipisci; sed quod minus habet imperfectio conversationis, suppleat humilitas confessionis, et imperfectum vestrum viderunt oculi Dei. Propterea enim mandata sua mandavit custodiri nimis, ut videntes imperfectionem nostram deficere, et non posse implere, quod debet, fugiamus ad misericordiam, et qui non possumus in vestitu innocentie seu justitie, appareamus vestiti confessione. Confessio enim est pulcritudo in conspectu Domini, si tamen sit non oris tantum sed etiam totius hominis, ut omnia cæca nostra dicant; Domine, quis similis tibi, idque solius pacis intuita et desiderio reconciliationis ad Deum.—In Epiphan. Dom., sermo 1. 1:

the way of thinking that is habitual with Luther, who fixes his attention rather on the relative imperfection than on the relative perfection of the works attainable by the regenerate, while Bernard, as has been seen, plainly pronounces an unvarying decision for the exclusive value of God's grace alike from either side of the question. It is of course implied in the very nature of the case that greater stress should be laid upon grace, when the believer calls to remembrance the imperfection of all his works, and impresses himself with the contrast they present to the requirements of God's law, than when by going back from his performances to divine grace he realizes to himself the sequence of its operations. So much the more strongly on that account does the conviction arise in the former case that believing confidence is the organ whereby the pardoning grace or mercy of God is appropriated.¹ In this view of faith Ber-

Quisquis consolationem ignorat necessariam, superest, ut non habeat Dei gratiam. 3. Quid agerem audiens Dominum venientem? Numquid non fugerem, sicut Adam, nonne desperarem, audiens quia ille venit, cujus legem sic prævaricatus sum, cujus patientia sic abusus sum, cujus beneficio tam ingratus inventus sum? Quæ vero major consolatio poterat esse, quam in dulci vocabulo, in nomine consolatorio. Propterea et ipse dicit, quia non venit filius, ut judicet mundum, sed ut salvetur mundus per ipsum. Jam confidenter accedo, jam supplico fiducialiter. Quid enim timeam, quando salvator venit in domum meam? Ei soli peccavi, donatum erit, quidquid indulserit ille. Deus est, qui justificat; quis est, qui condemnet? Aut quis accusabit adversus electos Dei? Propterea gaudere nos oportet, quod in nostra venerit; nunc enim facilis ad indulgentiam erit.—In psalm. xci., sermo 16. 1: Speravit in me, liberabo eum. . . . Non dicit, dignus fuit, justus et rectus fuit, innocens manibus et mundo corde, propterea liberabo, protegam et exaudiam eum. Si enim hæc et similia diceret, quis non diffideret? Quis gloriabitur, castum se habere cor? Nunc autem apud te propitiatio est, et propter hanc legem tuam sustinui te, Domine. Dulcis lex, quæ meritum exauditionis in clamore constituit postulationis.—In Dominica vi. post Pentecosten, sermo 3. 4: Liberaliter agit Deus, ignoscit plenarie, ita ut propter fiduciam peccatorum sed penitentium, ubi abundavit delictum, soleat et gratia superabundare. 6. Tria considero, in quibus tota spes mea consistit, caritatem adoptionis, veritatem promissionis, potestatem redditionis. Murmuret jam, quantum voluerit, insipiens cogitatio mea dicens; quis es tu aut quanta est illa gloria quibusve meritis hanc obtinere speras? Et ego fiducialiter respondebo: scio cui credidi, et certus sum, quia in caritate nimia adoptavit me, quia verax in promissione, quia potens in exhibitione.—In festo omnium sanctorum, sermo 1. 11: Quid potest omnis justitia nostra coram Deo? Nonne juxta prophetam velut pannus menstruatus reputabitur et si districte judicetur, injusta invenietur omnis justitia nostra? Propterea tota humilitate ad misericordiam recurramus, quæ sola potest salvare animas nostras.

¹ In vigil. nat. Dom., sermo 5. 5: Ante omnia fides querenda est. Crede ergo te Deo, committe te ei, jacta in eum cogitatum tuum, et ipse te enutriet, ut fiducialiter dicas: deus sollicitus est mei. Is vere fidelis est, qui nec sibi credit, nec in se sperat, factus sibi tanquam vas perditum, sed sic perdens

nard again necessarily rises to the level of Luther's thought, for mere intellectual belief and the faith that is formed by love alike fall short of what these statements express; and the confusion between faith and hope which is occasionally made in treating of this question has not here the effect of relegating the compassionate grace of God from the present to the future. It is true that Bernard occasionally brings the general thought of God's grace into connexion with the contemplation of the passion of Christ;¹ in this matter, however, he by no means comes up to the clear view of the Reformers, but entirely confines himself to a variety of figurative and fanciful expressions which have their closest analogues in the writings of Zinzendorf. This circumstance, however, does not affect the coincidence which, as we have seen, is to be found between Bernard and the Reformers, in so far as in common they regarded the moral self-consciousness of the regenerate as being modified and controlled by being referred to the religious standard of the grace of God.

18. St. Bernard's influence is seen throughout the whole ascetic and homiletic literature of the Middle Ages; but traces of the line of thought we have been describing are much more rarely to be met with than might have been expected from that circumstance. This, however, is accounted for by the fact, that the impulse towards a practical imitation of Christ's poverty, given by the two mendicant orders, came to have a central place in religion. In it is carried out the scheme of salvation briefly indicated by Anselm and Abelard, which represents, in the stricter sense, the Catholic view of Christianity. Poverty is the ascetic imitation of Christ, and the direct reciprocation of His self-sacrificing love of men. Of course it

animam suam, ut in vitam æternam custodiat eam.—In Epiph. Dom., sermo 3. 7: *Secure credamus in eum, secure credamus ei nos, cui nec potestas deest salvandi nos, cum sit verus Deus et Dei Filius, nec bona voluntas, cum sit tanquam unus ex nobis verus homo et hominis filius.*—In festo annuntiationis Mariæ, sermo 3. 3: *Sola spes apud te miserationis obtinet locum, nec oleum misericordiæ nisi in vase fiduciæ ponis. . . . Dicat quisque in pavore suo: vadam ad portas inferi, ut jam non nisi in sola Dei misericordia respirem.* *Hæc vera hominis fiducia, a se deficientis et innitentis Domino suo. Hæc, inquam, vera fiducia, cui misericordia non denegatur.*

¹ In Cantica, sermo 43. 3: *Pro acervo meritorum, quæ mihi deesse sciebam, hunc mihi fasciculum colligare volui collectum ex omnibus anxietatibus et amaritudinibus Domini mei.*—Sermo 61. 3: *Ubi tuta firmaque infirmis securitas et requies nisi in vulneribus salvatoris?*

claims to be the gospel type of piety, and to be on that account the peculiarly Catholic one. Nor did it confine itself within the limits of the Franciscan and Dominican orders, properly so called; rather by means of that activity in preaching, which constituted the principal business of these orders, and by the institution of the Tertiary orders, it gained a widely diffused influence throughout the whole ecclesiastical world. The real tendency of the gospel was not, however, carried out in this way. Since there was no clear idea of the positive conditions under which the world should be changed into the kingdom of God, the purpose of drawing it aside to the life of the cloister could not fail to be ineffectual so far as the world was concerned, and, at the same time, ultimately ruinous to the monasticism of the mendicant orders. In both orders the practical impulse found in mystical contemplation its complement and, also, its correction; for the sense of having done meritoriously, when aroused, had immediately to be put aside, along with everything pertaining to the creature, in rising to contemplation of the infinitude of God. Mystical contemplation, however, has a different purpose, and proceeds upon conditions and postulates other than those which regulate the religious estimate of one's own moral value by reference to the conception of grace revealed in Christ. The former seems to reach a higher level than the latter, and for this reason, perhaps, at the time when the mendicant orders flourished most, it might seem that the lower could be dispensed with where the higher was believed to be attainable. The particular tendency of the mendicant orders, on the one hand, to the practice of meritorious works, and, on the other hand, to mystical contemplation, was not counteracted by means of the study of the Bible, although the attention paid to it at that time was considerable;—the explanation of which is, that to the men of that time the Bible did not open up the immediate satisfaction of their religious needs in the passion and death of Christ as the basis of the reconciliation of mankind, because they were wont to use the empirico-practical notion of individual imitation of His poverty as the true key to the understanding of the life of Christ. The barrenness of such an attempt at imitation had first, therefore, to be experimentally proved before the general significance of Christ's passion as the basis of the covenant of grace, which

involves in it the forgiveness of sins, could rank higher than its particular significance as an ascetic pattern for individual believers. Further, it was necessary that the aspiration after a mystical exaltation into the infinite and boundless being of God should be first discovered in a practical way to be illusory, before men could again get hold of that concrete love which God has openly shown in Christ, as the means of correcting personal moral imperfection.

We can now understand why it is that the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries offer so few instances of the religious estimate of self, which Bernard exemplifies. But this deficiency is compensated for in a remarkable way by the very man who led the prevailing religious tendencies of those centuries—Saint Francis of Assisi. He was able to give to his contemporaries, and to succeeding generations, that grand impulse to the imitation of Christ's poverty, because his own religious genius surrendered itself unreservedly, without the slightest consciousness of merit in his works, to the assured persuasion of the grace of God. The whole structure of his life accords with that mode of thought whereby Bernard was able to rise above the catholic theological scheme of divine grace and human freedom. If Bernard, in spite of his theological training, was able to rise above all thought of merit towards God, Francis, by virtue of his very deficiency in theological education, was fitted for idealizing his strenuous activity in imitation of Christ's poverty and bearing of His cross by a complete renunciation of all pretension to personal merit in himself. Hereby he religiously ennobled the original simplicity of his nature in such a measure, that the sincerity and uprightness of his humility outweigh everything which by an appearance of constrained mannerism might tend to estrange us from him. Should it be necessary to show this otherwise than by reference to the attractive sketch of his life for which we are indebted to Hase,¹ I would simply point to those expressions in which Francis not only refers all that he did to God's grace and wisdom, but speaks of himself as sinful and worthless without these.²

¹ *Franciscus von Assisi. Ein Heiligenbild.* 1856. See particularly p. 109, and following pages.

² *Francisci Assisiensis et Antonii Paduani Opera*, ed. de la Haye. Pedeponti

Amongst the Franciscans and Dominicans who are eminent in the following centuries as practical and mystical preachers, it will not be possible to find traces of the prevalence of a piety of this stamp. In some cases there prevails stricter regard to the Catholic dogma, strengthened by the attribution of value to the practice of a life of poverty and humility; in other cases what is most insisted on is constant resort to the sacraments of penance and the eucharist; in other cases still, mystical elevation out of and above the sphere of created life into the infinity of the Divine Being (whereby the influences of semi-pelagianism are escaped). Yet even in these circles isolated hints of Bernard's way of thinking occasionally reveal themselves. On the one hand, Antony of Padua, a Franciscan, is explicit in declaring, in words avowedly borrowed from Bernard, that the blood of Christ is so strong a proof of the mercy of God, that no one is shut out from a share in its influence, and conversely, that he only is genuinely humble who neither suffers himself to be praised for his good works, nor permits himself to be called humble: but in relation to the grace of God within him is determined to pass for simply nothing.¹ In the sermons of John Tauler, a Dominican, on the other hand, there crops up once and again this same view of Bernard's, although, as is truly remarked by one who has made this province of history peculiarly his own,² the ideas of reconciliation

1739. Colloquium 4 (p. 71): In veritate dico vobis, domine episcopo, nullum tantum mihi concessisse honorem, sicut tu hodie. Alii sanctum, alii beatum me in Dei operibus proclamant, mihi, non Deo, honorem et gloriam tribuentes; sed tu hodie pro tua sapientia vere me honorasti, Deo, quæ sua sunt, laudem et gloriam tribuens; pretiosum a vili separasti, Deo sapientiam et virtutem, mihi inscitiam et vilitatem appropriasti.—Coll. 11 (p. 73): Videor, ait, mihi maximus peccatorum. Cui cum frater diceret ex adverso: Hoc non potes, pater, sana conscientia dicere nec sentire, subjunxit: Si quantumcunque sceleratum hominem tanta fuisset Christus misericordia prosecutus, arbitrator sane, quod multo, quam ego, Deo gravior esset.

¹ In the edition of his works cited above, *Sermones dominicales et de tempore*, pag. 2: Sanguis Christi clamat misericordiam. Securus, o homo, habes accessum ad Deum, ubi habes matrem ante filium, et filium ante patrem. Mater ostendit filio pectus et ubera, filius ostendit patri latus et vulnera. Nulla ergo ibi erit repulsa, ubi tot caritatis occurrunt insignia. Pag. 18:—Vere humilis non elevatur, cum de bonæ vitæ odore laudatur, verus (inquit Bernhardus) humilis vult vilis haberi et non humilis prædicari.

² Charles Schmidt: *Études sur le mysticisme allemand au xiv. siècle* (Paris 1847), pp. 142, 143. See Tauler's *Sermons* (Augsburg, 1508), fol. 85: "Worth never proceeds from man's works or merits, but solely from the grace and merit of our Lord Jesus Christ, flowing at the same time from God."—Fol. 124: "Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst come under my roof

and justification through Christ are of minor importance in Tauler's writings when compared with the striving after mystic union with God, and after the imitation of Christ.

It is a very common assumption with evangelical theologians that the mysticism which proceeds from the school of the Dominican Eckhart, as it is also represented by Tauler, Suso, and the compiler of the so-called *deutsche Theologie*, is in part a pre-Reformation exhibition of Reformation ways of thinking, and in part, through the last-mentioned book, the very source where Luther found his Reformation principles. To come to details—I do not think I am mistaken when I say that Ullmann has given important support to that belief by his assertion that in the *deutsche Theologie* are contained the essential constituent elements of the Reformation way of thinking.¹ A judgment so decided, even although it be rash and unsupported, could not fail to make a deeper impression than the more careful and guarded statement made by Ullmann at a later point (p. 279 f.), as to the general analogy between German mysticism and the Reformation movement. And accordingly it is received as an axiom of Church History, even by those who are worthy of every confidence in their own proper field.² If it be indeed true that the *deutsche Theologie* embodies the essentials of the Reformation doctrine, then the whole of the mysticism of the school of Eckhart is of a Reformation character. For the pantheistic principles of the school are not differently expressed in it than by Eckhart and Tauler; and the main problem of mysticism, which is the annihilation of the personality of the creature, in order to union with God, is asserted by the Frankfurt priest of the German order in the very hyper-ethical metaphysical sense of his predecessors. So that, if we take literally the assertion of Luther that to the *deutsche Theologie*, next to the Bible and Augustine, he is most indebted for what he has learned about "God, Christ, man, and all things,"³ we have

into my heart; but I come to that privilege through thy inexhaustible mercy, and the rich treasures of thy worthy merit. If I stand in need of repentance, love, and grace, I find it all in Thee, where virtue, desire, or longing and goodness are to be found."

¹ *Reformatoren vor der Reformation. II. Band.* (1842) p. 253.

² e.g. Weingarten: *Revolutionenkirchen Englands*, p. 2.

³ In Luther's preface to the complete edition of that work published in 1518. In Walch's edition xiv. p. 204, the date 1516 is wrongly given. That is the date of the shorter preface, along with which Luther at first

no reason for withholding from the older mystical theologians, beginning with Eckhart, the honour transferred to their servile follower, of having been the fathers of the German Reformation. But Luther's declaration ought not to be used in this way if we would avoid a hurtful misapprehension. Between the problem which the mystics seek to solve, and that of the Reformers, there undeniably exists a certain analogy, in virtue whereof Luther was able to sympathize with particular isolated assertions and exhortations of theirs when isolated from their premisses in the system, and understood in his own sense. But the problem how to get rid of one's personal individuality, as created, in order to attain to union with God, and absorption in His Being, is quite distinct from the problem how to renounce one's own merit in order to gain by confidence in Christ's merit a standing before God, and peace of conscience in spite of the sense of sin. The two problems differ not merely in compass but also in kind. It is not that the mystical consciousness merely aims higher than the other, so that the latter, perhaps, might be regarded as tacitly included in the former. The two standpoints are essentially distinct. For the religious task of the mystic is based upon a comparison between the Creator and the creature, metaphysically considered, and is designed to do away with the distance that the fact of creation establishes between the two. The religious task of the Reformer proceeds upon the moral contrast between the man who, while actually in the state of grace, is yet imperfect and sinful, on the one hand, and the lawgiver, on the other, and has for its object that revelation of God's grace in Christ, which is both the ground and the rule of all consciousness of salvation that is possible to the Church. In the one case it is sought to extirpate the individuality of man altogether; in the other case, what is desired is the maintenance of his ethical personality in the strictest sense.¹

published only a portion of the book, under the title, "The Old and the New Man—what they are." This preface is to be found in Walch, p. 207. Compare the preface, pp. x. xi. in Pfeiffer's edition of the *Theologie deutsch*. (2d Ed. 1855). As for the above-mentioned declaration of Luther, considered in itself, we must distinguish between two different ways of learning from books—learning by appropriation, and learning by suggestion. As Luther did not appropriate the peculiar circle of thought developed in this book, his interest in it must be referred to the stimulus he derived from it.

¹ Dorner in the main coincidea.—*Hist. Prot. Theol.* p. 215.

This is the reason why the consciousness of justification, when it awoke at the Reformation, could develop force enough to contend against the institutions of the Church of Rome, while the mystics acquiesced in them all. Nor did they even pave the way for the Reformation by developing that free inner life, that subjectivity and individuality, which, according to Ullmann (p. 280), were entirely confined to them during the Middle Ages. For their fundamental principle is really an exhortation to the utter extirpation of individuality, and the amount of thought and perseverance they devote to this absurd task does not exceed the measure of thoughtfulness and depth of feeling which could very well be associated with the scholastic style, and were indeed demanded by it. It is a surprising mistake, that one should for a moment imagine that the scholastic theology lays the foundation of a dead legality of life, and that the development of depth of subjective feeling lies quite beyond its scope; for the declaration common to all the schoolmen is precisely this, that justification through grace consists in the infusion of love. And surely, within the limits of Protestantism itself there are tendencies which, without in the least degree intending to break loose from the Reformation, yet check the development of free inner life, of subjectivity and individuality; the weak and conventional "illumination" does so as well as the dry orthodoxy of the school. The mystics of the fourteenth century can never be made out to be anything but thoroughly mediæval figures. They are not lifted out of their ecclesiastical surroundings in any specific way by the peculiarity of their religious principle, and whoever assigns to them a Reformation character abandons history just as much as those do who assign to the old Catholic Church an Ebionitic character and origin. In particular, we cannot assign the origin of the Reformation to the mystic school for these among other reasons: that notoriously the revolutionary reformation by the Anabaptists originated from the mystic type of piety, and that it is impossible to treat the Reformation fairly except by maintaining that specific distinction between it and the Anabaptist revolution of which the Reformers themselves were convinced. It is therefore radically wrong to seek within the sphere of the German mysticism of the fourteenth century for the mediæval basis of the fundamental concep-

tion of the Reformation as set forth by Luther and Zwingli. These anticipations of that manner of estimating self, brought into prominence by the Reformers, which are certainly to be found in the sentences quoted from Tauler, are not at all characteristic of mysticism, and on that account are so trifling in compass and importance as to be almost lost sight of amongst the mystical tendencies of that preacher.

19. A return to that immediate consciousness of the grace of God which we have seen in Bernard was first made in the fifteenth century, when on the one hand the productivity of mysticism had exhausted itself, and on the other the practical impulse given by the mendicant orders in the direction of a humble imitation of Christ's life of poverty had been transformed by the theology of Duns the Franciscan and his nominalist followers into a prevailing tendency towards meritorious action.¹ In that age of dry logic and common sense, in which even mysticism was maintained as a publicly taught system of doctrine only by the nominalist John Gerson, who discusses the conditions of the intuition of God as a part of the theory of knowledge—John Staupitz discovered in the distinct effort of reflection upon God's grace and love that very counterpoise to the pretensions of work-righteousness as ordinarily practised in the Western Church which corresponds to the model of Augustine and Bernard. Staupitz is in direct historical connexion with Luther as a master; but whether he himself owes his own style of thought to the influence of particular persons it is impossible to ascertain.² His writings, however, leave the impression of no small originality, and it were much to be

¹ I purposely refrain here from using the catchword Pelagianism, which I might perhaps be expected to use. The word certainly is very applicable to the nominalistic recognition of *merita de congruo*, but that is a theory to which no practice can directly adapt itself. In the Christian world of baptized persons *merita de congruo* could only occur in the *contritio* of those who had fallen from grace. Though an assumption apparently warranted by Duns, it has been disputed even by Biel, and has no formal recognition. The portion of the nominalistic theory which comes under consideration at this point is the assertion that Christ's merit and the *merita de condigno* which thereby first became possible are each partially and both of them together the causes of salvation (p. 92). This however is not Pelagian, because grace is postulated for the idea of merit.

² Compare C. L. Wilibald. Grimm, *De Joanne Staupitio, ejusque in sacrorum instaurationem merito*. In Illgen's *Zeitschrift f. histor. Theol.* 1837. Perhaps his predecessor in office as Vicar of the Augustinian order for Germany, Andreas Proles, had some influence upon him.

wished that Luther had attached himself theologically to his adviser and friend still more closely than he actually did. Staupitz's book, *De executione eternæ prædestinationis* (1517), which, viewed as a systematic work, is a very important one, in fact counts kindred more with Zwingli's *De providentia Dei anemnema* than with Luther's tract directed against Erasmus. Now Staupitz separates himself from the mystical theologians of the fourteenth century definitely and specifically by establishing the concrete personal idea of love as an element of our idea of God; here again, therefore, it leads to nothing but error when Ullmann (p. 256) makes him out to be the congenial successor of the mystics. For mysticism, properly speaking, in the first instance consists in that style of pious meditation dominated by the Areopagite's conception of God, wherein it is sought *as something attainable even in the present earthly state* to pass beyond all intervening objects until the individual consciousness be lost in the undifferentiated Being of God; the schoolmen on the other hand conceived of this as only possible in the life after death. Mystical theology is accordingly in the French school this pious contemplation put into a psychological theory; in the German school of Eckhart it is the theory, identical with that pious view, which discerns all things in the indeterminate oneness of the Divine Being; it is the theory of Pantheism, which only seemingly or only in virtue of inconsequence maintains itself in harmony with the Catholic dogma. With this theory Staupitz has nothing in common. But in the tractate *Von der Liebe Gottes* (1518) he undoubtedly makes statements of a mystical character, to the effect that by perfect love towards God man comes to be merged in Him so as to have no choice or activity of his own, that then the human spirit cleaves fast to God in such a manner as to be called one spirit, and that thereby man shakes himself free of himself and of every created thing.¹ But it would be wrong to make use of these expressions as if they were normal. For in the tractate *Vom christlichen Glauben* (chap. 10) he reserves for the life beyond the grave that unspeakable union, and thus puts himself in opposition to the mystics. But even were this not so, it no more follows from his assertion of the *unio mystica* that the theology of Staupitz is essentially mystical than that the Lutheran

¹ *Staupitzi Opera*, ed Knaake, vol. i. pp. 106, 118.

theology is to be classed as such on account of a similar assertion.

Staupitz, in fact, in such of his writings as we possess, declares himself, distinctly and without circumlocution, theologically to uphold the Catholic idea of justification. "The sinner is justified by regeneration. In this new birth God is the father, the will is the mother, the quickening seed is the merit of Christ. Wherever these three things concur, the Son of God is brought forth, justified and quickened through faith which worketh by love."¹ He accordingly adopts also the idea of merits rewarded by God with blessedness; but he hastens to add that, since grace is the ground of good works, God therefore rewards in the justified person His own works. For as God is the last operative cause in all operations, so also in us He has special works—the works of the faith formed in us. These proceed from Christ and return to Christ (as their end), and are therefore, in a particular sense, called works of Christ, although formally they are in man, and not God's, except in a merely external sense, for in themselves they are finite in nature and extent. Since now they belong to a finite person and in their nature are finite, it is therefore impossible that any righteousness of infinite merit, to which an infinite reward were due, should be founded on them. If, then, God has determined to bestow Himself as their reward, it comes of grace, not of debt. Since justification is a grace, and the acceptance of the works wrought in grace is also a grace which makes them meritorious (this with Duns as against Thomas), and since the merit of Christ is also ours through grace, the whole Christian's life is fitly brought under the idea of grace, and there is easily merged in that idea what is usually attributed to the reasonable creature, namely, the mastery or proper control of his own works from their beginning to their ending. For the beginning of the work of the Christian man is in Providence, the middle of it is justification, the ending of it is glorification or exaltation, which are works of grace and not of nature.² In like manner also in his treatise *Von der Liebe Gottes*, Staupitz is wholly intent on subordinating all human action under antecedent

¹ *De prædestinationis executione*, in Christopher Scheurl's translation; Sec. 34, 35, 36, as above, p. 145.

² Sec. 38, 40, 43, 52, as above, pp. 146-150.

Divine love. Our hope is built in no manner of way upon the love which we bear toward God, but upon the love which God has towards us—upon the works which God works in us (p. 101). He therefore declares against the folly of those men who flatter themselves that they are able, by their good deed, to move God at their pleasure, and to win Him to them with their devoutness, as a sparrow-hawk is drawn to carrion. These claim precedence over God's mercy, bring to market filthy rags, would fain buy gold with filth and be made blessed by means of their own righteousness, and, to vindicate their folly, make use of the teachings of holy masters whom they do not understand (p. 108). Although now the love inwrought in us by God at one time increases and at another time diminishes in degree, it is not without special consolation to know that the love which God bears towards us neither diminishes nor increases, and often, without our knowing it, does the very best for us when we least think it. So that we feel the greater confidence in God just as we lose confidence in ourselves, and no longer trusting to our own powers, look to the cross of Christ alone (p. 110).¹

The same theological adherence to the Catholic doctrine of justification in conjunction with a similar elevation of devotional feeling and of religious estimation of self, in attributing exclusive value to God's grace, had been already observable at an earlier period in the case of John Wessel. I can hardly understand how it is that Ullmann could assert² that, with regard to the material principle of the Reformation, in "carrying back the Christian life to the redemption and justification that is in Christ, to the exclusion of all other means of salvation that are merely of man's appointment," Wessel was at one with Luther and the contemporaries of Luther. In so far as such language can be applied with justice to Wessel's doctrine, it is

¹ I naturally refrain from laying stress here upon the tractate of Staupitz, *Von dem heiligen rechten christlichen Glauben*. For it was published in 1525, after his death (ob. 28 Dec. 1524), and bears unmistakeable traces of Luther's influence in the mode of apprehending the ideas of faith and of justification or redemption in Christ, as also in the inferior position given to the sacrament of penance in comparison with faith; although it was composed by Staupitz when he was Abbot of Saint Peter's, in Salzburg, whither he had withdrawn in order to continue at peace with the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church.

² *Reformatoren vor der Reformation*, ii. p. 659.

very far from accurately expressing the distinguishing characteristics of the Reformation teaching. And further, it is purely and explicitly the Romish doctrine which Ullmann himself (p. 514) reproduces in the following quotation from Wessel : "The taking away of sin is nothing else than the possession of justifying love; for he who is without that, abides in sin. In order that Christ, therefore, may take away our sins, He must needs infuse righteousness." It is indeed true, on the other hand, that Wessel, like Staupitz, lays the chief stress on Christ's objective working for the accomplishment of this end, and not upon the instrumentality of human freedom. For he proceeds, "Christ is thus, in His assumed humanity, the operating cause of the justification of the ungodly, of grace and wisdom, of judgment and love, of their progress unto perfection, and of the completion of those who have been made perfect, that is, of beatification."¹ Both aspects of his teaching are to be found also further on in the book. Wessel proceeds to say that men are not made righteous by the works of the law, since, being sinners, they do not accomplish these with the requisite degree of perfection (cap. 45, 46). Sinners are accordingly made righteous through faith in Christ—that faith, namely, which worketh by love. Faith has not, of course, a value which comes up to the active perfection of the angels; yet it pleased God to grant to believers greater righteousness than to the angels, the righteousness, to wit, of the priestly functions of Christ, whereby believers are righteous even if they do not work righteousness perfectly (cap. 45). Or, as it is expressed in another connexion, it is not our faith that is our righteousness, but the purpose of God, who, in the sacrifice of Christ, accepts our sacrifice. In the blood of Christ there is not merely the forgiveness of sins, but justification also and blessedness (cap. 44). Our works and spiritual sacrifices are in themselves unable to stand the judgment of God; but since by faith we have part in Christ's perfect sacrifice, we shall stand as right-

¹ *De magnitudine passionis*, cap. 7. *Opera*, Amstelod. 1617. I may remark that Wessel was a nominalist in metaphysics indeed, but not in theology. As a theologian, moreover, he makes use not of the scholastic, but of the rhetorical form, which is well adapted to his tendency to a brilliant use of figures. It is of course impossible to attain to any fixed theological ideas by such a method, still Wessel also in this respect follows in the track of the realist tendencies of the Catholic doctrine.

eous before God's strict judgment, by means of that participation and by means of our own spiritual sacrifices (cap. 39). But in spite of these sound Catholic views, Wessel is not disposed to lay weight upon the proper works and performances of those who are in Christ: his whole feeling relies upon the cross of Christ alone, and the gracious purpose of God. *Vere dignum et justum in cruce Christi gloriari, ex qua maxime nostra dignitas innotescit, per quam secuta nobis fiducia et pignus datur ad nostram illam dignitatem, quæ nobis per crucem innotuit certissime reditura* (cap. 42). *Super omnia gloriemur in Deo, per Christum suam in nobis caritatem commendante* (cap. 44). *Qui evangelium audiens credit,—præterea amat evangelisatum justificantem et beatificantem, quantalibet pro consequendo faciat et patiat, non sua opera, non se operantem extollit, sed propensus in eum quem amat,—nihil sibi ipsi tribuit, qui scit nihil habere ex se. Scit ergo, si nihil habet, nisi quod acceperit, non de suo gloriandum, quasi non acceperit sed in eo gloriandum, qui donat. Vere omnes justitiæ nostræ velut pannus menstruatus,—ut vere non tum justi, sed mere injusti plectendique convincamur* (cap. 46). Finally, I would point to his *Exempla scalæ meditationis*, three very elaborate tracts, in which the pedantic arrangement and rhetorical style do not affect the definiteness with which Wessel places his whole assurance of salvation in that love which Christ showed in giving up His life for us.

Besides Wessel, Ullmann has represented two other men of the fifteenth century, John von Goch and John von Wesel, as having been "Reformers previous to the Reformation." If we leave out of sight the general conception of what constitutes a "reformation" character as stated in the book that bears that title,—a conception so vague as to assign that character not merely to those chiefly practical and biblical theologians, but also to phenomena so completely heterogeneous and thoroughly mediæval as are pantheistic mysticism and scholastic nominalism,—then the connexion of these men with the Reformation amounts merely to this, that they disputed one or two of the institutions of the Romish Church—the vows, for example, and indulgences. Ullmann tries, however, to make too much of the value of that opposition of theirs. As in the case of Wessel, so here also his doing so can only be accounted for by his strangely defective understanding of the Catholic as well as of the Reforma-

tion doctrines of salvation. In speaking of Goch, indeed, he does not go so far as to maintain that he coincided with the Reformers in their doctrine of justification; he concedes that "the doctrine of justification through faith alone does not as yet come into prominence as the central point dominating everything, in the same measure as with the Reformers."¹ But Ullmann's own excerpts from the writings of Goch (from p. 77 onwards) show that that author holds nothing different from the regular Romish doctrine of justification. Ullmann finds this besides to praise specially in Goch, that he strictly excluded all human merit. His own excerpts, however, prove only that Goch, like Staupitz, controverted Thomas's conception of merit by means of that of Duns and the Nominalists. Nor does John von Wesel stand in any closer connexion with the Reformers upon the decisive question of justification. For what Ullmann² alleges as a proof that he did so stand, is, in fact, a Catholic doctrine;—this, namely, that Christ is our righteousness, in so far as we are guided by the Holy Ghost, and the love of God (towards God) is shed abroad in our hearts. The same want of knowledge of the Catholic doctrine is shared also by the biographer of another so-called forerunner of the Reformation. Of Hieronymus Savonarola it is certified by Charles Meier,³ that he "clearly apprehended the real core of the Reformation—the doctrine of justification without the merit of works, through grace, in faith,"—and yet, from the subsequent sketch of his doctrine, it is established indubitably that he was a Thomist!⁴ Of John Wyclif, too, Lechler⁵ brings it forward as something special, that "although his mode of expression is not without a scholastic character, particularly in the recognition of merits, he is yet far removed from holding the theory of work-righteousness, and rather inclines to hold by the free grace God in Christ. He declares the notion of *meritum de congruo* to be a fabrication. He accentuates, on the other hand, the truth

¹ As above, i. p. 90.

² As above, i. pp. 324, 325.

³ *Girolamo Savonarola* (1836), pp. 215, 269-281.

⁴ It must be conceded that Savonarola also gives expression to the religious estimate of self, after the manner of Bernard, in his exposition of the 51st Psalm, which was recommended by Luther: "Quot justi, tot miserationes. Nullus gloriari potest in semetipso. Veniant omnes justi et interrogemus eos coram Deo, an sua virtute salvi facti sint? Certe omnes respondebunt, Non nobis, Domine, sed nomini tuo da gloriam."

⁵ Herzog's *Realencyklopädie*, xviii. p. 100.

that faith is a gift of God, which is only bestowed of grace ; and that God, when He rewards a man's good work, crowns His own gift." This is Thomist theology ; and he who controverts *meritum de congruo*, impugns Nominalism indeed, but no part of the doctrine of the Romish Church. Equally inaccurate is Krummel's affirmation,¹ that John Hus is Protestant in his doctrine of justification. His own excerpts prove that Hus maintained the Catholic doctrine merely. For, as I have already said (above, p. 91), all the characteristics of justification as a work of grace enumerated there, are asserted by the realist teachers of the mediæval Church ; but they understand by the main idea of justification something different from what the Reformers understood, and so also there is a difference with regard to the faith which pertains to justification. It cannot, however, matter much whether the Reformation *doctrine* of justification was enunciated previous to the Reformers or not. For it was not from this *theological doctrine* that the Reformation proceeded. It is enough for me at present that the practical self-estimate of believers, according to the standard of grace,—an estimate which excludes all value of merits,—an estimate used alike by Augustine and Bernard,—was clearly and plainly reached in the fifteenth century by Wessel and Staupitz. For this practical consciousness was the root of the Reformation activity of both Luther and Zwingli.

20. And yet that concentration of attention upon grace, and that renunciation of all claim to merit, of which we have been speaking, is not confined merely to single distinguished individuals within the Catholic Church : in a certain sense it constitutes a constant and characteristic feature of the Roman Catholic Church itself. Whenever she places herself in the attitude of prayer, it is inevitable that in the expression of her religious discernment, in thanksgiving and in petition, all the benefits of salvation should be referred to God or to Christ ; the daily need for new grace, accordingly, is not expressed in the form of a claim based upon merits, but in the form of reliance upon God.² But consciousness of sin, the worthlessness of merits

¹ *Geschichte der böhmischen Reformation*, p. 388.

² *Hymni ecclesiastici, præsertim qui Ambrosiani dicuntur*. In *Georg. Cassandri Operibus* (Paris, 1616).

p. 177. Ob hoc redemptor quæsumus,
Ut probra nostra diluas,
Vitæ perennis commoda
Nobis benigne conferas.

before God, and the utter need of sin-pardoning grace for our salvation, are expressed and taught in the strictest way in a prayer of the Romish *Canon of the Mass*, which naturally, on account of this connexion, has supreme significance for the Church: *Nobis quoque PECCATORIBUS, famulis tuis, de multitudine MISERATIONUM tuarum sperantibus, partem aliquam et societatem donare digneris cum . . . omnibus sanctis tuis, intra quorum nos consortium NON ÆSTIMATOR MERITI, SED VENIÆ, quæsumus, LARGITOR admitte.*

When this testimony of Roman Catholicism is considered, it is fitted to cause surprise, that its point of view should have been practically resorted to so comparatively seldom, and only in instances so isolated during the centuries of the middle ages. On the other side, too, the Romish opponents of the Reformation in the sixteenth century were well aware that this manner of estimating self was either of obligation, or else that it represented the highest degree of piety, and one to be sought after.¹ I do not think it probable that such a line of thought in these circles was first of all brought again to recollection by the circumstance that the Reformers laid so great stress upon it. Rather even before the controversy broke out it had already come into prominence quite distinctly among theologians who

- p. 186. Virtutis infer copiam,
Qua conferas clementiam,
Oblitus ut peccaminum
Dones quietem temporum.
- p. 189. Infunde nunc piissime
Donum perennis gratiæ,
Fraudis novæ ne casibus
Nos error atterat vetus.
- p. 193. Ob hoc redemptor quæsumus,
Reple tuo nos lumine,
Per quod dierum circulis
Nullis ruamus actibus.
- p. 216. Da tempus acceptabile
Et penitens cor tribue,
Convertat ut benignitas,
Quos longa suffert pietas.
- p. 221. O crux ave, spes unica,
Hoc passionis tempore
Auge piis justitiam
Reisque dona veniam.

¹ Compare Wimpina, *Anacephalæosis hæresium* ii. 9; *Literæ pontificiæ Pauli III., de modo concionandi* (by Reginald Poole) in *Laemmer's Die vortridinisch-katholische Theologie*, p. 163, 168. Compare also *Gerhardi Confessio catholica*, p. 1558, *seq.*,—but with discrimination.

are far removed from the circle of the Reformers. I think I may venture to conjecture that towards the end of the fifteenth century, contemporaneously with the fall into discredit of the monkish work-righteousness, and the complete disappearance of the Nominalist school, there began a general recurrence on the part of men to *this* fundamental Augustinian principle of the religious life ; and particularly that the leaning of the Wittenberg theologians towards Augustine was originally only a branch-movement in that general agitation of the Church. George Cassander, in a passage I shall immediately cite, refers to the fact that not only the Parisian theologian, Iodocus Clichtoveus (ob. 1543), but also the theologian of Louvain, Adrian of Utrecht (Pope Adrian VI.), obviously following Bernard (p. 100, note, *ad fin.*), plainly pronounced against the value of meritorious works, making use of the figure employed in Isa. lxiv. 6.¹ But Cassander himself, at the close of a series of testimonies, adduces the evidence of these contemporaries to show that the universal Church had occupied this standpoint from the very beginning. He says, "With regard to the righteousness which consists in obeying the commandments of God, the universal Church declares that she depends chiefly upon faith in the forgiveness of sins, upon the mercy of God, through the instrumentality of Christ's blood, being in herself impure and imperfect." (Here follow testimonies taken from all ages of the Church.) "It appeared to me good to write this, in order that the Church of the present might be vindicated from reproach, as if she attributed too much to this active righteousness and to the merit of good works, and treated with ingratitude and contempt the merit of Christ, and also in order that the Protestants might more easily be able to attach themselves to

¹ The task I am immediately occupied with prevents me from investigating specially this change I have indicated in the Church's tone. Still I have not the slightest doubt that towards the beginning of the sixteenth century one could find, over and above the two theologians that have been named, several other orthodox Catholic divines who also revived the Augustinian tradition in this fashion. Even Erasmus belongs to this class. Accordingly, we must fix in some other way the value of Wessel and of Staupitz than by calling them forerunners of the Reformation, and even Reformers previous to the Reformation. The latter designation, in particular, is altogether to be set aside ; for it is untrue. These men reformed nothing either in the doctrine or in the institutions of the Church. But neither ought they as forerunners of the Reformation to be separated from the other Augustinians and realists, to whom they are more closely allied than to the Reformers.

Whom? because...

the unity of the Church in this essential point of justification before God."¹

That this expectation was not realized is to be attributed to the following circumstance, apart from the causes that may lie below the surface. The real position of the public doctrine which the Reformation had to do with, was on neither side apprehended or stated with historical accuracy and truth. The theological opponents of the Reformation, who were exclusively Realists, utterly ignore the fact that the Nominalist school, throughout an entire century and a half, had maintained Pelagian doctrine in connexion with *merita de congruo*, and had over-estimated *merita de condigno* as compared with the merit of Christ; that, as a school, Nominalism had received just the same public recognition with Realism; and both scientifically and practically had exercised a more widely extended influence. The Reformers, on the other hand, level against scholasticism, as a whole, the charges of Pelagianism, which are in reality true of the nominalist doctrine only.² And yet, even if these causes of mutual misunderstanding had been removed in time, the two parties would still have failed to adjust their

¹ *De articulis religionis inter Catholicos et Protestantos controversis consultatio ad Ferdinandum I. et Maximilianum II.* (1564.) In his collected Works, pp. 924, 925.

² Compare, for example, *Apologia Conf. Aug.* p. 61. "Scholastici secuti philosophos tantum docent justitiam rationis . . . quod ratio sine Spiritu sancto possit diligere Deum super omnia . . . ad hunc modum docent, homines mereri remissionem peccatorum, faciendo quod in se est," p. 63. "Quod fingunt discrimen inter meritum congrui et meritum condigni, ludunt tantum, ne videantur aperte *πελαγιστεύειν*. Nam si Deus necessario (!) dat gratiam pro merito congrui, jam non est meritum congrui, sed meritum condigni." This latter remark of Melancthon at once shows that he has no understanding of the matter, for the Nominalists, in respect of both sorts of merit, deny any sort of necessity so far as God is concerned (p. 91). It is in the adoption ("faithful to the confession") of these unhistorical assumptions, however, that the views of Protestant historians, reviewed above, have their origin, as if mediæval theologians at once separate themselves from the doctrine of the Catholic Church merely in virtue of the fact that they assign no value to *meritum de congruo*, and derive from grace everything that is good in man. Another scientifically inaccurate assertion of Melancthon—connected with the previous one—is to be found in p. 175: "Adversarii dicunt peccatum ita remitti, quia attritus seu contritus elicit actum dilectionis Dei, per hunc actum *meretur* accipere remissionem peccatorum. . . . Præterea docent confidere, quod remissionem peccatorum consequamur *propter* contritionem et dilectionem." On the one hand, even *attritio* as *actus informis*, presupposes grace; and, on the other, *contritio*, as being *actus caritate formatus*, presupposes *gratia gratum faciens*. In the progress from the first to the second grade, and even on the second grade itself, the idea of *meritum* is not at all resorted to.

differences by means of that common confession. For, just in order to leave room for merits, the followers of Rome tolerated the incongruity between the religious estimate of self that is gained when we judge ourselves exclusively in the light of divine grace, and the dogma of real justification. The Reformers, on the other hand, found themselves warranted and driven to bring the theological doctrine into harmony with the practical consciousness of grace. Can any one rationally deny that the actually righteous person, in placing his confidence without any regard to his own merits (*non æstimator meriti*) for the attainment of blessedness solely in God's forgiving grace (*sed veniæ largitor*), solicits such a sentence of God as shall mercifully (*de multitudini miserationum tuarum*) regard as righteous one who is conscious that, so far as his own merits are concerned, he is unrighteous (*nobis peccatoribus*)? Since such a subjective renunciation of all claim to merit is enjoined (*non æstimator meriti*), there must necessarily be assigned to this synthetic judgment of justification (*veniæ largitor—nobis peccatoribus*), a scope and significance reaching, so far as God is concerned, beyond that real change in man whereby it is possible for him to produce good works as merits. It is on the observation of this fact that the Reformers base their undertaking theologically to distinguish justification from regeneration, and to place the former as a divine sentence passed on the sinner before his actual renewal through the Holy Ghost. Of course the business of the Reformation is not exhausted in this attempt at a reconstruction of the doctrine; but such a reconstruction also is a necessary feature in that reformation of the church's life which Luther and Zwingli brought about by means of the leading idea of a religious estimate of self, in the light of God's grace alone.

The Roman Catholic Church, adhering to the doctrinal decisions of the Council of Trent, still continues to oscillate between the one view and the other. In her communion, people are assured of their ability to accomplish good works *in statu justificationis per gratiam*, whereby they satisfy *divinæ legi pro hujus vitæ statu plene* (what a contradiction!), and actually merit eternal life as a reward; but, at the same time, they do not forget that these merits are still only God's gifts of grace, so that one cannot attach value to them as being one's own

works (Sess. vi. *decr. de Iustificatione*, cap. 16). Hence the pledge of the continued religious solidarity of the Western Church is given by no means indistinctly in the closing sentences in this doctrinal decree, although obscured by their reference to merits, which is as deliberate as it is illogical: *Absit ut Christianus homo in se ipso vel confidat vel glorietur, et non in domino, cujus tanta est erga omnes homines bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quæ sunt ipsius dona. Et quia in multis offendimus omnes, unusquisque sicut misericordiam et bonitatem, ita severitatem et iudicium ante oculos habere debet, neque seipsum aliquis, etiamsi nihil sibi conscius fuerit, iudicare, quoniam omnis hominum vita non humano iudicio examinanda et iudicanda est, sed Dei, qui illuminabit abscondita tenebrarum et manifestabit consilia cordium; et tunc laus erit unicuique a Deo qui, ut scriptum est, reddet unicuique secundum opera sua.* In contrast with this, the fundamental fact of the exclusive importance of grace is unreservedly laid down in the exhortation to the dying which the official *agenda* of the Romish Church¹ prescribe, to the effect that the dying must repose their confidence upon Christ and His passion as the sole ground of salvation. This ordinance is the origin of the jocular saying current among the Lutherans in Würtemberg, that every Catholic becomes a Lutheran before his death: the sober fact is, that the Romish Church, in dealing with her members at *this* point, sacrifices her own particular pretensions to the universal Christian truth.

¹ *Agenda Coloniensis ecclesiæ* (Colon. 1637), p. 108; *Agenda sive Rituale Osnabrugensæ* (Colon. 1653), p. 171.

CHAPTER IV.

THE REFORMATION PRINCIPLE OF JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH IN CHRIST.

21. THE circle of thoughts, the historical development of which I am at present engaged in tracing, undergoes in the first instance, at the hand of the Reformers, an important modification in respect of form. In the mediæval system of doctrine, the treatment of the satisfaction or merit which Christ gave or acquired towards God on behalf of the human race or of the elect, was carried out in a purely objective way; the influence of this work upon man was always only alluded to in that connexion, and treated with doctrinal fulness, on the other hand, in an entirely different part of the system, in the doctrine of justification. The Reformers, on the contrary, not only take together the two thoughts in their immediate reciprocal relation to each other, but at the same time fix the chief interest upon the thought of justification, and seemingly assign to the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction the position of a subsidiary doctrine, which has the function of explaining the assertion they make, that justification is conditioned exclusively by faith. This formal change in the way of putting the problem is, however, an indication of a change in the nature and contents of the thought of justification. When Luther at once places it in a position of central importance, and emphasizes his own view of it as the decisive and indispensable truth, he means by justification through faith in Christ a subjective religious experience of the believer within the Church, and not an objective theological *dictum* in the Church's system of doctrinal beliefs. In this respect Luther's apprehension of justification differs in kind from the Roman Catholic doctrine that bears the same name to such an extent that the customary

procedure of the old polemical theology, and of the modern science of comparative "Symbolic" in comparing with one another the evangelical and the Roman Catholic views of justification, as if they were antitheses framed with direct reference to each other, is, at the outset, mistaken, fruitless, misleading. For by justification through Christ solely on condition of appropriating faith is meant an experience of the believer complete in itself and continuous. What the Roman Catholic doctrine understands by justification, on the other hand, on account of the machinery declared to be necessary,—the sacraments and active fulfilment of the laws of God and the Church,—can never possibly pass as a simple experience into the soul of the believer. Nay, rather the assurance of being justified before God, even if it be awakened for a moment by means of absolution, is forbidden to the ordinary course of everyday life as being presumptuous. The difference in kind between the two thoughts, though they bear the same name, appears too in their complete diversity, and mutual irrelevance in application and function. The Roman Catholic doctrine of justification is meant to explain how and by what means an actually righteous person, who can be judged as such in consistency with truth even by God, is produced out of a sinner. The meaning of the religious experience of justification, on the other hand, in the Reformation sense, is that the believer (who as such is regenerate and a member of the Church, and who through the Holy Ghost is capable of producing good works, and actually engaged in them), on account of the abiding imperfection of these good works does not find his standing before God, his righteousness and the ground of his abiding assurance of salvation, in them, but only in the mediatorial and perfectly righteous work of Christ appropriated by faith. It accords only with this definition of the thought that Luther, as well as Melancthon, the *Formula Concordiæ* as well as the *Apology for the Augsburg Confession*, that Calvin as well as Zwingli strive to establish in it the consolation of pious consciences, the quieting of souls anxious about their salvation. It is only as a subsequent and secondary matter that the Reformers direct their attention to the position to be assigned in the theological system to the thought that has been religiously and practically experienced. This last undertaking, however, was not carried

out by Luther and Melancthon with the clearness and independence of the religious and practical employment of that truth that were to be wished, and it will remain to be considered whether and how far succeeding dogmatists have succeeded in finishing the task which their great predecessors had left uncompleted. In the order of the doctrines, that of Christ's satisfaction had naturally to come first, then follows the doctrine of the awakening of faith or of regeneration, then the doctrine of justification, the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and *then* (not before) the doctrine of the habitual renewal of the justified, so that he becomes fitted for good works. In this shape, now, the evangelical *doctrines* of justification and regeneration come into contrast with the Romish *doctrine* of justification *or* regeneration; and here, first of all, does a comparison between these doctrines and that of Rome become possible. This being so, it is absurd to measure the two doctrines of justification by one another, although they bear the same name; for the compass and extent of the Romish doctrine are covered only by two or three doctrines of the evangelical system taken together. But the reason why the thought, which on the part of the Romish Church is conceived as a unity, is analysed on the part of the Evangelical Church into several distinct notions, is explained by the successors of the Reformers always merely from the religious need on the part of the regenerate for justification by faith, but never from objective considerations of the systematic connexion of Christian doctrine. It will appear also, that in the objective doctrinal exposition of the thought of justification by faith, the Lutherans were precisely those who failed to pay attention to all the conditioning elements under which the religious conception was brought by Luther. When, accordingly, school-tradition raised itself to a position of supreme power in the Lutheran Church, the imperfectly expounded thought of justification by faith came to be unintelligible just in proportion as men treated it, in the first instance, as an objective doctrine, and made its religious value to depend upon acceptance of the formula. And when afterwards Pietism undertook anew to bring back the doctrine to subjective praxis, or actual religious and moral experience, that was not done in the churchly spirit of the Reformation, but in a spirit of separation and sectarian-

ism hostile to the Church. Since, finally, the efforts of the Evangelical Church of the nineteenth century have gone back upon the Reformation, and believe that they have regained the regulative principle at once of Christian life and of theological creed in the distinctive truth of justification by faith, it might probably seem as if no obstacles had to be overcome in the historical investigation of the question, what the Reformers, and particularly Luther, actually maintained. But, unfortunately, the state of the case is far otherwise. For the repristination of Luther's standpoint in our day has been able to avoid neither the pietistic nor the scholastic distortion of that doctrine from what it originally was to his religious intuition, and on that account the historical and the theoretical ascertainment of the *churchly* sphere of vision within which Luther connected justification exclusively with faith in Christ's satisfaction, are alike problems still unresolved, because no one has yet apprehended them.¹

The widely comprehensive study of the history of theology and of dogma on which, as it was pursued during last generation, we have to congratulate ourselves, was not as a whole regulated so much as it ought to have been by regard to those points of Church history which were fitted to direct it, and this defect makes itself felt particularly in the manner of apprehending and interpreting the theology of the Reformers. When once we depart from that method of treating Church history, which proceeds upon the theory that in the changes and in the advances of theological science the logically necessary development of thought must be traced, we have no longer any other point of view left to us than that which makes the religious and scientific experiences of the theological subject to form the sufficient basis for his particular theological views. For second or third class men this standard may suffice: for by it the individual's development will be dependent on the position of the Church as he finds it. But such a standard, as it is customarily resorted to, is not sufficient for an understanding of the theology of the Reformation. The individual subjects, Luther,

¹ I have already, however, in an exposition of Andreas Osiander's doctrine of justification (*Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, ii., 1857), stated what are the points of view which always approved themselves to me as the right ones for the apprehension of the matter.

Zwingli, Melancthon, Calvin, are indeed recognised by us as reformers precisely by this feature, that they set themselves against the course of the Church and of theology as it had been going on up to their time, and so were not dominated by it. But we, for our part, cannot so appreciate them, as if they had put themselves in an attitude of contrariety to the tendency of the Catholic Church itself which had come down to them in history. For in that case we ourselves should not be able to distinguish between their dignity and that of their contemporaries,—the Anabaptists,—Schwenkfeld,—Faustus Socinus,—and we should at the very outset be conceding the justice of the Roman Catholic criticism, that the fathers of the evangelical churches were heretics just as much as these founders of sects and leaders of schools. But we are satisfied (without going further into the matter) that the Reformers as such neither had any wish to found a new religion, nor, as matter of fact, did they found new churches, as if they believed that up to their time their religious tendency had not been at all operative in the Western Church. Nor yet do we consider the Reformers in the light of prophets, as if they brought religious knowledge and the ordinances of the Church to a degree of perfection that had not been objectively possible before their time: for the Reformers expressly repudiated, so far as they were concerned, the claim to that effect made by the leaders of the Anabaptists. To what historical circumstances must we attribute it then, that the Church-Reformers as such should have kept the ground of the Church, and that they should have confounded it neither with that of the sects nor with that of the schools? In virtue of what principle was it that, in breaking loose from the Church in its Romish form, they did not also complete their separation from the Catholicity of the Church? The answer to these questions will not have been sufficiently given by pointing out the intention of the Reformers to maintain current the *idea* of the universal Church. For the Anabaptists also, and the Socinians after their fashion, share this intention, and yet the distinctive marks to which each of these parties in its own way brings back the idea of the Church run completely counter to the doctrine that up till then had been current or implicitly taken for granted. The question amounts, therefore, to this,—Whether the Reformers also, in accordance with a

traditional maxim, which was not altogether rejected even by their opponents, maintained the ground of the universal Church even after the Roman ecclesiastical power had cast them out as heretics? In fine, it amounts to this,—whether in this respect they actually are distinguished from the efforts of the Socinians and Anabaptists, seemingly analogous yet combated by them, or whether, together with these, they are to be ranked in one and the same class.

22. The Reformation could not have got beyond her first movements of life in Germany and Switzerland, if in these countries the pretension of the Roman Church, that *she alone is the Christian community*, had held good with unmitigated significance and strength. The power of the Pope and of the bishops would in that case have suppressed the Reformation by the same means and with the same result in these lands also, just as actually was the case in Italy. It was possible to carry out the Reformation in Germany and in Switzerland only because since the fifteenth century the consequences of the downfall of the papal power in these countries had entailed a preponderance of the State over the Church, based upon the State's generally recognised right of advocacy for the Church.¹ While this right had by Gregory VII. been degraded into the unconditional duty of submission on the part of the State to the power of the Church, its public currency since the Babylonian captivity of the popes, since the schism and reforming councils had again approximated to that standard according to which the relation of State to Church had been treated in the Byzantine and Frankish periods of the Roman Empire. As advocate of the Church, the Roman Emperor figured in the chief place; but the states of the Roman Empire belonging to the German nation participated each according to its share in the rights of that position. While, accordingly, the Empire was generally recognised at the period of the Reformation as being the Christian community, in the wider meaning of that expression, the division of political power amongst the large number of states of the Empire rendered possible, in virtue of the assertion by these of rights over the Church, the agitation and propagation of particular religious views, which the latter by virtue of her

¹ Compare Friedberg: *Der Missbrauch der geistlichen Amtsgewalt u. der Recurs an den Staat in the Zeitschrift f. Kirchenrecht*, Bd. viii. p. 304, seq.

constitution excluded. The Reformers, without exception, adhered to the Christian Society they found in the Roman Empire; the Anabaptists, on the contrary, entirely repudiated it, and sought to establish, as the Christian one, an altogether new order of society. Now, the Roman Empire had from a very early period been distinguished as a Christian society by a distinctive feature that more properly belongs to a church, namely, by the imposition of a dogmatic creed. The imperial edict of Gratianus, Valentinianus, and Theodosius *De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica* of the year 380 (the first in the Justinian codex), which was still the unchanged basis of public law at the time of the Reformation, treats as Catholic Christians all those persons who share the profession of Damasus, Bishop of Rome, respecting the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, and brands all others with the name of heretics, regarding them as exposed to the wrath of God, as well as to temporal punishment at the pleasure of the Emperor. The Reformers did not divest themselves of this, the mark that distinguished the Empire as the Christian community: for though they sought to bring about changes in the then existing ecclesiastical order, as well as in that view of the scheme of salvation which was current in their time, they never disputed the doctrine of the Trinity. The very omission of that doctrine from the oldest text-books—from Melancthon's *Loci Communes* and from Farel's *Sommaire* (published originally in 1524), far from implying any repudiation of it, rather indicates an intention to leave unaltered and untouched in the reconstruction of the practical doctrines of salvation a doctrine they looked upon as sacred, an unshaken mystery of the Christian faith. In fact the public Confessions—those of Augsburg and Smalkald, for example—expressly declare acceptance of the Nicene doctrine. Not only did the Reformers continue consciously and deliberately to be catholic in virtue of this: their strict conformity with the principles of the Christian religion, so far as these had been avowed by the Roman Empire, also made it possible for princes and rulers, as such, to tolerate them, to protect them, and even to make common cause with them. Such co-operation between the authorities and the Reformers on the basis of Christianity that the Roman Empire offered, also secured to the latter their continued

claim to be members of the universal Church—a claim which is more than once put forward in the Confession of Augsburg. For, apart from the Roman Empire, no universal Christian church then existed; and the Empire, by having fixed upon what was to be regarded as the distinctive test of Catholic Christianity, had given to all who answered that test a certificate of membership in the Christian Church. Both points are conveyed in the project of an œcumenical council, a project under the protection of which the Reformation established itself so securely that it could no longer be rolled back when the council itself actually came to be held. For in the case of the Reformers the appeal to a general council was equivalent to a continued claim to have part in the universal Church as embodied in the Roman Empire, their renunciation of the Pope's authority notwithstanding; and the promise obtained from the Emperor at the close of the Diet of Spire (1526), to the effect that he would cause the religious controversy to be settled by a council, actually concedes in a provisional manner to the Reformation full rights within the Church, so long as the states of the Empire so comported themselves as they could answer to God and the Emperor: thus at once entirely suspending the binding character of all such developments of dogma as up to that time had not been confirmed by any general council with the Emperor's approval. It may well be granted that this principle upon which the controversy in the Western Church was to be settled was a legal fiction; for the imperial power brought itself to submit to it only because the political situation was unfavourable; and the reforming party also, as soon as it had gained a firm footing and had acquired all the forms of a church constitution, refused to accept the conditions under which alone a general council of the Church could have been convened in the ordinary way. At the same time we must remember that it was also in virtue of a legal fiction that Constantine, for example, in his time received into the Roman Empire the new religion of Christ, while contrasting it as the old religion with the heretical sects. As, at all events, the history of the Reformation, in spite of its various political vicissitudes, was dominated by this half-churchly principle of law until, by the religious peace of Augsburg, it acquired positive political rights of its own in the Empire; the result of its course was,

that the same regard to the position of the Church in history which regulated Luther's undertaking,—and after his peculiar fashion that of Zwingli also,—pervaded as a characteristic and fundamentally important element all their reforms of the Church. However deeply one may feel the imperfection and partial erroneousness of the constitution of the churches of the Reformation, it is still true, above every other thing that can be said with regard to the Reformers, that in their reconstruction of the Church they gave a position so decisively important to the religious influences—especially to the preaching of the Word and the administration of the sacraments (which were always considered as the ultimate divinely appointed bases of the Church), precisely in order that they might thereby get something to set over against the specifically state character of the Romish Church. At the same time they thoroughly and effectually maintained the comprehensive character of the Church as against the essentially sectarian character of the Anabaptist organization and the essentially school character of that of the Socinians. For their whole doctrine of the plan of salvation, as well as their many diverse efforts at a church constitution with the help of the state, are dominated by the thought that the whole is before the parts, and that the individual comes to possess faith and to be in a state of salvation only as a member of the Church; while Anabaptists, and Socinians, would have the church they aim at to consist of the aggregate of *actively holy* persons, or of *those acquainted with the saving doctrines of Christ*. What other interpretation can we put upon that fundamental position of Luther—that God bestows the Holy Spirit only through the Word and Sacraments—than as meaning that faith and Christian life are inconceivable except within that religious society which is always in existence previous to any manifestation of individual life, and which is always actively operative in those her essential features, wherever the individual attains unto faith? But a similar meaning is conveyed by the practical principle, under the guidance of which Zwingli placed his whole undertaking,—the principle, namely, that the political authority in Zurich was the authorized representative of the Christian Church, and that therefore the ordinances of that authority in the interests of Christian religion, regarding soundness of public

teaching, simplicity of worship, salutary discipline of the individual, must be obeyed. But these ordinances commended themselves to the sense of the Church as a whole, because they were in accordance with Scripture. The community of believers, therefore, the body intrusted with God's Word and Sacraments, was, in Luther's view (although he could not like Zwingli regard it as a body exercising civil rights), neither a visionary imagination nor a new sectarian product of his own making; on the contrary, it stood forth as the imperishable kernel of the imperial Church that had become historical, —to a part in which the Reformers had and maintained their right at the very time when they took in hand to give force to the fundamental characteristics of that Church against the adventitious deformations that had taken place in her doctrines and life.

It must at once be admitted that the Reformers themselves hardly ever expressed a clear consciousness of the fact that, by their recognition of the doctrine of the Trinity, they were holding the legal standing ground given them by the Roman Empire. They only knew that in virtue of this confession they were maintaining the ground of the Catholic Church.¹ Neither can it be doubted that the said doctrine was originally accepted by the Reformers in virtue of Church tradition, and not in virtue of the specific authority of Scripture. It was their constantly widening separation from the Romish Church that first made it necessary for them to base this doctrine also on Scripture as soon as its defence (chiefly on account of Michael Servetus's denial) came to be a work of special importance to them. But then, as Servetus disputed the use made by the Church of the notion *hypostasis* or *person*, precisely because these words

¹ Compare Luther: *Die drei Symbola oder Bekenntnisse des christlichen Glaubens von Luthern, seinen Glauben zu bekennen, aufs Neue in Druck gegeben*. Walch, x. p. 1198. Preface: "I have *ex abundanti* caused to be published together in German the three symbols or Confessions which have hitherto been held throughout the whole Church; by this I testify once for all that I adhere to the true Christian Church which, up till now, has maintained those symbols, but not to that false pretentious church, which is the worst enemy of the true Church, and has surreptitiously introduced much idolatry alongside of these beautiful Confessions." Luther's attitude in the sacramentarian controversy also was to all intents and purposes determined by the (certainly erroneous) impression that the doctrine of the real presence of the body of Christ in the sacramental bread is upheld by the unvarying tradition of the Church. See his letter to Duke Albrecht of Prussia in 1532. De Wette; *Luther's Briefe*, iv. p. 354; Walch, xx. p. 2096.

are foreign to the Bible, the Reformers could not help conceding a measure of doctrinal authority to the Church on this point, though in a carefully restricted and guarded way.¹ This view, however, leans towards that tendency which led George Calixtus, at a later period, to declare the consensus of the first five centuries of the Christian Church to be authoritative for the interpretation of Scripture. The fact is, that the Reformers, in their doctrine of the person of Christ and of the Trinity, followed this consensus, in the first instance, because they still kept their footing on the ground of the Catholic Church as recognised by the Roman Empire. But it was a mistaken and useless attempt on the part of Calixtus to seek to impose that standard as a rule of primary value upon the Lutheran Church; for that Church had already for a whole century emancipated her *dogmatic* consciousness from resting on a fictitious harmony of ecclesiastical tradition, even although the task of interpreting Scripture by Scripture did not admit at that time of being thoroughly carried out.

If, however, the Reformers originally did not fully calculate the political importance to the Reformation of their adherence to the doctrine of the Trinity, the authorities at least who attached themselves to the Reformation movement were very

¹ Melanchthon expresses himself on this matter in a tractate of the year 1539, *De ecclesia et auctoritate verbi Dei* (C. R. xxiii. p. 595 seq.). He will have it that the authority of the Church ought to contribute towards our understanding of the Johannine Prologue, on the principle that the Church ought to be heard, Matt. xviii. 17. *Audiamus igitur docentem et admonentem ecclesiam, sed non propter auctoritatem ecclesiæ credendum est, cum videlicet admoniti ab ecclesia intelligimus hanc sententiam vere et sine sophistica in verbo Dei traditam esse . . . Auditor admonitus ab ecclesia, quod VERBUM significet personam, scilicet Filium Dei, adjuvatur jam ab ecclesia, et . . . articulum credit non propter ecclesiæ auctoritatem, sed quia videt hanc sententiam habere firma testimonia in ipsa scriptura.*—Calvin (*Inst. Chr. Rel.* i. 13, 3, 4), too, admits that the technical forms of the doctrine of the Trinity are not directly taken from Scripture; but after having shown them to be in accordance with the sense of the Bible, he justifies their continued use by the Church on the ground that the very erroneous ideas which compelled the Church to give a scientific shape to these ideas, continue still to render them necessary. This view is much more judicious than that of Melanchthon, and is in harmony with the greater strictness of the principle of adherence to Scripture which characterized the second generation of the Reformation. George Major also, *De origine et auctoritate verbi Dei* (1550), recognises *catholicus consensus in interpretatione scripturæ*, only he refuses as much as his teachers did to avail himself of it as an absolute guide upon the point in question. Even although it *multum valet ad confirmandas mentes piorum*, yet it should only be allowed to have some weight on account of its conformity with Scripture as interpreted by itself. He therefore places Scripture above dogmatically orthodox tradition.

distinctly aware of the rights and duties which pertained to them in virtue of the public law of the Empire. The evangelical authorities of Geneva and of Berne gave most distinct evidence of this when, with express reference to the edict of Gratian, and to subsequent imperial edicts against heretics, they sentenced to death Michael Servetus (1553) and Valentine Gentilis (1556) for having denied the doctrine of the Trinity.¹ It was the same consideration that led the Elector of Saxony to imprison Johannes Campanus, who, in 1530, had made himself notorious in Wittenberg by controverting the doctrine of the Trinity ; for the statements said to have been made by him at the same time regarding the cessation of sin in converted persons, and the needlessness of the law to such, although they betray an Anabaptist tendency, would not have sufficed to bring down on him such punishment.² Conversely, the supreme power in Zurich gave in 1528 striking evidence that, in spite of its sympathy with the Reformation, it was still Catholic when it caused to be beheaded for *læsa majestas* one Max Weerli of Thurgau (a district under the same government with Zurich), who, adopting the epithet habitually used by the Romish Church, had characterized as heretics the "gracious lords" of Zurich.³ The theologians Calvin, Melancthon, and Beza indeed base the right of punishing anti-Trinitarians upon a general obligation which the civil magistrate owes to the Church ; appealing to examples taken from the Old Testament, and laying no stress on the positive law of the Empire. It cannot, however, be doubted that their general proposition is framed upon the positive law, and that the proofs drawn from the Old Testament are conclusive only to those whose sphere of vision has been already prescribed for them by the imperial enactment. And, under certain circumstances, the theological supporters of the Reformed Church in Switzerland, when their impugned orthodoxy required to be defended, could persuade themselves to put it expressly under the protection of Gratian's edict. An example of this is found in the preface to the Second Helvetic Con-

¹ Compare Trechsel: *Antitrinitarier vor Faustus Socin.* i. p. 237 ; ii. p. 328. Compare also ii. pp. 358, 359, where Gentilis himself affirms the principle that heretics, as being teachers of false religion, deserve capital punishment.

² As above, i. p. 27.

³ Compare Hundeshagen: *Beiträge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik*, i. p. 99.

fession, which was published in 1556, while the process against Gentilis was pending.¹ But since the Reformed Churches could not prove themselves to be orthodox by the standard of the Romish Church, although they could do so by that of the Roman Empire, they accordingly separate the anti-Trinitarians as heretics from themselves, on the ground that they went beyond the rights of Christian society, so far as this was at all recognised as the basis of the universal Church, as distinguished from the narrower circle of that of Rome.

Such was the historical position in which originally Luther and Zwingli essayed the reformation of the Church; the former by regulating and renovating the religious and moral relations of the Christian life by means of a right understanding of the doctrine of the sinner's justification in Christ, the latter by introducing more immediately into the Church of Zurich the authority of the Word of God as alone operative towards the Church's faith and life. In declaring themselves to have kept within the limits of the Christian fellowship of the Roman Empire, from which the Anabaptists were withdrawing themselves in their sectarian effort towards the formation of a community of actual saints; in re-introducing into Christian life the Church's original scheme of salvation in accordance with the principles of the Gospel, they felt within themselves that they were acting in the spirit of the "Catholic Church." As matter of fact, however, it was not merely in an ideal sense that they held the priority of the Church to every saving manifestation in individual persons; they actually established, as the practical standard in accordance with which the religious life of the Church should be constantly renewed, simply that thought in accordance with which the self-estimate of the most conspicuous characters of the middle ages was formed, and in which, as a whole, the loftiest and purest piety of the mediæval Church finds expression—the thought, namely, that with the Christian, whether he be conscious of relative perfection or of relative imperfection, grace alone, and not merit, is the ground of his acceptance with God.

23. What Luther's thought of justification by faith practically meant, is made clear by Chemnitz's testimony and by Luther's

¹ Niemeyer: *Collectio Confessionum*, p. 462, *seq.* Compare Trechsel; as above, ii. p. 375.

own explanations in those sermons and tracts which date from the time previous to the beginning of the controversy about absolution. The preference I give to these last above all other writings of Luther, I found upon the fact that he suffered himself to be led by the attacks of his adversaries to a change of form in his position that is not immaterial to the proper apprehension of the question. Chemnitz's testimony¹ ought, however, to be placed in the foreground, because it is in every respect classical, and because it gives us the most adequate means of fully ascertaining the range of Luther's view. He says, "The main point of controversy at present agitated between us and the papists relates to the good works or new obedience of the *regenerate*; whether, namely, the regenerate are justified through that renewal which the Holy Ghost works in them, and by means of the good works which proceed from that renewal: in other words, whether the newness, virtues, or good works of the *regenerate* are the things in virtue of which they can stand at the judgment of God, for the sake of which God is propitiated and made gracious, upon which they can lean, and in which they can trust when the hard question comes to be answered, whether we be the children of God, and have been accepted to everlasting life." Chemnitz then points out that Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans, attributes to Abraham justification by faith, even while representing him as regenerate and adorned with good works. "If, accordingly, in true repentance faith lays hold of and appropriates to itself Christ's satisfaction, then has it something which it can oppose to the law's accusations at the bar of God, and so bring it to pass that we be declared just. It is indeed also true that believers through their renewing by the Holy Ghost have an actual righteousness; but inasmuch as that righteousness has only commenced in this life, inasmuch as it is imperfect and still impure by reason of the flesh,

¹ *Examen Conc. Trid.* (Genev. 1641), p. 134, seq. 140. Chemnitz's point of view as stated in the text is constantly recurring also in his article *De justificatione*. Bellarmine (*De justificatione*, ii. 2), in attacking this representation of the question at issue as a falsification of it, himself fails accurately to reproduce Chemnitz' dilemma. For the latter does not consider merely the question *propter quod Deus hominem in gratiam recipiat*, as Bellarmine says in summarizing Chemnitz, p. 129, but also the question *propter quod Deus hominem renatum justum censeat*.

we cannot stand in God's judgment with it, nor on its account does God pronounce us to be righteous."

Now, Luther's sermons, belonging to the years 1515-1517, in which the thought of justification through faith attains to clear statement, are, so far, perfectly correct in this respect, that Luther constantly bears in mind the fact that he is speaking to the Christian Church, and not to a miscellaneous number of sinners who require first to be converted. On this account it is that he represents the assurance of justification by faith as the religious regulating principle of the entire life of the Christian in its subjective phases,—a principle which pervades the whole course of it,—never as a mere phenomenon which ought to manifest itself at the close of the work of conversion in the sinner. For, properly speaking, those sermons have nothing to do—do not concern themselves at all—with the conversion of sinners. Luther, accordingly, fairly takes for granted in them that his hearers are really striving after and attaining unto good works; rebuking at the same time, however, such confidence in valuing these and such superficiality in the estimate of sin as is sure to pervade the whole Christian life and to mar its worth towards God. When people regard only their outward sins, and make no account of sinful concupiscence, as being venial, they are prone to believe themselves acceptable in virtue of their individual good works, and to think they may put confidence in them, although these become really null through pride. But it is all the other way. No one, not even the most perfect, can be free from the fear of hell. The fear of the just is at all times a mixture of holy and of slavish fear, but they attain ever more and more unto the former, until they come at last to fear nothing but God.¹ While the work-righteous do not fulfil the law in the spirit, for in their hearts, at least, they have sin and concupiscence; the saints, in like manner, have their secret sins (which have only begun to be subdued through grace) plainly revealed before their eyes; they cannot, therefore, pride themselves on their external works.² These indications of the imperfection of the good works of the regenerate, were systematically developed and theologically established by Luther in his *Resolutionen über die dreizehn*

¹ Löschner, *Reformationssacta*, i. pp. 777, 748, 252.

² As above, i. pp. 772, 777.

Sätze gegen Eck of the year 1519.¹ In this tract he appeals first of all to the declarations of Scripture (1 John i. 8; Isa. lxiv. 6; Eccl. vii. 20; Rom. vii. 15; Gal. v. 17; Ps. cxliii. 2); then rejects the idea of venial sin as inapplicable in judging of the case in hand; and declares that even though sin be forgiven in baptism, it still remains as concupiscence, and assuredly not as an indifferent thing; it must still be struggled against and overcome; further declaring that the contrary doctrine implies a dualistic theory of the relation between body and soul.

Since, accordingly, even in the works of the regenerate, God's law still remains unfulfilled; since, further, it is impossible by one's own efforts to gain acceptance with God, the believer is pointed to the way of finding acceptance through Christ's mediation. He fulfilled the law which we had been able only to break, and He makes us sharers in His fulfilment of it, covering us, like the mother bird, with His wings (Matt. xxiii. 37), so that even we, by His fulfilment of it, fulfil the law. "The more we do, work, strive, we only increase the unrest of the soul which we are seeking to quell. That unrest can effectually be stilled only by the knowledge of God's grace and mercy freely manifested to us in Christ, and of the merits of Christ imputed to us. The law having been fulfilled by Christ, it is no longer needful that we should fulfil it (that is, of course, for our justification); all that is required is, that we should cling to the fulfiller of the law, and become like Him, for Christ is righteousness, sanctification, and redemption."² The manner of that justification through Christ, on which the regenerate must base their assurance of salvation, had already been clearly defined as being by imputation in a *Disputation vom freien Willen* of the year 1516.³ "The righteousness of believers is solely of God's imputation, as we read in the 32d Psalm, 'Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity.' Hence every saint, as we see from Col. iii. 3, 4, is consciously a sinner, but unconsciously righteous; sinner in actuality, but righteous in hope; in himself a sinner, but righteous by the imputation of the merciful God."

By means of this thought of the righteousness of Christ

¹ As above, iii. pp. 756-768. Walch, xviii. 882-903.

² As above, i. pp. 244, 743, 762.

³ As above, i. p. 335.

applied by the solemn sentence of God to believers, and imputed to them for good, the practical end of comforting the troubled conscience is gained. If it is the case that one who has been born again of the Holy Ghost has power indeed to do good works, and gradually to gain the victory over his own sins, while yet, by reason of the imperfectness of his attainment, he can base neither upon it nor upon his state of regeneration his assurance of salvation, then he must fall back upon the value in God's sight of Christ's perfect righteousness, which as having been wrought for our benefit—with a view to the purchase of the forgiveness of sins to the Church—is by God's grace imputed to each individual believer as the ground of his acceptance. The stand-point and the main elements of this religious self-estimate are just those which we find in the cases of Bernard, of Staupitz, and of Wessel. Luther's view varies from the views of these men in the following minor details. First of all, Luther constantly looks at the comparative imperfection of the works of believers, while his mediæval antecedents directed their attention chiefly to the relative perfection of such works wrought in the believer by grace, although bidding men disregard their meritorious value. This difference has reference only to the practical application of the one thought which lies at the foundation in both cases, and which, according to the circumstances of individuals, and the prevailing ethical tendencies of the age, is always calculated to counteract alike self-righteousness and scrupulosity in the consciousness of salvation. That Luther always fixed his attention on the latter antithesis, was the natural outcome of his own personal needs; but he must also, at the same time, in doing so, have met with a certain disposition in his contemporaries, that dissatisfaction with self which is the indispensable prerequisite of all religious reformation. The other detail in which Luther differs from his other mediæval predecessors can be explained as follows:—While they as well as Luther trusted in God's grace as the principle of the religious life, *they* were able to satisfy themselves with a general view of it, representing to themselves the good works of the regenerate (perfect in their kind), as in continuity and congruity with grace. But as Luther invariably viewed good works in the light of their imperfection, and therefore in their

incongruity with the grace of God, he naturally required a more concrete view of God's grace as the counterpoise of imperfect works. This he found in the development of the thought of justification through Christ.

But our apprehension of the matter by Luther's help would be incomplete were we to disregard the following feature in his view. Even in his earliest utterances he maintains that the faith of the regenerate is not merely the receptive organ for the appropriation of justification through Christ, but is at the same time also the active instrument of all Christian life and action. Faith is the earnest of "Christ in us," as well as of "Christ for us." "Where faith is in the heart, there in like measure is Christ also present, on whom we trust in that faith; but where Christ is present, all can be won. Faith attains what the law enjoins. As righteousness brings forth good works, so Christ through faith sufficeth thee that thou mayest be just. Then thou livest, doest, sufferest, not for thyself, but for Christ; wherefore is nothing thine—everything is Christ's alone. The righteousness that is of faith is indeed bestowed without works, yet still it is given with a view to works; it is a living power, and cannot therefore remain inactive."¹ This view is not insisted on merely for the purpose of guarding against the mistaken inference that the inclination to continuance in sin might possibly be conjoined with faith in Christ's merit.² Luther needed this twofold view of faith also in order to secure for the moral works of the regenerate that unconstrainedness, the absence of which betokens effort after work-righteousness. The becoming attitude of the regenerate person is accordingly distinguished from effort after work-righteousness, by his trust in Christ, in such a manner that faith supplies to him, not merely the assurance of his salvation, but also the spontaneous impulse to well-doing.³ In the period preceding the Reforma-

¹ As above, i. pp. 230, 761, 778.

² As above, i. pp. 284, 742.

³ As above, i. p. 752: "They are the men of God who are led by the Spirit of God, who, having learned the control of the outer man, do not consider it except as a preliminary; they then put themselves in preparation for whatever work they may be called unto. If they are led by God through many sorrows and humiliations, without knowing whereunto, they yet intrust themselves to God alone, for they do not now rely upon any work henceforward, and their works have no value in the beginning, but only at the end; it is not they who lead, they are led. For they do not act from any ability of their own, nor yet do they form purposes for themselves, but, on the other

tion controversy, Luther was just as firm in invariably representing the imputed righteousness of Christ as preceding the imparted righteousness, as he is in distinguishing between the two ideas.¹ So that we must not lay any special stress upon the fact that occasionally there occurs a deflection into the Catholic usage of language; as, for example, when *justificatio in spiritu* is identified with *vivificatio novi hominis*, but is distinguished from the forgiveness of sins which precedes it; or when on one occasion even the imputation of Christ's righteousness is made to depend upon its actual infusion.²

24. If it seem desirable or necessary, in order to bring out more clearly Luther's thought about justification by faith, to compare it with some feature of Roman Catholic Christianity, then we must cite, not the Romish doctrine of justification, but rather the sacrament of penance. For as the evangelical act of faith in his justification through Christ establishes the believer's assurance of salvation against the abiding consciousness of sinful imperfection, in like manner in that sacrament the joint actions of the penitent and the priest serve to procure for the believer who has fallen from grace the forgiveness of his sins—that divine sentence of acquittal which restores him to the state of grace. Luther's attack on indulgences led directly to a controversy about the deeper bearings of the sacrament of penance,—to which sacrament the institution of indulgences is in fact only an appendage; and the overthrow of the sacrament of penance which Luther achieved in the course of the controversy, consists simply of logical deductions from his practical fundamental principle of justification by faith, which he ever resorted to as regulative, even at the period when he still, for a short time, continued to leave unassailed the traditional sacramental praxis in its outward forms.

hand, they are frequently broken off from their purpose, and are made to do something different from what they had proposed. Yet still are they content in this, and wait patiently for God, while those who are seeking to work out their own righteousness are in despair, not knowing the result of their toil. For they would fain have their work valued and established before acting; in this case, therefore, the character of the doer follows his deed, in the other it precedes it."

¹ Compare also as above, i. p. 288.

² As above, i. pp. 770, 742. Köstlin takes the same view: *Luther's Theologie*, i. p. 137.

But if now the sacrament of penance is an integral part of the very life of the Church,¹ the analogy, the opposition, the concurrence of the Lutheran thought of justification by faith, becomes unintelligible if one does not always represent it to one's self as a *practical experience of the living member of the Church of Christ*. It is when they come to consider the form of the sacrament of penance that the polemical divines of the Romish Church might be able to recover from their astonishment on finding that the evangelical system of doctrine maintains a free judgment on God's part—the pronouncing of sinners to be righteous—to be the antecedent ground of their regeneration, or, in other words, the determining principle of their real transformation into children of God. For in the sacrament of penance also the restitution of righteousness in the case of the believer who has relapsed into sin, is, ostensibly at least, the result of absolution pronounced by the priest as God's representative. In other words, the judgment pronounced—that the sinner is no more a sinner—is in point of time made to precede that *infusio gratiæ justificantis* which is expected to follow. Now, in the praxis of the sacrament of penance the *contritio* which precedes absolution is made to appear as the proper work of the penitent, in order that he may be predisposed to receive grace. Of course the theory has never conceded that hereby a *meritum de congruo* is acquired which obtains grace as a reward; and Melancthon's criticism² directed against that view is uncalled for; nay, rather the Catholic doctrine distinctly asserts that contrition is produced by antecedent grace. Practically, however, the procedure prescribed in the sacrament of penance leads penitents not to bring their repentance from a consciousness of grace, but to regulate it by the law; and those who are earnestly minded will be led by such a standard, and by the exhortation to bring into consideration every

¹ Compare Köstlin as above, i. p. 213. "The doctrine of penance constitutes the central point of the controversy. We must again remember that what we are now considering is really that penance which he who *already has entered the Christian Church, and has been received into the covenant of grace, has anew to exercise on account of the sins into which he is continually relapsing*. This was what had to be considered in connexion with the question of indulgence: *not the repentance of one who now for the first time embraces the faith and becomes partaker of salvation*." Compare a similar remark, p. 206, upon Luther's (first) sermon *De Penitentia*.

² In the *Apologia Conf. Aug.* p. 175. See above, p. 123, note.

separate sin, to a degree of self-introspection and of *detestatio peccatorum*, which is aimless in itself, simply in order to attain to the due measure of disposedness for *gratia justificans*. Luther's exposition is directed against this tendency insomuch that he raises the value of absolution and of faith in absolution above the striving after a mechanical completeness of *contritio*.¹ Even while still holding by the Catholic sacrament of penance, he declares himself to this effect : If assurance of the forgiveness of our sins depended on our sense of the completeness of our repentance, we should by that road draw ever nearer to despair and not to assurance. When, therefore, a sinner is distressed in his conscience, believing himself to be tainted with all evil, what he must do is to repose *faith* in the priest's sentence of absolution, inasmuch as the priest has by commission and authority of Christ power to absolve. In connexion with this matter, Luther accentuates very strongly the principle that it is always faith in Christ which justifies, and that the sacraments, as Augustine says, are effectual, not because they are received, but because they are received in faith ; that repentance is not so necessary as faith ; that one had better not think of resorting to this sacrament of penance unless he be sure of his faith ; and that it is abused if the priest is unable to establish the faith of the penitent. The importance here attributed to faith is, from the circumstances of the case, very far from meaning that the process of absolution is to be regarded as merely a reflex of subjective elevation of spirit ; for here faith is reposed upon Christ's sentence of absolution received through the priest, and thus upon the power of the keys given by Christ to His Church : hereby it is indirectly referred to all that Christ has done in founding the Church. If, now, anticipating a little, we remember how, in the pietistic form of Lutheranism, we anew find men in the position of inquiring whether their faith be sufficiently strong, and whether, in order to certainty of forgiveness, a deliberate continuousness and particular shade of sorrow be required, not only is it indubitable that Luther's view is just as much opposed to the

¹ *Sermo de Pœnitentia*, Lœcher, i. p. 574. *Resolutiones disputationum de virtute indulgentiarum* (against Tetzl), as above, ii. pp. 262-265. *Sermon von der Buße* (the second of the year 1518), *ib.* p. 512. *Erklärung an den Card. Cajetan*, *ib.* pp. 464-472. *De captivitate ecclesiæ Babylonica*, Opp. Lat. Jen. fol. 276 b. Walch, xix. p. 98 seq.

pietistic as to the common Catholic misrepresentation of *contritio*, as a feeling that is to be deliberately worked up; it is also manifest that sound consciousness of his standing within the Church excluded the possibility of such pietistic questionings, so far as Luther was concerned. He who belongs to the Church as an active member of it, even though he may on the Catholic theory have fallen from grace by mortal sin, needs only, through the revival of his faith, to lay hold of that free gift of the forgiveness of sins, or of absolution, which is lodged with the Church as the abiding fruit of Christ's obedience, and which is applied to individuals by his ministers, or even by any individual Christian man whatsoever.¹

Although, however, Luther in his writings of the year 1518 that bear upon this subject, accepts the current forms of the sacrament of penance, in order to remodel that institution in the direction we have indicated, and to substitute for its mechanical unspirituality or aimless self-torture a purely religious regulation of the consciousness of salvation, still the tendency of the practical religious principle which he had set on foot lay, even at the beginning of the controversy, beyond the limits of that sacrament. Of the ninety-five theses directed against Tetzel, the two first run as follows:—"When our Lord and Master Jesus Christ says *Do penance*, etc., He means that the whole life of His faithful ones on earth ought to be a continual and unceasing penance.—And such language on His part neither can nor ought to be understood as referring to the sacrament of penance, that is, to confession and satisfaction, as those are exercised through the intervention of the priestly office."² What leads him to this proposition is the practical uselessness of the distinction between mortal and venial sins;³ the more immediate explanation of the meaning of that statement is to be found in the view taken of another matter connected with the sacrament of penance. It is asked—What is the condition

¹ Compare his *Zweiter Sermon von der Busse* (as above, p. 526): "Thus thou seest that the whole Church is filled with the forgiveness of sins."

² As above, i. p. 439. *Erster Sermon von der Busse*, p. 572. *Conclusiones contra Eccium*, as above, ii. p. 321. The general idea is very far from being new or unfamiliar. See S. Bernardi *Sermones*, in *Quadragesima*, iii. 3: *Errant plane, qui paucissimos dies istos ad penitentiam sufficere credunt, cum certum sit, totum vitæ huius tempus ad penitentiam institutum.*

³ *Zweiter Sermon von der Busse*, as above, ii. p. 524. *Conclus. c. Eccium*, p. 321.

upon which it is possible for a person who has fallen from grace to seek forgiveness at all in the sacrament of penance, when as a sinner he must be supposed to be quite incapable of seeking it? In answer to this, Luther affirms¹ that the sorrow of repentance, and grief, and despondency, on account of sin, presuppose the secret working of divine forgiveness and restoring grace. Even when God appears to condemn the man, He is beginning to declare him righteous; while He is wounding him, it is His will to heal him; whom He slays, him He makes alive. So that when man feels himself near unto condemnation, grace is already at work upon him, and while he apprehends an outpouring of wrath, the mercy of God is actually laying hold of him. Therefore, when tempted to despair, he must seek peace in the Church's power of the keys, in order that by means of Christ's promise, declared unto him by the priest, and by means of *faith* in that promise, he may attain to certainty of that forgiveness which really had been granted before the absolution was pronounced.

In all this, Luther seems to say nothing that is not implied in the Catholic doctrine, that repentance is a result of grace. But in reality this view goes directly in the teeth of the Catholic discipline, inasmuch as that view of the origin of repentance, which had previously been current only as a theory, is here brought to bear in a practical way. For one gains assurance of grace only by faith. *If, therefore, repentance has its foundation and its value in grace, then it must proceed upon the faith that is conscious of that grace, and it cannot be regarded as a legal work.* Now, herein the theoretically assumed antithesis between the state of sin and the state of grace in the penitent melts away. For if, on the one hand, the believer's well-doing is defiled with sin, and that sin yet looks for forgiveness through the mercy of God,² then, on the other hand, the distress on account of sin shown by one who has fallen from grace, is really a proof of his gracious condition, and is elicited by a very distinct sense of the worth of that goodness to which sin is opposed. For, as Luther maintains in various utterances of the years 1517-1518, only that repentance is genuine which proceeds from love of righteousness and of God; for the

¹ *Resolutiones*, as above, ii. pp. 196-202.

² *Concl. c. Eccium*; see above, ii. p. 321.

repudiation of sin has force and genuineness only through the positive presence of its opposite; the penitence which flows from contemplation of particular sins, from legal fears, and from apprehension of future woe, only makes men hypocrites and greater sinners than before.¹

If, accordingly, Luther will have it that repentance be extended over the whole life, such an exhortation must apply to him who, being in a state of grace, continues in the love of God and of goodness even when he falls into sin; or who, at least, recovers it anon; who, accordingly, not merely leads a life of well-doing, as far as is possible for the continued imperfectness of this earthly life, but also duly repents of his sins. And here in these circumstances comes into action, as the religious regulating principle of practical life, the faith of justification through Christ—whether that justification be declared by a priest or by a brother, or whether it be appropriated in the immediate contemplation of the atoning work of Christ. For faith directed to these matters is the Christianly religious recognition of our dependence upon God in ethical respects. This faith, accordingly, on the one hand, appropriates the assurance of salvation to the man who is troubled with a sense of sin, and, on the other hand, secures him against self-righteousness, and against the tendency to think lightly of his faults, or to make small account of sin. Further, it is in itself the subjective motive for the doing of those good works to which the believer feels himself called in his redemption; and it nowhere is found in its genuine form without exerting this influence. But in order that this faith may operate easily, and, as it were, spontaneously, it is requisite that the believer, throughout the whole compass of his religious feeling and

¹ *Sermo de Pœnitentia* (as above, ii. p. 569): *Impossibile est ut odias aliquid vero odio et perfecto, cujus contrarium non prius dilexeris. Amor semper odio est prior et odium natura et sponte fluit ex amore . . . odium mali propter bonum. Sic odium peccati et detestatio vitæ præteritæ nulla cura, nullo labore quæsitâ veniunt sua sponte . . . Pœnitentia debet esse dulcis et ex dulcedine in iram descendere ad odium peccati. Amor enim est vinculum perpetuum quia, voluntarium, odium temporale, quia violentum. Igitur persuade homini primum ut diligat justitiam et sine magisterio tuo conteretur de peccato; diligat Christum et statim sui prodigus odio habebit se ipsum.* So also in his *Concl. c. Ecc.* (ii. p. 321): in his letter to Staupitz of May 30, 1518 (de Wette, i. p. 116). *Exposition of the Ten Commandments* (Löschner, i. p. 641). The letter to Staupitz shows that Luther was indebted to him for this important knowledge.

moral conduct, should feel himself to be within the Church, which, as founded by Christ, "is filled with the forgiveness of sins." But it is not this subjective function of faith, as the power capable of producing good works, that is the real occasion and object of the divine sentence of justification; on the contrary, the objective ground of the justification of the believer thus living and acting within the Church, is the grace of God as it is effectual through Christ and his work of reconciliation; while faith is the organ by which the regenerate person falls back upon the grace of God, as made effectual by that mediatorial work, and becomes conscious within himself that that grace is available also for him. Objectively, this faith never exists in the life of the believer unaccompanied by the desire to produce good works, and a measure of capability to produce them; subjectively, however, when the believer by faith consciously seeks and finds the assurance of salvation in Christ, he altogether disregards the value of those works, whatsoever be the perfection or imperfection which he feels to belong to them.¹ This subjective separation and antithesis between faith and works, does not, however, mean that faith belongs to the understanding only, and works alone to the will, for faith also is an act of the will—an act of obedience to God. But in faith the will rests immediately upon what the grace of God has wrought and revealed; while in good works it goes forth into the world, following in them God's purposes and commands. We shall see further on why in this connexion, thus understood, the thought of justification can be expressed only in the form of a divine sentence. Meanwhile, it is obvious that in the position described, the believer represents to himself God's sentence only in such a way as to think of himself as *the sinner who is the object of God's declaration of justification*. The synthetic judgment in this form will by and bye prove itself to be the necessary condition under which the thought of justification or forgiveness of sins solves the moral difficulty and

¹ Compare Melancthon's luminous statement (*Declamatio de calumnia Osiandri*, C. R., xii. p. 11): *Etai enim hac consolatione filius Dei ipse corda erigit et vivificat, ac spiritum sanctum in hunc, qui fide sustentatur, effundit, jam domicilium et templum Dei est homo renatus, tamen anteferenda est obedientia filii Dei his ipsis divinis actionibus quamquam excellentibus, et retinenda consolatio, propter mediatorem tibi imputari justitiam.*

hopeless logical contradiction which present themselves in real repentance as conceived of by Luther.

25. In his practically religious view of the believer's justification through Christ, Zwingli coincides with Luther in such a way as to be at one with him in essential particulars, while the diversity of view which may be remarked as existing between them only confirms the identity of their religious tendency. If, indeed, one sets out with the intention of finding in the writings of the Reformers, in the first instance, a *doctrine* of justification, or even assumes that to be possible; or if our knowledge of the position of these two men as Reformers were to be held to be completed by an explanation and comparison of their theological systems merely, we could not maintain the assertion we have made against Schneckenburger,¹ Zeller, and Sigwart. In saying so much, I disregard the fact that the first of the three I have mentioned rests his proof of the divergence between the Lutheran and Reformed theological systems too much upon the sporadic use of very secondary authorities, without ever taking his bearings from the practical attitude within the Church assumed by the Reformers. The second is even so unfair as to bring Zwingli's Theologoumena into comparison with the "Lutheran Dogmatic," as that is to be learned from familiar text-books;² while the third, by exaggerating Zwingli's connexion with Picus of Mirandula, makes Zwingli's reformation movement utterly unrecognisable. I quite agree with Schneckenburger in thinking that the *doctrine* of justification is neither the common palladium of the Lutheran and Reformed Confessions, nor the ultimate fundamental bond of union between them; for that doctrine, though indeed defined alike by both, is set forth in different connexions,—a circumstance which ought to be kept in view as not unimportant in our comparison of the two doctrinal systems. Since, however, systems of doctrine are not causes, but rather effects, of Church reformation, since the reformation of the Church arose rather out of a definitely expressed practical religious consciousness on the part of its leaders, whereby a change was wrought in the attitude of Christian communities, or bodies of men, towards the thing which up till then had been understood by the name

¹ *Zur kirchlichen Christologie*, p. 45.

² Zeller, *Das theologische System Zwingli's*, p. 174.

of Church, our verdict upon the identity or diversity in principle of the tasks undertaken by Luther and Zwingli will depend upon our answer to the question whether they are at one with each other in the view taken by them of that particular subjective religious principle which was the lever that set the Reformation in motion. In comparison with this, it will then seem a matter of secondary moment that these two men should have cherished and pursued different principles regarding the extent and method of the Church's renovation, and regarding the division of theological doctrines, according to the several premisses that their special theological education and religious development afforded them, as well as according to the different local circumstances of their respective spheres of labour. With regard to this, I may venture to cite Hundeshagen's masterly estimate of Zwingli,¹ and take along with me the parallel between Luther and him there wrought out, in order to show, in accordance with my task, that Zwingli no otherwise than Luther makes the life of the believer within the Church to be religiously regulated by reference to the righteousness of Christ—to the reconciling efficacy of His life and death.

If we are to proceed rightly and truly in this matter, we cannot adopt that method which has been chosen by those who have hitherto treated of Zwingli's theology, the method, namely, of culling from all possible writings of Zwingli detached passages about his idea of faith, about the relation of faith to the transeunt or immanent righteousness of Christ, about the meaning of Christ's satisfaction, and about divine election, etc., and thereupon setting up the discrepancies that occur, as if they were radical departures from the teaching of Luther. Such procedure betrays the fundamental mistake into which those writers have fallen—the mistake of supposing that in the question before us what we have first to consider is a theological *doctrine*, and not the statement of the believer's dominant verdict passed upon himself from a religious point of view. For theological doctrine will always of necessity represent the relation between the objective and subjective factors of justification in the shape of succession in time; the characteristic mark of a purely religious apprehension of the matter, on the contrary,

¹ *Beiträge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik*, vol. i. p. 163.

is the simple *realization as present* of all objective factors in the subjective consciousness. Now, in order to discover this aspect of Zwingli's idea of justification, we must restrict ourselves to the *Auslegung und Gründe der 67 Schlussreden oder Artikel* (1523); also the *Commentarius de vera et falsa religione*, taking along with these his sermon *von göttlicher und menschlicher Gerechtigkeit* (against Grebel and Manz, 1523). Now, those sixty-seven articles are quite a model of a Christian confession of *faith*, in giving such a view of all that Christ is to believers, as, while well arranged, is at the same time free from the trammels of theological system; this particular structure thus guarantees that, with regard to the question which at present occupies us, we shall find the religious point of view, as such, followed out. Upon the opening proposition that Christ, as the only Way to blessedness, constitutes the substance of the Gospel (1-5), follows that view of Christ which represents Him as the Head of the Church in which the Gospel is preached (6-16), as the sole High Priest and Mediator, whose sacrifice is not to be repeated, and whose honour is insulted by invocation of the saints (17-21); and, with the twenty-second article, that Christ is our righteousness, and that our righteousness is not founded upon works of our own, we reach the climax of the whole representation, which from that point proceeds to the criticism of particular ordinances, with special reference to abuses which had sprung up within the Church. In the mutual relation of the articles 19-22, Zwingli's *Auslegung* develops the views which must be recognised as determining his place as a Reformer. In the *Commentarius* also, Zwingli, in his representation of the matter at present in hand, gives it the form of direct religious dealing with one's-self, although the scientific aim of his book might have led him away on another track. After having explained the word religion, he defines God as the all-working First Cause of all things, investigates the position of man in relation to God, explains the thing religion in general, and then, in the *locus de religione Christiana*, lays hold of the relation of Christ to the believer as *pignus gratiæ Dei*, in such a manner as to show from a comparison between Christ's worth and the wants of the believer, who is always hampered with sin, that practically Christ is to the believer the fully satisfying present ground of salvation.

No exception can be taken to this view of the matter from the fact that the thought of Christ's satisfaction is developed here as well as in the *Auslegung*; for this satisfaction is *used* merely to explain the principal fact, that the *believer* finds his salvation in Christ alone. That this is the practical bearing of Zwingli's line of thought in the *Schlussreden* and in the *Auslegung*, is shown by the circumstance that Christ's title as Head of the Church is treated before his title as Mediator of reconciliation. The latter title is thus taken up only in so far as it presents itself to the member of the Church, or to the member of Christ the Head.

If now it has thus been shown that Zwingli undertakes to exhibit, in the very light in which Luther exhibits it, the subjective religious certainty of the believer that Christ is his righteousness, it ought not to be forgotten, on the other hand, that, as the obverse of this view, he undertakes in the *Auslegung* to refute the doctrine of the saints' mediation. Such an attempt is never met with in this connexion in Luther's writings. Here again one might perhaps begin to suspect a radical discrepancy of view between the two Reformers; all the more so, because it is well known that Herzog and Schweizer would fain make the divergence to consist in this—that Luther's Reformation activity was determined by reaction against the Judaistic perversion of the Christian life through work-righteousness, while Zwingli's, on the other hand, was determined by recoil from its paganistic perversion through saint-worship. Zwingli's *Auslegung*, however, which ought to be the chief authority for this statement, gives no just ground for it; for he justifies his rejection of the cultus of the saints (which is based on the assumption of the meritorious character of their works before God) on the ground that there could not possibly be any such merit;¹ and on this matter his assertion differs in no respect from the fundamental principle that Luther had at heart. If accordingly his repudiation of saint-worship does not rank as co-ordinate with his repudiation of work-righteousness, but is subordinate to it, then Zwingli's tendency to the former is seen to be only an accidental result elicited by special circumstances

¹ *Werke* (edited by Schuler and Schulthess), i. p. 280: "So now, merit having been demolished, the Papists need no longer molest the saints for their intercession."

from a fundamental idea that was common to him with Luther.

Zwingli then proceeds to show¹ that we—believers like all other creatures—must despair of ever fulfilling the law regarded as the eternal and immutable will of God; for who that still lives in the flesh could possibly be so entirely at one with God as to have love to Him always and above all things? Of course, even the law is a sort of gospel, for it is only useful to us as enabling us to know the will of God in its requirements, but the Gospel, properly so called, is the tidings of God's grace through Christ, who, as God-man Mediator, has fulfilled the law for us, endured the punishment which we had deserved, and appeased the wrath of God. If Christ, then, is our righteousness, and the pledge of God's grace towards us, any merit in our works which are due to God is not to be spoken of—unless, indeed, we would have it that Christ died in vain. Nay, more, inasmuch as on nearer view we find that in all our good works there is imperfection and sin, we should, in the alarm of our consciences, be led to despair of our salvation, and to regard ourselves as outcasts from God's presence, were we not enabled in faith, that is, in perfect confidence, to rely upon the fact that Christ has fulfilled the law for us, and borne all our work and all our wickedness, and that through the grace of which Christ is the pledge we are made righteous, and brought into a state of peace with God by faith. For renunciation of all claim to merit in ourselves is nothing more nor less than faith. "For that man should ascribe nothing to himself, but simply believe that all things are governed and ordered by the providence of God, can come only of an attitude of complete trust and self-surrender towards God; can come only of a firm assurance in faith that God is doing all things even when we do not see His hand. Such is faith, which grows and increases as soon as it has been sown; not that the increase is ours, but of God. . . . And the more faith grows, the more also does our activity in all good things grow; for the greater thy faith the fuller is the presence of God within thee—the greater also in thee is the working of everything that is good."

¹ *Auslegung der Schlussreden*, i. p. 262 sqq. *Von göttlicher und menschlicher Gerechtigkeit*, i. p. 431 sqq. *Commentarius de vera et falsa religione*, iii. p. 180 sqq.

This manner of describing faith by reference to the truth of God's all-working providence, does not exclude the significance of Christ as a Saviour, but actually includes it, as in fact the means whereby that providence reaches its effect. "Christ is made unto us of God wisdom—wherefore each individual ought to keep to His way, and not devise a new one for himself. He is made unto us also righteousness, for no one may come to God who is not righteous, and neither can any man be righteous in himself. But Christ is righteous, and He is *our Head*; we are His members, and thus as members draw near to God, through the righteousness of the Head. He is also made our sanctification, for He has sanctified us with his own blood. He is also made our ransom, for He has redeemed us from the law, from the devil, and from sin. . . . Thus are we made free from the law—not in order that we may no longer do that which God commands and wills, but we are more and more set on fire with the love of God, . . . so that we now do what God wills. . . . The believer is thus redeemed from the law, in order that he may no longer fear its condemnation, . . . but he actually fulfils the commandments out of love, not by his own strength, but because God works in him the love, the resolution, and whatsoever good thing he does: and in all that he achieves he is well aware that it is not his work; and that whatever is accomplished is the work of God."

Now, this attitude of the believer who is conscious of being a member of Christ, is entirely in accordance with Luther's delineation of it, inasmuch as faith, which appropriates the righteousness of Christ, counteracts the anxiety of the conscience that has been awakened by the law's demands (compare also iii. p. 195), and renounces all merit of works, which yet by the power of God do proceed from faith, through the Holy Ghost;¹

¹ Compare the first Confession of Basle (Niemeyer, *Collectio conf.* p. 83): "We acknowledge the remission of sins through faith in Jesus Christ the Crucified. And although this faith manifests itself unremittingly in works of love, reveals itself and proves itself thereby, yet we do not attribute our righteousness or the propitiation for our sins to those works, which are fruits of faith, but simply to our genuine confidence and trust in the shed blood of the Lamb of God. For we frankly confess that all things are given unto us in Christ, who is our Righteousness, Sanctification, Ransom, Way, Truth, Wisdom, and Life. Wherefore the works of believers are not done as a satisfaction for sin, but simply as evidence that they are in some measure thankful to God, the Lord, for the great goodness shown towards them in Christ."

and the coincidence between Zwingli and Luther extends also to their manner of regarding *pœnitentia* as a work that is the proper business of the whole lifetime.¹ While Christ, on the one hand, represents *pœnitentia* as a common task incumbent on us all; and the Gospel, on the other hand, connects the forgiveness of sins with the atoning work of Christ, the two really coincide with one another, because that self-knowledge which leads us to despair over our sins, is just as much brought about in us by Christ as our assurance of God's pity rests upon His work. As, however, we are never without sin, the Christian's business of self-improvement must always be accompanied by self-examination and by the forgiveness of sins. *Est ergo tota Christiani hominis vita pœnitentia: quando enim est, ut non peccemus?* In contradistinction from this, the *pœnitentia* enjoined by the Pope, and usually performed at Easter, is pure hypocrisy—for it rests exactly upon ignorance of one's own heart, and superficial views of sin, and ceases as soon as it has been gone through.²

26. It is well known that the counter-reformation of the Romish Church was invariably, in the first instance, directed to the purpose of bringing back to the confessional those who had joined the evangelical Church. This shows that the Romish Church is aware that her power over the consciences of Christians is founded specially upon her sacrament of penance. The reformation of the Church, accordingly, was possible then, and is intelligible to us now, only by means of a clear perception of that religious consciousness of Christ's significance, which, as an immediate and inevitable consequence, leads men to see the superfluity and hurtfulness of the Romish practice of penance. Zwingli, like Luther, was a reformer of the Church only in virtue of the fact that, in the thoughts which we have been tracing, he possessed a lever, by means of which he could overthrow and abolish the religious authority of the Romish priesthood, by means of the direct authority of Christ as Mediator of reconciliation, and as the Church's Master. For this purpose his idea of God's universal working in providence did not suffice

¹ *De vera et falsa religione (loci de evangelio, de pœnitentia)*, iii. p. 191 sq.

² Compare articles 50 to 54 of the 67 *Schlussreden*, and the *Auslegung* that relates to them. "Christ has borne all our pains, and done all our work. Whoever therefore attributes to works of penance what is due to Christ alone, is in error, and does despite to God" (Art. 54).

him, useful though it had been found to be, for maintaining the religious dignity of Christ as against the futile worth of men's own works and the mediation of saintly intercession, and characteristic though it be as a feature of his entire theology.¹ But Sigwart's assertion is erroneous and misleading, when he says that the universal operation of God is the fundamental principle of the Zwinglian doctrinal system, and that Zwingli represents God as being the supreme good of the universe in the sense that from Him alone every good thing, all being and life, all faith and all blessedness, *immediately* do proceed.² For the idea of God's universal activity is no specifically Christian idea, and however true it may be that in Zwingli's employment of it it has a directly religious, and no merely philosophical significance, it still stands in no immediate or direct relation to the Christian Church. If, then, Zwingli is a Church-reformer, and if he constructed his religious system of doctrine in the interests of Church reform, we might naturally expect that as theologian also he would take up another attitude towards the doctrine of God than that which is attributed to him by Zeller and Sigwart. Those writers ought to have kept well in mind the words of Zwingli at the beginning of his *locus de religione Christiana*, in his *Commentarius de vera et falsa religione* (iii. p. 179): *Habet hæc ætas ut eruditos multos, qui passim velut ex equo Trojano prosiliunt, ita multo plures qui se omnium censors faciant; ac dum per impietatem renascens verbum accipere nolunt, pietatem tamen simulantes, falsis confictisque suspicioni-*

¹ Compare his *Auslegung der Schlussreden*, i. p. 276.

² Sigwart, *Ulrich Zwingli*, p. 39. Zeller virtually expresses the same view *Theol. System Zwingli's*) because, adopting Schneckenburger's recipe, he allows the thought of eternal election, as the reformed principle of doctrine, to be taken for granted as arising out of Zwingli's craving after absolute certainty of salvation (p. 24 *seq.*) Sigwart (p. 3 *seq.*) is very well worth reading on this point. Although, however, he tries very hard to understand Zwingli as a reformer before forming an estimate of him as a systematical theologian, he is not successful, and so falls back to the level of Zeller's view, which is characterized throughout by this feature, that it measures the theology of a religious reformer of the Church by the standard that might be applied to an ordinary teacher of a theological school. One can judge from this how far Stahl (*die Lutherische Kirche und die Union*, p. 13) is right in characterizing Sigwart's book as an "unprejudiced" representation. Extreme parties are notoriously always alike in this matter of freedom from prejudice, and on this occasion Stahl has carried it so far as to spare himself the trouble of any thorough-going study of Zwingli's works, thereby hoping to exercise a more unbiased judgment on the value of the Reformation which Zwingli originated.

bus piorum aures implevit. Alii enim, dum strenue docemus, ut omnis fiducia in Deum patrem nostrum sit habenda, procaci suspicione prosiliunt, cavendum esse a nobis; omnem enim doctrinam nostram ad hoc tendere, ut Christum exterminemus, et Judæorum more, ut unum Deum credimus, sic unam solummodo personam credendam inducamus. Alii vero, dum propensius omnia Christo tribuimus, vereri se dicunt, ne nimis temere nimium ei tribuamus. Utrique tamen sic pronunciant, ut ipso

judicio videas eos esse vel audacter ignaros vel scienter impios. From this it appears that the fact of God's universal operation is with Zwingli the ultimate ground of salvation and the ultimate support of faith, only in so far as it includes in itself the Person and work of Christ as the definite and more proximate ground of salvation, and as the immediate object of faith: so that to him God's universal operation is the ultimate first cause only as being the at once religious and scientific principle of the Christian's view of the universe—only in so far as the almighty God is also the subject of that wise and righteous care and deliberate ordering of the entire universe, which is directed towards the design of bringing men into fellowship with God by means of His Son,—a fellowship unto which man was originally created.¹ The thought that the all-working God guarantees by His eternal election the salvation of men, is accordingly the principle of Zwingli's theology only in so far as it is inseparably conjoined with the positive Church doctrine that the community of the elect has its being simply in Christ; but both these views are gained by means of that teleological view of human history which is dominated from the very beginning by the thought of Christ as divine. If, then, we find occasionally in the writings of Zwingli statements which are interpreted by Zeller and Sigwart to mean that "the election by God of the individual is the *proper* object of faith," or, that "it is *only* election that justifies and blesses," the view taken by those critics, that Zwingli therein of set purpose reduces to unimportance the significance of Christ,² is, at the very outset, condemned by Zwingli himself, and, indeed, in no very complimentary terms.

¹ *De providentia Dei* (iv. p. 98). Compare the sketch of the train of thought in this tract of Zwingli's which is given in my *Geschichtl. Studien zur Christl. Lehre von Gott*. Art. ii. (Jahrb. für deutsche Theol. xiii. p. 94 sq.)

² Zeller, p. 24; Sigwart, p. 158.

The emphasis laid upon the thought of God's universal operation with reference to the elect naturally leads to certain divergencies between Zwingli and Luther on other points; as, for example, in the view taken of the sacraments: but the concentration of religious consciousness on Christ's righteousness, which characterized the Reformation movement, is not to be regarded as having been brought about by Zwingli and Luther by divergent methods, merely because the former strives to deepen the significance of Christ to the believer by pointing out the solidarity that exists between the all-working God and the Mediator of salvation. The assurance of justification by faith through Christ, as it is laid hold of by the believer who already has a standing in the Church, and is striving to do the will of God, is to both men alike the common lever by means of which they seek to achieve the reformation of the Church;¹ for the Reformers coupled with that subjective assurance of salvation the fundamental view of the Church as being the fellowship of believers who have been sanctified by God; and, as a consequence from this view, repudiated the importance for the salvation of the individual traditionally ascribed to the Church's legally constituted organs, as well as the authority conceded to them. That the Church was essentially the communion of saints or believers, was of course for the then Catholic Church indisputable, for it was the doctrine of the

¹ The notion to the contrary effect (which is widely spread amongst Lutherans) is also attributable to Melanchthon. He tells the Elector John, with reference to the conference at Marburg, amongst other inaccuracies and exaggerations, that "Zwingli and his companions speak and write improperly upon the question how man is reckoned just in the sight of God, and do not sufficiently urge the doctrine of faith, but speak in such a manner as if works (provided only they follow upon faith) were that very righteousness" (C. R. i. p. 1099). Still worse is the calumnious tone he assumes in a letter to Martin Gorolicus, Pastor in Brunswick: "*Ego agnovi coram auditis antesignanis illius sectæ, quam nullam habeant Christianam doctrinam. . . . Nulla est mentio fidei justificantis in omnibus Zwinglianorum libris. Cum nominant fidem non intelligunt illam, quæ credit remissionem peccatorum, quæ credit nos recipi in gratiam, exaudiri et defendi a Deo, sed intelligunt historicam*" (C. R. ii. p. 25). Particularly, in his communications to the Elector John and to Duke Henry of Saxony, he represents the Marburg articles (upon which the two parties had both agreed) at once as a victory for Luther and as a matter of indifference. At the same time, in his letter to his friends the preachers at Reutlingen (i. 1106), he refrains from such expressions regarding the articles, because these were connected with Zwingli. This entire proceeding puts the conscientiousness of Melanchthon in a bad light. That defect is the result of his want of independence of theological judgment. The evil results of it are still felt, even at the present day, in the Lutheran Church.

Apostles' Creed ; and the Reformers, in giving currency to this view of the Church's constitution, kept strictly within the indubitable limits of ecclesiastical tradition. As, however, the peculiar shape which the polity of the Church had, as matter of fact, taken, had led to an impression that the congregation of the faithful existed only as a result of the clerical functions of government and of administration of the sacraments, men were at that time accustomed to understand by the Church (out of which salvation was impossible) that aggregate of constitutional rights and sacramental privileges which is lodged in certain representatives through whose instrumentality alone every saving privilege must be held, and all assurance of salvation regulated. But as the subjective consciousness of salvation was maintained in the Reformers, in reciprocal connexion with their idea of the Church as the fellowship of believers, considered as deriving its rules directly from Christ in entire independence of the sacramental authority of the priests, there naturally resulted a change also in the view they took of the means of grace, as these had hitherto been recognised within the Church; and with that change their attitude towards the existent instrumentalities of the Church as matter of fact became different. He who in faith lays hold of Christ as the decisive ground of salvation, as the sure counterpoise to all consciousness of abiding sin, as the religious principle that regulates all man's striving after God, forthwith requires to be assured of fellowship with his fellows, who (just as he knows himself to have been) have been regenerated by the grace of God to be the people of Christ, but does not require the support of any Church mechanism, and much less a mechanism in which a privileged class, standing in the place of God, grants salvation to the laity. By showing the authority assumed by the clergy (more especially in the sacrament of penance) to be uncalled for and unjustifiable—by means of this positive view of the real nature of the Church—the Reformers achieved the Reformation ; in other words, they so brought their followers to a right position of subjective certainty of salvation, that the original idea of the Church came at once to have a leading place amongst those that swayed their spirits.¹ And though in this train of leading

¹ Such a phenomenon as Martin Boos is evidence enough that the clearest persuasion of justification by Christ through faith does not necessarily lead

thoughts the traditional practice of confession continued to be allowed by Luther, still it was practised with an altogether different significance, in such a way that the absolution was not intended to be a solemn sentence passed in the plenitude of divine authority, but simply that general announcement of the good news of salvation through Christ, upon whom all faith and all believing communion rests. But Zwingli also in the same direction, a few years afterwards, in his *Schlussreden*, resolved the sacrament of penance into the receiving of spiritual counsel and encouragement at the hand of those intrusted with the cure of souls, without departing from his own type of doctrine.

If, then, it is asked what was the leading principle of the Reformation, and of that entire phenomenon within the Church which arose from it—Protestantism to wit,—it is not at all sufficient to describe it with any such vague and bald formula as that it consisted in assigning value to the religious disposition, above every outward expression of it, and above every outward means of producing it.¹ For justifying faith, as the Reformers understood it, is a frame of mind that is essentially determined by regard to the historical (and thus objective) appearance of Christ. The peculiarity, however, of the *Church-reformation* achieved by Luther and Zwingli, is by no means at once expressed in that subjective consciousness of justification through Christ by faith, however perfectly and truly apprehended. We cannot hold it up as the principle of the Reformation and of Protestantism at all, unless we take it in its close reciprocal connexion with that objective conception of the Church which regards it as being before everything, and before all legal ordinances, the divinely-founded community of believers. In order to express accurately the one principle of the Church-reformation, we must take both these together in their inseparable connexion and reciprocal influence; on the

to the adoption of Reformation principles, if the view of the fellowship of believers, which is intimately connected with that persuasion, be not insisted upon *as against* the Roman sacrament of penance. Boos did not gain his assurance of justification in Christ without seeking and finding fellowship with like-minded persons, even among members of the evangelical Church. But he did not become a Reformer, because he maintained this fellowship with believers only as a *subordinate* matter to his fellowship with the Roman Church, to which last he remained faithful all his life, in spite of all persecutions. This is the reason why the awakening which he caused within the Roman Church vanished without leaving a trace after he had gone.

¹ Thus Zeller, as above, p. 10; and also Baur. See above, p. 47.

one hand, the thought of the certainty of salvation in the individual believer—a certainty which is independent of and rises above all mentionable instrumentalities, being determined solely by Christ; and, on the other hand, the thought of the community of believers under Christ—a community appointed and foreordained by God. That this line of thought dominates the whole of Zwingli's work as a Reformer is shown with all possible clearness in the outline of the *Schlussreden*, given above (p. 153), and in their *Auslegung*. Luther demonstrates the connexion of these two views to be the main point of his whole religious teaching by his fundamental propositions, to the effect that no one attains unto faith unless as having a standing in the Church by means of the Word of God, and that God has given this key of the kingdom of heaven to the community of believers.¹ With respect to the theory of the Reformation, the several schools of modern theology very naturally split at once. It is therefore perfectly unintelligible to me how a theologian who is avowedly defending Church-Protestantism, and striving against any degradation of the Church to the level of a school, such as is carried out by the extreme left and the extreme right, can fail to comprehend, in his view of the leading principles of the Reformation, the evangelical idea of the Church.² For that which is to be the chief thing in the final result must also be thought of in the first principle; otherwise it cannot be recognised as an end, but, at most, as only an incidental phenomenon. Of course one must in that case get rid of the apocryphal schema of two principles—the material and formal—whether of Protestantism or of Reformation theology; Dorner does not say very clearly whether it is to the former or the latter of these that the said principles belong. The two thoughts

¹ See in the shorter Catechism his explanation of the third article: "I believe that it is not of my own reason or by my own strength that I believe in Jesus Christ my Lord: it is the Holy Ghost that by the Gospel has called me, with His gifts has enlightened me, through genuine faith has sanctified and sustained me, just as He calls, gathers together, enlightens, sanctifies, and sustains by Jesus Christ, in true, proper faith, all Christendom. *Within which Christendom He daily gives to me and to all believers abundant forgiveness of all our sins.*"

² I refer to Dorner (*History of Protestant Theology*), whose very copious sketch of Luther's sphere of Reformation ideas only in two passages (pp. 138, 273) touches upon the thought of the Church; a thought which is nowhere brought into prominence in the section entitled *Darstellung des evangelischen Principes als Kirchenbildenden* (p. 212 *seqq.*)

which he designates by that name serve as principles neither for the one nor for the other. The material principle of the Reformation and of Protestantism has been already named.¹ It is certainly of the utmost importance to it that it should be in harmony with Scripture ; but not of so great importance that it should be in harmony with that *exclusively*, and have nothing to say to ecclesiastical tradition.² Even Zwingli's accentuation of the exclusive authority of Scripture in the teaching of the Church, does not exclude the fact (which must unavoidably be assumed before we can historically understand the influence he exercised) that his interpretation of Scripture is both directly and indirectly dominated by influences of tradition. The exclusive recognition of Scripture as the source from which all knowledge of divine truth is to be derived, as above and against all tradition, is the fundamental position only of evangelical *theology*, which has its feet firmly planted on the ground of the Reformation Church ; and it came to be wrought out in the course of the German Reformation as the sole rule for the Church only when all hope of compromise with the Romish Church was seen to be delusive. But then, again, neither is the doctrine of justification the fundamental principle of the Reformation theology either of Luther or of Zwingli. How is it possible (leaving other points out of sight) to deduce from that thought Luther's doctrine of the Supper, or the stress which he laid upon it ? Or how does this fit in with the asserted dominant position of that doctrine in his theology ? Luther's theological first principle is rather the thought of the abiding revelation of love as the essence of God in Christ ; and this—as has been shown above (p. 159)—is the case with Zwingli also, subject of course to the modification which is produced by the introduction into all his teachings of the idea of God's universal operation.

The partisans of a radical school-theology are naturally unable to discern how the reformation of Luther and Zwingli, that originated in considerations of religion, was determined by positive Church and Christian conditions. Those, on the other hand, who loudly proclaim the fact that they belong to the

¹ Hupfeld concurs in this view, *die Lehrartikel der Augsburgerischen Confession*, Marburg, 1840.

² Compare *Apol. Conf. Aug.* pp. 71, 99, 141.

Lutheran Church, but in reality are attached only to the interests of a quasi-conservative party within that Church, are very strenuous in denying the identity of the Reformation activities of Luther and Zwingli, on account of the differences which separated them—differences which are to be found in subordinate details of the religious confession they uttered of their belief in justification through Christ by faith. This is not the place to correct all Stahl's recent misrepresentations of Zwingli, made with the view of showing his total diversity from Luther; for the antitheses set up by Stahl¹ between the views of the two betray defective knowledge of Luther's views, as well as prove that no fair and thorough-going study has been devoted to the works of Zwingli, whom he traduces. I limit myself to the following points, which bear more immediately upon the subject in hand. In the *first* place, it is not true, what Stahl affirms, that by the works, the merit of which he denies, Zwingli chiefly means ceremonial observances merely, and outward literal compliance with the law; and is by no means explicit in denying to those really good works which are wrought with pious intention, all merit and all share in procuring the salvation of the soul (p. 26). The 22d of the 67 *Schlussreden* sufficiently meets this slander; affirming, as it does, that the works we do as believers are so far good as they are Christ's, while, so far as they are ours, they are neither right nor good. In the explanation of this article in the *Auslegung*, Zwingli refers to what he had said on the twentieth article; but in that he expresses himself with the utmost correctness upon the idea of merit. In the *second* place, it is not true, what Stahl asserts, that Zwingli hardly at all contemplates faith in its aspect as appropriation of the redemption wrought by Christ (p. 25). This assertion is contradicted by his exposition of the 19th and 20th articles throughout, by his *locus de religione Christiana*, in the *Commentarius de vera et falsa religione*, and by the article *de remissione peccatorum*, in the *Expositio fidei Christianæ*—his last work.² In the *third* place, it

¹ *Die Lutherische Kirche und die Union*, from p. 23 onwards.

² iv. p. 60: Confirmatio, satisfactio et expiatio criminum per solum Christum pro nobis impetrata est apud Deum. Ipse est enim propitiatio pro peccatis nostris. . . . Cum ergo ille pro peccato satisfecerit, quinam fiunt, queso, participes illius satisfactionis et redemptionis? Ipsum audiamus: Qui in me credit, hoc est qui in me fidei, qui in me nititur, habet vitam æternam.

is not true, what Stahl asserts, that Zwingli himself never appropriated justification by faith in the sense in which it is now held by the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, and recognised by them as the kernel of the evangelical reformation, and that if a lively sense of the significance of justifying faith had ever been present with him, he could not afterwards, when he developed his doctrine of predestination, have denied to faith (as he has done) all share in the work of our salvation (p. 27). Stahl here refers to certain passages of the treatise *de providentia Dei* (iv. p. 122 sq.) which Zeller and Sigwart also apply in a similar way, of which we have spoken above (p. 154). In the tract referred to, Zwingli so speaks of the mutual relation between election and faith as to make it appear that faith is the result and pledge of election, and that the declarations concerning justification or salvation by faith are to be understood only of God's election and grace.¹ But this is very far from meaning that the value of Christ's redeeming work is to be regarded as indifferent to faith, for not only is that work again and again brought into relation with faith throughout the course of the entire discussion, it is even conveyed in the passage we have quoted by the word *liberalitas*. But it did not need to be treated in a thoroughgoing way, for Zwingli was writing *de providentia Dei*, and not *de satisfactione Christi*. Moreover, even at the time when, as his critic would have it, he was elaborating his doctrine of predestination, Zwingli has fully met Stahl's demand for a testimony on the subject of justification by faith in the above-cited passage from his *expositio fidei*. Further, the complaint raised against Zwingli—that by his thought of the universal operation of God he has excluded or lessened the importance of Christ's redeeming work—is so effectually met in the passage already quoted from Zwingli (p. 153 f), that Stahl himself cannot escape Zwingli's own condemnation, to which I now expressly call the attention of all Stahl's followers. To crown all this, Stahl, far from being Lutheran, is Arminian, when, in his rectification of Zwingli's

At vitam æternam nemo adipiscitur, nisi cui peccata adempta sunt. Qui ergo Christo fidit, ei remittuntur peccata.

¹ *De prov. Dei* (iv. p. 124): Fidei tribuitur justificatio et salus, quum (although) ea solius sint electionis, et liberalitatis divinæ, fides autem electionem sic sequatur ut qui illam habeant, sciant veluti per sigillum ac pignus se electos esse.

teaching, he adopts the principle that justification ought to be represented as being brought about by faith, for Luther just as much as Zwingli always represents it as brought about only by Christ through faith as a condition, which last is produced by the Spirit of God. A due understanding of Zwingli's leading positions, moreover, leaves it open to no sort of doubt that he, just as much as Luther, in summing up the various elements of his subjective consciousness of salvation, apprehends Christ, who is our justification, with the historical features of His obedience and atoning passion. As he works out this thought only synthetically as a matter of religious consciousness, but never analytically as a doctrine of justification and reconciliation, we fail to find in his writings certain ideas which were needed to work out the doctrine dialectically; as, for example, the idea of the imputation to him who believes now, of Christ's work finished once for all. But from this we ought not, like Sigwart (p. 157), to infer that Zwingli, when he speaks of Christ as our righteousness, invariably intends "Christ in us" as the ground of "actual righteousness." And even supposing that such expressions did occasionally occur in Zwingli,¹ he would not therein be different from Luther, who also, as Köstlin shows,² occasionally attributed justification to the Spirit of God operating in the believer.

It is certainly a noteworthy circumstance, and one that demands investigation, that Zwingli gives weight and prominence neither so frequently nor so strongly as Luther does to the thought of justification through Christ by faith. They who always test Zwingli by Luther as a standard, and who turn to the disadvantage of the former all his divergencies from the latter, are sure to take advantage of this circumstance also for their purpose, and if they cannot, like Melancthon, go so far as to deny the essential agreement of both in their consciousness of justification, they will at least imagine, like Stahl (p. 22), that

¹ I do not find in the *Annotationes in Genesim* (v. p. 59), the expression of Zwingli quoted by Sigwart as above: *Justitiam largitur, internam istam, qua nihil aliud est, nisi spiritus*. Some such undercurrent of thought, however, seems to run in the *Expositio fidei* (iv. 60). *Sicut enim fidem nemo potest nisi spiritus sanctus dare, sic etiam non remissionem peccatorum*. Still, when taken along with its connexion, this also means only that the Holy Spirit as objective ground of faith is the means of the appropriation of the forgiveness of sins, grounded on Christ's atoning work, just as faith itself is.

² *Luther's Theologie*, ii. p. 454. I shall again recur to this point.

Zwingli borrowed those thoughts from Luther in a merely superficial way, and never really cherished any hearty regard for them. Along with this, they make the supposition that the tendency which Luther originally displayed towards work-righteousness, was the only form of piety that was possible within the Catholic Church of the West; and that Zwingli, accordingly, who never exerted himself so earnestly to establish a righteousness of his own, betrays a more superficial piety than does Luther, even when judged by the standard of the Catholic Church. But while this supposition implies in itself a pernicious mistake, we ought never to allow ourselves to forget that they were altogether special circumstances which led Luther so unweariedly to proclaim the comfort of troubled consciences in the good news of justification through Christ. It arose from the circumstance that Luther had pursued so long and so passionately the opposite course of seeking to make himself just with God through the merit of his ascetic (and therefore not even socially profitable) works. From his recollection of the energy with which he had sought to carry out this error of his monkish life, Luther derived a great part of that persistency, which he showed in laying so frequent and urgent stress on the consolation of the gospel and the method of its appropriation. Since Zwingli had not experienced in his own life the fruits of an error like Luther's—an error with which his monkish profession, his nominalistic education, and his hypochondriac malady had much to do,—since Zwingli's early life was not spent in struggles of conscience, arising from a false notion of piety, it was to be expected that he should manifest, in all his activity as a reformer and as a theologian, that balance of mind, even in the treatment of the various heads of doctrine, which elicits from the blind partisans of Luther charges of littleness of soul or of rationalism, but yet does not by any means prejudice the central significance of his consciousness of justification.

Stahl has suffered himself to make the assertion that Zwingli is on this point merely a superficial imitator of Luther (in spite of Zwingli's well-known declarations to the contrary effect, upon his entire independence of Luther),¹ because Ecolampadius has

¹ *Auslegung der Schlussreden* (Werke, i. pp. 253, 254); *Exegesis eucharistiae negotii ad Lutherum* (iii. p. 543).

asserted that *he* has Luther to thank for *his* views on justification. How utterly unlike the genuine orthodoxy of Luther is the modern Lutheran exclusiveness of Stahl and his school! The former did not feel secure in its Church-consciousness unless it was able to prove that all the articles of the evangelical faith had from the very beginning obtained currency within the Church; and that, accordingly, from the earliest times there had existed within the Church the tendency which was brought by Luther to determine the contest against Romanism. Even while their scholastic aims in theology were growing narrower, the older Lutherans always maintained this Catholic feeling. But now, forsooth, respect for Luther renders it necessary to assume that in the thought of justification through Christ by faith he propounded something that up to his time had been utterly unheard of! In that case Luther was merely the founder of a sect; and however accurate may have been his new and higher knowledge, he broke the continuity of the Church by it—and knowingly, too, if Stahl's assumption be correct. But Luther himself was conscious of the contrary;¹ Stahl's notion, therefore, that Luther was in his day the only source of true views upon justification, must be regarded as false.

But, over and above this, it has already been shown that a consciousness of the exclusive value of God's grace may be traced from Augustine downward through the middle ages, and that this very consciousness was the immediate means of bringing about a reaction against ascetic work-righteousness during the closing decades of the fifteenth century. The influence of this conviction can be seen even in that popular feeling against monkery, which was widely diffused even

¹ *Vermahnung sich vor Aufruhr zu hüten* (1522) Walch, x. p. 420. "Above everything would I have my name to be passed over in silence, and that ye should call yourselves not Lutherans, but Christians. What is Luther? At all events the doctrine is not mine. Neither have I been crucified for any man. St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 4, 5) would not suffer that Christians should call themselves of Paul or of Peter, but only of Christ. How then should I, a poor vile worm (*armer stinkender Madensack*), come to have children of Christ called by my worthless name? Nay, dear friends; let us do away with party names, and name ourselves of Christ, whose doctrine we hold. The Papists have a party name,—and justly; for, not satisfied with Christ's doctrine and name, they will have the Pope's also. Let them be the Pope's, who is their master. I am not, nor will I be, any man's master. In common with the congregation of Christ's people, I hold the one common doctrine of Christ, who alone is our Master."

previous to the Reformation, and which betokened religious earnestness, not a frivolous disposition. Even the cloister itself did not escape the influence of this revulsion. Luther notoriously was indebted to an old monk for the first consolatory reference to it in the midst of his struggles of conscience; and it was Staupitz, his patron, who aided him in further developing his views. It cannot be doubted that Zwingli also was brought to a similar conviction by tradition within the Church.¹ That conviction so derived was in his case, however, so identified with the exclusive authority of Scripture, that as soon as he gave himself up to the business of a Reformer he was able in the same breath to proclaim the dominion of Scripture over the Christian life, and the exclusive saving efficacy of Christ. Thus being saved the necessity of swinging to an opposite extreme in order to get rid of a gross error, and apprehend the proper basis of piety; and being able as a theologian to treat in a systematic manner, and to attribute due importance to all those parts of religious knowledge which escape Luther, it is easily seen why Zwingli was not always recurring anew, like Luther, to the consideration of the doctrine of justification through Christ. To put down and depreciate the one on account of his divergence from the other on the point we have indicated, betrays, therefore, not merely ignorance of the circumstances of the Reformation, and injustice in the appreciation of individuals; it betrays also that utter want of judgment which expects and demands mechanical uniformity in the spiritual life.²

Still, it was not the appropriation of the traditional thought of justification solely through grace in Christ that made either Luther or Zwingli to be reformers of the Church. The fact that this thought could be traced all through the middle ages, up to Augustine, shows that they could not possibly have intended to break with the Western Church upon a fundamental point.

¹ He himself refers to his teacher, Thomas Wyttenbach, and to Erasmus. Compare *Auslegung der Schlussreden* (i. p. 298); *Exegesis eucharistiæ negotii ad Lutherum* (iii. p. 544).

² Compare Hundeshagen (as above, pp. 146-154), whose judgment upon the relative divergence between Luther and Zwingli is correct also in reference to the thought of justification as a whole; though it might be modified in some of the details, in so far as neither Reformer immediately contemplates a doctrine of justification, and in so far as their practical consciousness of justification rises out of an almost similar spiritual movement in the Catholic Church.

But in order that the truth should become in the spirit of either of them a reforming fact, something more was necessary. For one thing, the conviction of justification by grace had to be established as scriptural; and with the help of Paul, and also by means of the idea of the reconciliation of the justice and mercy of God in Christ's passion, it had to be put in decisive contrast against the value of good works, in order that the current doctrines of justification and merit might be refuted. And then the religious conviction of justification by grace—presupposing faith or confidence towards God—had to be put into reciprocal relation with the thought of the Church or community of believers, in order to root up those institutions which deprived the Church of her proper character as the community of believers. Thus far the Reformation denotes a specific stage in the Church's development; and (inasmuch as the Church was in a great measure prevented by the authorities which were then in the ascendant, from yielding to this development) it implied a rupture with the previous stage. The Anabaptists and Socinians, on the other hand, broke with the historical Church in principle in separating themselves from the Christian fellowship of the Roman Empire. For the Anabaptists, instead of aiming at a community of persons set apart by God by His Word and by His Sacraments, aimed at the formation of a sect consisting of actively holy and sinless persons; while the Socinians, instead of the Church, aimed at the formation of a school of persons theologically of one mind upon the doctrine of Christ.¹ In order, then, specifically to distinguish the Church-work of Luther and of Zwingli from these shapes of radical and revolutionary reform,² I think I may venture to affirm that neither Zwingli nor Luther either discovered the thought which was the leading one with them as Reformers, or rediscovered it merely by study of the Bible, but that they imbibed it from a tradition current within the Church; and further, that the Reformation application of the religious consciousness as fixed

¹ Upon this point compare my *Geschichtl. Studien zur Christl. Lehre von Gott*, Art. iii. (Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie, xiii. p. 278 sq.)

² This is not rendered needless by Zeller's observation, as above, p. 13, that the Lutheran Confession approaches Catholicism more closely, while those of the Reformed Churches approximate those sects and parties which stand outside of the limits of Reformation Protestantism. Such an observation betrays a merely superficial mode of viewing the question.

only upon grace and upon Christ, to put aside all contrary institutions and school traditions, is quite within the limits of the Church character of Christianity; for it stands in reciprocal relation with the original and true idea of the Church as the community of persons set apart to holiness by God.

27. If the lever of the Reformation had been a *doctrine* of justification by faith, similar to that which we now possess fully wrought out, one might expect at least that the learned Melancthon would have set it forth with peculiar completeness and in adequate dialectic relation with the doctrine of reconciliation. But this is not the case: he invariably treats the doctrine of Christ's work, as such, not apart from the thought of justification, but usually simply hints at it, and takes it for granted, as the means of justification, as the object of faith, while his whole view is dominated by the Reformation fact of subjective consciousness of justification through Christ. Thus Melancthon also almost always *keeps in full view* the historical basis of the sense of justification when stating the latter; and so regards *remissio peccatorum*, OR *justificatio*, OR *reconciliatio*, as the *immediate* effect of Christ's work, just as much as the appeasing of the wrath of God and satisfaction for sin are so; while the doctrine subsequently developed (which is the prevalent one in the dogmatic text-books) assigns to the active and passive obedience of Christ an immediate effect only upon God, but upon man merely a mediate one. In harmony with this attitude are the expressions in the first edition of the *loci theol.* (C. R. xxi. pp. 155-158), to the effect that he who in obedience to the gospel puts faith in God is justified already, and that the grace with which God accepts Christ embraces all sanctified persons in Christ, and for Christ's sake. We have a further indication of the churchly character of the consciousness of justification, in the remark that the faith which justifies, in other words, which appropriates justifying grace, is not possible *nisi renovante et illuminante corda nostra Spiritu Dei* (p. 162). The expression in the third edition of the *loci theol.* (1543) points in the same direction: *Cum dicat, justificamur fide, vult te intueri filium Dei sedentem ad dexteram patris, mediatorem interpellantem pro nobis, et statuere quod tibi remittantur peccata, quod justus, i.e. acceptus reputeris seu pronuntieris propter illum ipsum filium, qui fuit victima* (p. 743). It is one of

the conditions of religious faith that what it contains in thought should be represented as present. Now Christ, as He is believed to be present, has the attributes of His exaltation; if, therefore, He is to be regarded at the same time as the Mediator of forgiveness of sins, this can be done only because the exalted Head of the Church, as its intercessor, continues to maintain the atoning efficacy of His sacrifice. Finally, Melanchthon occupies the same standing-ground as Luther and Zwingli, in respect that in conjunction with a rejection of the Romish sacrament of penance, he regards the whole Christian life, in so far as it is *vetustatis nostræ mortificatio et renovatio spiritus*, as being *pœnitentia*, so that also the negative side is subordinated to its principle on the positive side; for no real turning away of the soul from sin is conceivable unless produced by the working of God, and more especially by the Holy Ghost (pp. 215, 216; see also the second edition of the *loci*, p. 489).

These indications just as certainly convey the true idea of Luther's point of view as they are unknown to the later theology of the Lutheran Church. Their judicious use would have led to the result of placing the Church (within which one is conscious of justification through Christ, and within which one does *pœnitentia* as the duty of the renewed man) in a position of priority to the salvation of individuals, and of bringing into immediate relation with the reconciling work of Christ. The theological thinking of Luther and Melanchthon, however, does not carry them so far. For Luther never gave himself to the business of framing a theological system; and the *loci theol.*, with the loose concatenation of which even Melanchthon contented himself, can pass for a theological system only in a very improper sense of the word, for they are not dominated and arranged by the idea of a purpose in revelation. So far as either of them apprehended the task of framing a *doctrine* of justification, and thus, by means of a chronological order of conditions, try to account for the subjective consciousness, they restrict themselves to the doctrines *de lege*, *de evangelio*, *de fidei efficacia*, on which, however, also the doctrine *de pœnitentia* throws some stray lights. But the analysis, by means of these notions, of the consciousness of justification, implies an important change of the locus in which that Reformation question originally presented itself. For in the order of those ideas,

fides justificans comes to be represented as the *beginning in time* of the new life; and the temporal process by means of which this result is brought about from previous causes, finds its place between the period of the state of sin and the period of the state of grace, just as this is properly the locus of the *Catholic* idea of justification. Now it was his apologetical relations to the position and purpose of this latter idea that led Luther to pursue the path in which Melancthon followed him. In the controversy upon absolution and the sacrament of penance, Luther had defended his own practical consciousness of justification through Christ as a basis of Christian life in the Church, against that most influential institution of the Romish system. He had proved that in justification we must look away from our works, although it was taken for granted that the believer would perform them. The controversy afterwards extended to the question regarding the idea of justification. But as that idea referred his opponents directly back to the thought of good works, and as they supposed in the justification of the sinner an actual change of the individual with respect to his free-will by the grace of God, Luther conceded thus much to them, that he suited his own similarly designated conception of the subject as nearly as possible to their scheme merely giving a place of first importance to the consideration that justification by faith lays the foundation for the ability to produce good works, in such a manner that the pacification of the conscience that has been in trouble and pain on account of sin is at once achieved.

These points of antithesis and of analogy with the Romish doctrine of justification, connected themselves with the need for a manner of representing them that should be as popular and practical as possible. Both purposes were attained when the schema of the reciprocal relation between law and gospel was brought into the Reformation thought, and any reference away from the reconciliation through Christ that is *pronounced* in the gospel to the view and meaning of the historical process itself, and its necessary relations, was omitted. In none of the repeated expositions of the doctrine is it deliberately and directly brought into relation with the idea of the Church; at the same time, we ought not to forget Luther's grand principle, that the gospel, as the immediate

objective ground of justification by faith, has a strict relation with the Church of Christ, inasmuch as the Church is founded on that gospel. The same cannot be said without qualification of the law which normally presents itself in the form of the Mosaic decalogue, but which can also be traced in the natural consciousness of mankind. For, contained in it, the Reformers recognise the eternal will of God,—that ordering of the moral world which continues to be the same from beginning to end; and they raise this thought (which of course is not in itself a new one) to the dignity of a comprehensive standard for our moral and religious view of the universe. Still that naturalistic assumption does not influence the relations at present in question, and to consider the law as decalogue really removes little from the sphere of Christian life those processes of moral and religious life which resulted in connexion with the law; for even in the Old Testament there is recognised a connexion between law and gospel; and even at that epoch justification by faith in the promises is asserted. Now, as the true Church of God is considered to have existed from the moment that promises of salvation are recorded in the Bible narrative, the view of the Reformers is, that that change in men which they explain by reference to the working of law and gospel takes place within the Church. This confirms the Church basis for the course of justification and renovation of life which the Reformers directly set forth, although they do not close the series of representations which I have indicated in the above-mentioned way. I have found myself compelled to enter upon this investigation, not merely in order to bring out the historical state of the case, but also in order to show at the outset the spuriousness of a view of the Reformation doctrine which, by a narrower limitation of the definition of the Church, gives rise to the impression that one who is under the religious influence of the law must necessarily still be altogether unrelated to the number of those who are saved.

God's word of revelation, then, throughout all the stages of its development, has consisted both of law and of gospel; of which the former includes all those precepts which God enjoins on mankind, bearing upon the honour and worship due to Himself, and also with a view to the maintenance of a duly ordered fellowship between man and man, with the express intention

that men should gain eternal life by the literal fulfilment of these precepts. The gospel includes the promise of the grace and mercy of God, of forgiveness of sins and unmerited salvation through Christ, to men who, as sinners, vainly seek to attain everlasting life by means of the law. If, accordingly, law and gospel are, in respect of their matter, mutually opposed, they yet in respect of their form are closely connected with each other. For the law, although it cannot be fulfilled by the sinner, produces in him consciousness of his sin, alarm at the demerit of it, and despondency in the matter of his salvation, and disposes him to embrace the gospel by faith. The gospel, on the other hand, while it awakens faith, does not limit itself to the task of bestowing upon that faith forgiveness of sins through Christ, and, by assurance of this, pacifying the conscience. It proceeds further to bestow the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that the soul may exhibit that reciprocity of love towards God which evinces itself in the fulfilling of the law. Although such fulfilment is of course always imperfect, it is still obligatory, because the law is of everlasting obligation; but, on account of its defectiveness, the acceptance even of the believer with God is based solely upon the righteousness of Christ, which, by his faith in its worth, is imputed to him as his own by the solemn judgment of God.

Now, although this genetic representation of justification by faith ultimately leads up to that attitude of the religious subjective consciousness which has been shown to be the motive power that produced the Reformation, it is yet worthy of remark that in the first instance the doctrine we have been sketching sets itself to explain the manner in which *the sinner is made righteous*; in other words, in form and tendency it approaches the Romish doctrine, which, while bearing the same name, is really so different. The Reformation doctrine is fully warranted in excluding all intermixture of *merita de congruo* and *de condigno*, for the former are impossible when the presupposition of sin is rightly understood; while neither of them is conceivable when the strictness of the divine judgment is kept in mind. Moreover, the conception of justification as *actus forensis*, as a sentence of God, is based not only on the testimony of Paul, but also on the necessity of providing that the life of the believer should be protected against the errors

of self-righteousness on the one hand, and of the tendency to despair of salvation on the other. On this account the declaration of the sentence of acquittal must be ranked above regeneration by the Holy Ghost, and regarded as prior to it. Although, however, in these respects we must recognise an inner suitability and logicity in this view, we cannot extend the same praise to the assertion that through the gospel not only is forgiveness of sins bestowed, but also the Holy Ghost unto newness of life ; or, in other words, that in the faith which appropriates justification is contained also the ability and inclination to well-doing. For it is merely asserted and proved by Bible-texts that the two results always go together ; but then the statement of the doctrine by Luther and Melanchthon never enters on the consideration that even in justification, as such, there must be traced a telic reference to regeneration and the fulfilling of the law by faith, in order to secure a strict sequence of ideas in the doctrine. Instead of this, the two facts, though declared to be invariably conjoined, are regarded as altogether distinct in respect of the purposes which they serve. Justification is wrought in order that the believer's conscience may be pacified ; while the gift of the Holy Ghost, as the ability to produce good works, is conferred in order that God may be well pleased, or that His eternal law may be kept. As long as these two elements are not united in one thought, the doctrine of Luther and Melanchthon is incomplete, and fails fully to commend itself to men's convictions as against the Romish doctrine, in which the idea of *justificatio* is directly framed in such a way as to satisfy at once man's need, as also the demand of God's law, by laying the foundation for the ability to produce meritorious works.

When we compare with this style of doctrine Zwingli's treatment of the question, we are met by the same difficulty, although in another form. Zwingli (*Comm. de vera et falsa religione*, Opp. iii. p. 191 *sqq.*), by connecting the ideas *evangelium* and *pœnitentia*, adheres to the line of thought originally adopted by Luther, to the effect that the gospel, as the announcement of the reconciliation accomplished by Christ, and as the medium that conveys the power of the Holy Ghost, and awakens trust in the pardoning grace of God, also supplies at once the motive and the standard for the sinner's self-know-

ledge ; while also as preached by the most innocent of men it gives sufficient motive for a change in the whole tendency of life. This expresses exactly the external connexion that is implied in the association between justification and regeneration which Luther and Melanchthon also assert. He does not get beyond this mode of viewing the matter, even when he describes the new life as the condition under which alone the pacification of the conscience, which the gospel works, can take effect upon any one. *Filium mittit, qui Dei justitiæ pro nobis satisfaciat, indubitatumque pignus salutis fiat. Verum ea lege, ut nova creatura simus, ut Christum induiti ambulemus. Est ergo tota Christiani hominis vita pœnitentia ; quando enim est, ut non peccemus ?* (p. 194.) For this condition is not derived from the direct object of faith, to wit the pacifying mercy of God. For this reason Zwingli presently adds the supplementary formula (p. 201), *Quod Christiana religio nihil aliud est, quam firma spes in Deum per Christum Jesum et innocens vita ad exemplum Christi, quoad ipse donat, expressa*—a formula in which the diversity of the motives of hope and of well-doing in the atoning work and in the example of Christ is unmistakably expressed. It is true that he immediately passes on to point out a closer connexion between the two, *quod pœnitentia peccata non abluit, sed spes in Christum, quodque pœnitentia custodia est, ne in ea recidas, quæ damnavisti*. Still he does not lay the chief emphasis on this thought, that a good walk serves as the means of sustaining one's faith, for he immediately afterwards gives it out as a hard problem how to solve the antinomy, *quod Christi redemptio cuncta possit et efficiat quæ ad salutem attinent, et contra tam constanter innocentia requiratur* (p. 202). For they who are constantly laying stress upon faith in Christ seem to surrender the necessity of striving after moral excellence ; while those whose thoughts are directed especially to the latter are apt to become doubtful as to what was the advantage of Christ and his work. Zwingli appeals to the actual experience of faith in order to meet this difficulty, and thus evades the necessity of a theoretical adjustment of the relation that has been spoken of. Nor do we find matters more fully explained in his later dissertation in the *Christianæ fidei expositio* (Opp. iv. p. 61 sqq.) Here he simply defines saving faith as being at the same time the disposition to perform good

works. But this combination is merely asserted, not vindicated. At all events, the following is hardly sufficient: *Fides a solo Dei spiritu est. Qui ergo fidem habent in omni opere ad Dei voluntatem velut ad archetypum spectant* (p. 61). *Fides enim cum spiritus divini sit adflatus, quomodo potest quiescere aut in otio desiderare, quum spiritus ille jugis sit actio et operatio?* *Ubi-cunque ergo vera fides est, ibi et opus est non minus, quam ubi ignis isthic et calor est* (p. 63). For inasmuch as faith had been at the outset defined as *trust* in God and Christ—in other words, as the faculty of resting on God's omnipotence and mercy,—any additional reference to the work of the Divine Spirit in producing well-doing in the believer, however right it may be in itself, and however characteristic it may be of Zwingli's special work as a reformer, is yet only a mere appendix to the primary definition of faith; and the necessity of the new thought cannot be inferred by deduction from our Christian intuitions.

By Luther's sense of the disparity of his doctrine and of the need for bringing into closer connexion the two thoughts of justification and of renewal by the Holy Ghost, I think it is possible to explain the fact that in certain of his expressions Luther defined the idea of justification in a way identical with that which was subsequently elevated to the rank of a principle by Andreas Osiander. That Luther, previous to the year 1517, in spite of his chief accentuation of imputed righteousness, occasionally also gives expression in a way that was then customary to the idea of a real infusion of righteousness, has been already shown above (p. 139). These expressions reproduce themselves, too, even in the times of his reformation activity, and particularly are to be found in writings of the years 1519-22.¹ This chiefly arises from inaccurate considera-

¹ *Kürzere Auslegung des Briefes an die Galater* (1519), Walch, ix. p. 209: "When Paul speaks of the faith which justifies he of course means the faith which worketh by love; for faith earns the bestowal of the Spirit." P. 117: "To the righteous no sin is imputed, and this by reason of faith, which, being in conformity with God, crucifies sin in the flesh." *Sermon von dreierlei gutem Leben* (1521), x. p. 1992: "Faith alone makes blessed. Wherefore? It brings with it the spirit that does all good works willingly and lovingly, and thus fulfils and delights in the commandments of God." *Auslegung der 22 ersten Psalmen* (1519), iv. p. 859: "Beware of the sophists who make Christ to be our righteousness and our wisdom in such a way that all the time they make him only to be the cause of our righteousness. . . . Faith in Christ brings it about that he lives and works in me just as a

tion of those data of the subjective consciousness which at other times are carefully kept distinct from each other. We being in faith conscious of justification through Christ, and, at the same time, through faith possessors of the divine Spirit and of the love which fulfils the law, Luther brings the two together in such a way as to make justification or forgiveness of sins dependent upon the Spirit of God, which is in believers the efficient cause of actual goodness. It is only in the passage we have quoted below from the Exposition of the Psalms, that Luther approaches that objective mode of representation in which Osiander subsequently elaborated the thought. Although the controversy with Osiander that ensued shows that indefiniteness of doctrine, under certain circumstances, leads to important results, yet Luther's episodical leaning, which he here displays to a scientific development of the thought of justification, which, in fact, overthrows his own special religious interest therein, proves also still more clearly that his mode of representation in connexion with the relation between law and gospel is at least incomplete. For this reason Luther was not able to free himself from the discrepancy, even when Melanchthon had an opportunity to correct that distorted view when it had been put forward by John Brenz. The latter had propounded, as against Melanchthon, the view *fide justificari homines, quia fide accipiamus spiritum sanctum, ut postea justi esse possimus impletione legis, quam efficit spiritus sanctus*. Against which Melanchthon¹ affirms, in a letter dated May 1531, *Ideo sola fide sumus justi, non quia sit radix (justitiæ), ut tu scribis, sed quia apprehendit Christum, propter quem sumus accepti, qualis sit illa novitas, etsi necessario sequi debet, sed non pacificat conscientiam. Ideo non dilectio, quæ est impletio legis, justificat, sed sola fides, non quia est perfectio quædam in nobis, sed tantum quia apprehendit Christum. . . . Quando haberet conscientia pacem et certam spem, si deberet sentire, quod tunc demum justi reputemur, cum illa novitas in nobis perfecta esset*. Luther appended to

healing salve works on a sick body; thus there is made with Christ one flesh and one body by a hidden unspeakable transformation of our sins into his righteousness. . . . It is now Christ's office and nature to cleanse the sins away from those who believe in him, and by himself to infuse righteousness into them." *Enarratio Epist. et Evang.* (1521), Opp. lat. Jen. ii. p. 356 b. *Vorrede zum Römerbrief* (1522), Walch, xiv. p. 112. Compare Küstlin, i. p. 285; ii. p. 454 sq.

¹ C. R. ii. p. 501.

this letter a note of his concurrence ; but even that is accompanied by a hint of another tendency. He conceives that *nulla sit in corde meo qualitas, quæ fides vel caritas vocetur, sed in loco ipsorum pono ipsum Christum et dico, hæc est justitia mea, ipse est qualitas et formalis, ut vocant, justitia mea, ut sic me liberem ab intuitu legis et operum, imo et ab intuitu objecti istius, Christi qui vel doctor vel donator intelligitur : sed volo ipsum mihi esse donum et doctrinam per se, ut omnia in ipso habeam. Sic dicit : ego sum via, veritas et vita ; non dicit : ego do tibi viam, veritatem, et vitam, quasi extra me positus operetur in me. Talia in me debet esse, manere, et vivere.* The striking thing in this declaration is not that Luther postulates such an immanence of Christ in believers—for he ceases to maintain the error of making the forgiveness of sins dependent on that,—but he separates himself from Melancthon and approximates more closely to Osiander, inasmuch as he would fain pass over the intuition of the Christ of history, and thus treat as merely an initial stage of the believer's consciousness, that has soon to be got over, that relationship between the believer and the historical appearance of Christ, which is justly described to be the abiding ground of the subjective consciousness of salvation.¹ On this matter one may venture to apply to Luther what used to be said in the middle ages with reference to certain propositions of the Lombard : *in hoc magister non tenetur !*

Melancthon had attempted to put upon a secure basis the actual fact of the co-existence of justification and good works in the believing subject, in the *loci* of 1535, by declaring the latter to be necessary to eternal life, although the believer's destiny thereto is already fully guaranteed in his justification : *Quos justificat, eosdem et glorificat. Itaque non datur vita æterna propter dignitatem bonorum operum, sed gratis propter Christum. Et tamen bona opera ita necessaria sunt ad vitam æternam, quia sequi reconciliationem necessario debent* (C. R. xxi. p. 429). But this very utterance shows more clearly than ever the defect

¹ Luther must also in other ways have given indication of a measure of uncertainty in his idea of justification. Otherwise it would be impossible to understand how Melancthon, in 1536, could have expressly questioned him as to his opinion (*Tischreden, Ausg. von Förstemann*, ii. p. 145 sq. ; Walch, xxii. p. 710 sq.) I agree with Köstlin, ii. p. 456, in this, that the expression then made use of by Luther, *nulla alia re, sed sola illa renascentia per fidem, qua justus factus est, permanet justus perpetuo et acceptus*, is a harmless one, and merely means faith as something new in comparison with a state of sin.

that has already been pointed out. If good works are necessary to salvation, then they can be thought of only as means or indispensable conditions thereto; but if they are only the accessories of justification, the alone ground of salvation, then they are just as little necessary for the one as for the other. This doctrine was maintained in its dialectical unprecision owing to the fact that in Melancthon's view the objective reference of the idea of justification never separated itself from the subjective. Viewing it from the subjective standpoint, he felt fully justified in allowing his disciple, Caspar Cruziger (1536), speaking of the fundamental religious experience, to say that penitence is the *conditio sine qua non justificationis*; and was able to acquiesce in the doctrine *bona opera conditionem sine qua non esse justificationis*. But yet when Conrad Cordatus took exception to this, applying as he did the above expressions to justification as God's act (a thing we cannot wonder at in a theologian of the second generation, who from the first was conscious of having received only an objective doctrine), Melancthon was in no position, owing to his sensitiveness, to adduce anything to clear this up.¹ At the same time, however, he took the warning; and, in consequence, neither maintained that formula nor reproduced the assertion of the necessity of good works *for salvation* in the edition of the *Loci*, 1543. In the *Augsburg Interim* of Charles v., the latter formula certainly made its appearance as a deliberate expression of Catholic doctrine; but when it was taken up in the *Leipzig Interim* of the Elector Maurice, such a sense of it was neutralized by the addition that "this in no way countenances the error that everlasting life is merited by the worthiness of our works."² Yet this very addition placed the original thought in a more suspicious light than before. So that George Major and Justus Menius found that they had to face a general opposition when, on account of the frequent abuse of the doctrine of justification in the direction of Antinomianism, they had recourse to that very idea of good works.³ It availed them nothing to make the qualification that they meant good works as means of

¹ C. R. iii. pp. 160-180. Compare Schmidt, *Philipp Melancthon*, p. 327 sq.

² Compare Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*, III. i. pp. 348-364.

³ For the requisite citations I would refer to Thomasius: *das Bekenntnis der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche in der Consequenz seines Principis*, p. 100 sq.

salvation only in so far as by their means faith is maintained and protected from its own decay. While amongst those of the opposite side, Flacius, for example, gave expression to the still graver statement: *instauratio aut renovatio est prorsus res separata a justificatione*, and Amsdorf permitted himself his well-known absurdity of saying that good works are prejudicial to salvation, Melanchthon surrendered, as unaccustomed in the Church and easily capable of being misunderstood, the opposite formula which he had himself hit upon, and with entire self-satisfaction fell back upon the formula that we have justification and the inheritance of blessedness through and by Christ, and that good works are necessary by reason of immutable Divine command (C. R. viii. pp. 194-412). The *formula concordie* goes no further than this; and yet its assertion that final blessedness as well as justification depend solely upon faith, can hardly stand its ground when brought to the test of Scripture, to which itself appeals. The course of the vicissitudes and controversies that centre round this point accordingly shows that Melanchthon, even after he had attempted to indicate a closer relation between justification and moral renovation, stopped short at the vaguer formula, from want of dialectic power.

Yet another instance of want of precision is to be met with in the course of that phase of the *doctrine* of justification which is embraced by Luther and Melanchthon alike. The question comes to be asked, namely, At what period is he who (the troubles of his conscience about sin once ended) puts his trust in Christ objectively declared to be righteous by God? Upon this point Melanchthon, in a passage already cited (above, p. 173) from the first edition of the *Loci*, says: *qui erectus voce evangelii credit Deo is jam justificatus est* (C. R. xxi. p. 155). In the second edition it runs (p. 421): *cum fide se mens erigit, donantur remissio peccatorum et reconciliatio*. This can be understood in the same sense as the other. But, as shortly afterwards one reads, *cum Deus remittit peccata simul donat nobis spiritum sanctum*—rather is the thought brought into prominence that forgiveness of sins, or justification, as the act of God, is brought about at the moment when faith is wrought in each individual, and not previously in Christ's work on behalf of all those who should believe. On this point Melanchthon throws no clear

light, because he does not develop the doctrine of justification in connexion with the doctrine of reconciliation. As rather the subjective assurance of the benefits of justification, reconciliation and remission of sins is immediately secured in the intuition of Christ's passion, he accordingly represents them objectively also as immediate effects of the passion of Christ. The benefits of redemption based thereupon must subsequently be appropriated in each case by the faith of the individual. Therefore, in the third edition of the *Loci* (p. 756) he says: *justificamur in sanguine Christi, id est, placatur ira Dei per mortem fidei. Sed hoc beneficium fide applicari oportet.* But how is that view of the effect of the past passion of Christ intelligible at a time when we were without faith and did not even exist? There is missing here an intermediate thought which was discovered by Melancthon no more than by Luther, and which indeed neither of them looked for, since they never allowed their theoretical reflection to work independently of their religious experience. So that by and by the other view comes into prominence, that justification takes place then first of all when the individual fulfils the condition of it in the possession of faith. But this thought was much later in becoming the prevailing doctrine of the Lutheran Church; only indeed after the effects of Christ's passion upon God and upon man respectively had been so distinguished from each other, that only the effect upon the former was regarded as immediate, while the effect upon the latter was regarded as a mediate result of that prestation. But the formula that Christ at that time reconciled God with the sinful human race, and that God in consequence thereof imputes the righteousness of Christ at all times to those who perform the act of faith, is *no* doctrine of the Reformers. Neither, however, can the later doctrine be regarded as the true solution of the question proposed above. For, leaving out of sight the narrow and one-sided apprehension of the idea of reconciliation which is not contemplated by the Reformers, the doctrine involves itself in a contradiction which orthodox theologians have resolved only by a not very cogent distinction. They share with the Reformers the view that the justification of the individual comes before the bestowal of God's Spirit. No one, however, can perform the act of faith except by the Holy Ghost. But if justification as the act of God is to follow

upon the faith of the subject as a condition, then it must be assumed that God bestows upon the individual the Spirit, in order to the act of faith, before He justifies him. And this contradicts the view of the doctrine with which we had set out. In due time we shall see how the Lutheran theologians of the seventeenth century sought to escape this conclusion.

28. While the Reformers made justification in the course of conversion to proceed from the successive influence of law and of gospel upon the consciousness of the sinner, they were originally agreed on this point, that the Holy Ghost and faith are to be presupposed before the law can become effectual in producing repentance.¹ In substance this is identical with the thought which Luther had expressed in the form—that repentance, if it is to be distinguished from the hypocritical *contritio* in the penance of the Romish Church, must arise from love to what is good (see above, p. 143 f). The same thought is indirectly implied in the view expressed by Luther in 1516, that the gospel includes also the commanding and punishing will of God; that it alone interprets the law in its spiritual sense, and so attains to *mortificatio* or repentance. In the gospel the wrath of God is also made manifest (Rom. i. 18).² For no one can discern and lay to heart the wrath of God on account of sin, as expressed in Christ's vicarious endurance of the punishment of sin, unless with very special faith he recognise at the same time

¹ *Von der babyl. Gefangenschaft* (Walch, xix. p. 102): "It is only by faith (kindled in view of the promise and God's threatening) that the conscience is thus crushed, and again lifted up and comforted. For this reason faith ought before all things to be instructed and awakened. Where faith has been attained, repentance and peace will infallibly follow." *Auslegung der 22 ersten Psalmen* (iv. p. 1506): the writer of the 19th Psalm affirms of the law that it converts the soul, "in order to distinguish it from the law that is learned without the word of faith and without the glow of the Spirit, for such learning only defiles, perverts souls, makes unbelievers and fools. Therefore everything that is here said in praise of the law must be understood of the Holy Spirit, which quickens us by the word of faith." Melancthon: *Loci* (1521), l. c. p. 154: *Certum est, odio peccati neminem tangi posse, nisi per spiritum sanctum.* p. 216: *Tantum abest, ut sine opera spiritus sancti conteramur.*

² Lösscher: i. pp. 762, 765, 785. So also Melancthon: *Apol. Conf. Aug.* (libr. symb. ed. Hase, p. 71). *Loci* (1535); p. 421. *Evangelium arguit peccata et docet, nobis opus esse mediatore.* Cf. p. 490 (1543) p. 741: *Poenitentia fit voce legis, per quam Deus arguit peccata nostra, . . . fit et voce evangelii accusantis mundum, quod non audiat filium Dei, non moveatur ejus passione et resurrectione. Ideo inquit Christus (Joh. xvi. 8): spiritus sanctus arguet mundum de peccato, quod non credunt. Et Rom. i. 18: revelatur ira Dei, etc.*

the divine worth of Christ, which rendered it impossible that He should have deserved death, or have been overtaken by it in a merely incidental way. On logical, theological, and psychological grounds faith as a condition is indispensable to a due apprehension of the *contritio* that is to be gained from the law. The negation of sin by the will can be distinct and effectual only when it follows upon an affirmation of the value of goodness, its opposite. The work of the law in punishing and chastening the spirit is conceivable only as a consequence of the recognition of the absolute power of the lawgiver over the well-being of men. The transition from repudiation of sin to appropriation of God's grace, is logical only when the spirit in contrition has already felt itself drawn by that power which is to be recognised as the only saving power. All this presupposes a degree of saving faith even as necessary to the due influence of the law in producing *contritio*. And it surely cannot be difficult to distinguish from this grade of faith the true and complete faith that accepts the forgiveness of sins through Christ. Our German Reformers, however, shrank from this task, certainly not to the advantage either of the doctrinal system or of the Church constitution that resulted from their activity.

This unfavourable crisis is indicated very characteristically in Melancthon's *Unterricht der Visitatoren* (published in 1528, C. R. xxvi. pp. 51, 52), where we read, "Although some deem that nothing ought to be taught before faith, but that repentance should be allowed to follow as a result from faith, in order that our opponents may not be able to say that *we are taking back our former doctrine*, we must yet look at the matter thus ; though repentance and the law belong to our common faith (for one must first *believe that God is* who threatens, commands, alarms), it is yet expedient for the *common rude man* that *such parts of faith as these* should still be allowed to pass under the names, command, law, fear, etc., in order that *all the more distinctly* they may understand the faith of Christ, which the apostles call *justificantem fidem*, in other words, the faith which makes righteous and wipes away sin,—a result which is not brought about by the *faith of the commandment and of repentance*, although the common man gets confused upon the word faith, and asks useless questions about it." In this declara-

tion of Melanchthon the original view of the need of faith as a condition in order that the law may work its due effect in *contritio* is expressly recognised as the right one. But in the teeth of this original doctrine of the Reformation an opposite view is taken, and the idea of faith receives its narrowest limitation as *fides justificans*; and this from no regard to truth, but simply from an accommodation to the understanding of theologically and religiously uneducated persons. John Agricola had raised his protest against this view of Melanchthon; remembering Luther's repeatedly expressed principle, that conversion proceeds from love of righteousness;¹ the manner in which Melanchthon evaded this weighty consideration betrays as much superficiality in his observation of the phenomenon in question as personal feeling against the unwelcome adviser. Finally, Luther's conciliatory decision in favour of Melanchthon proceeds with obvious arbitrariness, and yet even then he adheres to his opinion that in *contritio* a certain degree of faith is an indispensable condition. Now, why could not this fact, even though it did seem dangerous for "the common rude man," be preserved in the theological doctrine? That this was not done, particularly that the last edition (1543) of Melanchthon's *Loci* is purged of all the earlier traces of the thought, is another circumstance that has been attended with evil results to theology and the Lutheran Church.

In giving this direction to the Lutheran doctrine, Agricola himself in fact helped, in the year 1537, by maintaining the superfluity of the law to the way of salvation in exaggerated and perverse deduction from his original view. As Luther, therefore, could not avoid misunderstanding Agricola,

¹ C. R. i. pp. 915, 916. Melanchthon's letter to Justus Jonas, dated 20th December 1527, reporting a discussion held at Torgau upon Melanchthon's book of Visitation, previous to its publication: *Ialebius contendit, pugnare meum scriptum cum . . . Lutheri dogmatibus. Lutherum docuisse quod ab amore justitiæ poenitentia inchoari debeat. . . . Ego respondi paucis, oportere terrores in animis existerere ante justificationem, et in his moribus non discerni facile posse amorem justitiæ et timorem poenarum. . . . Fatetur hoc Ialebius, sed ait a fide minarum inchoandam esse contritionem. . . . Ego respondi a fide minarum terrores non esse separandos, quod aliud est fides minarum quam pavor. Quod si uni sibi existimet ille has disputationes de fide minarum, de amore justitiæ notas esse, ut tot annis versatus inter theologos nihil de talibus rebus audierim, nã ille non multum ingenio meo tribuit. . . . Lutherus sic altercantibus nobis diremit controversiam, sibi placere, ut fidei nomen tribuatur justificanti fidei ac consolanti nos in his terroribus, fidem generalem sub nomine poenitentis recte comprehendere.*

who himself was not master of the tendency of his thoughts, it is easily understood that Luther only settled himself firmer in his scheme of conversion as derived from law and gospel, and entirely abandoned the view that such an apprehension of the law as leads to repentance is itself conditioned by a certain measure of saving faith, even although the subject himself has no more consciousness of that than he has of the hidden prevenient grace of God (see above, p. 143). Where this is not presupposed the law either works not at all upon the sinner, or it leads him to that aimless and hypocritical penitence the exercise of which within the Romish Church Luther had hardly shaken himself free of. The history of the Lutheran Church proves the truth of both these alternatives. The moral crudity which was to be observed throughout her orthodox period in the mass of her members, was the inevitable result of a preaching of the law that was incorrect in theory, and therefore ineffective as a whole. On the other hand, the pietistic methodism of Halle, which at last began to take seriously the Lutheran doctrine of conversion, involved men either in hypocrisy or despair. But another weighty result of that view, which Luther and Melancthon adopted against Agricola's earlier remonstrances, is the dislocation of the various elements of the idea of the Church. Without dwelling long upon this I may say that the evangelical conception of the Church is distinguished from the Romish in so far as the latter asserts simply a causal connexion between the necessary parts of the idea of the Church, while the former asserts a relation dominated by the idea of a purpose. Thus, while on both hands the Church is acknowledged to be the community of believers, the Roman Catholic thought finds expression herein, that the community of believers is always and exclusively the product of the Church as a mechanism, of the clergy as opposed to the laity, of the *ecclesia representans*. The evangelical thought—as it is *hinted at* in the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, as well as in the Smalkald manifesto *de potestate papæ et jurisdictione episcoporum*, and counts upon an educated understanding—amounts to this, that if the community of believers is the *end* of everything that goes by the name of Church, it is also the *ground* thereof, and that therefore the *ministerium verbi*, in so far as it necessarily belongs to the

Church, is only an *instrumentality* in the community of believers. The commanding importance of this connexion of ideas was weakened, and a door was opened for unevangelical practices, when the Reformers *in concreto* abandoned the thought that the congregations before them were Christian, however incomplete might be their moral condition; and instead of this set out with the presupposition that they had to do with the "common rude man," who first of all needed to be converted to Christianity, and from whom the logically correct and alone effective view of the conditions of conversion had to be carefully withheld. In this way the Reformers gave to the office of the *ministerium verbi* a preponderance over Christian congregations which really makes the *ministri verbi divini* to appear as the cause, and the community of believers as the result. For this reason the Lutheran pastorate is always exposed to the temptation to imitate the attitude of the Romish clergy to the people in defiance of the Augsburg Confession and of the truth.¹

29. Calvin's able delineation of the thought of justification took a different direction from Luther's and Melancthon's. Notwithstanding this, the practical religious apprehension of that thought within the sphere of his Church-influence is not different from that which has been traced as common to Luther and Zwingli.² It is, indeed, impossible that Luther himself could have stated the leading article of the standing and falling Church more accurately than that has been stated by the framers of the Heidelberg Catechism, disciples and followers of Calvin (Qu. 60-64). The other Confessions of Calvinistic origin, the *Gallicana*, *Scoticana*, *Belgica*, *Helvetica posterior*, are very far indeed from altering in any way the religious contents, and the religious and moral effect of the thought of justification; ³ their specialty lies herein, that they all either directly follow the order

¹ In passing, I may remark that the mistaken spirit of concession to the "common rude man" in the doctrine of *penitentia* brings with it also the evil consequence for theology, that the "common rude man," in all sorts of shapes and guises, holds himself exempt from paying any heed to the scientific theology that does not suit his prejudices.

² The article from the first Confession of Basle has been cited above (p. 157). The second Confession of Basle (the first Helvetic), dated 1536, owing to Bucer's influence, contains the expression of Luther's and Melancthon's doctrine of justification in the schema of law and gospel (Niemeyer, *Coll. conf.* pp. 108, 109).

³ Compare Niemeyer, pp. 333, 346-348, 374, 489-494.

of Calvin's theological system, or, like the Gallican, at least have a regard to it. Only the last-mentioned formula bears the character of a confession of *faith*, the rest are in point of form treatises theologically reasoned out, corresponding in kind to the Lutheran *formula concordia*.

And yet Calvin's doctrinal delineation, however puzzling may be the sequence of its ideas to him who has been accustomed to the traditionary doctrine of Luther and Melancthon, as that is to be found in certain text-books, is determined precisely by a chief regard to the original reformation phenomenon of the subjective consciousness of justification. The order of the themes and the mode of their treatment in the *Institutio religionis Christianæ* (third edition, 1559), is dominated by the inquiry after the antecedents which must have existed without and within the Subject, in order that he may become conscious of justification through Christ alone, as Luther and Zwingli have described it. But the fundamental thought of the Reformation is, to adopt the formula of Chemnitz (p. 139), that the *regenerate* becomes conscious of his acceptance with God of his righteousness, not in virtue of his really good works; not in virtue of the newness of life that has been implanted in him by the Holy Ghost; but only in virtue of the perfect obedience of Christ, which, by faith, he lays hold of as the alone ground of salvation. This thought presupposes in Calvin's view the doctrine of the atoning work of Christ (Lib. ii. cap. 15-17); the doctrine of the regeneration of the believer (Lib. iii. cap. 1-3); the doctrine of the active life of the regenerate (Lib. iii. cap. 6-11). While thus the doctrine of justification by faith (Lib. iii. cap. 12-17) only now is brought up for the first time, it accordingly stands related to that phenomenon of the subjective consciousness which only now admits of having its religious value and its truth accurately determined. This is but logical. For if the consciousness of justification through Christ is practically opposed to any false attribution of value to the good works of the believer and to his consciousness of regeneration that might possibly be made, these elements of the Christian consciousness must first of all be objectively fixed and ascertained before we can posit any negation of their value towards the divine sentence upon believers, by means of an explanation of the reference and significance of justifying faith. Only the

question arises, in judging of the systematic arrangement of these doctrines that is aimed at, whether the idea of justification ought not to have been developed on its objective side previous to entering upon the consideration of subjective facts and phenomena of consciousness, particularly in connexion with the doctrine of Christ's work? Calvin never raised this question; for his whole discussion of the satisfaction given by Christ and upon His merit, upon the forgiveness of sins and the righteousness procured by Him, is dominated, not by objective theological considerations, but by others of a subjective and religious character—viz., that Christ did all this for *us*, earned it for *us*, although the reference to this purpose is not objectively stated in any actual expression.

The third book of the *Institutio* begins with the remark that as long as Christ, the bestower of the benefits of redemption that have been designed for us, remains outside of us in historical objectivity, He exercises no saving influence upon us. The application of His redemption to us is, on the one hand, brought about by the Holy Ghost, and, on the other hand, it is appropriated by faith. This mutual relation between man's receptivity and the divine working of Christ, in whom is contained the plenitude of the Holy Spirit, and who therefore does all things by the self-same Spirit, answers to the Pauline figure that Christ is our Head, and we who are engrafted into Him and clothed with Him are His members.¹ In other words, all that is said about regeneration, new life, justification applies to the individual only in so far as he is considered to be a member of the Church, and as the Church of believers is considered to be prior to the experiences of individuals. It is true that Calvin in the last (1559) edition of the *Institutio*, to which I have been hitherto referring, avoids giving expression to the idea of the Church in this connexion, reserving it for later development in the fourth book. On the other hand, in the earlier editions, which in their arrangement follow the order of the Apostles' Creed, and in the *Catechismus Genevensis* (1541),

¹ Lib. iii. 2. 35: Huc redit summa, Christum, ubi nos in fidem illuminat Spiritus sui virtute, simul inserere in corpus suum, ut fiamus bonorum omnium participes. 13. 5: Statuant fideles, non alio jure sperandam sibi esse hereditatem regni celestis, nisi quia insiti in Christi corpus, justi gratis reputantur. Nam quoad justificationem res est mere passiva fides, nihil afferens nostrum ad conciliandam Dei gratiam, sed a Christo recipiens, quod nobis deest. Cf. i. 1. 3; 2. 30; 11. 10.

which exhibits the same arrangement, the article upon the Church precedes those upon forgiveness of sins, upon *pœnitentia* and upon *justificatio*, in such a way as decisively to dominate their meaning. It is worth one's while to convince one's-self by reference to the passages cited below, from the first edition of 1536, how completely, how accurately, and also how independently, Calvin had appropriated to himself the leading thought of the Reformation.¹ In the Genevan Catechism, indeed, the connexion between the doctrine of Christ's work and the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins that the individual needs, is even made closer by means of the intermediate idea of the Church than it is in Calvin's systematic works. In it the Church is set forth as the intentional result of the death of Christ, while forgiveness of sins is represented as the fundamental benefit of redemption for the members of the Church.² In comparison with these earlier expressions, I cannot regard the mode of representation that is followed in the last edition of the *Institutio* as an improvement. Calvin, of course, by no means intends to abandon his presupposition of the Church in the

¹ C. R. xxix. p. 78 : Credimus remissionem peccatorum, hoc est : divina liberalitate, intercedente Christi merito, peccatorum remissionem ac gratiam nobis fieri, qui in ecclesiæ corpus asciti et inserti sumus ; nullam vero peccatorum remissionem aut aliunde, aut ulla alia ratione, aut aliis dari. Quando extra hanc ecclesiam et hanc sanctorum communionem nulla est salus. Porro ecclesia ipsa constat et consistit hac peccatorum remissione, hocque veluti fundamento suffulta est. Quando peccatorum remissio via est, qua ad Deum accedatur, ac ratio qua nobis concilietur, ideoque et hæc una nobis ingressum in ecclesiam (quæ civitas est Dei et tabernaculum, quod sibi in habitationem sanctificavit altissimus) aperit, et nos in ea retinet ac tuetur. Hanc vero remissionem accipiunt fideles, cum peccatorum suorum conscientia oppressi . . . divini iudicii sensu consternantur sibi que ipsis displicent . . . hocque peccati odio ac sui confusione carnem suam, ac quidquid ex se est, mortificant. Atque ut hanc pœnitentiam assidue (sic enim oportet) illi, quamdiu in carcere sui corporis degunt, prosequuntur, ita subinde et assidue illam remissionem obtinent. Non quod ita eorum pœnitentia mereatur, sed visum est Domino, sese hominibus hoc ordine exhibere ; ut cum ex suis ipsorum paupertatis agnitione omnem fastum exuerint, se totos abjecerint, ac sibi ipsis plane vulerint, tum demum suavitatem misericordiae, quam illis in Christo proponit, gustare incipiant, qua percepta respirent, ac se consolentur, secure sibi in Christo promittentes et peccatorum remissionem et beatam salutem. Cf. *ibid.* p. 672 (from edd. 1539-1554).

² Niemeyer, *Coll. conf.* pp. 135, 136 : Ecclesia est corpus et societas fidelium, quos Deus ad vitam æternam prædestinavit. Estne hoc etiam caput creditu necessarium ? Imo vero, nisi facere velimus otiosam Christi mortem, et pro nihilo ducere, quidquid hactenus relatum est. Hic enim unus est omnium effectus, ut sit ecclesia. . . . Cur peccatorum remissionem subnectit ecclesiæ ? Quia eam nemo consequitur, quia et coadunatus fuerit ante populo Dei, et unitatem cum Christi corpore perseveranter ad finem usque colat, eoque modo testatum faciat, verum se esse ecclesiæ membrum.

doctrines of regeneration, etc., for in the third book he always avails himself only of the figurative expression *Corpus Christi*, and the connected figures of the *caput* and *membra corporis*. If other proof were necessary, it might be pointed out that faith is not only traced to the influence of the Holy Spirit, but also connected with the promise, with the gospel, with the *ministerium evangelii* (iii. 2, 29), which is not supposed to exist outside of the Church. Moreover, the idea of the treatment of the notion of the Church in the fourth book is so framed that every intelligent person recognises in it not only a continuation of the doctrines of the third book, but also the sphere in which regeneration, etc., find place.¹ And yet a man so acute and circumspect as Schneckenburger² has regarded that *Unio mystica* of the believer with Christ, which Calvin considers to be implied in faith, as a purely individual process just as it is in the Lutheran view, without recognising the reference to the idea of the Church that is conveyed in the above-mentioned passages which he himself quotes (see p. 193, note), although these supply a very important psychological and ethical commentary on the "mystery." This shows that by means of the arrangement of doctrine that has been adopted in the last edition of the *Institutio*—an arrangement which follows that of Melancthon's *Loci theol.* and of the *Sententias* of the Lombard—the true Church character of Calvin's theology has been less adequately expressed than in the earlier treatment which followed the order of the Apostles' Creed. We have already been reminded (p. 176) that Luther and Melancthon also, after all, indirectly recognised the priority of the Church to the conversion and justification of the individual, in deducing these results from the influence of law and gospel. But Calvin's doctrine must still be preferred to theirs, inasmuch as he, along with Zwingli (p. 156), directly and objectively postulates, as necessary to an understanding of the justification of the individual, the existence of the Church and the fellowship of the individual member of the Church with Christ the Head. Calvin's exposition of the doctrine of Christ's work is framed

¹ *Lib. iv. 1, 1*: In ecclesiæ sinum aggregari vult Deus filios suos, non modo ut ejus opera et ministerio alantur, quamdiu infantes sunt ac pueri, sed cura etiam materna regantur donec adolescant, ac tandem perveniant ad fidei metam.

² *Comparative Dogmatik*, ii. pp. 22, 23.

in view of this. The sequence of the offices executed by Christ as our Redeemer, as given by Calvin, is different from what it is according to the Lutherans : Prophet, King, High Priest.¹ This order proceeds on the assumption that Christ's general title as Lord includes under it His high-priestly office ;² and it is logically in accordance therewith that justification, as result of the *sacerdotium Christi*, can be understood only when Christ's Lordship over the believer is presupposed in virtue of his incorporation with the Head of the Church. It is true that neither Calvin nor Zwingli has stated so clearly as Thomas Aquinas (p. 56) did, that it was as Head of the Church that Christ satisfied Divine justice and acquired that merit which extends to us so that our sins are forgiven ; their meaning, however, points entirely in this direction. Both alike either were ignorant of or overlooked this position of Thomas ; their analogous doctrine is plainly derived from a combination of the leading idea of the Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and Ephesians with that of the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans, a combination which was rendered necessary by the obligation that lay upon them to make an exhaustive use of Scripture in the construction of their theology.

30. Calvin then treats justification through Christ by faith as the consciousness of justification in the regenerate person, who by the Holy Spirit is actively engaged within the Church in carrying out his *pœnitentia*, and in manifesting his new life by good works. But still the other weighty view of justification as preceding regeneration is also maintained in the arrangement and mode of presentation he has chosen. For having shown the relation between faith and the Holy Ghost in the first two chapters of the third book, and having then at the beginning of the third chapter pointed to *novitas vitæ* and *reconciliatio gratuita* as the twofold possession of faith, he vindicates the propriety of taking the former into consideration first, because it helps to a comprehension of the latter, and to an adequate understanding of the manner in which the two

¹ *Lib.* ii. 15. 3, 6 : In the Genevan Catechism it is even King, High Priest, Prophet (Niemeyer, p. 129).

² *Lib.* ii. 15. 5 : Dedit pater omnem potestatem filio, ut per ejus manum nos gubernet, foveat, sustentet, sub ejus tutela nos protegat nobisque auxilietur. Ita quantisper a Deo peregrinamur, Christus intercedit medius, qui nos paulatim ad solidam cum Deo conjunctionem perducatur.

benefits go together. Viewing the matter objectively, however, he maintains as distinctly as any Lutheran could do the priority of the forgiving to the regenerating grace of God.¹ For this reason Calvin was not able to conclude his previous psychological and ethical description of the idea of faith without alluding to the opposite schema in which true justification presents itself to the eye of faith. The assurance of salvation (as opposed to doubts of all sorts), possessed by faith, consists entirely in looking towards God and towards His promise; and excludes the possibility of any value being attributed to works, which entitle no one to make the faintest conjecture of his acceptance with God (iii. 2. 37, 38). The justification that is by faith makes reference to the grace of God, through the mediation of Christ, particularly through his historical act of obedience which reconciled us with God, or earned from Him the forgiveness of our sins, so that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us. All those formulæ have a similar meaning to Calvin, for it is in the light of religious intuition that he regards the value of that bygone event to be the ground of our salvation.² With Calvin also the assurance of *this* justification by faith serves to guard the Christian life both against despair of salvation and against all phases of self-righteousness (iii. 11. 15; 12. 2, 4). If now it occurs to us that this relation between faith and the grace of God, that justifies through Christ, exists in the believer only, under the condition that through the Holy Ghost he has been made a member of Christ the Head, Calvin has also been care-

¹ iii. 3. 19: *Proprium fidei objectum est dei bonitas, qua peccata remittuntur.* 11. 1: *Regeneratio est secunda gratia. Justificationis ratio . . . ita discutienda est, ut meminerimus præcipuum esse sustinendæ religionis cardinem. Nisi enim primum omnium, quo sis apud Deum loco, et quale de te sit illius judicium, tenes, ut nullum habes stabiliendæ salutis fundamentum, ita nec erigendæ in Deum pietatis.*

² iii. 11. 2: *Justificabitur ille fide, qui operum justitia exclusus, Christi justitiam per fidem apprehendit, qua vestitus in Dei conspectu non ut peccator sed tanquam justus appareat. Ita nos justificationem simpliciter interpretamur acceptionem, qua nos Deus in gratiam receptos pro justis habet. Eamque in peccatorum remissione ac justitiæ Christi imputatione positam esse dicimus (Ac here conjoins synonymous ideas, cf. § 21). § 16: Hic est fidei sensus, per quem peccator in possessionem venit suæ salutis, dum ex evangelii doctrina agnoscit Deo se reconciliatum, quod intercedente Christi justitia, impetrata peccatorum remissione justificatus sit, et quanquam spiritu Dei regeneratus, non in bonis operibus, sed in sola Christi justitia repositam sibi perpetuam justitiam cogitat. § 9: Quomodo justificati sumus si quæsitur, respondet Paulus, Christi obedientia.*

ful to provide that the forensic idea of justification should not be touched or injured by this. There certainly does occur in the earlier editions of the *Institutio*¹ a passage in which, along with other benefits of redemption, *justificatio* also is derived from the working of God by the Holy Spirit; but as even the earlier editions represent with perfect accuracy imputation as the form of justification,² the Holy Spirit accordingly is to be understood merely as the *conditio sine qua non* of imputation to individuals, just as is done by Zwingli in his *Expositio fidei* (above, p. 162, note). In particular, Calvin, even previous to the appearance of Osiander, expressly opposes the view that this possession of the Holy Spirit, or the fact of his faith, is the objective ground of that sentence of acquittal which the believer receives;³ or that faith contributes some real thing towards justification;⁴ on the contrary, he asserts that faith or enlightenment by God's Spirit is only the means of justification, just as incorporation with the Church by the Holy Spirit's work is represented as the needful connecting idea between the work of Christ and our consciousness of righteousness founded thereupon.⁵ If perhaps some vagueness is still felt here, this can only be because this connecting idea had not already been treated in connexion with the doctrine of the work of Christ, as is cursorily done in the language of the Genevan Catechism (above, p. 187). From all that has been said, it results that Schneckenburger's impression⁶ that the reformed view of the doctrine is specifically distinguished from the Lutheran, inasmuch as the latter represents justification as a

¹ C. R. xxix. pp. 72, 536.

² On this point compare Küstlin, *Calvin's Institutio nach Form u. Inhalt; Stud. u. Krit.* 1868, p. 452, *sqq.*

³ iii. 11. 23: *Evanescit nugamentum illud, ideo justificari hominem fide, quoniam illa spiritum Dei participat, quo justus redditur, quod magis est contrarium superiori doctrinæ quam ut conciliari unquam queat.* The same expression is repeated in the second edition (C. R. xxix. p. 745).

⁴ iii. 13. 5: *Quoad justificationem res est mere passiva fidei, nihil afferens nostrum ad conciliandam Dei gratiam, sed a Christo recipiens quod nobis deest.*

⁵ iii. 14. 21: *Stat inconcussum, quod ante posuimus, effectum nostræ salutis in dei patris dilectione situm esse, materiam in filii obedientia, instrumentum in spiritus illuminatione, hoc est fide, finem esse tantæ Dei benignitatis gloriam.* 11. 10: *Non ergo eum extra nos procul speculamur, ut nobis imputetur ejus justitia, sed quia ipsum induimus et insiti sumus in ejus corpus . . . ideo justitiæ societatem nobis cum eo esse gloriamur.*

⁶ *Comparative Dogmatik*, ii. p. 23. *Zur kirchl. Christologie*, p. 55 *sq.*

synthetic judgment (the sinner is just), the former as an analytic judgment (the believer is just) resulting necessarily from the *unio cum Christo*, or regeneration, cannot be justified by reference to Calvin. The contents of the religious consciousness of justification are not described by Calvin otherwise than they are described by Luther; both agree that the believer gives himself a sinner's place even while he knows himself to be justified through Christ (p. 135). Calvin in no way weakens this thought when he brings it out in connexion with the fact that the subject must be savingly united to Christ in the Church before he can know himself to be justified. For *unio cum Christo* is assumed to be not the sufficient cause but the *conditio sine qua non* of the justification that is experienced.

As is the case with the other Reformers, so with Calvin also : an alteration in the idea of *pœnitentia* is conjoined with the maintenance of the doctrine of justification through Christ. I may venture, however, to omit a reproduction of Calvin's refutation of the Romish doctrine of the sacrament of penance and of indulgence (iii. cap. 4, 5), for here he does not differ at all from the other Reformers. With reference, however, to the positive explanation of *pœnitentia*, there is observable in Calvin a change of view which is the exact converse of that which Luther and Melancthon exhibited. In the first edition of the *Institutio* (1536), he treats the subject merely *à propos* of the false traditional idea of the sacraments, and indeed with an indeterminateness that is not usual with him in other cases when he is criticising diverse views. At last, from Acts xx. 21, he comes to the conclusion that *pœnitentia* and *fides* are to be distinguished; although no true *pœnitentia* occurs without *fides*.¹ In this way *pœnitentia* comes to have the merely negative meaning that makes it equivalent to the *mortificatio* which, when it is genuine and active, finds its issue in *fiducia erga Dei promissiones*, in assurance of the forgiveness of sins. This sequence is just as empirically apprehended as that of *contritio et fides* in Luther's and Melancthon's view. Calvin's view of the matter, however, differs from the latter herein, that he derives the *pœnitentia* that leads to good results, not from the preaching of the law, but from the gospel, inasmuch as the

¹ C. R. xxix. pp. 148-150.

gospel declares the crucifixion of our old man in conformity with Christ's death on the cross to be necessary. Calvin no less than the others, however, regards the business of *pœnitentia* as extending over the entire new life, although the discharge of it naturally belongs also to the beginning of that life. Now a peculiar obscurity, in which Calvin coincides with Agricola and goes against Luther and Melanchthon, attaches to that point. If repentance be occasioned by the gospel, one might expect faith in the gospel to be recognised as its subjective root; and yet, since the latter is empirically represented as the conclusion of repentance, its subjective motive is defined only as *verus ac sincerus Dei timor*. This is explained by the fact that, in his empirical treatment of the matter, Calvin has in his eye the initial appearance of *pœnitentia* in the case of one who turns to Christ for the first time, and, on this presupposition, forthwith extends the business of *pœnitentia* to the whole life, without asking whether the subjective motive does not afterwards change. On this point at least he thus takes the view that Luther maintained in his first discussion with Agricola, *fidem generalem sub nomine pœnitentiæ recte comprehendî* (p. 182).

For this empirical view of conversion Calvin, in his editions of the years 1539-1559, substituted another that was throughout arranged in a scientific manner, and is characterized by a change in the use of language back to Melanchthon's original sense (p. 168).¹ He no longer identifies *pœnitentia* with the negative *mortificatio*, but will have it *pœnitentiæ nomine totam ad Deum conversionem comprehendî*. And then he defines it as *veram ad Deum vitæ nostræ conversionem, a sincero serioque Dei timore profectam, quæ carnis nostræ veterisque hominis mortificatione et spiritus vivificatione constet* (iii. 3. 5). *Pœnitentiam interpretor regenerationem, cujus scopus est, ut imago Dei . . . in nobis reformetur* (sect. 9). Moreover, it is distinctly stated that *pœnitentia vera citra fidem consistere non potest* (sect. 5). Specific faith is therefore to be understood as the motive of that earnest fear of God, and especially of His judgment, from which (sects. 5, 7) *pœnitentia* proceeds to actual recognition of the demerit of sin, to horror of it, and to hatred of it and to godly sorrow (sect. 7). In conformity with this beginning is

¹ Second edition, cap. ix. (v.) sects. 2-8 (C. R. xxix. pp. 687-691). Third edition, lib. iii. cap. 3, sects. 3-9.

the sequel of the development, as by union to Christ the adequate motive is gained for crucifying the old man (sect. 9), and the impelling motive to calmness of spirit, and to zeal in the renewal of our life (sect. 3), as well as to obedience to the law (sect. 8). This change, however, is not described as the task of a few days, but as one which extends over the whole lifetime (sect. 9). It cannot be doubted that, according to Calvin, the law co-operates towards the first part of this experience, in so far as it causes knowledge of sin and of its demerit (always supposing the lawgiver to be recognised), although this thought had been worked out in an earlier portion of the treatise (ii. 7, 6-8). It is no less clear, however, that he thinks of the process of mortification that is thus rich in consequences, only by conceiving that the general *timor Dei* is specialized into saving faith in Christ, in such a way as to make the actual turning of the disposition and will away from sin to be the result, not of self-contemplation in the mirror of the law, but primarily of attraction to the ideal of moral perfection discerned in Christ. But while Calvin, in his second and third editions, interpolated the whole doctrine of *pœnitentia* into the course of that Christian life which is dominated by the ideas of the Holy Spirit and of faith, he prefaced the description of *pœnitentia* that is given in sections 5-9 with an explanation of the principle of *pœnitentia*, according to which *pœnitentia* falls to be considered only *within* the Christian life itself. In this explanation he says that *pœnitentia*, in its above-mentioned comprehensive meaning as the task of the whole Christian life, has its adequate ground, its immanent principle, in special faith in the grace of God through Christ.¹ In order to bring this out still more clearly, he explains in the third edition that if many are prepared unto obedience by alarm of conscience before they know or experience God's grace, this *initialis timor* only illustrates the variety of ways in which Christ draws men to Himself, or *prepares* them for striving after goodness. It is thus hereby declared that ordinary education within the community of believers makes it unreasonable to

¹ Lib. iii. 3, 1. *Pœnitentia non modo fidem continuo sequitur, sed ex ea nascitur. Sect. 2: Christus dominus et Joannes . . . resipiscendi causam ab ipsa gratia et salutis promissione ducunt.—Non potest homo pœnitentiæ serio studere, nisi se Dei esse noverit.—Nemo unquam Deum reverebitur, nisi qui sibi propitium confidet.*

expect that in the case of every one *pœnitentia* should be introduced by marked appearances of dread of judgment, and of struggles between conscience and the law. On comparing with this how Calvin at the outset condemns and rejects not only the jesuitical but also the pietistic praxis of penitential exercise which necessarily flows from the doctrine of Luther and Melanchthon,¹ one has not only cause to admire his insight, but also has proof that that insight rests upon a proper appreciation of the priority of the idea of the Church over the saving experience of the individual. In this Calvin has rescued a fundamental principle which Luther, in his originally true perception of the reciprocal relation between the faith of justification and the believer's life in the Church, had opposed to the Romish Church theory, and to the Romish practice of penance. That Köstlin (as above, p. 462), according to his own confession, has not been able to attain a clear understanding of Calvin's explications relating to this point is to be accounted for from the fact that, in his analysis of the *Institutio*, he has failed as completely as Schneckenburger to recognise the clearly marked subordination of the individual's experience of salvation to the idea of the Church. And this circumstance is to be accounted for in that Köstlin avowedly measures Calvin's representation by that conception of *pœnitentia* which Lutheranism has embraced, and which has been derived from regard to the "common rude man." But this course implies injustice to Calvin; for he regulates the idea of *pœnitentia* in accordance with the peculiarly reformation thought of the fellowship of believers under Christ their Head, while Luther and Melanchthon by their deliberate vacillation in the *Visitationsbüchlein* really glide into the notion that the Church *primarily* is a mechanism designed for the conversion of men to Christ (p. 184), and thus on this point render one of the valuable gains of the Reformation inoperative.

¹ Lib. iii. 3, 2 : *Omni rationis specie caret eorum deliramentum, qui ut a pœnitentia exordiantur, certos dies suis neophytis præscribunt, per quos se in pœnitentiam exerceant, quibus demum transactis in evangelicæ gratiæ communionem ipsos admittunt. De plurimis Anabaptistarum loquor . . . eorumque sodalibus Jesuitis et similibus quiaquiliis.*

CHAPTER V.

THE REFORMATION DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION CONTRASTED IN ITS PRINCIPLES WITH THAT OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND WITH OSIANDER'S DOCTRINE OF JUSTIFICATION.

31. INASMUCH as the Reformers set about the practical and theoretical exhibition of the thought of justification by faith as their paramount task, they invariably treated everything that belongs to the objective doctrine of reconciliation merely as preparatory to the other truth. Even Calvin, who relatively raised to a position of highest distinctness the scientific exhibition of that foundation of justification, remained satisfied with the immediately religious conception implied in the expression that we are reconciled through the satisfaction of Christ. On this account not even he had any occasion carefully to separate the two references of Christ's satisfaction, to God on the one hand and to us on the other, or to specify their mutual relation. For, in realizing the value of Christ's work from *the religious* point of view, God's reconciliation with us is just as certain as our reconciliation with God, and *vice versa*. The Reformers accordingly do not in this direction at all advance the task of fixing the doctrine of reconciliation; particularly, they never face the question whether God through Christ has been reconciled with the whole sinful race of mankind, or only with the community of believers. In one important respect, on the other hand, they gave to the thought of reconciliation between God and "us" an aspect that differs from the prevailing mediæval view. For they measured the two entirely correlate quantities, the value of Christ's work and the demerit of sin, by a standard which betrays equally a greater subjective intensity of moral earnestness, and a more developed perception of the fixity of the objective moral order of the universe than belonged to the theology of the middle ages. They rejected

the assumption from which the mediæval theology set out, that the moral relation between God and man has the character of a private relation, and that, therefore, sin only amounts to an insult offered to a person who, quantitatively considered, ranks higher than man; and as against this they maintained that sin is a violation of the order of public law that is upheld by God's authority, a violation of the law that is correlate with the eternal being of God; and that thus it assumes the character of crime. Accordingly, they go beyond the Thomist and Scotist doctrines of the merely relative propriety, or of the entirely incidental character of the means adopted for doing away with sin; and, instead of this, they made it their aim to deduce the *absolute* unavoidable necessity of Christ's satisfaction from that moral order of the universe, which is *solidaire* with the essential will of God. By means of this apparatus of ideas they also get beyond that sphere of vision within which Anselm, with inadequate means at his disposal, had followed the same tendency.¹ In this exhibition of Christ's satisfaction under the view-point of a vicarious suffering of punishment for "our" sins, the Reformers, *theologically speaking*, adduced nothing that was absolutely new. In the first place, the theme of their theory is not foreign to the middle ages. For it is as old as Augustine.² To leave out of sight other schoolmen, Thomas Aquinas, amongst various other appreciations of the effect of the death of Christ, adduces this also, that Christ thereby fulfilled the law, and suffered the punishment that was due for Adam's breach thereof.³ Still the exhibition of this thought is incidental with him rather than

¹ I can find no echo of Anselm's theory, as directly excluding the punitive justice of God, except in Peter Martyr Vermilius: *Loci Communes*, ii. 17, 19 (p. 295). This author, however, declares himself, *L. C.* ii. 18, 17 (p. 300), for the Reformation doctrine of satisfaction.

² *Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, iv. 4: Christus solus pro nobis suscepit sine malis meritis poenam, ut nos per illum sine bonis meritis consequeremur gratiam.

³ *Summa*, P. i. qu. 47, art. 2: The cry of Christ (John xix. 30) means that in morte Christi lex vetus consummata est, that He omnia veteris legis præcepta implevit, moralia, inquantum passus est et ex dilectione patris (John xiv. 31) et ex dilectione proximi (Gal. ii. 20) ceremonialia (inasmuch as he fulfilled the typical sacrifices) judicialia, quæ præcipue ordinantur ad satisfaciendum injuriam passis, quoniam, quæ non rapuit, exsolvit (Ps. lxi. 5) permittens se ligno affigi pro pomo, quod de ligno homo rapuerat contra Dei mandatum. Art. 3. In quo ostenditur et Dei severitas, qui peccatum sine pœna dimittere noluit.

seriously meant, and is rendered ineffectual from the first by the influence of his idea of the Divine arbitrariness. John Gerson, on the other hand, enunciates with all precision the fundamental thought of the theory current with the Reformers, that sin amounts to the crime of *læsa majestas*, that God's justice is so great that He will not let sin pass unpunished, but that in pity He gives up His innocent Son to punishment, and thus maintains the harmony between His justice and His mercy, and takes away sin on condition that the sinner by faith, that is, by obedience and imitation, join himself with Christ.¹ It is possible that Luther may have borrowed this train of thought from Gerson, from his acquaintance with the works of that writer; stress, however, would have to be laid on this only if a similar source could be traced for the similar view taken by Zwingli.

If in Christ's satisfaction the punishment of man's breach of the law is to be recognised; and if such a way of procuring forgiveness of sins is to be shown to be inevitable and necessary for God, then it must in the first instance be proved that the moral law is identical in contents with the essential will of God. This task is of course not immediately achieved by the mere assertion of that proposition; there is further necessary at once a regard to the metaphysical attribute of freedom of will taken in connexion with the exhibition of the necessary contents of the will, as also the establishment of the fundamental truth of God's love as against the claims which the varying conduct of men seems to make upon God's justice. No one of the Reformers has fulfilled these conditions, for their practical work prevented them from devoting themselves to that problem (which is the highest of theoretical questions), and because they had still to contend in their own minds with the

¹ *Expositio in passionem Domini* (Opp. ed. E. du Pin, tom. iii. pp. 1157, 1187, 1188): Per læsæ majestatis crimen mortis es obnoxius. Rex tamen adeo justus fuerit, quod nec ullo pacto crimen tuum dimittere velit impunitum, altera vero ex parte tam benignus et misericors, quod proprium filium suum innocentem doloribus committat et morti, et id quidem sponte sua, ut justitiam concordet cum misericordia, fiatque criminis emendatio.—Nunquam Deus malum impunitum permitteret; eapropter omnia peccata et delicta nostra I. Chro. supposuit. Ideo ipse est justitia et redemptio nostra, modo nos junxerimus ei et per fidem gratiamque ei adhaeserimus. The same thought is put forward by Joh. Weasel, although with less precision. Compare Ullmann: *Reformatoren vor der Reformation*, ii. p. 496. See other traces chiefly from Sermons, in Thomasius, *Christi Person und Werk*, iii. 1, p. 249 seq.

mediaeval conception of God's absolute arbitrariness. The pioneering vigour of their genius is shown, however, by the fact that they actually furnished the elements for an altogether new idea of God; and their superiority over their theological successors is seen all the more clearly when it becomes apparent that the respect of the latter for their teachers was not accompanied by the ability to place in their right connexion the suggestions that these had given. With regard to Luther, certainly this task would involve a difficulty quite peculiar; for he never dedicated any systematic labour to setting forth the idea of God; but just as opportunity offered alternately brought into prominence the one or the other factor of it without taking any care for their harmony, or avoiding numerous contradictions between his various expressions. So that in order to understand Luther's various views that affect the idea of God, it is much more important to distinguish their references than to bring them into a connexion which they never possessed in Luther's own thinking. Quite away from the present problem, or rather completely indifferent to it, is the thought which Luther laid down in his tract *De servo arbitrio*, as foundation for his assertion of God's twofold predestination, and which he also otherwise applied as conclusive against human freedom, the thought, namely, that God is *exlex*, that He is bound by no law, that His will is divine only because it is the highest rule for everything; that nothing is good because it previously determines God's will, but only inasmuch as it is willed by God.¹ This is the motto of Scotism and of Nominalism adopted by Luther from the latter school. It is worthy of note, however, that in the application he limited the deductions usually drawn from this principle. He applies it only to God's special dealing with men; but carefully refrains from saying that the contents of the law that has been given to man proceed from Divine arbitrariness, and that therefore the very opposite line of conduct might have been enjoined upon men by God. Nay, when speaking of the connexion between law and gospel, and thus of the value of Christ's atoning work, he expressly describes the law as the eternal and immutable expression of God's will.² Were Luther's method thoroughly systematic, this proposition

¹ Compare Köstlin: *Luther's Theologie*, ii. pp. 48, 53; and my *Geschichtl. studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott*. Art. ii. (*Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* xiii. 88.)

² Compare Harnack: *Luther's Theologie*, i. p. 522 sq.; Köstlin, i. p. 405.

would of course be in direct contradiction with the statement that God's will cannot include anything of a necessary character. But as he applies the two contradictory assertions at separate times to separate problems, the one proposition, to his mind, has really nothing to do with the other. This appears also when we remember that, in his tract against Erasmus, the two problems are brought into juxtaposition both of time and of place. There the secret will of God is represented as the ground (subject to no law) of the decree for the salvation of individuals; while God's revealed gracious will towards all in Christ includes, in Luther's mind, the view of Christ's atoning work which regards it as regulated by the standard of the law considered as the eternal will of God. Apart, however, from the fact that Luther does not in that tract carry out the analysis of the atoning work of Christ, I have shown in the article referred to above that the course of Luther's thought in the treatise against Erasmus (which must be regarded much more as a contribution to the Reformation than as a sample of systematic theorizing) lies partly in the line of the traditions of the Nominalistic school, which are enforced by him as against the freedom of the human will; and partly in the line of his new theology—the theology of the grace of God shown in Christ—which admittedly depends for its result upon the free choice of the human will. If, then, Christ in Luther's view is the Mediator of God's grace to man, and if His death is part of His mediatorial work as being a vicarious endurance of punishment which renders satisfaction to the eternal law of God, it would cause a complete perversion of the view intended were we to say that Luther still, properly speaking, has no earnest belief in the necessity of Christ's endurance of punishment, because he denies the idea of any necessity being inherent in the will of God. For, in the actual unfolding of his thoughts, he limits the application of the latter idea to the question of the predestination of individuals to salvation, while, at the foundation of his analysis of the atoning work of Christ, he lays the opposite thought of the necessary character of the law in relation to the will of God. But hereby his doctrine of reconciliation emancipates itself from the region in which the leading theologians of the middle ages moved, for they traced Christ's atoning work also to God's arbitrary will.

Since thus the two thoughts of the freedom of God's will from all rule, and of its necessary restriction by eternal law, are brought forward by Luther in connexion with two quite distinct practical problems, and in these have absolutely nothing to do with one another, it is plain that he has not even succeeded in apprehending the highest problem of theology as such, much less has he succeeded in solving it. For this reason¹ he is not even aware that the form taken by his utterances respecting the justice in virtue of which God punishes sinners, and cannot exercise His grace towards them until Christ has borne the punishment they deserved and endured the wrath of God,¹ is such that they can be understood only as implying a natural necessity. It is admitted that Luther at the same time surpassed all previous theology when he brought love into prominence as the character which exhaustively expresses the Christian idea of God; and in this fundamental conception of God he recognises also the ultimate determining motive for the redemption and reconciliation of the sinner that were wrought by Christ. However strongly he may insist upon God's wrath against sinners, however emphatically he may proclaim Christ's vicarious punishment as the means of appeasing it, his meaning is never that God's relation to sinful man had previously resolved itself wholly into one of wrath; that in that wrath His love had ceased, and could be reawakened only by the merits of Christ. In his bold manner of statement he so decisively brings the love into prominence over the wrath, that in occasional expressions he weakens the wrath of God (the reality of which is proved clearly enough by reference to the passion of Christ) into an unreal reflex of the sinner's bad conscience.² His true opinion, however, is essentially that God's love as the ultimate motive of the sinner's redemption is the superior determination of His will, while penal justice or wrath—regarded as "not the proper" work of God—is considered as the subordinate motive of His action in carrying out the work of redemption. This ranking of the ideas is also implied when Luther in various connexions describes wrath as a modification of love. At the same time, it is only in occasional moments of logical consistency that Luther refers

¹ On this and on what follows compare Küstlin: ii. p. 306 *seqq.*, 402 *seqq.*

² Küstlin: *as above*, p. 313.

the wrath of God to sin only, but not to the sinner; or in the expressions of wrath would have us discern proofs of love. On the whole, he makes love and wrath in God, notwithstanding his subordination of the latter to the former, to appear as co-ordinate, and therefore as opposed and even (in certain circumstances) contradictory forces, for the harmonizing of which in God Himself, endurance of punishment by the Mediator is necessary. Melancthon cuts the knot in a much directer way, for he makes God's forensic punishment-demanding justice to be the fundamental conception—justice which can be turned into grace only by means of the sacrifice of Christ.¹ He therefore is the true author of the subsequent orthodox doctrine. Now it is worth noticing that he never carries up this explanation of Christ's penal satisfaction into the thought of justification, but only into an indefinite assertion of the grace of God. So far was he from possessing a systematic genius. In Luther, on the other hand, there is brought into prominence the thoroughly Scriptural idea that God has pity on us, justifies us, bestows righteousness upon us, precisely in His character as the Just Being.² This thought indeed is not even brought into contact, much less into harmony, with the juristic presupposition that the punishment of the sinner is for God an essential thing. No one entered on the inheritance of this exegetical gain made by Luther except Faustus Socinus; and he sought to make use of the opposition between the religious and the legal conception of righteousness in order to destroy the doctrine of reconciliation handed down by Luther and Melancthon. For the rest, Luther's fancy expatiates in the thought, suggested by the oldest Church-fathers, and particularly frequent in Augustine, that Christ by His passion and death, and still more by His descent into hell and by His resurrection, vanquished sin, the law, the devil, death, and hell.³ As assaults upon Christ proceeded from these powers, He, by His perseverance in fidelity towards God, overcame them *for Himself* and made them ineffectual. And, as Luther identifies men with Christ, he maintains the immediate result of

¹ *Adnot. in Ev. Matth.*, C. R. xiv. p. 938. *Enarr. Symb. Nic.*, C. R. xxiii. p. 338. *Declamatio*, C. R. xi. p. 779: Exponatur mirandum Dei consilium, quod cum sit justus et horribiliter irascatur peccato, ita demum placari iustissimam iram voluerit, quia filius est factus supplex pro nobis et in sese iram derivavit et pro nobis piaculum et victima factus est.

² Küstlin: as above, p. 308.

³ As above, pp. 420 sqq.

this victory to have been the same for men, and describes it in a dramatic way. As, however, this result could only be understood by reference to the regeneration of individuals, those expressions have, properly speaking, no theological features.

32. Zwingli's affirmation, in agreement with both Luther and Melancthon, that it was necessary that Christ by His satisfaction should meet the claims of God's justice, which had been offended by man's crime, before mercy could accomplish redemption, is, in his line of thought, based in a systematic way on two propositions which are laid down in the tract *De providentia*. In substance they are, that God's providence has its climax in the redemption by His Son of the Church that had been chosen from all eternity, and in the fellowship of that Church with God based upon redemption; and that the law expresses God's spirit and intention, in other words, denotes His eternal will. So that His goodness (or, which is the same thing, His love) and His righteousness reciprocally condition one another, as is shown at length in the *Expositio fidei* (iv. p. 47); and so operate that the former achieves the redeeming work of Christ, the latter accepts it for the expiation of all sins. I might have contented myself with this notice, if Zeller and Sigwart had not been at pains to detect in Zwingli divergencies from the "prevailing type of doctrine," as Zeller expresses himself (p. 71). These divergencies, according to Zeller, resolve themselves into this,—that Zwingli regards as the result that had to be gained by the life and death of Christ the subjective authentication of reconciliation to men rather than the objective propitiation of God Himself; while, according to Sigwart (p. 133), Zwingli does not base the necessity of satisfaction on the objective inflexibility of Divine justice, but, properly speaking, makes its end to be that, even in the bestowal of redeeming grace upon men, a right sense of the enduring reality of Divine justice might be elicited. Were this so, it would commend Zwingli to the taste of those who relegate the idea of reconciliation exclusively to the region of the subjective reflection of the penitent individual, in the same measure as it would give support to the prejudiced dislike shown to the Swiss Reformer by the "genuine" Lutherans. And yet the "prevailing type of doctrine," which guides the prejudice of this party and the prejudice of both of these im-

partial historians in their judgment of Zwingli, is simply the latest form of the Lutheran doctrinal tradition which in effect represents the satisfaction wrought by Christ towards God as direct and primary, and the conciliatory work of Christ towards men as merely indirect and secondary, being conditioned by faith. The Reformers, however, did not carry out this explication of their thoughts which is regarded by both these historians as the prevailing type of doctrine. All of them, with the single above-mentioned exception of Melancthon, gave no independence to the objective thought of reconciliation as against the previous religious certainty of justification in Christ. The expressions of Zwingli accordingly, in which Sigwart and Zeller would fain detect a distortion of the objective determination of the idea of reconciliation towards the subjective sphere, only prove that Zwingli's doctrine of the reconciliation accomplished by Christ is dominated by the religious consciousness of its being directly designed *for us*, just as much as is the case with the other Reformers. In order to be convinced of this, it is of course necessary to renounce a dogmatic theology that has been learned merely by rote, and to substitute an understanding of the believing consciousness of the reformation for blind faith in an imaginary "prevailing type of doctrine."

Both these critics of the theology of Zwingli appeal to the fact that in *one* passage of the *Commentarius de vera ac falsa religione* he has directly denied the objective Godward necessity of Christ's death, because God has power to restore sinful men to purity without any such condition; thus attributing to the example of His penal justice shown in the death of Christ merely the design of overcoming believers' sluggishness towards what is good.¹ This one expression is to be held as betraying Zwingli's real opinion, a countless number of assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, and although it is immediately sur-

¹ iii. p. 180: Invenit divina bonitas, quo justitiæ quidem satisfaceret, misericordiæ vero sinus absque justitiæ detrimento liberaliter pandere liceret. Non quo sibi hac ratione ab adversario caveret, aut figulo non liceret e consperso luto facere vel refingere, qualemcunque velit testam, sed quo per hoc justitiæ exemplum oscitantiam et torporem a nobis tolleret, ac se, qualisnam esset, justus, bonus, misericors, nobis exponeret; aut ne nimium de ejus consiliis loqui præsumamus, quia sic illi placuit. . . . Cum ergo Deus juxta sit justus et misericors, tametsi ad miserationem propendat, justitiæ tamen ejus omnino satisfieri, ut iratus placetur, oportet.

rounded by distinct statements of an opposite sort. They are to be regarded in this light because, forsooth, from certain statements which are to be found in a letter to John Haner in Nürnberg (vii. pp. 569, 570), Zwingli sees in the death of Christ only improperly speaking the ground of our salvation, which is really to be recognised only in the grace of God—and in Christ, inasmuch as He who in His human nature died is very God. But precisely in this letter, in which Zwingli appeals to the *Commentarius*, we find a plain declaration that the death of the God-man is necessary in view of the inviolable justice of God. Nothing special occurs in the letter except in so far as twice it is said: *Christus ipsum salutis pignus ac veluti satisfactio*, and again, *Christi humanitas velut instrumentum ac pignus est, cujus contemplatione irata nobis justitia placatur*. But this does not mean that Zwingli doubts the objectively necessary relation of Christ's death to the Divine justice, but that, as in the passage of the *Commentarius* already quoted, he is afraid to fix *a priori* the order of the Divine decrees and to assert man's development of ideas as directly regulative of God's thought. Moreover, on this point also he observes the already quoted principle (p. 154) of explaining the plan of salvation by reference jointly to the will of God and to the historical work of Christ. In face of *this* declaration it is also perverse to attribute a constitutive importance for Zwingli's theology to an opinion which occurs only in an isolated instance, that God does not need the satisfaction of Christ in order to the achievement of the work of redemption, and that Christ's death is to be regarded only as a penal example deterring from sin. Undoubtedly in this expression of Zwingli, the reference to a penal example, to which subsequently Grotius limited the value of the death of Christ, does receive a secondary place in his theory, but in all other respects Zwingli is in intention far removed from the standpoint of Puns Scotus. Anything, therefore, in the expression above quoted that reminds us of Scotus's way of handling the idea of atonement ought to be judged of just as we judge of those echoes of a doctrine of divine arbitrariness, aimless and lawless, in the predestination of individuals, which, in his *anamnema de providentia*, occasionally interrupt a quite differently framed teleological development of the Divine providence, and a

teleological judgment of sin in general and of reprobation in particular.¹ They who refuse to make an allowance for the fact that in this class of expressions Zwingli has for once wandered from his own proper views in accordance with a tendency that in his time was very prevalent, ought, in like manner, to reject as really worthless Luther's doctrine of the propitiation of God's wrath through Christ, because he sometimes represents the wrath of God as the reflex of the sinner's evil conscience, and denies its actual existence in God.

33. The Reformation thought that Christ's death had the value of a vicarious punishment, and had reference to the propitiation of the wrath of God, found a suitable form of expression already laid to its hand in the current phrase *satisfactio*. That the Reformers borrowed the expression from no other than Anselm, is an unwarranted assumption, which only tends to encourage the very prevalent mistake of supposing that the doctrines of Anselm and the Reformers, as they are alike in name, are also in essential harmony with each other. Just as little does the use made of the idea *meritum* by the Reformers imply their intention of concurring in the doctrine of Duns Scotus on that topic. The circumstance that they treat *satisfactio* and *meritum* as synonyms, shows on the contrary that, in stating their own doctrine, it never occurred to them to explain themselves as to the relation in which it stood to the similar yet divergent theories of their predecessors. The last edition of Calvin's *Institutio* presents a characteristic illustration of this. With that dogmatic precision which is peculiar to him, he originally explained the propitiation of Divine justice by the penal death of Christ only by means of the conception of satisfaction (lib. ii. cap. 16).² In his exposition of this doctrine he carries out unhesitatingly the principle that the law is the expression of the essential will of God. That he does so in this connexion does not affect the position of his doctrine of predestination, in which God's dealing with individual men is, in Luther's style, regarded as independent of every law (lib. iii. cap. 21-24), although Calvin

¹ Compare *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, xiii. (1868), p. 96.

² Baur, indeed (*Veröhnungslehre*, p. 334), denies that Calvin deduces the satisfactory character of the death of Christ from the idea of the Divine justice; but see lib. ii. cap. 16. 2, 3. Baur's subsequent characterization of the theology of Calvin is also incorrect.

at the same time exerts himself to avoid the idea that God is *exlex*.¹ The antecedent necessity of a satisfaction to God's justice is not lessened by the statement (ii. 12. 1) that Christ's incarnation was not simply and unconditionally necessary, but only in virtue of God's active saving purpose. Certain external circumstances, however, led Calvin, in the edition of 1559, to append to his doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ a special chapter (the seventeenth) upon the theme *Recte et proprie dici, Christum nobis promeritum esse gratiam et salutem*. For in the year 1545 Camillus Rensus, in the church at Chiavenna, and in 1555 Lælius Socinus, in epistolary correspondence with Calvin, had come forward with the deduction, which naturally flows from the Scotist sphere of thought, that if the will of God works in an absolutely unconditioned manner, the bestowal of grace is to be attributed to God only, and not to the merit of Christ.² These Italians, who had abandoned the equilibrium of Church tradition, approached their scholastic criticism upon Christian doctrine entirely from the traditions of the school of Scotus,³ and therefore also they know of no other form of Christ's saving work than that of merit, and thus direct their attack precisely to this view of the idea of atonement.

Calvin, then, finding himself impelled to vindicate against them the thought of Christ's merit, thus expresses the counterposition of his opponents,—that the assertion of Christ's merit throws the grace of God into the shade; and that, therefore, Christ must be regarded as the instrument and servant of grace, not as its author. Now, Calvin concedes that the conception of merit would be inadmissible if one meant thereby to set up Christ simply and by Himself over against the Divine judgment. But in the affirmation of Christ's merit there is not assumed a primary principle (a power that works independently of God); the merit of Christ is subordinated to the ordination of God, who is the ultimate first cause. In this logical relation there exists no contradiction; and it is no inconsistency to assert that in the unconditioned operation of the mercy of God towards the justification of men the merit of Christ intervenes. Against the claims of human works, the free grace of God and

¹ Compare *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* xiii. (1868), p. 105 seq.

² Trechsel: *Antitrinitarier*, ii. pp. 97, 167.

³ Compare *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* xiii. (1868), p. 271.

the obedience of Christ militate alike. For "only by the good pleasure of God could Christ merit anything," and "thus, since Christ's merit depends upon God's grace alone, it is not less fitted than the latter to confute man's claims to a righteousness of his own." From the subsequent portion of the chapter, it appears that Calvin regards as meritorious the doing and suffering of Christ, which he had previously represented to be satisfactory; in this he plainly has not the purpose and meaning to say anything formally divergent from his previous doctrine. And to show that this is the case is my primary object. With Calvin himself this double representation of Christ's work as satisfaction and as merit has no other significance than it has when the others use these expressions convertibly as synonyms. For the historian, however, it is worthy of notice that Calvin's two lines of thought do not coincide. Just because Calvin's expression is true in the sense of Duns Scotus—*Christus non nisi ex Dei beneplacito quidquam mereri potuit*, it becomes all the clearer that in this proposition is implied a different conception of God from that which lies at the foundation of the doctrine of satisfaction. And if *ex sola gratia dependet meritum Christi*, this at the same time indirectly says to the expert in the subject that it has no reference to the justice of God, which dominates the idea of satisfaction. The fact is that Calvin, by his vindication of the idea of Christ's merit, has made a divergence into that Scotism which, in so far as it bears on the point in question, is otherwise utterly diverse from his own way of thinking, as well as from that of the other Reformers. For the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction rests upon the craving for harmony between God's mercy and God's justice; and it presupposes the Divine providence—that Will which in conformity with a purpose organizes and directs nature and history, with special care over the Church of the elect. In this field of knowledge Calvin leaves no room for any action of the Divine good pleasure, private arbitrariness, and reasonableness; and that he deduces the doctrine of predestination from the Scotist doctrine of the absolute power of God over the creatures, leaves that department of God's providence quite untouched.¹ The chapter upon Christ's merit in the 1559 edition of the *Institutes*, has not the effect of giving to the

¹ Compare *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* xiii. (1868) p. 108.

conception of God as embodied in the doctrine of predestination preponderance over the doctrine of providence; for no line of connexion is drawn between those two thoughts. That chapter, therefore, is only a casual appendage to Calvin's system of doctrine, and, so far as he himself is concerned, has no positive or characteristic meaning.

34. When Luther laid the conception of God's love, and Zwingli and Calvin the conception of God's goodness, and the plan of His providence culminating in the Church of the redeemed, at the foundation of the doctrine of reconciliation; when at the same time they estimated the atoning work of Christ by reference to that justice of God which finds its expression in the eternal moral law, the Reformers opened up a field of vision that disclosed a view far beyond the unregulated and casual arbitrariness which, as implied in the idea of God of which Thomas and Duns display only different grades, dominated the mediæval view of the doctrine of reconciliation. It implies a more worthy conception of God to think of Him as the moral power which satisfies the highest human interests with an orderly system of ends, and with an order of public law that is in harmony with His very being, than to think of Him as the highest subject of private law and of private morality, and to regard that method of reconciliation which Christian tradition presents to us only as having been in God's judgment the most suitable, without confirming this assumption by a comparison with other possible modes of procedure. This advance in theology made by the Reformers bears witness at the same time also to a religious and moral elevation above the level of the Christianity that had been at work in the middle ages,—an elevation the importance and influence of which is shown even independently of the dialectical treatment which the doctrine of reconciliation received at the hands of the Reformers, and of their immediate theological successors. To the number of those fundamental views to which I would apply this remark, belongs the view which regards Christ's doing as having laid the foundation of the reconciliation He effected between God and sinful men, along with or even more than His suffering. If there is anything that is fitted to destroy all appearance of agreement between the Reformers and Anselm, it is this point. Anselm bases the atonement upon

the death of Christ, regarding that as an *opus supererogatorium* in contrast with the moral life of Christ, which was but His duty (p. 32). The employment of the idea of merit had enabled Thomas and Duns to find the atoning value of Christ's passion in the whole duration of His life, inclusive of His death (pp. 57, 61). Anselm's modern admirers might indeed have discovered in Abelard (p. 37) that anticipation which is wanting in Anselm, of so important a characteristic feature of the Reformation doctrine, if only he had not been so badly recommended by his reputation for rationalism. I do not mean to say by this that the Reformers had taken the hint from Abelard;¹ I only wish to show that Abelard's agreement with the Reformers in this point betokens in him a religious depth of view which puts to shame all talk of his rationalism; and that in seeking historical lines of connexion we ought to have a regard to completeness, and not be guided by the caprice of party likings and dislikings.

The style in which Luther, in an Epistle-sermon in his *Kirchen-postille* (Walch, xii. pp. 312-317), estimates Christ's active fulfilment of the law is not yet in accordance with the doctrinal treatment that afterwards became customary, which co-ordinates the active and passive obedience of Christ, and attributes to the former as well as to the latter a vicarious value for men to the end of their justification. Luther rather regards Christ's obedience to the law as the *genus* under which is included as a species His vicarious endurance of the curse of the law. As thus the passion of the guiltless One directly serves the end of delivering believers from the curse of the law, the positive fulfilment of the law is the *conditio sine qua non* of the accomplishment of this end; particularly because in the former is necessarily implied, so far as Christ is concerned, self-renunciation—that is, suffering. The endurance of the curse of the law has its value only in universal obedience to the law; and the active fulfilment of the law already implies for Christ, who essentially is the Lord superior to all law, that suffering which is finished only in death. In Luther's view, Christ is regarded as Lord over the law, not

¹ John Wessel also distinguishes between *satisfacere* and *satispati* in the works of Christ. Compare Ullmann, *Reformatoren vor der Reformation*, ii. p. 497, note.

merely on account of His divine nature; for in this line of thought it is far from being taken for granted that the Divine nature itself is exempt from the law as a rule. Here, in fact, there comes in a modification of the idea of the law, which is characteristic of Luther's view of the Christian life, although it has come to be the occasion of doubtful subtleties. For here he understands by the law, not the moral law, which is the concrete correlative of moral freedom, but that rule of life, accompanied with threatening and promise, which counts upon fulfilment from selfish motives, and which one must transcend in order to attain to full reasonable freedom. Law, then, in Luther's view, signifies the moral law in the form of legal injunction. Christ now is above law in that sense, and is not bound thereby, because He always with His unselfish disposition goes beyond its sphere; but this disposition He has as the Man who at the same time possesses Divine nature. Now, indeed, it seems to be imperative to conclude that Christ, as one whose disposition is in perfect conformity with the pure moral law, could not become subject to law in its legal form, that His moral obedience towards the law, as accompanied with threatening and promise, is a contradiction in itself, and that if He willingly fulfilled that law which appeals to the personal advantage of him who fulfils it, He fulfilled it only apparently. These deductions Luther conceals from himself by means of the paradoxical antithesis: "He did it voluntarily; and neither feared nor sought anything for Himself therein. But in respect of His outward works He was like all others who did it unwillingly and of constraint, so that His freedom and willingness were hidden from the eyes of men (?) just as their constraint and unwillingness were also concealed, and thus therefore He submits Himself to the law, and at the same time is not under the law. He does as they do who are under it, and yet is not on that account under it; with His will He is free, and therefore not under it; by the works which He willingly does He is under it. But we as sinners are in will and in works subject to it; for we with constrained will do the works of the law." This mode of apprehending the problem is connected with the question under what practical point of view it is that Luther estimates Christ's obedience to the law considered as a legal code. With him the point is by no means, as in the case of

his successors, that a condition of our justification founded upon the righteousness of God is fulfilled by Christ's active obedience to the law; but that a pattern is set up for the life of justified persons, inasmuch as they in the Spirit of Christ voluntarily fulfil the moral law, and thereby are freed from that juristic view of it which counts upon selfish observance. Since in our state of sin we could not shake ourselves free from the latter form of it, the independence of the state of grace in relation thereto is secured, by the fact that Christ's voluntary submission to the compulsion of the law has invalidated that constraint for all those that are Christ's.

This reference of Christ's active obedience does not influence the doctrine of reconciliation. In view of that doctrine the following has to be considered. When Luther defines the law to which Christ voluntarily submitted Himself, and when he exemplifies it in Christ's submission to His parents and in His circumcision, he brings into prominence, in connexion with the legal compulsion of the law, the obvious narrowness of the sphere of life to which it refers, and to which Christ was superior in virtue of that destiny of which He was conscious. His obedience to the law thus shows itself, like His endurance of the curse of the law, in the light of endurance of the restraints of life—as suffering—and therefore Luther places both these elements in such close continuity that he takes into account only the suffering of Christ which extended throughout His whole life, and not in connexion therewith His doing as a condition of justification. If, now, it might appear as if this view did not distinguish itself much from the mediæval view of Christ's merit, this would result from under-estimation of the difference which is implied in the application of the idea of the law to an understanding of Christ's work. But yet it is clear that Luther, with his paradoxical statements respecting Christ's obedience to the law, of the meaning of which he has himself no clear understanding, postulates rather than shows the existence of a connexion between the doing and suffering of Christ. If Luther, on other occasions,¹ appreciates the value towards our salvation of Christ's obedience, of his fulfilling of the law which is the will of God, he does so in the sense that His doing and suffering had for their motive the love which is

¹ Compare Kœstlin, ii. pp. 404, 405.

prescribed by the law as all-comprehensive obedience. If, now, this serves to bring it about that our standing with God is no longer determined by regard to the law, provided that we believe in Christ, then in this connexion it is no more the artificial conception of the law which we find in the Epistle-sermon that is maintained; rather is the view opened up which the *formula concordia* presents upon this point of doctrine. For its elaboration, however, still other influences were at work.

How slight was the emphasis that, in the first theological period of the German Reformation, was laid upon the satisfactory character of the active obedience of Christ may be inferred from the fact that Melanchthon in his published writings regards only His penal suffering as the part of Christ's obedience which availed towards our justification.¹ Zwingli also definitely distinguishes the two only in the tract *von göttlicher und menschlicher Gerechtigkeit* (i. p. 433): God has given His Son for us as fulfiller of His will, who has been able to comply with His entire command, and pay the debt of all our sins, and is the sure pledge by which we come to God. Calvin's view, on the other hand, running through all editions of the *Institutio* (3 ed., Lib. ii. 16, 5), reverts to the same connexion between active and passive obedience in the doctrine of reconciliation, as is to be traced in Luther's Epistle-sermon. His achievement of righteousness for us rests upon the whole course of His obedience; the ground of the forgiveness which frees us from the curse of the law is spread over the entire life of Christ; as soon as He assumed the form of a servant, He began to pay the price of our liberation. Death is merely the close of this series of prestations. For as the sacrifice in its death must be voluntarily offered (for its value is rooted in love as the motive) it is only His general active obedience that guarantees the significance and efficacy of His suffering unto death. On the other hand, Calvin brings into prominence, in connexion with the obedience of His life as a whole, only the instances in which He submitted Himself to that which ran counter to His own proper destiny in life—wherein, therefore, He relatively

¹ In two passages, however, of the *Postille* (C. R. xxiv. pp. 216, 242) there occurs also an assignation of value to *obedientia activa* along with *satisfactio* as contributing to justification.

suffered ; as, for example, in being made under the law (Gal. iv. 4), and submitting to the baptism of John (Matt. iii. 15). Calvin is distinguished from Luther only in so far as he does not in general terms refer the active obedience of Christ to the law, but to a less definite aspect of the will of God ; and that, therefore, he adduces as a particular proof of obedience His submission to the law as that is expressed by Paul. Finally, it is worthy of remark that public documents originating in Calvin's sphere of Reformation activity, the Heidelberg Catechism (Qu. 36, 37) and the *Confessio Helvetica posterior* (cap. 11), are the first that recognise the active obedience of Christ along with, or even before, the passive obedience, as a ground of justification. The meaning of this is, that the two ought to be regarded in the light of one another, the active obedience and the perfect holiness of life as the general ground that gives value to the suffering, the graduated suffering as the constant manifestation of the sinless life.¹

35. If, accordingly, the Reformers have laid down very definite fundamental ideas and suggestions upon the value of Christ's personal prestations, with a view to the reconstruction of the doctrine of reconciliation, they have neither clearly realized to themselves the scientific task they had in hand, nor set about its solution in connexion with the doctrine of justification. Even Calvin, although he of all those connected with the Reformation movement has accomplished relatively the most finished work in this field, and in this respect far surpasses Melancthon's services, has not firmly fixed the links of that chain which constitutes the religious confession of the Reformers and dominates their harmonious theological effort. Such an attempt at exact systematic exhibition of the doctrines of Christ's satisfaction and of our justification was, however, undertaken by Andreas Osiander, but in a direction, and with instrumentalities and postulates, which show his connexion with the Reformers to be very slight, and which thoroughly justify the explicit repudiation of his doctrine by Melancthon, Calvin, and the genuine Lutherans. But as his opponents rested satisfied with the rejection of his theory without any exertion on the part of any of them to solve the systematic problem in

¹ Compare Schneckenburger, *Zur kirchl. Christologie*, p. 65. Ursinus, *Explicatio catechesis* ; ad. qu. 16 (Opp. i. pp. 92, 93).

the line the Reformers had taken, and with the postulates supplied by them, certain elements in Osiander's doctrine, where he attaches himself to Luther, have exercised an important influence upon the doctrinal principles of Lutheran theology precisely in the view which he himself first originated. Although accordingly his theory, as a whole, must be looked upon as something outside of the genuine Reformation, Osiander, in several respects, has undoubtedly contributed his share toward the development of Lutheran orthodoxy.¹

Osiander, who, from the year 1522, laboured at Nürnberg in furtherance of the Reformation of Luther, from the beginning had held that idea of justification as making the sinner really righteous, on account of which he was so vigorously assailed when he developed it in a thorough-going way in the year 1551, during the period of his activity at Königsberg in Prussia.² But as he coincided with Luther in the principles that works are not the grounds but the consequences of justification, that all religious truth is to be derived from Scripture only and not from tradition, that the influence of the external word of God precedes that of the internal—he was equally persuaded that he was only following Luther when he regarded justification as a real operation of Christ within the believer. Luther undeniably had given to him, as well as Brenz, some occasion for thinking this (p. 176), but it was not Luther's prevalent and deliberate view that Osiander, in defending himself, laid hold of as exhibiting the proper tendency of that Reformer.³ The following is the line of thought in Osiander's tract:⁴—As we are all born children of wrath, we need for our salvation that God should again become gracious unto us, again quicken us

¹ In what follows I reproduce the substance of my essay, "*Ueber die Rechtfertigungslehre des Andreas Osiander*," in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* ii. (1857) pp. 795-829.

² Compare Heberle, *Osiander's Lehre in ihrer frühesten Gestalt*. Stud. u. Krit. 1844, p. 386 sqq. Wilken, *A. Osiander's Leben, Lehre und Schriften*, 1ste Abth. 1844, p. 5. Möller, *A. Osiander*, 1870.

³ Compare Osiander's *Excerpta quædam dilucide et perspicue dictorum de justificatione fidei in commentario super Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas reverendi patris Domini Martini Lutheri*, 1551 (republished with additions in the *Confessio de Justificatione*).

⁴ *De Unico Mediatore Jesu Christo et Justificatione fidei Confessio*. Regiomonte Prussia (24 Oct. 1551). Compare the previous *Disputatio de Justificatione*, hab. ix. Kal. Nov. 1550; the principal heads of which are to be found extracted in Gieseler, *Kirchengeschichte*, iii. 2, p. 275 sq.

from the death of sin, and make us righteous. To the accomplishment of this end we, as sinners, can contribute nothing; therefore God has raised up the Mediator, Jesus Christ. But in the idea of Mediator it is implied that He deal separately with both parties. Therefore He has reconciled God first of all, having borne the punishment of sin in His death, and also fulfilled the law in man's room and stead. Hereby He has brought it about that God is willing to forgive men their sins, and that He will not impute to them the imperfection of their moral walk if they believe. This done, the Mediator next directs Himself to men, with the announcement of forgiveness of sins and with justification. Both are contained in the gospel, which takes effect upon sinners when the conditions of repentance (which is awakened by the law) and of faith are fulfilled. The gospel is the external word of God which, in the first instance, offers to man the forgiveness of sins that has been obtained from God in virtue of Christ's passion and fulfilment of the law, and afterwards offers to believers the inner Word, which is Christ, and which *makes the believer righteous*. The external word, which comes by hearing, is the vehicle of the inner Word, which is able to force its way through the understanding and memory into the heart. For the inner Word—the substance of the gospel—is not merely the eternal gracious decree regarding sinners, but it is the very Word which is with God, and which is God; which as the wisdom of God is the eternal self-knowledge of God in exercise, and which in Jesus Christ has been made man. When then the outwardly preached gospel shows itself as the power of God, it implants in the heart of man that inner Word, which is Christ Himself in His divine nature, which in the believer grounds his actual righteousness before God, and with which the Father also and the Holy Ghost are inseparably associated. Osiander apprehends this goal of Christ's mediatorship in individual believers in a manner that corresponds to his representation of man in his original state before the fall.¹ Pointing to 2 Cor. iv. 4, Col. i. 15, Osiander explains that image of God in which man was created to have been the eternal idea of the God-man, by means of which the

¹ As set forth in Osiander's tract, *An filius Dei fuerit incarnandus, si peccatum non introivisset in mundum, item, de imagine Dei quid sit*. Montereg. Fr. 18 Dec. 1550.

various theophanies were made to the patriarchs, and which was realized in the Person of Jesus Christ. God's determination to make man in His image implies that His personal intercourse and influence with man, which He accomplished by means of His Christ-foreshadowing theophanies, constituted part of Adam's normal existence. From this intercourse with the Son of God Adam derived His Spirit, and was filled with the knowledge of God and with trust in Him. But the knowledge of God is eternal life (John xvii. 3), and eternal life is the Word, the Son of God (John xiv. 6); the Word, therefore, the Son of God, and consequently also the Father and the Holy Ghost, dwelt in Adam *by grace*. As Christ by nature is God and man, so Adam by nature is man, but by grace is partaker of the divine nature. Osiander deduces this original condition of man's being from the consideration that the state of grace in the redeemed man has such high attributes, and that Christ's mediatorship only restored to man the destiny which had been lost by sin. Hence his explanation of the righteousness that is bestowed on believers through Christ naturally corresponds with this view of the state of grace which belonged to the original destiny of man.

In this train of thought Osiander himself brings prominently forward two divergencies from the view then current among Lutheran theologians. In the *first* place, he distinguishes decidedly between the ideas *redemptio* and *justificatio*, and makes the former only to be the result of the historical work of Christ; while in that religious realization of Christ by faith, which at the time of the Reformation dominated reflection upon this subject, the two words are used as equivalent. Now, when Osiander, starting from a systematic order of ideas, sharply distinguishes the effect of Christ's work upon God from that upon man, his meaning is, that the former, which had been accomplished more than 1500 years before, might well be called our redemption, but not our justification. For to justification our faith is necessary; and to believe, one must exist. But we were not living then; and therefore we could not be justified by Christ's twofold fulfilment of the law. But, on the other hand, he regards it as quite conceivable that one might be redeemed and freed previous to being born; as, for example, in the case where our ancestor is freed from slavery. In the

second place, he limits, in accordance with this distinction, the idea of *justificatio* to the daily renewed influence of the Mediator upon individual believers as such, and ranks the idea along with *regeneratio*, *renovatio*, and *vivificatio*. At the same time, he frankly admits that *justificare* in the Bible is sometimes exactly equivalent to *injustum aut reum justum pronunciare, sive ille justus sit, sive non*. But, as a rule, he would explain the Pauline usage of the word as meaning *aliquem, qui non justus sed impius est, re ipsa et in veritate justum efficere*. He decides for the Catholic view in this definition, as also in his reference of *justificatio* to the end that it *justum ad juste agendum movet, et sine quo nec justus esse nec juste agere potest*. On the other hand, he abandons the Catholic view in so far as it gives to man's own works any claim to justification. He will have it regarded as only a metaphorical expression, when occasionally the works and fruits of righteousness are called by the name of righteousness itself. The righteousness which is to be established in man by God is no empirical doing and suffering; it is a state that is raised above the vicissitudes of these, and is not increased by well-doing. In view of the fourth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, he insists that faith, which is imputed as righteousness, means faith in so far as it *Dominum Jesum Christum, verum Deum et hominem totum et indivisum apprehendit et in sese includit ut ita Dominus Jesus Christus ipse justitia nostra sit*. Only in this way can we avoid the blasphemous error regarding God into which the Lutheran doctrine falls, when it asserts that God declares us to be righteous on account of our faith, as on account of an action which has value in itself, although we are not righteous, and although God does not at all make us righteous, but leaves us just in the same condition as before. Only on the supposition that this (Osiander's) view is true, does God find real ground for his judgment upon believers.

36. Amongst the opponents of Osiander,¹ Victorinus Strigel rightly perceives that the distinction between *justificatio* and

¹ *Censuræ der fürstlich-sächsischen Theologen zu Weimar und Coburg auf das Bekenntniß Andreas Osiander's von Rechtfertigung des Glaubens*, Erfurt, 1552 (containing three tracts prepared by Menius, Strigel, and Schnepf, and signed by them along with others, e.g. Amsdorf and Jonas). Matth. Flacius, *Verlegung des Bekenntnisses Osiandri von der Rechtfertigung armen Sünder durch die wesentliche Gerechtigkeit der hohen Majestät Gottes allein*. Magdeburg, 1552.

redemptio depends upon an identification of *justificatio* and *regeneratio*. If it be right to make this identification, Osiander is certainly correct in saying that we cannot be justified before our life begins. But if justification should not be connected with the death of Christ, neither should redemption. For the individual (who is always the subject of discussion in these questions) cannot be redeemed until he is made captive; but captivity under sin begins, in the individual, only when he is conceived and born. It was not difficult for Osiander's opponents to show exegetically the identity of redemption and justification. But Flacius, moreover, brings it into prominence that they are synonymous ideas: forgiveness of sins is not merely the doing away of guilt incurred by violation of the law, it is also the imputation of the fulfilment of the law. This is quite correct if one realizes, in the religious way in which the Reformers did so, what are the operations of Christ upon the believing subject. But as Osiander started the question with regard to the objective systematic arrangement of these steps—an arrangement which Luther and Melancthon had not discussed—the question with the Lutherans came to be, whether they could, against Osiander, maintain the connexion or identity of those ideas, even when Christ's historical work was separated from the saving experience of believers, as it takes place from time to time? Is there any other schema besides that which Osiander employed—that Christ by means of his historical prestations has influenced God,—has determined Him to be gracious towards sinners—and that He presently accomplishes the justification of believers, whether that be represented as *actus forensis* or as *actus causativus*? Strigel puts forth another schema, asserting that by Christ's death and resurrection "eternal redemption and justification were prepared for the whole human race, and the promised treasure won in Christ for the world as a whole," but that to individual believers this is applied as they come into being. Just as by Adam's sin the wrath and curse of God came upon the whole human race, but overtake individual persons only when they come into being; so in like manner 1500 years ago by Christ "was the human race redeemed, sanctified, and justified, though these benefits are applied for the first time to particular individuals when they believe in Christ and are baptized in His name." This result

certainly establishes the identity of redemption and justification and seems fitted to mediate between Melancthon's divergent expressions (p. 178), in which it is at one time asserted that the believer is already justified, and, at another time, that justification follows the act of faith. Strigel thus founds the individual's assurance of faith upon the change wrought by Christ on the attitude of God towards the human race, and carries it back to an arrangement of the whole plan of salvation previously made by Christ. This important result remains unrealized when Osiander separates in point of time Christ's mediatorial functions and opposes them to each other in point of fact. Or then, when he regards the achievement of *propitiatio Dei* by Christ, and *redemptio hominum* by Him as amounting to the same thing, he thereby, in contravention of his own view, and in conformity with the Reformation usage of language, expresses a change not only in God's disposition, but in his attitude towards men; and he has nothing to answer to Strigel's remark, that if Christ has redeemed the human race, He in doing so has determined God to regard it no more as sinful, but as righteous, so that thus every individual in his own time may, by means of his faith, experience within himself redemption, or justification by the sentence of God.

The ground of Osiander's untenable distinction between redemption and justification was that he considered justification to be a real change in the sinner. But that assertion he attempted to support by means of an obvious misunderstanding of the Lutheran view. Osiander's opponents could with perfect justice repudiate the charge made against them, as if by justification they intended such a judgment passed by God upon the sinner as leaves him inwardly unchanged. Melancthon,¹ Schnepf, Flacius, are at one in affirming that with the declaration that the believer is righteous, is immediately connected the working of the Holy Spirit towards illumination, towards renovation of life, towards new obedience. But this mere assertion of the co-existence in the believer of two things which have reference to quite diverse purposes (p. 172), must at once have presented itself as a weak point of the Reformation-doctrine. The theological defectiveness of this supplementary formula

¹ *Antwort auf das Buch Herrn A. Osiander's von der Rechtfertigung des Menschen*, Wittenberg, 1552. C. R. vii. pp. 892-902.

comes all the more clearly into prominence when Flacius, Strigel, and Schnepf try to explain the priority of the thought of justification to that of regeneration, in general only on the ground that an analytical sentence of justification such as Osiander attributes to God, does indeed suit the human measure of justice, but that, notwithstanding this, the synthetic imputation of righteousness to the sinner is befitting in God precisely, because of its contrariness to the human standard. Thus to forego the rationality of one's own view is at least very rash; but at the same time is an indication of the haughty indifference with which these epigoni of the Reformation held themselves back from all serious effort in theological work. They were satisfied to appeal, against the identification of justification and regeneration, to that religious consciousness by which the Reformation saw itself directed to distinguish between these two ideas. They accordingly vindicate the forensic interpretation of justification by reference to the cravings of the troubled conscience after a ground of righteousness that shall stand firm, independently of the subjective life; and they meet Osiander's attack with the charge that he by his doctrine gives a false security to man, and that he surely never could have passed through those experiences which had pointed Luther to seek justification through Christ's merit. Here again Melancthon, the theologians of the Principality of Saxony, and Flacius are quite agreed.

The *religious* difference between Osiander's standpoint and that of the Reformers undoubtedly comes to be clearly seen in this dispute. For although Osiander, following his *purpose*, again and again declares that the believer bases the consciousness of his acceptance with God, in view of the imperfection of his own works, upon the value of Christ's obedience,¹ he yet declares in one passage of his "Confession" that God regards

¹ *Confessio*, c. 4: Posteaquam thesaurus redemptionis—in externo verbo nobis offertur, apprehendimus eum fide ad justificationem nostri, scientes, quod eundem in verbo interno, quod in corde nostro manet, certo habeamus, ac de eo in omnibus certaminibus conscientie contra omnes portas inferorum confidere, gaudere, ipsoque uti possimus. P. 2: Cum peccatum sit remissum, et tamen adhuc in nobis hæreat, debet ipse (Jesus) obedientiam suam, qua legem implevit, nobis donare, ac pro nobis ponere, ne nobis imputetur, quod legem nondum possumus adimplere, sed adhuc quotidie peccamus et offendimus. S. 2: Quamvis legem etiam post resurrectionem non pure et perfecte impleamus, tamen huiusmodi defectus, infirmitas et debitum nobis non imputatur sed condonatur, et impletio Christi pro nobis substituitur.

the believer as righteous on account of his habitual righteousness, on account of "Christ in him;" and that with God the sins of the believer are no more than an impure drop in the purest sea.¹ From a later expression, indeed, we may conclude that the discrepancy between the two thoughts was not clear to him, for he allows them to become mixed up with each other.² But as matter of fact, not merely does it follow as a necessary consequence of his premisses that the believer will overcome the consciousness of his imperfection by reflection upon his habitual righteousness, it *fails* to follow from his view of Christ's historical work, that the believer can regard himself as *justified by His obedience*. For as His work of redemption is not to be understood as also *justificatio*, the believer gains by reflection upon the value of Christ's obedience only the assurance that God regards him *no longer as unrighteous*. But if he desires to be accepted by God as positively righteous, the believer, on Osiander's principles, can attribute this completion of his consciousness of salvation only to Christ's righteousness *dwelling in him*, upon which also, of course, God's corresponding judgment must proceed.

As Osiander, in his theory, proceeds upon a different religious judgment of self from that which the Reformers follow, so also in speaking of the relation between God and men he is entirely opposed to them in the ethical and metaphysical views which he adopts. When his opponents not only had repudiated the charge that by their view of justification they excluded the supposition of a real change in the sinner, but had even pointed out to Osiander that they also maintained, as a result of God's sentence of justification, a real union of Christ and the Holy Spirit with the believer, he still continued his opposition against their representation of the manner in which this union is brought about. In his *Widerlegung der Antwoort*

¹ Q. 3: Christus implet nos justitia sua,—ita ut Deus ipse et omnes angeli, cum Christus noster et in nobis sit, meram justitiam in nobis videant.—Et quamvis peccatum adhuc in carne nostra habitat et tenaciter adhaereat, tamen perinde est, sicut stilla immunda respectu totius purissimi maris. Et propter justitiam Christi, quæ in nobis est, Deus illud non vult observare.

² In Osiander's *Widerlegung der ungegründeten undienstlichen Antwoort Philipp Melancthon's* (Königsberg, 21st April 1552), we read: "Thou must not rely in this life upon thy obedience nor upon thy purity, but upon the obedience and purity of my Son, who has perfectly fulfilled the law for thee; for His righteousness is not imputed to thee by me because it works in thee any works, be they great or small, but only because it is in thee by faith."

Melanchthon's, he complains that the latter, even while conceding the indwelling of Christ in us, understands it to be *effective* merely somewhat as the sun exercises influence upon the field, but does not regard it as an actual indwelling of Christ in His completeness, in His two inseparable natures. This complaint, in harmony as it is with his view of man's original condition (p. 217), brings clearly before us Osiander's conception of the ethical destiny of man. In like manner he affirms in his *Confessio* also that the law requires of man that righteousness which is the eternal essence of God Himself. Menius, however, in refuting so exaggerated a demand upon men, omits distinctly to state what in his opinion is the real meaning of the law. But it is obvious that what he holds is, that the righteousness in conformity with the law, which Adam lost and which is restored in regeneration, has not the nature of a habit except in the form of an act of will. But Osiander opposes to this view the following dilemma: *Omnis justitia, proprie de justitia loquendo, aut est divina justitia et essentia Dei, aut est humana justitia, et qualitas creata, nullo autem modo actio aut passio*. Human righteousness, says he, is produced by instruction, discipline, laws, penalties; but the righteousness which the law of God demands and yet cannot produce is Christ Himself in His Divine nature,—in other words, it is God Himself, the eternal Divine Being, and no other; else would we be glorying in a created righteousness. But the indwelling of Christ, with whom the Father also and the Spirit are united, causes the obedience and well-doing of believers with the same natural necessity wherewith Christ's own obedience is produced by His Divine nature. Osiander's theory thus has its ultimate origin in a tendency to withdraw from the conditions of man's free will, as something supernatural and divine, all religious assurance of salvation, and the corresponding task of moral life; while the theology of the Reformation, on the other hand, assumes without questioning that all religious change of character—all regeneration by God's Spirit—takes place in the region of the human will. Osiander thinks that by means of the notion of substance he can express a more intimate connexion between man and God than is possible by means of the notion of cause, the application of which to the relation between the Divine Spirit and

the regenerate man appears to him too bald. Had this point of controversy been more fully gone into, even Melancthon would hardly have succeeded in so defending his own views as to avoid that appearance. But unless we suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by the mysticism which attaches to Osiander's view, it is impossible not to see that the causal view of the problem, while it certainly does not exhaust it, does not, at all events, destroy it. On the other hand, whoever regards the notion of *actio* as altogether inadmissible here, and treats the notion of righteousness exclusively either as *divina essentia* or as *qualitas creata*, leads in his view of justification to a confusion of the Divine with the human essence in the same degree wherein he denies that peculiarity which distinguishes the human will from other created powers, whereby it is capable of receiving into itself the influence of the Divine Spirit.

Osiander, however, shrinks from fully developing the consequences which the abstract metaphysical view of justification might seem to admit or to necessitate. He affirms, indeed, that *in nova regeneratione attrahimus essentialem justitiam Christi, quæ est Deus ipse, quemadmodum in prima nativitate peccatricem naturam Adami contraximus*. But that the divine-human Being of Christ has become to the regenerate *another nature*, must not lead us in our judgment of ourselves to assume a deification of the believer. Although the regenerate be partakers of the Divine nature, Osiander reminds us that we are and remain creatures still, however gloriously we may have been renewed. We ought never to allow ourselves to regard as our own God's righteousness in us. The figurative expressions of Christ's indwelling in believers, and of the garment with which they are clothed, are to be taken as denoting only a mechanical outward relation of God's righteousness to human persons. Christ's righteousness, which thus must be regarded as something *foreign* when it occurs in the believer, must accordingly be *imputed* to the believer.¹ It

¹ *Confessio*, M. 3 : Cum Christus per fidem in nobis habitat, tum affert suam justitiam, quæ est ejus divina natura, secum in nos, quæ deinde nobis imputatur ac si esset nostra propria, imo et donatur nobis, manatque ex ipsius humana natura tanquam ex capite etiam in nos tanquam ipsius membra et movet nos, ut exhibeamus membra nostra arma justitiæ Dei. *Widerlegung Melancthon's* : — " If we by faith become living members of Christ then do

is obvious that such practical departures on Osiander's part from his theoretical principles were forced upon him by the ethical spirit of the Reformation. But with that concession Osiander has invalidated all those arguments in favour of his doctrine, which are based upon the ostensible necessity for finding *actual* Divine righteousness in the believer. In it especially is prescribed a quite different judgment of self on the part of the believer from that which is involved in the expression quoted above (p. 222), to the effect that God sees nothing but righteousness when Christ's righteousness dwells in the believer, and that sin disappears like an impure drop in the pure sea of righteousness.

Osiander's interest thus was plainly divided between two opposite points of view, which so counteracted one another as to wreck his speculative doctrine, which aimed at a thorough-going consistency of thought. The Reformation doctrine having left on Osiander the impression that it weakened the motives to well-doing, he sought by means of his assertion of real justification to unite in one thought religious pacification and impulse to moral action. But he had gone too far in the Reformation school of religious judgment of self, not to feel the importance of that imputed righteousness of Christ which meets the believer's consciousness of sin. But here the oneness of *his* consciousness of justification which he had striven to attain was broken up. For the immanent righteousness of Christ appeared indeed as the believer's own power with reference to his good works; but, in so far as it had to be imputed in order to supplement the imperfection of these, it presented itself as a foreign element in the sphere of his own life. While then Osiander was able only *in one case* to draw from himself the logical conclusion that God sees in the believer nothing but righteousness since Christ essentially dwells in him; and that sins are lost sight of in this habitual righteousness, as the impure drop in the purest sea; we can now understand why it is that involuntarily he has more fre-

we become partakers also of His essential righteousness, for He dwells in us. But we are not completely obedient thereunto; in fact, our obedience has hardly made any beginning; but it ought to grow from day to day, and will be made perfect in the resurrection. Meanwhile, God imputes to us His essential righteousness, simply because it is in us, irrespective of the fact that we are not perfectly obedient as we ought to be."

quently adopted the Reformation doctrine, that the obedience of the Mediator handed down to us in history is imputed to the believer for the forgiveness of sins.

37. Osiander follows Luther's tradition in yet other respects. And as he was the first who brought into consistent shape the doctrine before us, it is easy to understand how he, by his way of setting forth Luther's thought, should have exercised a leading influence upon the form given to that doctrine by the Lutherans. The distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ, originally due to Luther (p. 210), was first of all so applied by Osiander that to each of these a separate end was attributed (p. 216). The endurance of the punishment of sins by Christ is the condition under which God in His grace is ready to bestow forgiveness of sins upon men ; the fulfilment of the law in man's place serves the end of supplementing the imperfection of the obedience of believers in such a way that that imperfection can no longer be laid to their charge.¹ Properly speaking this distinction of Osiander stands in no relation of subserviency to the deliberate tendency of his doctrine ; for the latter tends to indicate that the deficiency of the believer's obedience finds its supplement in the value of Christ's substantial righteousness that dwells in him. Flacius and Menius, on the other hand, make use of Osiander's suggestion on this point for filling out the Lutheran doctrine. Now, it is worthy of notice that these men, and also the compilers of the *formula concordiæ* following in their footsteps, assert the distinction and co-ordination of the passive and active obedience of Christ as contributing to the two ends of vicarious endurance of punishment and vicarious fulfilling of the law, just as distinctly as they also assert the coincidence of obedience and suffering in the life of Christ as alike conditions of justification or forgiveness of sins.² Thomasius explains the former distinction

¹ The distinction was first laid down by Osiander in his "Constitution of the Nürnberg and Brandenburg Churches" (1533).

² Compare the citations from the writings of Flacius and Menius to be found in Thomasius : *Das Bekenntnis der lutherischen Kirche von der Versöhnung*, pp. 56-71. *Formula Concordiæ*, Art. III. : *Epitome* (p. 584) : Christus obedientia sua, quam patri ad mortem usque absolutissimam præstitit, nobis peccatorum omnium remissionem et vitam æternam promeruit. Sol. decl. (p. 685) : Ipsius obedientia, non ea tantum, qua patri paruit in tota sua passione et morte, verum etiam, qua nostra causa sponte sese legi subiecit eamque obedientia illa sua implevit, nobis ad justitiam imputatur, ita ut

between the passive and the active obedience as arising from the design to find a basis for forgiveness of sins, *and* justification as "the negative and the positive side" of the salutary result that was contemplated (as above, p. 43), but attributes the latter distinction "to the mode of representation peculiar to that time, which was characterized by the tendency to bring into prominence by means of clear co-ordination the concurrent momenta of one and the same thing" (p. 81), so that by looking at the obedience and suffering of Christ together "the two sides" of the thing are again made to appear one. The theologian of Erlangen has not in these observations disclosed the sense of the Lutheran doctrinal idea. It is true that the theologians of the seventeenth century distinguish between the non-imputation of sins and the imputation of righteousness as "the two sides of the same thing;" and, in distinguishing them, refer them back to separate parts of Christ's obedience. But Flacius, Menius, and the *formula concordiæ* treat the two conceptions as synonymous, as indeed is shown by the allegations of Thomasius himself (pp. 41, 56, 57). But further, the distinction as well as the collocation of the two forms of Christ's obedience corresponds to certain quite distinct conditions and assumptions of the doctrinal system that received its impulse from Luther, which have not been noticed by Thomasius; and the instinctive acuteness of the former theologians does not deserve the reproach which the latter teacher of dogmatics, of all people in the world, casts upon them as having in accordance with the spirit of their age revelled unduly in dialectics.

For, by Luther's assumption that the Divine law is the rule which regulates the relation between man and God which holds good from the beginning; and by the assumption that men have incurred guilt towards the law in such a way that they could never by themselves either become free from debt or yet be in a position to offer that obedience to the law on which their acceptance with God depends, it is necessary that not only the *debt of guilt* towards the law but also the *legal obligation* of man towards God should be abolished, in order that the new gracious dispensation of justification *or* forgiveness of sins

Deus propter totam obedientiam, quam Christus agendo et patiando . . . præstitit, peccata nobis remittat, pro bonis et justis nos reputet et salute æterna donet.

may take effect. If, now, Christ as our substitute is destined to fulfil the conditions under which God's justice and the law cease to regulate the relation in which those who are to be redeemed stand to God, it follows that Christ must meet the claims of the law alike when these demand that we should be punished, and when they demand to be fulfilled by us; thus a double obedience to the law is necessary on the part of the Mediator. For, were it seen that only human guilt had been done away by Christ's passion, then would the demand for fulfilment of the law press upon those who had been redeemed from guilt as heavily as before; the dispensation of redemption would include the dispensation of the law as means towards the end of complete justification. If, on the other hand, the dispensation of grace excludes such a view of the force of the law for justified persons, then must justification be preceded by the vicarious fulfilment of the law in order to the dissolution of the legal relation with God. The distinction between the two forms of Christ's obedience and the diversity of their reference are thus perfectly rational in relation to the premisses and to the purpose of the doctrine.¹ But these things being determined, the problem is not yet exhausted; indeed the thought, which in the original religious apprehension of justification by faith is the dominant one, has not yet found expression in them—the thought that Christ is our righteousness, and that His obedience is imputed to us. This betokens the need of recognising Christ, who gives perfect obedience to the law, as the *direct Mediator* of positive gracious acceptance; but in so far as His twofold obedience to the law satisfies the Divine *justice*, He is as yet recognised merely as the *indispensable condition* in order that grace may take effect. To show Christ's twofold obedience towards the law serves accordingly only to lay the foundation for the thought that for Christ's sake the existing legal relation between those who are to be redeemed and God has been abolished; but in this negative result it is not implied that a new relation of another kind is formed through Christ. This end is attained by that assertion of the oneness of Christ's obedience which is made by the

¹ Töllner (*Der thätige Gehorsam Jesu Christi*, p. 563) formulates these premisses quite accurately: "The double obligation that lies upon men arises from the fact that as *men* they are bound to give the obedience that they have hitherto failed to give, and that as *sinners* they are bound to suffer."

opponents of Osiander and by the *formula concordiæ*. As *obedience to the law*, Christ's twofold work meets the legal demands of God and discharges them; but, on the other hand, as *voluntary moral obedience towards God*, Christ's doing and suffering have the effect at once of guaranteeing the operation of God's grace and of representing the pattern of the contemplated new relation in which those who are to be redeemed are to stand, which, on condition of their faith, is imputed to them as their righteousness, and precludes the measurement of their new obedience by the strict rule of the law. That this profound train of thoughts has not been thus clearly set forth by its authors cannot justly be urged against this interpretation of it; the inadequacy of the representation only shows that with regard to this point the epigoni of Luther, while not yet deserted by that creative play of phantasy which is always the first means of progress in scientific knowledge, do not take their dialectic task sufficiently in earnest. Now, on comparing this train of thought, which the Lutheran doctrine through the *formula concordiæ* has attained, with Osiander's analogous view, a certain divergence cannot be overlooked. Osiander's distinction of the active and passive obedience of Christ is not, in sense, covered by the Lutheran distinction which resembles it in sound. If, according to Osiander, the active obedience of Christ, while it satisfies the law at the same time, lays the foundation for the completion of the believer's ever-defective new obedience, he has taken together in this what the Lutherans regard partly as the negative effect of His active obedience to the law, and partly as the positive effect of His whole obedience to God. The superior maturity and clearness of the Lutheran formula is obvious.

In making distinctions with regard to time and place between the Mediator's works in their references to God and to men, Osiander had appropriated the doctrine of Luther and Melancthon, so far as it had been deliberately wrought out; particularly with reference to this point,—that justification as a result is brought about upon the individual by means of God's word, the gospel of forgiveness of sins (pp. 170-1). As the Reformers had satisfied themselves with this way of explaining justification, while not even Melancthon wrought out the doctrine of atonement by Christ which had been formulated by

himself as the objective antecedent to the doctrine of justification (p. 202), Osiander, by adopting Melanchthon's formula, goes beyond the circle of vision of his predecessors, just in so far as after his own fashion he has marked off the respective boundaries and mutual relations of the reconciliation of God and of the justification of men. However far Osiander's Lutheran opponents thought they had occasion to enter into his way of regarding the matter, they also were unable to discover any other objective intermediary between the general result of Christ's work and the justification of the individual than the so-called means of grace. Thus Menius says that "the righteousness which Christ has earned for us by His obedience, He causes to be presented, offered, and given to every one through the preaching of the gospel, and through the holy sacraments. Whoever, therefore, believes in the promise, really receives these treasures of grace." But faith itself also exists only as operation of the Word of God received by hearing. We ought not to be surprised that the Lutherans never got beyond this formula. For it had Luther's authority on its side, and the *epigoni* of Luther had not learned from Melanchthon anything of the discipline of accurate theological thinking. Must not the question have pressed itself upon them how those processes to which they pointed stood related to the idea of the Church? Does the Church take its rise first of all from those who are justified through the instrumentality of the gospel and the sacraments? or do not rather the means of grace presuppose the existence of the community of believers? For, after all, the gospel—the keys of the kingdom of heaven—are intrusted *principaliter* to the Church, and the sacraments cannot even be thought of apart from it. Or, in conformity with the structure of the Catholic idea of the Church, are we to understand the exercise of the means of grace to be a function peculiar to particular officials previous to the existence of any community of believers? If this is really not to be thought of, must not then the idea of the Church at once be placed in direct relation to the redeeming acts of Christ, in order that the operation of the means of grace towards the justification of individual believers may have what, in the evangelical sense, is its necessary presupposition? If Christ by His obedience once purchased righteousness for *us*, who then are "we," unless the

community of believers regarded as the totality that is previous to the individual? While now that motto of the original believing consciousness of the Reformation again comes out here also (as indeed it never became extinct in the doctrinal tradition of Lutheranism), the problem is thus reduced to narrower limits than in Strigel's proposition (p. 219), that Christ 1500 years before established redemption and justification for *the whole human race*. Strigel's view, accordingly, is just as hard hit by a remark of Melanchthon, his master, as is that declaration of Osiander against which it is directed. Melanchthon characterizes it as a frightful proof of impiety in Osiander that he extends the forgiveness of sins, as the general result of Christ's passion, to all men, instead of limiting it to believers; because the wrath of God abides upon those who do not believe in the Son. According to such a view the sins of men would be forgiven first of all only at the very moment of their actually achieving faith.¹ But how is it, then, with that immediate effect of Christ's passion, which Melanchthon notwithstanding always regards as *justificatio* and *reconciliatio*, without limiting it as Osiander does to *placatio Dei* (p. 179)? Either this latter effect must be asserted with reference to the whole human race with the reservation that it finds its limits in application to individuals, or then *justificatio* and *reconciliatio* must from the outset be regarded as referring to the community of believers. The circumstance that in the Lutheran theology adequate clearness has never been attained on this point, must be attributed, I think, amongst other causes, to the influence of Melanchthon's unsystematic method, which continued to prevail among the Lutherans,—and all the more immoveably too as they were persuaded that by their rejection of his doctrine of the Supper they had escaped the influence of the man they suspected. Flacius, particularly, who in respect of the contents of his doctrine is a highly important intermediary between Luther and the *formula concordiae*, betrays precisely, by the very negligent form of his writings against Osiander, how little

¹ C. R. viii. p. 580: Osiander divellit remissionem peccatorum a justitia. Expresse ait, omnibus hominibus esse remissa peccata, sed Neronem damnari, quia non habeat essentialiam justitiam. (I do not know where Osiander has said so.) Hic primum manifesta et horribilis impietas est, dicere omnibus hominibus, etiam non credentibus, remissa esse peccata (John iii. 36; Acts x. 43).—Quare tum primum remittuntur hominibus peccata, cum fide statuant sibi remitti illa propter mediatorem.

he had grown away from the influence of Melancthon. That an acuteness which displays itself in sporadic instances can be associated with general heedlessness respecting the systematic laws of doctrinal exposition, can be observed in other instances also among Lutheran theologians in the development of the doctrine of reconciliation. These, by this latter peculiarity of their procedure, show even now that they are more faithful to Melancthon than they themselves are aware; but precisely in a trait of character which is one of the weak points of that Reformer.

At the same time the Lutheran opponents of Osiander who did not know how to avail themselves of the thought of the Church, with a view to the adjustment of the doctrine in dispute, can claim our lenient judgment all the more because even Calvin did not realize to himself with sufficient clearness the importance and difficulty of the problem which had been pointed out to him in Osiander's erroneous solution of it. This shows itself at once in the circumstance that Calvin in his doctrine of justification supposes that he can dispose of Osiander in a perfunctory way. He therefore simply brings assertions against assertions. These are true in themselves; but, as proof is wanting, knowledge is not advanced by them; nay, rather it is in a measure thrown back. I may here call it to mind that Luther was able to throw himself into the line of Osiander's ideas, because he manifestly felt how unsatisfactorily he himself had given expression to the connexion that subsists between regeneration and justification (p. 174); in like manner Osiander is not vanquished, because Calvin (iii. 11. 6, 11), like Melancthon and the Lutherans generally (p. 220), asserts the concurrence of the two states without investigating the bearing of justification upon regeneration as an end, and the consequent necessity of their coincidence in the individual believer. Still more unfavourable for the course of the development of the doctrine is Calvin's procedure in pointing out that Osiander's assertion of a *crassa mixtura Christi cum fidelibus*, is confuted by his view of the *unio mystica* of the regenerate with Christ.¹ Calvin, in invariably giving preference to this

¹ iii. 11. 10: *Conjunctio illa capitis et membrorum, habitatio Christi in cordibus nostris, mystica denique unio a nobis in summo gradu statuitur, ut Christus noster factus donorum, quibus præditus est, nos faciat consortes.—Quia ipsum induimus et insiti sumus in ejus corpus, unum denique nos secum*

comparison, has given occasion to the supposition, which Schneckenburger in particular has deliberately stated (p. 191), that he too, like Osiander, regards God's judgment of justification as proceeding upon the real union of the believer with Christ. But Calvin's thought ought not to be brought into *direct* parallelism with the similarly-sounding thought of Osiander. For Calvin's *unio mystica* indicates the individual's membership in the Church as the condition under which he becomes conscious within himself of justification through Christ's obedience (p. 191); the indwelling of Christ, as Osiander understands it, is a predicate of the individual believer as such, upon whom the means of grace have taken effect in accordance with Christ's intention to his being made righteous, and so to his membership in the body of Christ. How then could Calvin show that he set up a *spiritualis conjunctio* in opposition to the *crassa mixtura* of Osiander, when the latter would hardly at all have accepted this representation of his view? The spiritual and moral sort of union with Christ could have been *proved* as against Osiander's pretended physical indwelling of Christ in the believer, only if Calvin had analysed the thought (which he was indeed cherishing), that the individual subject can be thought of as recipient of the Holy Ghost, and as possessing the consciousness of justification through Christ only *on condition* that he be viewed as a member of the community of believers, and that this last be regarded as the object of Christ's redeeming purpose. But in his chief dogmatic work Calvin has not determined upon the last-mentioned thought, and the first he has weakened of its full effect, in so far as in the last edition of the *Institutio* he has shifted the doctrine of the Church from the place which it occupied in the earlier editions, and which of right belongs to it (p. 187).

efficere dignatus est, ideo justitiæ societatem nobis cum eo esse gloriamur. Sed Osiander hæc spirituali conjunctione spreta crassam mixturam Christi cum fidelibus urget.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION AND JUSTIFICATION AS HELD BY LUTHERANS AND CALVINISTS : AND THE SOCINIAN CONTROVERSY.

38. OUR interest in the orthodox doctrine *de Christo mediatore* would be materially lessened were we to omit to confront it, in the form it assumed in the seventeenth century, with the deliberate and determined resistance offered to it, with the help of all scientific appliances, by the Socinians. For in this polar opposition of the contending parties—both of which alike claimed to be loyal to Christ and Scripture, but which in fact had no points of contact except in the controversy about Christian truth—is seen the entire compass of the influences of that Christianity which at that period had separated itself from the political unity of the Western Church. The dispute, however, between the orthodox party and the Socinians was fruitless, because neither on the one side nor on the other was the root of the controversy laid bare. Lutherans and Calvinists maintain the idea of atonement as a whole, and Socinians deny it, because Christendom is regarded by the former as a religious community, by the latter as an ethical school.¹ The conception of the Church as the fellowship which logically and really comes before the individual believer, and outside of which no subjective religion and no religious knowledge of God are possible, stands in immediate reciprocal connexion with the thought that Christ has reconciled men with God, and thereby founded the Church, and within it opened up to sinners access to God. The Socinians deny this idea, having no need for it, because in Christ, as the Founder of a school of morality, they

¹ Compare my *Geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott*; Art. iii. (*Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* xiii. p. 280-283.)

merely look for that guidance and impulse towards moral self-culture which each one appropriates to himself as he may be able, without previously having been joined in fellowship with others of his kind. But this fundamental practical opposition remained obscure. And in fact the Socinians were on their side persuaded that they were, as men then expressed it, building up the Church, while they were only making a school. Still more unfavourable to the clearing up of the controversy was the circumstance that the tendency of Church progress amongst the successors of the Reformers was impeded, and all proper insight into the conditions of the existence of a Church rendered impossible to them by the growth of an excessive devotion to a theology of the schools. It is indeed true that on their side the true idea of the Church was never allowed to fall out of sight; but as the school element in the Church and the theological element in religion were over-valued, they came to present too close a resemblance in point of form with Socinianism; so that it was not possible to recognise the fundamental error of the merely scholastic view of Christendom which characterized the latter system. The Socinians who valued the theoretical side of Christianity only as instrumental for the ethical guidance of the individual subject, acquired in consequence of this a large-hearted toleration for theoretical aberrations, which resembles the normal universalism of a truly churchly consciousness. The orthodox party, on the other hand, appeared to have lost all interest in the universal Church in that narrowness of sympathy which characterizes a theoretical school. Thus the two tendencies produce a superficial impression precisely antithetic to their essential character; and thus insight into the contrast of their principles is made all the more difficult.

The construction of the Reformation churches was originally guided by the thought of the unity of the Church. Only, in opposition to the political form which that thought had assumed in the Roman Catholic doctrine and practice, it came to be requisite to define it as a necessary object of faith by means of characteristic marks, in which the Divine origin of the fellowship of the redeemed should be recognisable; and at the same time, in opposition to Anabaptism, to secure an orderly constitution in the Church. With respect to the former point, the

fellowship of persons set apart by God was connected with the preaching of the word of God "according to its simple meaning," and with the administration of the sacraments as these had been instituted; while, with reference to the other point, the *office of preacher* was recognised as that which is ordinarily intrusted with the administration of these divine means of grace. The champions of Catholicism also laid claim to the word of God; and in order to secure its authenticity as conveyed through human instrumentalities, the whole constitutional structure of the Romish Church was postulated. But the Reformers denied to their opponents the "simple meaning" of the word, establishing it in a much simpler way. For in a dissertation by Luther among the Articles of Torgau, which served as basis for the Augsburg Confession, the following is the explanation given wherefore the word of God is regarded as one of the conditions of the Church's existence:—that "in it is clearly, properly, and rightly taught and set forth what Christ is and what the gospel; what is true repentance and fear of God; how forgiveness of sins is to be attained; what the authority and power of the keys in the Church is."¹ In the other document from which the Augsburg Confession was compiled—the Articles of Schwabach, to wit—the Church had been described as consisting of all believers in Christ who accept and teach all the preceding articles of doctrine, and also the objective saving efficacy of the Sacraments;² but in the seventh Article of the Augsburg Confession the *pura doctrina evangelii* is restricted to a narrower range of fundamental articles of faith.³ And if, along with the due administration of the sacraments, only the *pura doctrina evangelii* in the already defined sense of that word was demanded as the human guarantee of God's saving operation towards the founding of the Church, it follows that a theoretically defined repre-

¹ *Corpus Reformatorum*, xxvi. p. 193.

² *L. c.* p. 157.

³ If a single glance informs us that the Articles of Torgau, which were first discovered and published by Fürstemann (in the *Urkundenbuch zu der Gesch. des Reichstages zu Augsburg im Jahre 1530*, 1ster Band. 1833), are almost word for word the basis of the second part of the Augsburg Confession; a glance also is sufficient to satisfy us that the formula in the seventh article is drawn from the same source, and not from the Articles of Schwabach, which are followed in all other respects in the first part of the Augsburg Confession. Thus it is only fair to explain that formula according to the connexion in which it occurs in the article of Torgau.

sentation of the supper was not included, but only recognition of the objective value of the sacraments presupposed. *This* fundamental religious doctrine of the Church has been explained by Melanchthon in the *Apology for the Confession*, and repeated in the 2d edition of the *Loci Theologici* (1535).

This doctrine of the Church was undeniably incomplete; those distinctive marks of its Divine origin were simply put forward as the most necessary and most important criteria, in order to show the continuity of the Church in the Reformation and its distinction from Anabaptism. The distinctive marks under which the fellowship of the saints set apart by God's Word and sacraments is *self-acting* in its kind and towards its end,—in other words, the ethical idea of the Church,—was left untouched in these definitions. And yet this completion of the idea of the Church was needed in order to establish by regular deduction that existence as a law-ordered fellowship which was pointed to by the office of preacher.¹ The fundamental mark of the Church as active is indicated when Luther in his treatise *Von Conciliis und Kirchen* (1539), amongst the seven characteristics of the Church, along with the Word of God, baptism, the supper, the keys, the function of preaching, the cross, in the sixth place reckons prayer.² For this is that confession of the name of God (Heb. xiii. 15) by which the community of the saints exercises its priestly character. Melanchthon has repeatedly touched upon the same thought in academic declamations and disputations.³ But, in order that the invocation of God in the Church may rightly be gone about, he insists upon the true doctrine of the articles of faith as a necessary means; and yet further on he assigns the significance of a leading characteristic to this instrumentality which is subordinate to the active destiny of the Church. This fatal change of position betrays itself in the circumstance that the dogmatico-religious doctrine of the Church which, in the 2d edition of the *Loci Theologici*, follows the type of the Augsburg Confession, is in the 3rd edition (1543) superseded by a representation of the

¹ Compare my dissertation upon *Die Begründung des Kirchenrechtes im evangelischen Begriff von der Kirche* (*Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht von Dove und Friedberg*, viii. (1869) pp. 220-279).

² Walch's edition, xvi. p. 2803.

³ *Decl. de vera Dei invocatione*, C. R. xi. p. 660: *Precatio proprie discernit ecclesiam ab omnibus gentibus*. *Disp. de invocatione Dei*, xii. p. 529, cf. p. 8.

idea of the active Church, which is not an object of faith, but to which one is bound to attach one's-self. It is from the standpoint of empiricism and of practical utility that the Church is defined as *cœtus vocatorum, profitentium evangelium Dei,—in quo articuli fidei recte docentur,—amplectentium evangelium Christi et recte utentium sacramentis*. And it is only in accounting for the value of these active characteristics that the constitutive dogmatic characteristic is indicated; which is that God *per ministerium evangelii est efficax et multos ad vitam æternam regenerat*.¹

This change of view was brought about when it came to be clearly felt that union with the Roman Church was no longer attainable, and when the impression gained ground that it was accordingly imperative to vindicate the true Church against the false, and to insist upon the duty of joining the former as being intrusted with the pure gospel. The bare way, however, in which Melancthon now proclaimed the *pura doctrina evangelii* as the main characteristic of the Church betokens the scholastic style which distinguished the *præceptor Germaniæ* from the *reformator ecclesiæ*. It is far from being unimportant for the praxis of the Church that Melancthon, while denying her political nature, should have found no other analogy for her real character than that of a school.² In correspondence with this thought is the marked way in which he devotes chief care to the maintenance of purity of doctrine. Luther, in his treatise *Von Conciliis und Kirchen*, had nobly judged of divergencies between pure and impure doctrine, while the foundation was still adhered to by saying, that those who build thereupon wood, hay, and stubble shall find their work destroyed by the fire of Holy Writ.³ But Melancthon, insisting as he does repeatedly in his declamations on purity of doctrine always,

¹ *Corpus Reformatorum*, xxi. p. 825 sq.: A similar definition of the Church is given in the *Examen ordinandorum*, C. R. xxiii. p. 38 sq., and in the *Repetitio confessionis Augustanæ* (*Conf. Saxonica*), C. R. xxviii. p. 407 sq.

² L. c. p. 835: *Concedendum est, ecclesiam esse cœtum visibilem, neque tamen esse regnum pontificum, sed cœtum similem scholastico cœtui.—Erit aliquis visibilis cœtus ecclesia Dei, sed ut cœtus scholasticus. Est ordo, est discrimen inter docentes et auditores.—P. 837: Non contemnamus docentem ecclesiam, et tamen judicem esse sciamus ipsum verbum Dei.—C. R. xii. p. 367: Conspicitur ecclesia ut honesta aristocratia seu pius cœtus docentium et discentium christianam κατήχησιν, qui dispersus eandem tamen veræ doctrinæ et piæ invocationis vocem sonat.*

³ Walch, xvi. pp. 2663, 2785.

after the style of the old Church, regards Satan as the author of *every* divergence.¹ In treating the matter so, he is very far from using a mere form of speech, for even with regard to Greek philosophy he contrasts the orthodoxy of Aristotle with the teachings of Epicurus and Zeno which had the devil for their author.² From his imperious demand that errors in doctrine should forthwith be brought to the test of Scripture and judged by it, and from his fanatical expectation³ that God would then destroy the false teachers, Melanchthon was not broken off by his melancholy experiences at the hands of his own pupils, some of whom were audacious enough to direct even against himself those very rules regarding the necessity of purity of doctrine. For as early as the year 1536 Conrad Cordatus pressed him hard on account of his unfortunate expression that good works were *conditio sine qua non justificationis*.⁴ And Flacius, in the controversy with his master on the *Adiaphora*, held to Melanchthon's principle with a tenacity which proved him a loyal scholar in everything save respect for his master. In fact the whole movement of Lutheranism as against Melanchthon up to the time of the *formula concordiæ*, as well as the final decision of the Lutheran against the Reformed

¹ C. R. xi. p. 272 sq., 598 sq., 703 sq., 758 sq., 775 sq., xii. p. 365 sq.

² *Decl. de Luthero et statibus ecclesiæ*, C. R. xi. p. 784: *Ludit hoc modo diabolus non in ecclesia tantum, sed etiam in artibus. Ut cum philosophia recte constituta esset in doctrina Aristotelis et Theophrasti, postea prave naturæ studio novitatis petulanter quæsierunt novas opiniones et quasi a media et regia via aberrantes, contrarios errores amplexæ sunt.—Nec accusanda hic tantum vanitas humanorum ingeniorum, sed etiam dæmonum malitia, quibus voluptati est, odio Dei veritatem involvere tenebris.*

³ *Loci Theol.*, C. R. xxi. p. 836: *Quis igitur erit iudex, quando de scripturæ sententia dissensio oritur, cum tunc opus sit voce dirimentis controversiam? Respondeo: Ipsum verbum Dei est iudex, et accedit confessio veræ ecclesiæ.—Et cum major pars hunc verum iudicem et hanc veram confessionem non audit, Deus ecclesiæ iudex tandem dirimit controversiam, delens blasphemos. Declamatio de iudiciis ecclesiæ*, C. R. xii. p. 138 sq., p. 142: *Deus ipse defensor est veritatis, et tandem delet impias sectas.*

⁴ See above, p. 177.—In this case, however, which touched himself so nearly, he had the impression that there was no need for a speedy settlement of the controversy. On the 15th of April 1537 he writes to Cordatus with the view of getting rid of the controverted question: *Si controversiæ, quæ in ecclesia motæ sunt, adeo tibi videntur faciles, ut subito eas assequaris, gratulor tibi hoc acumen. Ego fatebor, etiamsi hebes dicar, mihi videri valde difficiles, ac animadverti, plerasque disputationes a multis parum dextere intelligi* (C. R. iii. pp. 343, 344). Unfortunately Melanchthon was not able to impart this insight to his disciples, who threw themselves into the doctrinal controversies that arose, and rent the Church, with the greatest nonchalance.

Church, were consequences brought about simply by the idea of the Church set up by Melanchthon himself, and by the scholastic concern for oneness of doctrine. The reaction of scholastic narrowness against the Catholic tendency of the Reformation is accordingly so far from being inexplicable that, in point of form, it can be understood only as the result of Melanchthon's influence. Finally, it was Melanchthon too who gave the signal for the Lutheran Church, which was narrowing itself into a theological school, no more to recognise in the communion rightly administered God's gift of grace, in the reception of which Churches dogmatically separated had to show forth in a practical way their confession of the unity of the Church, but only the token of adherence to a particular Church.¹ Melanchthon's disciples strengthened the doctrinaire element in the Reformed Church also, where, indeed, it had already been brought into prominence through Calvin's individuality, but first reached its full development in the controversy against Arminianism.

As the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, alike in their confessions and in their theology, upheld the general idea of reconciliation through Christ, and belief in the oneness of the community of saints described by the well-known leading characteristics, their title and right to a Church character is established. Both branches of the Reformation Church manifest, in their theoretical statement of the doctrines of reconciliation and justification, such a measure of agreement, and their points of difference upon these heads are so subordinate in importance, that these last almost entirely disappear when confronted with Socinianism. So that it is imperative to treat the Lutheran and Reformed theology together in the following exposition; an opposite procedure would be inconsistent with the just principles of historical arrangement. Of course, in pursuing this path, I shall have to come to an explanation with Schneckenburger on more points than one.² That acute writer certainly did not intend, by widening the distance between the Lutheran and Reformed doctrinal notions, to pro-

¹ *Conf. Sazonica*, C. R. xxviii. p. 417: *Filius Dei vult, hanc publicam sumtionem confessionem esse, qua ostendas, quod doctrinæ genus amplectaris, cui cœtui te adjungas.*

² Schweizer (*Reformirte Glaubenslehre*, ii. p. 376 sq.) blindly follows him, not to the advantage of the clearness of his own representation.

mote the alienation of these confessions. Although he was a Lutheran and therefore, as will afterwards appear, did not fully understand the special peculiarities of the Reformed type of doctrine, he was very far from seeking, by an exaggerated view of certain divergencies between the two, and by tracing out their antitheses, to lower the value of the Reformed as against the Lutheran doctrine. On the contrary, he often prefers the former to the latter, because he thinks that it favours the tendencies of modern, that is, Schleiermacherian theology; or that it conveys an impulse to the investigation of the problems discussed in that theology. His representation of the Reformed doctrine of reconciliation leads in more points than one to the conclusion that the opposition to Socinianism, which, to the consciousness of the Reformed theologians, appeared to be thoroughgoing, is not in reality so, but that their development of doctrine is distinguished from the contemporary Lutheran development by a secret leaning towards Socinian principles.¹ These conclusions rest partly upon inaccurate and imperfect observation, and partly upon the attribution of exaggerated value to casual and isolated aberrations; but partly, too, upon the historian's desire to find a distinct difference in kind between the two evangelical confessions, and one that shall be observable in all practical points of the theological system. Schneckenburger has undertaken this task with the disposition to look complacently upon the peculiarities of all manifestations of the human spirit within the sphere of the Christian life. But, in the instance before us, the result is, that between Lutheran and Reformed Christianity, though they stand upon a common basis, a definite difference of kind is made out, while Calvinistic Christianity and Socinianism are made to come so near each other that they appear to be mere varieties. Such a view is certainly in direct opposition to the consciousness of the orthodox Reformed Church, neither was it asserted by the earlier Lutherans at all so broadly as by Schneckenburger. From this consideration may be derived for the following dis-

¹ Here the reader must remember the drastic character which Schneckenburger, in his *Comparative Dogmatik*, makes out to be the prevailing principle of Reformed Christianity, compared with his criticism upon the Socinian system, "which is framed entirely in the interests of morals, and constructed from the practical standpoint."—*Vorlesungen über die Lehrbegr. der kleineren protest. Parteien*, p. 60.

cussion a measure of caution with regard to Schneckenburger's combinations ; and this can only be confirmed by the detailed proof that the Lutheran and Reformed view of the doctrine of the atonement, while standing together in specific opposition to Socinianism, at the same time prove that the two evangelical confessions, with respect to the doctrine as a whole, differ from one another only as varieties.

39. Both evangelical confessions coincide, in the *first* place, in their definition and explanation of the idea of satisfaction as applied to the work of Christ. The line of thought taken by the Reformers (see above, p. 198) is so carried out as, in the first place, to separate the work of Christ, which formerly had been brought into view as the means of justification, from that result, and to place the doctrine *de officio Christi* or *de Christo mediatore* over against the doctrine *de justificatione* as its general historical prerequisite. This procedure, however, is earlier resorted to, and in a more decisive manner, by Calvin's successors, *e.g.*, by Peter Martyr and by Zanchi, than by the Lutherans. Among the latter, Hutter, for example, treats of everything under the *locus de justificatione* ; and Gerhard, under the head *de officio Christi*, gives only in general outline what he afterwards investigates more thoroughly as the *causa meritoria justificationis*. Here may be detected the influence of Melancthon, in whom regard to the systematic construction of the doctrine was outweighed by the religious view of the connexion of justification with the historical work of Christ ; while the systematic tendency of the Reformed theologians betrays the influence of Calvin as their pattern. But their common doctrine is, that God in His love or grace towards the sinful human race, which had become liable to eternal destruction, sent His Son into the world, in the unity of the Divine and human natures, in order to redeem men from sin, or to reconcile them with Himself, and that the essential or inherent justice of God prescribes the special work whereby Christ approves Himself as the mediator of salvation. The justice of God of necessity demands the punishment of sin ; in other words, in the case in question, it demands the eternal condemnation of the human race. If, then, their preservation unto everlasting life is to be secured to men through Christ, this purpose of God's grace can be realized only on condition

that satisfaction be given to the penal justice of God by the suffering of a substitute in the room of sinners. For this work Christ as God-man is qualified, because, as the Sinless One, He was under no obligation to suffer and die, and because His innocent passion, by reason of the Divine and therefore infinite value of His Person, constitutes the equivalent for the infinite guilt of sin. His vicarious endurance of the punishment that was due to sinners is accordingly that satisfaction suited to the righteousness of God, which makes it possible for God, through the God-man, to confer upon men the grace of forgiveness of sins and of justification. But the idea of satisfaction includes in itself that Christ by His suffering and death endured the wrath of God which is due to sin, and that thereby he appeased and removed that wrath.

Now Schneckenburger represents it as the general Reformed doctrine, that Christ's satisfaction is not the *causa meritoria* of our salvation, but simply the *causa instrumentalis* of the execution of God's saving decree and of the application of salvation; thus implying that the satisfaction wrought by the historical Christ only has reference to our subjective need.¹ Hereby Schneckenburger desires to indicate that the strict notion of satisfaction, as referred to the justice of God and deduced from it as necessary, has no firm basis in the Reformed theology, and is no characteristic feature in it; but that whenever it finds expression it is always either directly or indirectly again withdrawn. That this is logical in the Reformed system Schneckenburger infers from the relation in which the Person of Christ stands to the *beneplacitum* of God,—to that act of mere good pleasure which ordains the union between the Logos and human nature; and also from the circumstance that, properly speaking, the Divine nature of Christ is represented as the factor that offers satisfaction, while the human nature is regarded as the selfless medium by which God gives satisfaction to Himself. If, then, Christ's human activity finds no independent place in the chain of God's decree and personal

¹ *Zur kirchl. Christologie*, pp. 48, 49, repeated from the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1844, p. 248. Schweizer (*Glaubenslehre der ref. Kirche*, ii. p. 376) and Zeller (*Theologie Zwingli's*, p. 75) have copied this assertion. The meaning of this view of the Reformed doctrine of salvation is that, properly speaking, it follows the type of Abelard, to which indeed, on all essential points, Schleiermacher also recurs.

activity, the above-mentioned denial of the meritorious value of Christ's satisfaction is intelligible. This view has points of resemblance with John Gerhard's assertion¹ that the Socinian opposition to the interpretation of Christ's work as *causa meritoria justificationis* was at least occasioned by the thought of God's mere good pleasure in Calvin's dogma of eternal election and reprobation. For, as Gerhard assumes, it would be Calvinistic to argue, *si absoluta Dei voluntate salvandi electi sunt ad vitam æternam, utique etiam absoluta Dei voluntate peccata illis remittuntur, vel certe remitti potuerunt, neque opus erit Christi satisfactione et merito*. That this deduction really applies to Calvinism, at least in respect of a certain tendency in it, Gerhard proves on the one hand by Calvin's own confession that the idea of the *meritum Christi* is correlative to that of the *beneplacitum Dei*, for Christ as man could have no merit over against God's righteous judgment; further, by an expression of Wolfgang Musculus in the *Loci communes* (*loc.* 26, *de justific. cap.* 3.), and by the declaration of Conrad Vorstius against the strict conception of satisfaction. Gerhard then, in his criticism upon Calvinism, satisfies himself with asserting a tendency implied in it that is fitted to supersede the strict conception of satisfaction; while Schneckenburger goes so far as to find in the avoidance of the idea of the *causa meritoria* a tangible result of that tendency. But, with regard to Gerhard, he ought not to appeal to Vorstius, who indeed took the limited assertion of God's mere good pleasure that Calvinism makes, as an occasion for developing that thought after the manner of the Socinians, as a principle for the entire system of doctrine;² but was on that account proscribed by the Reformed Church. The expression made use of by Wolfgang Musculus, moreover, is misapplied in the deduction that Gerhard draws from it. For Musculus, after having defined the justice that is necessary for God, is merely so clumsy as to represent the grace which is just as necessary for God as an arbitrary exception from that justice, illustrating it by the arbitrary exercise of the right of pardon by earthly potentates; but, as a Calvinist, he is far from deducing as a consequence from this, that the

¹ *Loci Theol.*, ed. Cotta, tom. vii. pp. 33, 34.

² Compare what is said of him by Schweizer in the *Theol. Jahrb.* vols. xv., xvi.

actual pardon of the sinner by God in Christ is independent of the satisfaction offered by Christ to the righteousness of God. Faustus Socinus¹ has also borne witness to him in this, when he appeals to the view of grace as mere good pleasure that Musculus took. With regard to Calvin's quite casual investigation into the idea of the *meritum Christi*, it has already been shown that it has no relation to his doctrine of election and its explanation in the mere good pleasure of God.²

Schneckenburger's argument also, to show that in the Reformed theology there prevails a tendency against the reception of the strict idea of satisfaction, is not happy; for it is simply erroneous to say that the Reformed theologians represent Christ's satisfaction, not as the *causa meritoria*, but as the *causa instrumentalis justificationis*. Schweizer (as above, p. 378) oddly cites, as testimony to that idea, Keckermann, who, on his own showing (p. 376), ought to be regarded as unconnected with the Reformed system. I may add that Keckermann, as is usual, represents *fides* to be the *causa instrumentalis justificationis*. Henry Alting regards Christ's work as *causa meritoria* as well as *causa instrumentalis*. But, moreover, that thought which we are told was foreign to the theologians of the Reformed Church, is expressly defended by Bucanus, Piscator, Amesius, Maccovius, Maresius, Witsius, Fr. Turretinus; and its substance is taught by all. For nothing could be further from the truth than to say that the thought of God's arbitrary good pleasure, which is the fundamental principle of the Socinian system, also dominates the Reformed theology as a whole, and thus renders indifferent all ideas of the means employed in the plan of salvation. Rather on the contrary, in the Reformed theology, only the doctrine of twofold predestination is wrought out in accordance with that idea; but this doctrine, with Calvin, just as with Luther, is originally something incidental in the system, and without influence on the other doctrines, particularly without influence upon that of the atonement. The doctrine of reconciliation remains without change even in those Reformed theologians who, following in

¹ *De Christo servatore*, lib. iii. cap. i. p. 187.

² Gerhard's opinion is confuted also by Henr. Alting: *Theol. problematica nova* (Groning. 1662), p. 609 sq. Fr. Turretinus: *de satisfactione Christi* (Lugd. Bat. 1696), p. 7.

the footsteps of Beza and Gomarus, undertake to incorporate the doctrine of twofold predestination in that of Providence, and thus to elevate it to the dignity of the fundamental principle of the system.¹ It is undeniable that Arminianism, by referring the idea of God to the standard of indulgent reasonableness, induced many of the opponents of that system to put the idea of God under the point of view of the *absolutum dominium*, which is free from every inner moral necessity;² these efforts, however, always as matter of fact, have reference only to the problem of election and reprobation, and Voetius³ expressly testifies that theologians like Twisse by no means intended to throw doubt upon the explanation of the necessity of punishment or of penal satisfaction as arising from the essential justice of God. Voetius, moreover, in his discussion against Twisse, on the question whether Christ's satisfaction was necessary by reason of the immanent penal justice of God, the *jus divinum naturale seu absolute necessarium*, or by reason of the justice established by decree and law, has decided in favour of the first alternative,⁴ and hereby has clearly enough

¹ Compare my *geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott*. Art. ii. (*Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* xiii. (1868), p. 108 sq.)

² Amyraldus; *de jure Dei in creaturas*. *Comp. Jahrb.*, as above, p. 120 sq. W. Twisse; *vindiciz gratiz, potestatis ac providentiz Dei*. Amstelod. 1632, ed. ult. 1648. Compare Gass, *Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik*, i. p. 472.

³ Voetius: *De jure et justitia Dei* (*Disputationes theol. selectas*, i. p. 372).

⁴ *L. c.* p. 342, cf. *Maccovii Loc. commun.* p. 162. It cannot be denied that the application of the idea of God's arbitrary will to the doctrine of double predestination has been the occasion, in the case of many Reformed theologians, for giving wider scope to the Scotist conception of God. In this sense Polanus (*Syntagma theol.* lib. ii. cap. 26) distinctly says, *quidquid Deus fieri vult, eo ipso, quod vult, justum est*. In the same direction Szydlowski (*Vindiciz questionum aliquot difficilium et controversarum in theologia*. Franecq. 1643), in harmony with Duns Scotus, has argued that God might have made the contents of the moral law quite opposite from what they are. (Compare *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theol.* xiii. p. 115; Voetius, *l. c.* i. p. 388 sq.) In accordance with the same testimony, Twisse deduced God's penal justice as flowing with only hypothetical necessity from His decree. Still, as this tendency in Reformed theology is only a subordinate one, the testimony of Voetius vouches in the case of Twisse for the fact that the validity of the doctrine of satisfaction was neither purposely nor accidentally weakened by it. In the same way must we judge also of those expressions in which, as in the case of Zwingli (p. 204), the proposition of Thomas occasionally occurs, to the effect that God might have accomplished redemption in some other way than that which He actually chose. Thus Calvin (*In Ev. Joh.* cap. 15, v. 13): *Poterat nos Deus verbo aut nutu redimere, nisi aliter nostra causa visum fuisset*;—Zanchius (*De Incarnatione*, lib. ii. cap. 3; *Opp.* tom. viii. p. 45): *Servare nos poterat solo suo imperio, peccata simpliciter per solam suam misericordiam condonando*;—Peter Martyr Vermilius (*Loci communes*, ii. 17,

indicated the standard of Reformed orthodoxy. Moreover the validity of the doctrine of satisfaction in Reformed systematic theology is not affected by the circumstance that the Person of Christ as a historical fact is subordinated to the *beneplacitum Dei*. For that this fact is just as contingent in the order of the universe as sin to which it is opposed does not prevent the course of its operation from being regulated in accordance with the necessary justice of God. The world also, and the human race, exist only in virtue of a sovereign decree of God; but, being in existence, they are bound by a law which corresponds to the inalienable necessary immanent right of God.¹ If Christ then, as the union of the Divine and human natures, exists only by the *beneplacitum Dei*, it does not result therefrom either actually or necessarily, or probably that the Reformed theologians display a tendency to refer His prestations for the salvation of men to an arbitrary Divine standard. Finally, it has no visible effect upon the idea of satisfaction, that occasionally, as Schneckenburger shows (pp. 47, 48), the Divine and not the human nature of Christ is chosen to form the basis of that thought. For even if that view occurred more frequently than it does,² still the thought of a reconcilia-

19). The sentence which Schneckenburger quotes (*Zur kirchlichen Christologie*, p. 49, note) under Alsted's name, but without mentioning the title of the book, amounts to the same thing: *Satisfactio ad procurandam salutem electorum fuit necessaria, non absolute, siquidem deesse nequivit Deo sapientissimo alius servandi modus, sed ex hypothesi beneplaciti Dei*. This sentence does not come from Alsted, but from Henry Alting (*Theol. didactica, Opp. Heidelbergensia*, i. p. 81). Yet Alting himself in his *Explic. Catech. Palat.* (Opp. iii. p. 215), and elaborately in the *Theol. problematica nova*: loc. 3. probl. 25; loc. 12, probl. 35, decides against such an admission, representing God's penal justice as a natural attribute, against the line taken by Twisse. At the same time, it is worthy of notice that, like Voetius, he does not regard as heterodox the divergent view taken by those who hold the hypothetical necessity of the Divine justice, because, with respect to the chief matter, namely, the recognition as matter of fact of the necessity of Christ's satisfaction in order to the work of redemption, harmony prevailed none the less between the different parties. But the expressions made use of by Calvin, Zanchi, and Peter Martyr cannot be regarded as of greater importance, for they also, with the utmost deliberation and fulness, affirm and support the idea of satisfaction.

¹ Voetius: *l. c.*, i. pp. 342, 373.

² It is an expression of Cocceius (*De Fœd. et Testam. Dei*, cap. 5, 92) that Schneckenburger quotes: *Ita mysterium illud maximum (pactum æternum inter Patrem et Filium) patescit, quomodo in Deo justificemur et salvemur, quomodo Deus sit et qui judicat et qui spondet atque ita judicatur, qui absolvit et qui intercedit, qui mittit et qui mittitur. Item hoc, quomodo Deus sibi met ipse satisfecerit suo sanguine.*

tion of God by Himself is, in accordance with the prevailing type of doctrine, connected with the necessity which arises from God's righteousness; for that mere good pleasure which dominates the double predestination is, as matter of fact, kept far away from the region of the doctrine of the atonement.

40. In the *second* place, the two confessions have in common the thought that satisfaction is given to the Divine justice, or to the law regarded as the expression of that justice, and as the eternal rule that regulates the relation between man and God, by the suffering and death of Christ, as well as by his fulfilling of the law; in other words, by the *obedientia passiva et activa Christi* (see above, p. 214). At least the divergence of John Piscator upon this point, although he found supporters in the Reformed party, is to be regarded merely as an episode which rather helped than hindered the essential oneness of the Lutheran and Reformed theologians upon this point. At the same time it is, particularly instructive, with reference to Piscator's denial of the satisfactory significance of Christ's active obedience as well as with reference to the attitude which his opponents assumed, to keep sight of the fact that the school theology of both confessions did not regulate its business of intelligent distinction by a historical understanding of the original religious chain of thought. Piscator's view,¹ that only the suffering and death of Christ had a satisfactory significance, without doubt betokens the continued influence of the tradition of Melancthon's view (p. 213), which through the instrumentality of Ursinus² continued to be influential in the German Reformed Church. For, amongst the supporters of Piscator's opinion whom I find cited by Gerhard, Matthew Martini, Ludwig Crocius, and Urban Pierius in Bremen, Pareus in Heidelberg, Goclenius in Marburg, are out-and-out Melancthonians. Piscator's assertion turns upon the thought, which,

¹ Not having had access to his *Theses theol.* (Herborn. 1618), I draw for materials upon Gerhard: *Loci theologici*, tom. vii. p. 61 sqq; Anton. Walæus: *L. c.* (opp. i. p. 398 sq.); and Baur: *Geschichte der Versöhnungslehre*, p. 352 sqq.

² Schneckenburger (p. 65) conversely cites Ursinus as a witness for the fact that, even previous to Piscator, the satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience had been recognised by the Reformed theologians. But the expressions cited by Schneckenburger from Ursinus are separated from their connexion. When that is taken into account it becomes plain enough that Ursinus regards active obedience only as a preliminary to the penal satisfaction, and comprehends the *status humiliationis* under the idea of His passion. Compare *Explic. catech. opp.* i. pp. 93, 231, 232.

as a matter of religious experience, dominates the whole Reformation course of thinking, that forgiveness of sins and justification are synonymous terms for the same thing. While the *formula concordiae* still adopts this usage of language (p. 227); but, on the other hand, attributes a satisfactory significance to the active obedience of Christ, the historical position of Piscator's doctrine is rightly determined only when contrasted with the doctrine of the *formula concordiae*, and only thus can the state of the question be suitably ascertained. Now, the arguments which Piscator drew from the design of the law, from the design of satisfaction towards our consciousness of salvation, lastly from the function designed for Christ, are not all of equal value. (1.) The law obliges either to obedience or to punishment. Christ has freed us from the punishment which we had deserved on account of our sins; thus there was no need that Christ in our room and stead should give obedience to the law. (2.) If Christ fulfilled the law in our place, then we are not required to fulfil it; the consequent is absurd, therefore the antecedent also is so. Gerhard rightly rejects both arguments, alleging against the former that sinners by the endurance of punishment for their transgression of the law are not released from fulfilling it, and therefore their substitute had to undertake both. As against the second, it holds good that the vicarious fulfilment of the law by Christ has the effect of abolishing it in the case of believers, only in so far as it was the original condition of salvation, but not in so far as it is the universally binding standard for the Christian life. From the design of Christ's satisfaction for our consciousness of justification or forgiveness of sins, Piscator draws the conclusion (3.) that the death of Christ would have been superfluous had He given satisfaction by His holy life. (4.) As the thing on account of which sins are forgiven is what is contained in the satisfaction, but sins are forgiven by reason of the death of Christ, it follows that this last alone is satisfactory to God. Piscator vindicated this argument to the religious and moral self-consciousness against the objection that the imperfection of the obedience of believers needs to be covered by the perfect obedience of Christ. He says (5.) that this imperfection of believers is not imputed to them but forgiven on the same ground—the death of Christ,—

which cleanseth altogether from all sin, and thus also from the sin of that imperfection. To meet this, Gerhard brings into the field a distinction which makes its appearance simultaneously among Lutherans and Reformed,¹ to wit, that justification consists *not merely* in the forgiveness of sins, *but also* in the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and that the latter is founded upon His active obedience to the law. Inasmuch as God in the justification of sinners could not contravene the eternal rule of the law, it was necessary that that justification should proceed upon a perfect fulfilment of the law; and this fulfilment, not being possible for the sinner, had to be accomplished by Christ in his room and imputed to the sinner. Here, in passing, I notice that that distinction is still unknown to the *formula concordiæ*; but inasmuch as its vindication, by reference to the two co-ordinate kinds of Christ's obedience, is likewise something new, this train of thought calls for special examination. Upon this point, accordingly, Piscator is not so easily refuted as on that which has been already considered. Piscator's most fruitful assertion is, however, (6.) that Christ by His active obedience could not have given satisfaction vicariously for us, because as man He was Himself legally bound thereto. But in so far as Christ stood under the law (Paul being witness), that has reference only to the curse of the law, which Christ endured in His passion. Undoubtedly the active obedience of Christ to the law had also a bearing upon His satisfaction, but only the indirect one, that without Christ's sinless life His passion would not have had its satisfactory value.

In solim

Now, in these last sentences Piscator has not indeed fully and characteristically formulated the Reformed type of doctrine, but in them he represents one interest which is maintained by the Reformed theology and disallowed by the Lutheran. Precisely in this thought, he has Ursinus² as his forerunner, who

¹ Gerhard, p. 69. At p. 260 he appeals to Weinrich and to Balduin. To a like effect Bucanus; *Institutiones Theol.* 1604: and previous to him George Sohnius (ob. 1588); *Methodus Theologiæ* and *Exegesis Aug. Confessionis* (opp. ed. 3. 1609).

² *Explicatio catechetica ad qu. 16*: Quatuor modis Christus homo perfecte fuit justus seu legem implevit—(1) sua ipsius justitia; solus enim perfectam obedientiam, qualem lex requirebat, præstitit; (2) solvendo poenam sufficientem pro peccatis nostris.—Prior vocatur impletio legis per obedientiam, qua ipse fuit conformis legi; posterior impletio legis per poenam, quam pro

only failed to express it quite so antithetically. In uncompromising opposition to this view is that of the Lutheran theologians, who deny Christ's obligation to fulfil the law for His own part, on the ground that as true God he was not subject to the law but superior to it as Lord. Of necessity, therefore, must the obedience actually rendered to the law by the God-man, be regarded solely as a work done in the place of men. The two views stand in direct dependence upon the division between the two parties on the doctrine of Christ's Person. If, in accordance with the Lutheran view, by the incarnation of the Logos the humanity of Christ was made to participate in all Divine attributes, and therefore also in superiority to the law, then the fulfilling of the law, as an act of exinanition on the part of the God-man thus constituted, can have value *only* for those on whose account He took the exinanition upon Himself. If, on the contrary, in accordance with the Reformed view, the Word of God is made-man by foregoing the exercise of specific Divine attributes, then it is not inconsistent with Christ's divinity, that as man he does what belongs to all men and so also renders obedience to the law. But the chief representatives of Reformed theology by no means hesitate on this account to say that Christ's active obedience is yet also vicarious on behalf of His people. In support of this they adduce two arguments of unequal breadth and force, of which the second is not invariably conjoined with the first. Alsted, Keckermann, Amesius, Walaeus, Witsius affirm, that inasmuch as Christ became man only for our behoof, therefore even His individual fulfilment of the law pertains to His satisfaction and His merit.¹ Bucanus, Polanus, Amesius, Voetius, Heidanus, Witsius affirm with growing distinctness that Christ's whole activity as Mediator, His endurance of death as well as His obedience, are based on the

nobis dependit: (3) in nobis implet legem suo spiritu, dum videlicet per spiritum sanctum nos regenerat, et per legem informat ad obedientiam internam et externam quam lex a nobis requirit, et quam in hac vita inchoamus, integram vero præstabimus in vita æterna; (4) implet legem Christus docendo et repurgando eam ab erroribus et corruptelis (opp. i. p. 93). In his *Theses de Persona et Officio unici Mediatoris Jesu Christi* (l. c. p. 744 sq.) also, Ursinus gives clear expression only to the satisfactory value of Christ's passive obedience.

¹ Amesius: *Medulla* i. 21, 24: Quamvis hæc obedientia legalis a Christo jam homine facto jure creationis exigebatur, quoniam tamen non pro se ipso, sed pro nobis factus est, pars fuit humiliationis et satisfactionis et meriti illius.

consideration that from the very first He is fulfilling His destination as Surety and Head of all those who are to be redeemed.¹ For this thought Calvin had paved the way, in so far as he had subordinated the priestly to the kingly office of Christ, and made the former to depend on the latter (p. 189). By this it is meant that Christ's actions have atoning efficacy, because He by His personal dignity is qualified as the party who has to act in the room of the elect who belong to Him. The necessity of this connexion lies here, that not merely the efficacy but also the purpose of Christ has reference to the elect, who from all eternity are chosen by God *in Him* as their Mediator and Head,—in other words, so that He from all eternity is designed by God to be the instrumentality whereby grace shall take effect upon the elect. Thus the typical character of Reformed theology gains its perfect expression herein, that the subject of the mediatorial work is characterized (as had already been done by Thomas Aquinas, p. 54) as *caput ecclesiae*. But hereby it becomes possible to assert a vicarious value, not merely for Christ's innocent suffering, but

¹ Bucanus : *Institutiones theol.* xxxi. 27 : Justitia Christi—aliena non est, quatenus nobis destinata est.—Est etiam nostra illa justitia, quatenus illud ipsum ejus subjectum, nempe Christus, noster est. Polanus : *Syntagma* vi. 27, p. 781 : Secundum quam naturam Christus est nobis a patre datus caput, secundum eandem est mediator inter Deum et nos. Atqui secundum utramque naturam est datus caput. Ergo. Major propositio est certissima, quia mediatorem esse est officium illius, qui a Deo caput constitutus est ipsi ecclesiae. Amesius : i. 20. 11 : Pendet totum hoc mysterium (satisfactionis pro peccatis) ex eo, quod Christus sit constitutus talis mediator, ut sit etiam sponsor et commune principium redimendorum, sicut Adamus fuit creatorum et perditorum. 12 : In eadem Christi humiliatione fuit etiam meritum, qua ordinatur ad nostrum commodum. Ostenditur hoc omnibus illis scripturae locis, quibus dicitur obedientia sua nobis procurasse justitiam. Voetius : *Disp. theol.* ii. p. 229 : Obedientia activa a Christo praestita est pro Christo, quatenus singularis ille homo erat legi divinae subjectus, pro nobis, quatenus sponsor erat, et omnium salvandorum personam sustinebat (supra : ecclesiam suam representans), ac pro iis omnem justitiam legis implebat, quam illi implere non poterant.—Heidanus : *Corp. Theol. Chr.* loc. ix. (tom. ii. p. 79) : Christus tanquam semen mulieris contritum semen serpentis, ut sanctificaret reliquum semen, factus est secundus Adam, in quo omnes censemur. Ut quicquid ille ut secundus Adam pro nobis fecit et passus est, id perinde sit, ac si nos id fecissemus et passi essemus. p. 105 : Christus hic considerandus venit ut persona conjuncta (juxta 2 Cor. v. 16) ut secundus Adam et caput redimendorum.—Witsius : *De Econ. Fœd. Dei*, ii. 5, 11 : Christus ut dominus et caput et novus Adamus origo et fons hereditatis derivandae in fratres, habet obedientiam universae legis Dei. Per eam tota multitudo eorum, qui ad ipsum pertinent, justi constituuntur, i.e. censentur jus habere ad vitam aeternam, ac si quilibet eorum in propria persona illam obedientiam praestitisset.

also for His fulfilment of the law, irrespective of its obligation upon Himself.

Lutheran theologians have avoided this line of thought; but I do not see why they should not have adopted it. Only external causes can be assigned to explain why they did not actually do so; perhaps because the idea was rendered suspicious in their eyes by its connexion with the thought of election; or perhaps because among Reformed theologians themselves it found expression too late; and even when it was brought forward, was not stated with sufficient clearness to break through the ban of confessional exclusiveness that had already become so inveterate. But yet, if the Lutheran doctrine of the Person of Christ defines Christ's Kingship as an attribute of His incarnation, the fact of His *exinanitio* is no reason why, in His intention of founding the Church by His twofold obedience, He should not already be regarded as its active Head. That this thought was never attained, arises from the want of talent for system in the Lutheran divines. That talent should have exhibited itself in linking together individual truths in relation to the final end contemplated; but, in place of this procedure, the Lutheran theology always advances only by means of the ideas of cause and effect. On this account also it never brings into view the way in which each one of the offices of Christ is reciprocally conditioned by the two others, but contents itself with such an account of them as can only be regarded as a preliminary chronological arrangement of the matters to which they have respect, after which the real work of coming to a comprehension of the oneness of Christ's mediatorial activities should only begin. In mitigation of this judgment, the circumstance must of course be considered that even the Reformed theologians do not handle the systematic method in a thoroughgoing way. Precisely in their representation of the three offices of Christ have they failed to make use of the advantage Calvin gained for them in ranking the kingly above the priestly office of Christ. They avail themselves rather of the same external scheme and sequence which the Lutherans adopted, following the chronological order of the life of Christ; and for this reason even with them the idea of Christ as *caput ecclesie* is not so clearly and thoroughly expounded as was to be expected. Still less did the Lutherans

detect the value of that idea towards an understanding of Christ's mediatorial work. It could not but have been for the advantage of these had they taken it up. For, so far as the Lutheran explanation of the exclusively vicarious significance of Christ's active obedience is concerned, it is little in harmony with the other principles of the Lutheran Church. That God is the Lord of the law, and that the God-man is *therefore* not bound to fulfil it on his own behalf, is a view unworthy of the Lutheran theology. Here indeed the Scotist idea of God inexplicably shows itself—an idea which the Lutherans are on other occasions so skilful in avoiding,—and the presence of which in Calvin's doctrine of predestination gave occasion to a Gerhard very unwarrantably to misrepresent the Reformed doctrine of atonement (p. 244). It is the old story of the mote and the beam! Luther of course as Nominalist knew nothing other than that God is *exlex*; but the Lutherans, in rejecting Luther's doctrine of predestination, repudiated precisely this view; and at the very foundation of their doctrine of reconciliation lies the clearly expressed thought that the law is expressive of the eternal will of God Himself. Is it not then rather in harmony with *this* fundamental proposition that Walaeus (p. 398) sets right the Lutherans in their inference from Matt. xii. 8, that Christ as God is *lege superior*, by adding, *nec tamen propterea potuit se ipsum abnegare, quia natura divina sibi ipsi lex est*? The divinity of Christ would, according to this, be precisely the reason for saying that the God-man cannot, so far as He is concerned, do otherwise than live in conformity with the law. What I wish to be inferred from this is, that the opposition between the theologians of the two parties with reference to the interpretation of Christ's active obedience betokens no immovable specific difference between their doctrines, but is merely accidental and not essential.¹

The criticism which Schneckenburger (p. 61 *sqq.*) bestows on the Reformed theologians' line of thought which we have been discussing, does not come to the point, but loses itself in erroneous deductions from certain assumptions of Reformed

¹ At the same time, it was because Lutheranism had once failed to take up that idea, and made Christ, considered as man, to appear throughout His earthly life merely as an individual among other individuals, that a praxis of pietism, such as Zinzendorf wrought out in his community, became possible only within the sphere of the religious development of Lutheranism.

Christology ; and this because he entirely overlooks the fact that the standard for estimating Christ's historical work is His position as *caput et sponsor electorum*. The remark is a just one, that the vicarious value of Christ's active obedience is not proved against Piscator merely by pointing out that Christ is not man on His own behalf but only for our sakes. For this destination would still be Christ's even if, like Piscator, we were to regard His perfect obedience merely as the condition which was indispensable before He could endure punishment in our room and stead. But by His destination as *caput et sponsor electorum*, Christ is so qualified that His actions on behalf of His Church can be regarded just as if they had been done by the Church herself. In the further course of his criticism, Schneckenburger certainly takes notice of the thought of the *unio fidelium cum Christo*. He calls to mind the assumption (to be again referred to) that Christ merited *gloria* for Himself and at the same time for those others who are one with Him, and to whom therefore His merit can be imputed ; but he thinks that this fellowship with Christ is only regarded as a result of Christ's meritorious fulfilment of the law, to which fulfilment, however, no vicarious value can be assigned, since His people, *as such*, are bound to fulfil the law. But these remarks are not in harmony with the sense of Reformed theology. The actual union of the elect with Christ is explained as resulting through His *efficacia* (in the Holy Spirit) from His *satisfactio* and *meritum*, because He, in the deliberate discharge of His offices, is represented at the outset ideally as the the Head and Surety of those who are to be redeemed, on the ground of the elective decree or of the everlasting covenant.¹ That He in that capacity fulfilled the law in the room and stead of the elect is moreover not disproved by the stress laid on their obligation towards the law. For, as the older theologians clearly enough explain, the vicarious value of Christ's active obedience rendered to the law as the condition of attaining to blessedness for one's-self, serves to do away with *this* function of the law for the elect. Thus it is possible at the same time to assert the duty of obedience on the part of the elect to the law regarded as part of the Divine order of grace. There is thus no contradiction between the two positions, that the law is abolished as

¹ Compare the testimonies cited above (p. 252).

a covenant of life by Christ's vicarious fulfilment of it, and that God causes those whom He has graciously chosen to attain to eternal life in the way of fulfilment of the law.

41. Gerhard had rebutted Piscator's exception to the vicarious value of Christ's active obedience by drawing the distinction that justification comprehends the forgiveness of sins *and* the imputation of Christ's righteousness, and that the former proceeds upon the vicarious value of Christ's death, the latter upon that of His life (p. 250). This formula, in which Thomasius of Erlangen recognises the genuine meaning of justification (p. 227), is indeed to be found in Lutheran as well as in Reformed dogmatic theologians; but as it goes against the *usus loquendi* of the Reformation period it has by no means met with universal acceptance. Gerhard himself (tom. vii. pp. 260, 261, Loc. 17, cap. 4, sect. 199) is compelled to admit that the two benefits are to be distinguished not in fact, but only *secundum rationem*; that is, in accordance with a very superficial mode of viewing the matter; and Quenstedt is of the same opinion. Baier (*Theol. Pos.* iii. 5, 11) appealing to Hülsemann indicates at least that if those benefits are to be distinguished, then in logical order *imputatio justitiæ* precedes the remission of the guilt of sin; and the same view is taken by the Reformed divines Polanus (*Syntagma*, p. 840), H. Alting (*Theol. probl. nova*, p. 726), and F. Turretine (*Compend. theol. conscr. a L. Riissenio*, p. 427). That priority of the forgiveness of sins to the imputation of righteousness, which Thomasius vindicates, is only the superficial view of an apparent progress from the *terminus a quo* to the *terminus ad quem*. For if we bring this wisdom of the schools to the test of actual comparison with the phenomenon of consciousness which has to be explained, we find that that consciousness embraces the two propositions, "I am free from guilt" and "I am pronounced righteous," regarding them as perfectly identical. The distinction, therefore, is not made from any regard to the subjective consciousness of justification, but only from regard to the co-ordination between Christ's active and passive obedience to the law, so far as these may be considered as possessing satisfactory value. Thus Gerhard's argument against Piscator appears to be irrelevant. The satisfactory value of the active as compared with the passive obedience is to be recognised

from the corresponding distinction between forgiveness of sins and imputation of righteousness. But the believer is not conscious of these two things as separate attainments. Thus the believer cannot be convinced of the necessity of the other distinction.

If the assertion of the satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience unanimously made against the school of Melancthon cannot stand the appeal to consciousness as a test, it is still involved in another regard as a consequence of premisses which are acknowledged by both branches of the theology of the Reformation. But in spite of all the acuteness of the theologians of the seventeenth century, the consideration of this point has not been clearly brought out; much less have their present successors showed themselves capable of supplying the deficiency. The thought in question is often enough expressed by the elder theologians, but only in an apologetic connexion, without having its place assigned to it in systematic theology; because it does not convey anything immediately implied in the religious consciousness. F. Turretine, for example, enunciates it with great precision (as above, p. 425): *Objectio: Ergo nos non tenemur ad obedientiam activam, quia Christus eam pro nobis præstitit. Resp. Negatur consequentia. Sequitur quidem, nos ad eam non teneri eundem in finem, sc. ut per eam vivamus: sed non obstat, quominus teneamur ad idem obsequium Deo præstandum, non ut vivamus, sed quia vivimus, non ut jus acquiramus ad vitam, sed ut juris acquisiti possessionem adeamus.*¹ I have already (p. 228) in speaking of the doctrine embodied in the *formula concordie* pointed out the value of this thought. Though the believer be conscious that through Christ he has forgiveness of the guilt that he has incurred by transgression of the law, yet the gracious nature of the righteousness before God of which he is at the same time conscious, is not securely placed unless he be at the same time aware of his release from that legal obligation imposed by the eternal law, in accordance with which righteousness or eternal life is attained by means of the fulfilment of its commands on

¹ See above, p. 255, a similar observation with reference to Schneckenburger. Compare Gerhard, *L. c.* p. 71 (against Piscator): *Ab onere perfectæ et ad vitam æternam adsequendam præstandæ obedientiæ Christus perfectissima sua obedientia nos liberavit.*

the part of men.¹ By this consideration, taking for granted the common presuppositions, is confuted Piscator's assertion that Christ by His vicarious passion has only freed us from the *curse* of the law. For that would mean that, after the abolition of our guilt towards the law we should anew have to seek eternal life under Christ by means of a fulfilment of the law in accordance with legal principles. Thus on the presupposition that the law as an expression of everlasting righteousness legally binds men in the beginning (in the *scelus operum*) to obtain everlasting life by means of actual fulfilment of its injunctions, and on the further presupposition that the dispensation of grace under Christ makes the forgiveness of men's transgressions of the law to be the permanent basis of the believer's life, then the author of this dispensation must at the same time stand security that the law as the legal condition of the attainment of everlasting life shall make absolutely no further claim on believers. But, assuming that the dispensation of grace cannot at all contradict God's eternal justice and the law which is its expression, and assuming that Christ's fulfilment of the law must be understood as *exsecutio et explicatio* and not as *abrogatio et dispensatio*, it then necessarily follows that Christ in the place of men as sinners has fulfilled the law's demand for punishment, and in the room of men as men has fulfilled the demands of the law as a covenant of life.²

Christ's satisfaction to the wider and to the narrower demands of the law as the ground of our justification, is deduced, as is well known, from God's justice. But by our justification is

¹ How little this thought is allowed by the dogmatic theologians to attain to its full dignity in their systems is shown by the fact that Walaeus and Quenstedt, for example, while expressing themselves as I have indicated regarding the necessity of satisfaction through Christ's active obedience, at the same time make this distinction—that the passive obedience abolishes our punishment, the active obedience our guilt (*culpa*)—a distinction which is either utterly unintelligible, or which goes far beyond the limits of orthodox theology. Compare Walaeus, *L. c.* pp. 397, 399: Quenstedt, *P. iii.* pp. 282, 284.

² Rodolf: *Catechesis Pal. Illustrata*, p. 338: Jus ad vitam pendet ab impletione legis. p. 340 (In Christo) Deus nos justificat imputata ea justitia, quam lex primaria intentione exigit, quæ alia non est, quam perfecta legis impletio. Altera illa, quæ in passiva obedientia sita est, secundario demum et supplendo prioris defectui a lege postulatur. Assertioni nostræ inde fides constat, quia justificatio nostra fit sine legis rescissione, quin potius cum legis stabilitione. Adde, si Deus *sola peccatorum remissione* nos justificaret censendo, nos nihil omisisse, hactenus *solum essemus non injusti*.

intended the direct result of God's love and grace. Christ's satisfaction, therefore, to the Divine righteousness can be regarded only as indirect—only as a *conditio sine qua non* of the justification of believers. In so far as Christ's prestations are reckoned as satisfaction given to the law on behalf of believers, we have an explanation why God's forensic righteousness ceases to be the standard; but the bringing in of His positive justifying grace as a new standard is still left unaccounted for. Theologians often enough have failed to put this point clearly to themselves. But, it may be noticed, that the *formula concordia* (p. 226) meets it; for along with the co-ordinated forms of the passive and active obedience of Christ, which have satisfied the demands of the law, it embraces both in one voluntary obedience which Christ, active even in His passion, yielded to the will of God, and which is graciously imputed to believers as their righteousness. It might have been expected, as a logical consequence of the doctrine of the Person of Christ, that while the *God-man* as the representative of *men*, fulfilled by His doing and suffering the conditions that the justice of God had imposed as necessary to the justification of believers, the obedience of the whole life of the *God-man* (flowing as it did from love to men) should, at the same time, be regarded as representing the love and grace of *God*, and that to this obedience should have been attributed, not merely the matter, but also the form-giving power of positive justification. Only thus would expression be given to that balance in the interpretation of Christ's priestly functions which is required by the doctrine of the two natures. But, as the doctrine has actually been developed, whether by Lutherans or Calvinists, the Divine nature of Christ comes into play in His passion only as a feature that gives it value, and in His action only as a condition of its perfection; but neither in His action nor in His passion is it regarded as the acting subject, as it is considered to be in His prophetic and kingly offices. In spite of all their zeal against the scholastic view, that the *human* nature of Christ was the subject of His earthly doing and suffering, the view of the evangelical divines amounts to nothing different. So far, therefore, as God's grace is taken into account as contributing to the progress and efficacy of Christ's doing and suffering, the opinion of these theologians goes no further than to affirm that

it is God's grace that brings the God-man into being, and that imputes His acts to believers unto righteousness. But the immanence of God's love is not set forth even in the love and obedience of Christ; nor is that immanence allowed to have its due place in the connexion of the doctrine. Rather is the obedience or righteousness of Christ, as the matter which is imputed to believers, brought under the idea of *merit* and set over against God's purpose of grace, which is the form-giving power that causes its application to individual believers, and which comes into exercise only through the kingly functions of Christ.

The evangelical divines originally make absolutely no distinction between *satisfactio* and *meritum*, and the prestations made to the justice of God, which, strictly speaking, fall under the notion of *satisfactio*, are designated also as *meritum*, without any consciousness of a difference. This use of language continues to prevail among the Reformed theologians also. But the *formula concordiae* had at one time distinguished the active from the passive obedience of Christ, and referred them to distinct grades in the demands of God's justice; and, at another time, had comprehended the opposite phenomena of Christ's suffering and doing under the one head of Christ's loving obedience towards God (p. 226). Hereby the negative was distinguished from the positive condition of justification. Now, although the indifferent use of the ideas of *satisfactio* and *meritum* might possibly be continued with reference to the negative condition of the satisfaction of God's justice, it betokens a true instinct that the forensic idea of *satisfactio* is suppressed when the righteousness or obedience of Christ, which is viewed as the material cause of justification by grace, comes to be spoken of. In place of it is found throughout, from a very early period (as in Selnecker, for example), the exclusive use of *meritum* to denote the positive condition of justification. This is very clearly seen in the case of Gerhard. Although he does not deliberately separate between the two ideas, he first takes the title *causa meritoria justificationis* to embrace the whole compass of Christ's work, then designates the negative condition involved in Christ's twofold fulfilment of the law indiscriminately as *satisfactio* and as *meritum*; and then proceeds to set forth the positive condition of justification under the

title *Per quod Christus justitiam coram Deo valentem promeruerit* (loc. xvii. 2. 55): *Tota Christi obedientia, tam activa quam passiva ad illud meritum concurrit. Quamvis enim sæpe morti Christi redemptionis opus tribuatur, id ideo fit, quia nusquam illuxit clarius, quod nos dilexerit ac redemerit Dominus, quam in ipsius passione et morte, et quia mors Christi est finis et perfectio totius obedientiæ. Plane ἀδύνατον est, activam obedientiam a passiva in hoc merito separare, quia in ipsa Christi morte concurrit voluntaria illa obedientia et ardentissima dilectio, quarum prior patrem cœlestem, posterior nos homines respicit.*

From this we can understand how a deliberate distinction between the two points of view comes in. Of course it must be a notional distinction. Amesius (*Medulla*, i. 20, 13), where I find it for the first time, expressly says it does not hold good, *re ipsa ita ut in variis et inter se differentibus operationibus debeant quæri, sed varia ratione in una eademque obedientia debent agnosci.* This distinction, however, has not been duly applied by Amesius. He refers the *satisfactio* to the endurance of punishment, the *meritum* to the active obedience, without distinguishing between the two aspects of the latter as active fulfilment of the law, and as the totality of fulfilment of the will of God. Not before the climax of theological development is a tolerable explication of the matter reached by Quenstedt.¹ For in No. 1 the result of satisfaction is

¹ Quenstedt: P. iii. cap. 3, membr. 2 sec. 1 thes. 26: *Satisfactio et meritum Christi non sunt ἰσοδυναμούντα. Nam*

1. *illa compensat injuriam Deo illatam, iniquitatem expiat, debitum solvit et a penis æternis liberat,—hoc restituit nos in statum benevolentis divins; mercedem gratuitam seu gratiam remissionis peccatorum, justificationem et vitam æternam peccatoribus acquirit;*

2. *illa se habet ut causa, hoc ut effectus. Ex satisfactione enim meritum ortum est. Satisfecit Christus pro peccatis nostris et pro penis illis debitis et ita promeruit nobis gratiam Dei, remissionem peccatorum et vitam æternam;*

3. *satisfactio facta est Deo unitrino ejusque justitiæ, non nobis, licet pro nobis facta sit. At non ipsi Trinitati, sed nobis Christus aliquid meruit et merito suo acquisivit;*

4. *actus exinanitionis, ut legis impletio, passio, mors sunt simul satisfactorii et meritorii, actus vero exaltationis, ut resurrectio, ascensio in celum, sessio ad dexteram Dei non satisfactorii actus sunt, sed solum meritorii, eo ipso resurrectionem ad vitam nobis promeruit et celum reservavit;*

5. *Satisfactio ex debito oritur, sed meritum opus plane indebitum ac liberum est, cui ex adverso respondet merces.*

He was anticipated by Feuerborn (*Syntagma primum sacrarum disquisitionum*: Marburg, 1642), and followed by Hollaz (*Examen theol.* P. iii. sec. 1, cap. 3, qu. 76):—both imperfectly. Voetius, on the other hand (*Disputationes theol.* tom. ii. p. 229), repudiates the distinction drawn by Amesius.

is taken too narrowly, and the passive obedience is regarded only as the matter of that idea, while at the same time it results from No. 4 that His vicarious fulfilment of the law also falls under the idea of satisfaction. On the other hand, following out the *formula concordia*, it ought to have been brought more clearly forward under No. 4 that both kinds of obedience are in their co-ordination satisfactory, and in their conjunction meritorious. Moreover, under No. 2 the relation between the two ideas is not happily expressed in the schema of cause and effect, if No. 5 is right in affirming that the same transactions, according to their diverse references to God, are distinguished by means of that pair of ideas. But since the freeness of Christ's obedience, which betokens merit, is the characteristic feature that transcends the congruence of that obedience with the law, and is not excluded by the idea of *satisfactio*, the satisfactory value of His prestations is rightly recognised rather as the *conditio sine qua non* of their meritorious value. Moreover, in No. 4 account is taken in an awkward way of the meritorious value of those acts of Christ's exaltation which do not belong to the priestly office, and therefore do not fall to be considered at all. The chief scientific deficiency, however, of the whole treatment of this subject lies in the fact that the idea of merit is not elucidated at all; in particular, that no account is given of the attitude of God to which the idea of merit corresponds. The theologians of that epoch have none of them set this task before them, because it was inconceivable to them, in virtue of their whole religious feeling, that Christ's merit could be of any advantage to God; *non ipsi Deo, sed nobis Christus meruit*. Even those who are distinguished by their acquaintance with the scholastic theology of the middle ages, betray no suspicion of the importance of the conclusions of Thomas and Duns respecting the idea of merit and its application to Christ. With reference to this point it is easy to see that the so-called Protestant schoolmen of the seventeenth century do not come up to the scientific spirit and *élan* of the schoolmen of the middle ages. At the same time the problem remains in this position, that it falls to be considered whether the good pleasure of God which, according to Calvin (p. 208) and Polanus is the condition of the validity of the merit of Christ, and is thus the correlate of that idea, gives adequate

expression to the grace and love of God when placed alongside of the idea of His justice.

To the Lutherans also, in accordance with their Christological premisses, the idea does not occur that the merit of the *God-man* has a reflex influence upon Himself, or that He earned any advantage to Himself. The older theologians of the Reformed Church,—Calvin, Beza, Keckermann,¹ concur in this, partly because Christ is man not on His own account but only for the sake of sinners; partly, as Beza observes, because of His Divinity, which makes Him worthy of eternal life from the beginning. On the other hand Zanchius (*De Incarnatione*, Opp. viii. pp. 173, 174), Gomarus (*In Ep. ad Philip.* Opp. i. p. 531), Voetius (*L. c.* ii. pp. 279, 280), assert that Christ not only as man merited *exaltatio* or *gloria* for Himself, but also as God merited the *plenior gloriæ patefactio* which was veiled by the incarnation or humiliation of the Logos. This view then is possible according to the Christological premisses of the Reformed theologians. H. Alting (*Theol. probl.* i. 43) mediates between the two views in such a way as to make it appear that Christ achieved merit in the first instance only for us, and for Himself only in so far as He fully dedicated His whole being to the object of attaining our salvation.

I believe I may venture to assert that the divergence of the Reformed type of doctrine from the Lutheran on this point extends no further than to this feature. The other points upon which Schneckenburger traces differences between the two schools are either not controverted, or find but little support, and that not from important Reformed theologians. He gives it out as essentially a Reformed view, that not merely Christ's actual obedience unto death, but also the habitual sanctity of His nature, as the opposite of original sin, had a vicarious value so as to be imputed to us. For this is adduced (Schneckenburger, p. 66) the answer to the 36th question in the Heidelberg Catechism: *quod sua innocentia ac perfecta sanctitate mea peccata, in quibus conceptus sum, tegat*. Now, even assuming that by this is meant Christ's habitual as distinguished from His actual purity (a thing of which I am not quite sure), the thought would be very far from being a specifically reformed one. For Gerhard (*Loc. xvii.* 2. 56) also teaches that the

¹ Cited in Schweizer's *Ref. Glaubenslehre*, ii. p. 381.

habitualis humanæ naturæ Christi justitia a merito nostræ justitiæ minime exulabit. Schneckenburger appeals on this point to Ursinus also, the compiler of the Heidelberg Catechism, who writes in the *Doctrinæ Christianæ Compendium, sive Commentarii Catechetici* (Genev. 1584), p. 479: *Imputatur nobis et prior illa legis impletio, nempe humiliatio et justitia humanæ Christi naturæ,—propter obedientiam vel satisfactionem ipsius.*¹ But, when looked at more closely, this sentence resolves itself into another point of difference that has been formulated by Schneckenburger, as separating the Reformed type of doctrine from the Lutheran. For he maintains that it is Reformed doctrine to include also the *assumptio carnis* as an act of obedience on the part of the Logos in the imputed and therefore substitutionary righteousness of Christ. Schneckenburger (p. 68) certainly calls attention to the fact that this act does not suitably come under the idea of substitution, for in the sphere of human duties there is nothing analogous to this act. But, just for this reason, is this view hailed by him as a breach made in the idea of substitution, which, as he thinks, has no very firm footing in Reformed theology. Now, it cannot be doubted that in addition to the later theologian Rodolf (*Catech. Palatina illustrata, Bernæ, 1697, p. 214*), Ursinus had already hinted at the same view. He says (Opp. i. p. 232): *Justitia nostra est sola satisfactio Christi præstita legi pro nobis, seu pœna, quam sustinuit Christus pro nobis, atque ideo tota humiliatio Christi, hoc est assumptio carnis, servitutis, penuriæ, ignominiae et infirmitatis, passionis et mortis tolerantia.* By adding *ea enim satisfactio æquipollet vel impletioni legis per obedientiam vel pœnæ æternæ propter peccata, ad quorum alterutrum lege obligamur,*—he indicates his standpoint (pp. 250-1), according to which he attributes vicarious value to the passive obedience only. If then he includes in the category of suffering and of punishment even the act of the incarnation of the Logos, that is certainly an isolated view. I meet with it also in M. Martini (*Christiana et Catholica fides, Bremæ, 1618, p. 259*), who, as

¹ The edition of the lectures of Ursinus upon the Heidelberg Catechism, from which this quotation is taken, is one that was prepared by his hearers, and called forth a corrected edition by Pareus (first published in 1591), which is inserted in the *Opera* (ed. Quirin. Reuter. *Heidelb.* 1612); and in this authentic text the expression referred to by Schneckenburger is not to be found. Compare Walch: *Bibliotheca theol. selecta*, i. p. 520.

a follower of Piscator, views the fulfilment of the law of love by Christ as a duty of the creature, therefore not as vicarious, nor as an element of the *exinanitio*. But to the question *quomodo sancta Christi conceptio nostra peccata tegit?* his answer is *quatenus in ea consideratur Domini altissimi exinanitio, in qua tota et sola posita est satisfactio pro peccatis nostris*. But this is no more than a momentary exaggeration; as substratum of satisfaction only the exinanition in suffering of the incarnate one avails. For at p. 294 we read *Christus proprie et per se exinanitus, quatenus homo*: and at p. 298 it is said, *si exinaniri sit privari aliquo bono, incarnatio non est exinanitio*. Very little weight is thus to be attached to that view which the proper representatives of Reformed orthodoxy manifestly declined to adopt, from the very consideration stated by Schneckenburger. For the view in question is incorrect just when tried by that very theory of the *pactum æternum* to which he refers us for a right understanding of it. For the *pactum* of the Logos-Son contemplates the obedience of the Incarnate One; the incarnation itself, however, as the first act of humiliation, is regarded as an act equally independent with the *pactum* itself, and accordingly does not fall within the compass of that obedience which it first makes possible.¹ Finally, the extraordinary view which Eglin (*De magno insitionis nostræ in Christum mysterio*, Marburg, 1613) propounds in exaggerated opposition to Piscator (Schneckenburger, 128, 129),—that Christ's vicarious obedience continues even in his *status exultationis*—is not a Reformed one, and has exercised absolutely no influence. It does not recur anywhere else; and Gomarus (as above) shows its falsity with the observation that the *meritum Christi consummatum est in terris in statu humilitatis*.

Schneckenburger has ignored the fact that these views occur

¹ Cocceius: *De Fœdere et Testamento Dei*, cap. 5. 93: Posito æterno decreto Patris et Filii, postquam hic ex muliere natus et caro factus est et servi formam accepit, eo ipso factus est sub legem, servus, debitor obedientiæ a nobis præstandæ. Gomarus: *In Ep. ad Philipp.* (Opp. i. p. 531): Meritum Christi in humilitate et obedientia consistit ratione secundi gradus humilitatis (obedience to the law as contradistinguished from the incarnation) cui soli Paulus opponit exultationem tanquam præmium.—This completely overthrows that point of view from which Schneckenburger regards the Reformed theory of the obedience of Christ. Its subject is not the Logos-God who humbles Himself, but the God-man that exists as the result of the humiliation or incarnation of the Logos.

only in an isolated way amongst Reformed theologians, because they had to serve as his proofs that Reformed theology as a whole, in the reaction against Piscator, betrays a tendency to resolve the significance of Christ's passive into that of His active obedience (p. 64 *seq.*) As this resulted from the consideration that it is only the Divine intention of the God-man that gives value to His passion, and that therefore the latter really appears as the climax of His active obedience, Schneckenburger believes that he can detect in the Reformed doctrine the idea that the active obedience avails as vicarious only in so far as it is more than vicarious, and overflows to others with the Divine power that actuates it. This is for him proof of the assertion which had been previously made, that Reformed theology from the beginning is based upon the idea (formally defined by Schleiermacher) of a living fellowship subsisting between men and God—a fellowship which Christ brought about by means of His peculiar manifestation of life. And such a train of thought he holds is inadmissible in the Lutheran system (p. 69). But this is a very surprising misapprehension of the real state of the case. The Lutheran doctrine is no less deeply interested than the Reformed in combining in that one active obedience which shows itself in suffering and death, and for the end of the positive justification of believers, the two co-ordinate species of Christ's obedience which are satisfactory in relation to God's justice and to the law ; and this it is which the Lutherans actually and designedly denote by the term *meritum* (pp. 260-1). Both systems, moreover, notwithstanding the divergence of their Christologies, alike set forth the God-man as the subject of Christ's obedience thus summed up. But both theological schools see in the merit of Christ only an indirect bearing on the establishment of a living fellowship with God, which they associate directly with the prophetic and kingly offices of the exalted God-man. Nay, it is precisely by the Reformed theologians that these functions are placed under the idea of *efficacia*, and so brought into very clear *logical* contrast with the contents of that *meritum*. This may be gathered from that third form of Christ's fulfilment of the law which Ursinus enumerates (see above, p. 250), but which Schneckenburger (p. 69) has quoted in a mutilated and therefore obscure form, and has applied in an inaccurate way. For even the

view that *Christus nobis justificationem meruit* does not mean that a direct unbroken line is traced from Christ's obedience to the result of that obedience in believers. *Meritum* has still a direct bearing upon God, though this thought does not find expression in either school. Only under the correlated idea of *præmium*, i.e. from an act of God that logically corresponds to the *meritum Christi*, is Christ in his state of exaltation qualified to procure for individuals the Divine gifts of grace, to the bestowal of which God suffers Himself to be induced by the *meritum obedientiæ Christi*.¹

42. In no element of the doctrine of justification and reconciliation does the divergence between the exhibition of matters that dogmatic theology gives and the religious conception of the order of things, so plainly appear as in the way in which the data of the *status exaltationis Christi* are applied by the dogmatic theologians. The interval of time between the acts of obedience rendered by Christ, pertaining as they do to the past, and the present effect on believers ;—an interval which does not exist where justification by the obedience of Christ is realized in the religious consciousness—must be filled up by the aid of these data. Now in that region the theologians of both confessions have in common all that relates to the *status exaltationis* in the schema of the three offices of Christ. To the priestly office belongs the intercession of the heavenly High Priest, which secures the continuance of that merit towards God which He earned during His earthly life ; but, as a whole, the *applicatio gratiæ*, or, as the Reformed divines call it, the *efficacia*, falls under the kingly office of Christ, insomuch as His efficacy by the Holy Spirit, who is the organ of that activity, is at the same time the actual exercise of His Divine lordship over the Church. The indirect exercise of the prophetic office through

¹ The assumption that the Reformed Christology has at bottom the tendency to reject the idea of satisfaction, and to call into prominence the idea of a living fellowship between men and the God-man, Schneckenburger has attempted to base upon the above quoted (p. 247, note) utterances of Cocceius. I only remark that Cocceius is not prepared for such a consequence as Schneckenburger draws. At least he says (cap. 5. 95) : *Neque putamus Christum, quatenus secundum Deitatem mediator est, Patri minorem esse, sed sponsonem hanc et adductionem hominis lapsi in eam gratiam in qua stamus, adeo non esse infra eminentiam divinitatis, ut non dubitemus cum Isa. 42. 6-8, eam gloriam et laudem divinitatis omnibus creaturis incommunicabilem asserere.*—*Gloria Dei est esse justitiam Israelis ; hanc gloriam non dat non Deo.*

the instrumentality of the *ministri verbi divini* is subordinate to the exercise of the kingly office. The opposite directions of His mediatorial activity towards God and towards men, which Osiander was the first to formulate, are not distributed over both the states of Christ's life, but are both contemporaneously included in the state of exaltation. For the rest, the Reformed divines, by their view of the exaltation of Christ, have established a closer and stricter connexion between Christ's merit and justification than has been done by the Lutherans. In Baier's much esteemed *Compendium Theol. Posit.* (first published in 1686), the treatment of the *officium sacerdotale* is followed by the description of the *officium regium*, which, in the Lutheran style, according to the assumption of the *communicatio idiomatum*, is first exhibited in the *regnum potentie*, and afterwards in the *regnum gratie*. The latter is exercised by Christ in gathering together and sustaining His Church by means of the Word and sacraments, and in furnishing it with the gifts of the Holy Spirit. In order now to experience in one's-self that saving efficacy of the Mediator which, as merit and as promise, is *de se indeterminata*; in other words, in order to complete the effect of Christ's merit, which is not yet finished, one must believe. Thus the doctrine of faith comes next. But as believer the sinner is born again and converted; thus we must proceed or revert to the doctrines of regeneration or conversion. The cause which moves God to the conversion of a sinner is the merit of Christ; the instrumentality whereby God effects it is the word, baptism, and, in their sphere, the ministers of the Church. The immediate purpose and result of regeneration, as of faith, is justification. Thus follows the doctrine of that justification to which a man who as believer is regenerate, yet presents himself as a sinner, who, at the moment when he exercises that act of faith which decides his conversion, experiences the judgment of God imputing to him the righteousness of Christ. This series of thoughts progresses only in the schema of efficient causes; and even these are not brought before us so completely as they might have been. Had it been otherwise, many difficulties would have been observed regarding which the Lutheran theologians unfortunately show too little concern.

The Reformed divines, on the other hand, had it before

them to secure justification as the *purpose* of Christ's merit, as the dominant form of all God's gracious dealings with individuals, by means of their view of the exaltation, and particularly of the kingship of Christ. This is gained, in the first instance, by means of a view respecting the value of Christ's resurrection, which is possible on the assumption that Christ as our Head is the subject of satisfaction and merit. He thus died for us, because our sins were imputed to Him; so His resurrection is His and our justification from our sins.¹ This is supported by Rom. iv. 25, and by the prevailing impression left upon the mind by the New Testament *usus loquendi* regarding the resurrection of Christ by the Father. But this does not preclude from regarding the resurrection as at the same time an independent act of Christ and as His entry on His kingly office. (Amesius.) That the Lutheran theology did not adopt this combination, but attributes to the resurrection merely the second meaning, and concedes to it only a remote bearing upon the purpose of justification (Quenstedt), was caused by the circumstance that it counted as a step of His exaltation the *descensus Christi ad inferos*. But for this obstacle, it is difficult to see that any inner motive could have led the Lutherans to object to the other thought of Christ's resurrection. For Luther has given the impression of the intimate connexion between Christ's resurrection and His death among other expressions in certain phrases which can adequately be explained only by reference to that view of Reformed theologians.² And those who strictly follow the authority of the *formula concordiæ* must adopt that view.³ Calvin, on the other hand (ii. 16. 13), upon this point expresses himself exclusively in the Lutheran sense, connecting

¹ Polanus, p. 753: *Secundus fructus resurrectionis Christi est justificatio nostri coram Deo . . . est actualis ejus absolutio a peccatis nostris, pro quibus mortuus est. Excitando eum a morte ipso facto eum absolvit Pater a peccatis nostris ei imputatis et nos etiam absolvit in eo.* Amesius, p. 101: *Finis resurrectionis fuit (4) ut se et justificatum et alios justificantem ostenderet.* P. 123: *Sententia justificationis (2) fuit in Christo capite nostro e mortuis jam resurgente pronunciata.* Maastricht, *Theol. theoretico-practica*, p. 703, repeats word for word these sentences along with their context from Amesius. Witsius, iii. 8. 4. Compare Schneckenburger as above, p. 99.

² Köstlin, ii. p. 423.

³ F. C. p. 684: *Justitia illa, quæ coram Deo credentibus imputatur, est obedientia, passio et resurrectio Christi, quibus ille legi nostra causa satisfecit et peccata nostra expiavit.*

with the resurrection of Christ only His operation in transferring the power of His death to us.

I now place in contrast with the train of thought developed by the Lutheran Baier that of the Calvinist Amesius, who in precision is equal to the other, and in genius and talent for combination excels him as well as the greater number of his party, so far as I know them. By the well-known reference of Christ's resurrection to the justification of those who belong to Him as their Head is, in the first place, explained the assumption uniformly made by Reformed divines, that Christ's Kingship extends, in the first instance, to His Church, or at least that, as dominion over all, it is applied for the benefit of those who are His. Amesius then makes the priestly intercession and the prophetic sending of messengers to be elements of the kingly character of Christ, so that thus the pleading of His merit in our behalf finds an emphatic certainty. The doctrine of the application of the mediatorial work of Christ to particular men next follows. Being brought about by the instrumentality of the Holy Ghost, it in the first instance depends upon the Father's decree of election which has given to the Redeemer certain men to be redeemed; in the second instance, it depends on the purpose wherewith Christ gave satisfaction for these. Thus our deliverance from sin is determined in God's decree, but at the same time communicated to Christ, and in Him to us, before it actually is received by us. The application of grace to this end takes place accordingly to the same extent to which Christ embraced and carried out the purpose of redemption. For the decree of election, to the consideration of which we have now passed, relates to those definite individual men in their connexion with the body of Christ who is the Head of this new humanity, just as the creation of natural humanity in Adam was one act. The *applicatio* consists of the following parts: Union with Christ in effectual calling, and Participation in the benefits of redemption that are found in Christ. In so far as the calling of the elect is effectual as *conversio* or *regeneratio*, there pertain to it objectively the preaching of the gospel (with preparation by means of the law), inner appropriation by the Holy Ghost, and its implanting in the will, which subjectively appears as the act of faith. In faith is attained that condition upon which

participation in Christ's benefits depends; these consist partly of changes in relation, to wit, justification and adoption, partly in the real change of sanctification. Justification is the judgment whereby God declares free from sin and from death, and accepts as righteous the believer for the sake of Christ, whom he lays hold of by faith. This judgment was (1.) existent in God's thought in virtue of the decree of justification; (2.) declared in the resurrection of Christ; (3.) virtually (that is to say without being unfolded in the subjective consciousness) pronounced in that first relation, which results from implanted faith, i.e. in the primary union with Christ which corresponds to subjective faith (according to Rom. viii. 1); (4.) expressly pronounced by the Spirit of God, who bears witness in us of our reconciliation with God. Justification, as a relation to God, is objectively complete in one act; although, as regards its appearance in the subjective assurance, and as regards the sense of its presence, it has diverse degrees. This is a self-consistent and definite exhibition in which not even an apparent contradiction results from the two propositions (Amesius, p. 124), that faith precedes justification as its cause, and that faith presupposes justification and is its consequence. For justification as contained in the subjective consciousness presupposes faith, but as an objective act of God it precedes faith, and is operative in the believing subject before he is conscious of its presence, because it is previously contained in God's electing decree, in Christ's redeeming purpose and in His resurrection. In this exhibition, moreover, justification is regarded as a synthetic judgment upon the believer as sinner. Of the four steps in the sentence of justification, as they are to be met with in Amesius, the first two, *in mente Dei* and *in resurrectione Christi*, are, without any doubt, synthetical. That the fourth step, justification in the consciousness of the believer, is not analytical, follows from the assumption of the third step which virtually presents justification in the *unio cum Christo* in regeneration.¹ The relation to Christ, which arises from

¹ *Medulla*, i. 27. 9 (p. 123): *Sententia justificationis (3.) virtualiter pronuntiatur ex prima illa relatione, quæ ex fide ingenerata exsurgit.* This is explained by the following sentences from cap. 26 (p. 119): *Ratione receptionis Christi vocatio dicitur conversio, regeneratio.—Passiva receptio Christi est, qua spirituale principium gratiæ ingeneratur hominis voluntati.—Hæc enim gratia est fundamentum relationis illius, qua homo cum Christo unitur.*

regenerating grace in the act of faith, is the very same as that which is denoted in the idea of justification. If thus the *unio cum Christo* is formally justification, it cannot be thought of as preceding the judgment of justification with self-contained reality; rather if regeneration is regarded as bestowed on the elect, then is the sentence of justification, which is virtually made known in the act of regeneration, synthetic even at this stage, and therefore also necessarily so at the fourth. Now, it is again a deduction drawn by Schneckenburger (p. 57), the correctness of which would be acknowledged by no orthodox Reformed divine, that justification, as Schleiermacher maintains, properly speaking, resolves itself into that one eternal act of election which is the effective imputation of Christ to humanity in general (!), which realizes itself subsequently as faith begins in individuals. To this Maccovius (*Loci communes*, p. 608), appealing to Worton (*de reconciliatione*), as well as F. Turretine (*Compendium*, 452 sq.), have already answered that the decree of justification and its execution are to be distinguished from each other. For the attention they bestow on the ultimate ground of salvation is as far as possible removed from making the Reformed divines indifferent with regard to the historical instrumentalities by which it is brought about; though certainly Lutheran theology, from its regard to the latter, has become indifferent to the methodical exposition of the former. Turretine, for example, also recognises justification as a historical act performed on the individual (p. 453): (1.) *In momento vocationis efficacis, per quam homo peccator transfertur a statu peccati ad statum gratiæ et unitur Christo capiti suo per fidem. Hinc enim fit, ut justitia Christi illi imputetur a Deo, cujus merito per fidem apprehenso absolvitur a peccatis suis et jus ad vitam consequitur, quam sententiam absolutoriam.* (2.) *Spiritus in corde pronunciat, quum ait, confide fili, remissa sunt tibi peccata tua.* This representation, moreover, is in complete harmony with the third and fourth steps of justification which are assumed by Amesius, and which are not only distinguished from one another by the unvarying *usus loquendi* as *justificatio activa* and *passiva*, but also referred to one another as mutually complete—*Receptio activa est elicitus actus fidei, qua vocatus in Christum recumbit ut suum servatorem.* This line of thought is not found in Calvin, who, agreeably to the Reformation character of his contemplation of the consciousness of justification, expressly limits justification to Ames's fourth step.

mentary.¹ In order to understand this relation of the ideas, however, we must disregard Schneckenburger's observation (p. 57, note), that when regeneration is represented as justification, justification must be taken to mean the actual change whereby the sinner is really made righteous. He ought rather conversely to have concluded that if regeneration or union with Christ is identified with *justificatio activa*, it is precisely thereby declared to be not a real change, but an ideal relation to Christ; and that it first of all acquires its significance as a real change when in accordance with the nature of the case *justificatio passiva*,—i.e. consciousness of justification, presents itself in the subject.

A misapprehension of a similar sort, but of a more clearly marked character, appears however in Schneckenburger's assertion,² which has already been proved to be incorrect, that it is the unanimous opinion of Reformed theologians, in opposition to Lutheranism, that the sentence of justification as *judicium secundum veritatem* holds good with regard to the believer, not as a sinner, but as *unitus cum Christo*; so that it is an analytical judgment expressing the import of the regeneration that precedes it. I have already (p. 192), when speaking of Calvin, confuted this assertion which Schneckenburger supports only by references to a few theologians, without consulting the leaders of the Reformed school. But the same view is held by Dörtenbach also,³ at least with reference to a section of the Reformed divines, of whom he mentions Bucanus, Witsius, van Til, in addition to Rodolf, Melchior, Hulsius, F. Turretine, who are referred to by Schneckenburger. He adds also Claude Albery,⁴—not felicitously, however. For he, the counterpart of A. Osiander in the sphere of the Calvinistic Churches, was on this very account censured by an assembly of divines at Berne (1588), and thus does not belong to the number

¹ It is true that justification, which on God's side is a single act, manifests itself in subjective experience as a plurality of acts. *Non est indivisus actus a parte nostri et ratione sensus, qui fit per varios et iteratos actus, prout sensu; iste potest interrumpi vel augeri vel minui ratione peccatorum intercurrentium* (*Turret. Comp.* p. 453). Compare Schneckenburger, ii. p. 73.

² *Kirchl. Christologie*, p. 55 sq. *Compar. Dogmatik*, ii. p. 12 sq.

³ In the article *Sündenvergebung* in *Herzog's Real-Encykl.* xv. p. 238.

⁴ Professor of Philosophy in Lausanne; wrote *de fide Catholica* (1587). (Compare Schweizer: *Centraldogmen*, i. p. 521-526.) His principle is—*justitia nostra coram Deo qualitas patibilis in nobis inherens, coniunctione cum Christo effecta, et vitiosæ qualitati originali opposita.*

of recognised representatives of the Reformed doctrine. With regard to Bucanus, it is obvious that he had no intention at least to teach in the way that has been indicated (*Institutiones theol.* Loc. 29. 11. 12), although by one or two sentences he may give rise to an appearance of such a tendency. That appearance vanishes whenever the connexion is observed, and the old gentleman receives indulgence for a certain want of skill. He lays down two steps of justification (sect. 17) whereby the elect (sect. 20) are declared righteous, first as sinners, then as believers. This is the first, but by no means sufficiently elaborated form of the distinction which has already been adduced from Amesius and Turretine. Bucanus next (sect. 18) proposes the question how God can declare the unjust to be just in the face of his own prohibition (Prov. xvii. 15). To this he answers awkwardly enough that God is above the law, that the person to be justified, who with respect to nature is a sinner, is a chosen one with respect to grace, and finally, that he must be a penitent sinner. Here undeniably are the elements of a divergence into Osiander's tendency; but sect. 19 shows that they do not find any consistent application. Bucanus does not give up the assumption of the two degrees—the justification of the sinner to whom faith is given in consequence, and the justification of the believer. He indeed expresses the difference between them by saying that God *in non renatis nihil invenit præter horrendam malorum colluviem, in renatis vero sua etiam dona complectitur Deus*; but he winds up by saying in a harmonizing way that God *utrosque tamen eodem modo justificat*, namely, by imputation of Christ's merit, not therefore by a judgment upon the value of His own gifts of grace in the believer. In Witsius (*De Œcon. Fœd.* iii. 8, 22) I find the sentences, in virtue of which Dörtenbach indicates the standpoint of the Reformed theologians named by him, to the effect that in regeneration we are liberated from the *crimen profanitatis et hypocriseos*; *non potest Deus homines aliter considerare, aliter declarare, quam reapse sunt*. These sentences, however, are incomprehensibly misapplied to a purpose which they by no means serve according to their context. For the fundamental principle of the Divine judgment (*judicium Dei secundum veritatem est*, Rom. ii. 12), is applied by Witsius partly to gross sinners, and partly to the actively righteous, to the regenerate

who are slanderously accused of impiety and hypocrisy, like Job. For the latter in particular he coins the *absolutio a crimine profanitatis et hypocriseos* not, as our untrustworthy reporter represents, for believers as a whole. Witsius adds that this justification of the righteous, presupposing as it does the *sanctitas et justitia inhærens* which an individual possesses by the grace of God, is totally distinct from the justification of sinners, *prout in sponsore censentur*. This last he represents, in the familiar way, as an imputation of the righteousness of Christ, as a synthetic judgment upon sinners; but he is at the same time convinced that God in this procedure also judges *secundum veritatem*. This affirmation he proves simply on the ground that it is an actual righteousness which God imputes, and that God knows that that righteousness was not wrought by us but by Christ in our room, to the end *ut nos illius merito juste coronari possimus. Quod tam verum est, ut summa sit totius evangelii* (sect. 38). John Melchior (*Fundamenta Theol. Didascalicæ*, Opp. ii. p. 108-110) develops the following line of thought: men were destitute of the righteousness prescribed by the law, while no righteousness can be accepted by God which does not receive the approbation of the law. For God's judgment is *secundum veritatem*. Whereupon the wisdom of God devised a plan for acquitting the unrighteous while yet He should maintain His justice—*i.e.* should judge in conformity to the law. In accordance with that plan, Christ as our Surety had to fulfil the law, so that He was justified, and has acquired the right, as God's righteous servant, to justify His own, or through His own obedience to exhibit many as righteous. Men come to the participation of this righteousness of Christ by means of faith, to which therefore especially justification is attributed. *Non enim amplius pro injusto potest haberi, si quis sit in Christo, cui nos fides inserit. Quod judicium Dei de fidelibus in communione justitiæ Christi jam constitutis vocatur justificatio*. It is obvious that Melchior does not intend to diverge from the usual doctrine; but, unless we judge unfairly of his line of thought, we shall not find that as matter of fact he has gone beyond bounds in the two last sentences. For the *judicium secundum veritatem* takes place with reference to the state of faith, not in so far as that state is an operation wrought by the Holy Ghost on the analogy of the legal right-

eousness of Christ, but in so far as faith fulfils that condition under which Christ's fulfilment of the law, which is the *only possible object of God's truthful judgment*, can be imputed to the sinner. F. Turretine receives from Schneckenburger (pp. 16, 24) the testimony that he approaches most nearly to the Lutheran type of justification (compare above, p. 272); yet to him also are attributed divergencies towards the pretended Reformed interpretation of the doctrine. The allegations, however, taken by Schneckenburger from his *Theologia elenctica*, ii. p. 705 sq. (Lugd. Bat. 1696), are neither complete nor trustworthy. The view-point of the *judicium Dei secundum veritatem*, which proceeds upon the rule that God can declare no one to be righteous unless he have a perfect righteousness, is never intended by Turretine to represent the imputation of Christ's righteousness as something impossible, or that needs to be supplemented; nay, rather he applies that fundamental principle precisely to this case. *Qui destituitur propria justitia, aliam debet habere qua justificetur*. The imputation of the righteousness of the vicarious surety to those whom He represents thus constitutes the *judicium secundum veritatem*. Of course to this result attaches the condition of *unio cum Christo*. But when Turretine anew defends the rightness of God's judgment of imputation against the charge of fiction, he does not appeal to that *unio cum Christo*, thus not to "Christ in us," but to the relation of suretiship in which the validity of the action of one as legally representing others constitutes the type of Christ's work as our substitute. Finally, his attaching to justification the condition of *unio cum Christo* (p. 713) does not render invalid the thought *justificatur impius*, for *renovatio per gratiam* does not precede justification but follows it; and the believer, in spite of his faith, must be regarded with respect to justification as *impius*, *quatenus opponitur operanti, adeoque impius partim antecedenter, partim respective ad justificationem, non autem concomitanter, minus adhuc consequenter*. In opposition to Schneckenburger I have to remark that this sentence has nothing to do with any reference to *judicium secundum veritatem*. Of course the *justificandus* is from one side represented as "already a regenerate person;" but it is not at all in this aspect that he is brought before the judgment of God, but only as *impius*. Schneckenburger (p. 15) appeals for support

to Rodolf also (*Catechesis Pal. Illustrata*): but wrongly, for he omits the decisive sentences of the author he cites. Rodolf, just like Turretine, says that *imputatio non denotat fictionem mentis et opinionem, sed verum justumque judicium, quo Deus judicat eos, qui credunt, esse in Filio, atque adeo justitiæ et omnis juris ipsius, ut capitis et fratris primogeniti, consortes* (p. 340). *Hujus imputationis fundamentum est* (1.) *sponsio Christi. Quidquid Filius Dei legi subjectus fecit, id voluntaria sponsione loco electorum fecit et passus est; merito igitur id ipsis imputatur; (2.) unio electorum cum Christo per spiritum fidei tam arcta ut unum fiant corpus. Quapropter in Christo fecisse ac tulisse censentur, quod fecit tulitque ipsorum vice Christus* (p. 341). Schneckenburger, by citing only the second condition as the *fundamentum imputationis*, without bringing forward the previous *fundamentum*, or the subsequent elucidation, has really falsified the evidence of his witness. Solomon van Til (*Theologiæ utriusque compendium, cum naturalis tum revelatæ, ed. quarta, 1734*), discusses justification after regeneration, and certainly might seem in some sentences to regard the former as an analytical judgment proceeding upon the latter. *Sicut homo cum dono fidei in regeneratione accipit immutationem status, ita quoque novam subit relationem, qua relatus ad amorem Dei concipitur ut conciliatus, amicus, id que summo jure propter ejus communionem cum Christo* (ii. p. 160). By this, however, is expressed, not the object, but the condition of justification; for the latter is described as a *judicium fori divini, quo a reatu absolvitur redemptus fidelis propter satisfactionem Christi præstitam, et jus vitæ seu justitiæ imputatur propter meritum Christi, dum censetur per fidem arctissimam habere communionem cum Christo*. Subsequently (p. 164) we read again: *totum fundamentum justitiæ judicii divini in justificatione fundatur in credentis conjunctione cum Christo*. But, as at the same time, *objectum justificationis ponitur improbus*, the synthetical character of the sentence of justification is placed beyond all doubt. Only in the judgment of grace passed on the sinner is at the same time introduced a judgment of righteousness which has regard in the first instance to Christ's work: but on account of the fellowship we have with Him in faith, *omnia quæ Christi sunt, jure censentur nostra*.¹

¹ I have not been able to gain access to the *Systema controversiarum theo-*

In fact, the Reformed thought that Christ is the subject of satisfaction and of merit, as Surety and Head of the Church, leads further to the remarkable conclusion that the justification of the individual believer is not merely regarded as an act of grace (which to the Lutherans is its only value), but, at the same time, as an act of God's justice. If Christ as Head of the Church has suffered in their room, the sins of the elect being imputed to Him ; if, therefore, also, as Head of the Church, He was declared free from its sins, then it is only just that the forgiveness of sins should be transferred to the individual member of His Church. Just as had been signified by van Til, H. Altling says (*Loc. comm.* i. 14, *Opp.* i. p. 117) : *Consideratur homo electus bifariam, prout est in se et natura sua et prout est in Christo satisfaciente. Priore modo Deus justificat impium, posteriore justificat eum, qui est ex fide Jesu. Illud facit pro sua erga nos gratia, istud facit pro justitia sua, qua satisfactionem a Christo acceptam credentibus imputat.* So also Cocceius : (*Summa Theologiæ*, cap. 48) : *Imputatio justitiæ sive imputatio fidei in justitiam est judicium Dei justum, quod illi, qui credunt in Christum et in eo sunt, propter justitiam Christi capitis et filii in judicium non venire, dono Dei debeant, tanquam si eam obedientiam patrassent et nullum peccatum commisissent.* There was no need, therefore, that Schneckenburger should adduce, in support of this thought, only so late a writer as Beveridge (p. 23, 24), who, moreover, in his purpose of practical edification, puts it in connexion with the condition *supposé que je remplisse les conditions, qu'il exige dans son alliance*, and so glides into an Arminian point of view. But Schneckenburger ought to have formulated that thought more distinctly than he has done. For actual *unio cum Christo* is indeed represented as a con-

logicarum of Anthony Hulsius, from which Schneckenburger (ii. p. 16) quotes the following sentences in support of his assertion : *Certum est, cum justificatur, eum non esse peccatorem in statu peccati, sed fidelem et consequenter justum justitia inhærente.* From the proofs of inaccuracy in quoting, which on this occasion I have discovered in both Württemberg theologians, I shall wait to see whether any one will contradict me when I assert that the statement by Hulsius has no reference to the present question of the condition of the sinner's justification through Christ, but to the case of the acquittal of the righteous person (touched on by Witsius, p. 274), which is called by Braun (*Doctrina Fœderum*, iii. 9, 21) *justificatio secunda : Secunda est inhærens, imperfecta et mutabilis, fitque non tantum fide, sed operibus, et quidem per sanctificationem ad obtinendum testimonium sanctitatis, ut absolveremur ab hypocrisi*—in so far, that is, as the devil accuses the just as he accused Job.

dition of the true and righteous judgment of God, but its *cause* is the ideal oneness in virtue of election with Christ, *who gives satisfaction*. In this way is the interest maintained which Reformed theologians no less than Lutherans feel in the affirmation of the proposition *quod justificatur impius*.

Were it not so, one could at all events retort upon the Lutheran doctrine, precisely in the terms in which Schneckenburger has spoken of the Reformed view—that it places the doctrine of regeneration before that of justification, in order to indicate that this judgment of God presupposes that man is in an actual state, which is the opposite of the state of sin. And yet this is not the case; for the interpretation of regeneration as a presupposition of justification is guarded in a very special way. Baier, for example (*theol. pos.* iii. 4. 2. 3. 12. 15), recognises a widest sense of the word regeneration; embracing conversion, justification, renovation; and a narrowest one, in which it is equivalent to justification, *qua confertur jus filios Dei fieri* (the *justificatio activa* of Reformed divines). According to another less narrow idea, regeneration is made equivalent to renovation or sanctification. But what Baier actually understands and explains under that heading is just the *donatio fidei* as a condition of the *justificatio peccatoris*, and to this does he limit the equivalent ideas of *nova creatio*, *vivificatio*, *spiritualis resuscitatio*. Accordingly he admits, indeed, that in this is implied *mutatio aliqua spiritualis*; but as he defines this with respect to justification as being the *proximus finis et effectus justificationis*, as he regards the *vires spirituales* which are bestowed in regeneration as relating merely *ad credendum in Christum vitamque adeo spiritualem inchoandam*, while he makes real renovation to be dependent on justification, it is easy to see what the purpose of the doctrine is. As actual conscious justification is intelligible as a new relation of the sinner to God only on condition of faith, and as the bestowal of faith is a real change of the will, it is important to attenuate the latter as much as possible in relation to justification. For indubitably the first mentioned formal change cannot be exhibited at all without a material change of the sinner, and such a change lies already in the directing of his will to Christ. But this aspect of the process is not regarded as the matter but only as the condition of the judgment, whereby the new relation

of the sinner to God is first established. Inasmuch, then, as it is impossible to avoid representing the act of faith as the initial stage of the new life, it does not follow that it is to *this* value of faith that regard is had in the sentence of justification. But the Reformed doctrine is conditioned in the same way. It also cannot think of regeneration or union with Christ, merely as the mere empty schema of a relation, which is intended when it is represented as a step in the *pronunciatio justificationis*. For the direction of the will to Christ, which pertains thereto, is an *efficax conversio voluntatis*.¹ But by this is always meant a condition, and not the object, of justification. I do not at present enter into the question whether and how the difficulties that cluster round this point could be avoided or otherwise put to rest. At all events, no one party ought to reproach the other with the fact that in determining the relation between justification and regeneration, it has betrayed or even dropped out of sight the common interest of both parties in the former of these.

43. On the other hand a most pertinacious controversy, between the two schools, is raised by the question regarding the extent of Christ's purpose of salvation in relation to the actual result of that purpose. The Reformed party assert that both are equal in extent, that the *merit* and *efficacy* of Christ alike refer only to the elect, even although the power and worth of Christ's merit was sufficient for the salvation of all. The Lutherans, on the other hand, teach that Christ's saving purpose had the same universal extent as His power; that He purposed to give satisfaction for all, even for the reprobate, but that the efficacy of His work is limited to the elect, who by faith fall in with His purpose of salvation, and appropriate to themselves His work. This opposition of views not merely served in its time as a theological Shibboleth, but even divided the popular religious consciousness; although both of the

¹ Schneckenburger (*Comp. Dogm.*, ii. p. 12) thinks that it is impossible for a Lutheran to say what is natural to a Reformed divine: *justificatio sequitur fidem ut ejus effectus*. But Baier and Gerhard say:—*Finis et effectus fidei proximus est justificatio*. According to p. 13 it is only the later and pietistically inclined Lutherans who, after the Reformed manner, understand by regeneration the *donatio fidei*. But this is not merely the opinion of Quenstedt and Baier; it is also that of Gerhard, who has no *locus de regeneratione*, but places that *de penitentia* before that *de justificatione*, comp. his *Loc.* 17, cap. 3, sec. 3.

opposing views, when externally regarded, are equally strongly supported in the New Testament, and although the same contrariety had exhibited itself between Thomas and Duns (p. 64), without extending its influence beyond the limits of the school. In the influence of this opposition of different schools upon the religious and church consciousness in the evangelical confessions, we have thus a striking proof how the importance given by religious interest to school questions has complicated the church-development of the Reformation. But this contrariety, like most of the divergencies that have been already noticed, was caused by the circumstance, that the systematic impulse in the theology of the Reformed Church operated with a strength which the Lutherans did not experience. The defectiveness of the latter as regards their interest in systematic theology, was inherited from Melanchthon (p. 231), since even in method they made no use of the pattern that had been set before them by Calvin, who was the one systematic theologian of the later Reformation period. This is not the place to come to a conclusion upon that dogmatic difference. I will only point out how desire after unity of system was operative both in the one and in the other assertion. On both sides it is equally recognised as the result of the Divine redemption, that it is appropriated by a part of the human race—by the *fideles, electi*. Both parties moreover are at one in maintaining that this result was from all eternity contemplated by God, and that in fact the whole ordering of the universe and the whole of God's providence refer to *this* number of men and their benefit. But only the Reformed Church explains this connexion from the stand-point of the independence of God's willing and doing; the Lutherans make the result, as also God's eternal decree regarding that result, to depend upon the independent decision of individual men with regard to faith and upon foresight of this. For, so far as His inmost mind is concerned, God earnestly strives after the salvation of all men; but His actual decree for the ruling of the universe is regulated by regard to the moral freedom of men with respect to their faith. Now, as faith is a condition of salvation, inasmuch as it recognises and appropriates the merit of Christ, the eternal election of future believers has its motive in the fact that God foresaw the merit of Christ which should make the accomplishment of election

possible,¹ although, indeed, from another point of view, God appointed this work of Christ from grace. Now, whether the doctrine of predestination precede or follow the doctrine of Christ's person and work with Lutheran theologians, it is a thing of course that the latter doctrine is not affected by the former, but conversely. For while God indeed has the desire (*desiderium*) to save all by the mission and exhibition of His Son, but yet that salvation takes place only in those who believe, in the exercise of their own independent will, there is a contradiction between the result of Christ's work or the extent of justification and the purpose for which Christ was sent; and the decree of election, regulated as it is by the option of men, is in contradiction with the purpose which precedes in the mind and wish of God. In short, the Lutheran assertion that Christ was designed to be *pro omnibus et singulis hominibus*, a destiny which, even by the eternal decree of God, is not realized, renders it impossible that the carrying out of one Divine purpose can be recognised in the history of redemption; and therefore the theology of the Lutherans in the seventeenth century never

¹ Arminius was the first who from Eph. i. 4 pressed the doctrine of election in Christ. With regard to the meaning of the phrase, he expressed himself variously, designating Christ in virtue of His passion at one time as *causa meritoria, qua gratia et gloria est parata*; at another time as *causa meritoria eorum bonorum, quæ decreto electionis fidelibus destinata sunt* (Compare Twisse: *Vindicia gratia, potestatis ac providentiæ Dei*, p. 36). The former interpretation was adopted by his followers (Schweizer: *Centraldogmen*, ii. p. 91); the second was insisted upon by his opponents as against the other (for it was no longer possible to avoid that passage from St. Paul). It is the interpretation given in the decision of the Synod of Dort (cap. i. 7): *Certam quorundam hominum multitudinem elegit in Christo, quem etiam ab æterno mediatorem et omnium electorum caput, salutisque fundamentum constituit*. Should this not be held to be sufficiently clear, then Gomarus may be consulted (*Loc. Comm.*, v. p. 63): *Medium electionis est donatio Christi servatoria. . . . Apparet, electionem Christi aliorum ad salutem destinationem ordine non precedere, sed ut medium ei fini subordinatum succedere*. H. Alting (*Loc. Comm.*, iv. p. 66): *Primum summumque mediorum omnium ad salutem præparatorum est Christus. Sumus igitur electi in Christo ut mediatore, ut capite, cujus satisfactione interveniente fieret reconciliatio inter Deum et homines*. This orthodox Calvinist view thus coincides with the Arminian, in so far as both contemplate Christ in connexion with the subject of election, in His quality as the Giver of satisfaction for sinners; but they differ from one another inasmuch as God's plan of satisfaction through Christ is regarded by the Arminians as the ground, and by the Calvinists as the consequence, of the elective decree. Now the Lutherans, having adopted the Arminians' unlimited conception of freedom (Schweizer ii. p. 209), have also accepted the Arminian assertion that Christ is the *causa meritoria electionis*. On the other side, in one circle of Reformed divines the view has been developed that election in Christ is valid for all those who in connexion with Him as their Head shall attain to

became a system (although this title was sometimes made use of), but remained an aggregate of *loci theologici*.

On the other hand, the Reformed assertion that Christ's saving purpose at the outset was limited to the persons in whom it comes to *applicatio* or *efficacia*, is in accordance with the systematic position that, in the course of the history of redemption, guided as that is by God, His previous purpose must be recognised. If now the result of Christ's influence upon men be the formation and organisation of a part of mankind into the fellowship of the kingdom of God under Christ as the Head, this body must have been contemplated in God's eternal election. This fellowship, therefore, is the *objectum applicationis gratiæ* (Keckermann, H. Alting, Amesius). Christ, in fine, acts as the subject of satisfaction and of merit, because He is regarded as the *caput et sponsor electorum*, and directs His intention in accordance with this. Were this otherwise, says Amesius (p. 106), like Bucanus (p. 226), Christ's work of redemption would be of ambiguous result; the Father would have appointed the Son unto death, and the Son would have

final salvation. In fact, both by the rule *ultimum in executione est primum in intentione*, and also by consideration of the circumstance that Christ's satisfaction does not establish but presuppose His dignity as Head of the Church that is to be redeemed, Amesius teaches (*Medulla*, i. cap. 25, sect. 27): *Electio unica fuit in Deo respectu totius Christi mystici, Christi et eorum, qui sunt in Christo, sicut creatio una fuit totius generis humani; prout tamen secundum rationem distinctio quædam concipi potest, Christus primo fuit electus ut caput, ac deinde homines quidam ut membra in ipso*. Witsius (*De Œconomia Fæd. Dei*, iii. 4. 2): *Electi sunt in Christo ut mediatore et propterea electo, qui uno eodemque actu sic ipsis datus est in caput et dominum, ut illi simul ei data sint in membra et peculium, servandi ejus merito et efficacia, et in communione cum ipso*. Heidegger (*Corp. Theol. Chr.*, loc. v. 28): *Electionis consilium ab æterno dispositum est per modum voluntatis, qua Deus in Christo hæredes justitiæ et regni sui apud se ipsum definivit. 29: Ad eligendum quosdam Deum in universum impulit amor gloriæ suæ. . . . In specie autem amor personarum S. Trinitatis electionis intra Deum causa est. 30: In æterno illo testamento scriptus principalis hæres est Jesus Christus partim ut hæres omnium, partim ut hæreditatis sibi datæ vindex et assertor. . . . Unde liquet hæreditatem filii esse homines quosdam sibi datos, ut per eum salvati gloriæ ejus consortes fierent. . . . Elegit nos in ipso, Christo, in hærede principali cohæredes, in principe salutis nostræ salvandos, in capite corpus*. By this view of election, the tradition that descends from Luther and Calvin is, properly speaking, departed from. If the elect be represented *a priori* as a whole in Christ, they are then no longer the many individuals with whom the *reprobi* in the other act of God's will are to be co-ordinated. This deduction, however, has not been clearly brought out. Still I find that such a change of the idea of election, while it withdraws from Calvin, approaches the line inaugurated by Zwingly (Compare *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.*, xiii. p. 94). I believe also that these theologians have rightly apprehended the meaning of the apostle Paul.

submitted Himself thereto, in uncertainty whether any one at all was to be saved by Him; the whole result of this mystery would depend upon the unrestrained arbitrariness of men. And Bucanus (p. 396) points out that this seeming vocation of all, upon which the Lutheran assertion proceeds, really is not directed to *omnes et singuli*, but rather is indefinite.

However this controversy may be decided with the aid of the exegetical and dialectic means at present available, and however we may obviate the difficulty which the Lutherans felt with regard to the Reformed view of the thought of election, in counterpoise to which view is the offensiveness of that estimate of human freedom which the Lutherans borrowed from the Arminians, the Reformed theory at all events has this advantage: that it gives strong emphasis to the idea of the Church. Christ, in His doing and suffering, having been conscious, as Head of the elect, that He was doing and suffering for them and in their room, the formation of the Church is recognised as the direct end of His historical activity, even although yet other means secured by the activity of the exalted Saviour are necessary to the attainment of the actual result. The Church being represented as the immediate object of the *efficacia*—in other words, of those operations of the exalted Christ—the identity of the subject of *exinanitio* and of *exaltatio* (which in appearance are opposed) is put on a firm footing by the oneness of the purpose to which they related. Finally, on this presupposition the advantage is gained that the regeneration and justification of the individual cannot even be conceived outside of the Church, which, binding him up with Christ and the other members of Christ, embraces the individual in idea and in fact before he is at all conscious of his justification. Thus is the assumption made possible that the *justificatio activa* of the individual, whether it be represented as a transient act of regeneration or as an immanent act of God *in foro celi*, is valid and effectual for all the elect in virtue of the general sentence of justification, previous to *justificatio passiva* and the consciousness of a change of state that the testimony of the Holy Ghost brings. At the same time, the objective validity of this fact for the individual is maintained, even though the subjective sense of it, the feeling of peace and joy in the Holy Ghost cannot be detected with equable strength and continuous duration. The

Lutheran doctrine has not equalled these attainments. No doubt, it also, by referring to Christ's kingly and prophetic office in His state of exaltation, deduces the rise of the Church as an indirect consequence of the priestly activity of the God-man in His state of humiliation. But it does not accomplish this by exhibiting any relation of purpose. On the contrary, it only places Christ's two offices in chronological sequence, and arranges the facts contained in them in the order of the three offices. The Lutheran doctrine amounts to this, that Christ, who in the state of humiliation has given satisfaction for all men to God, in His state of exaltation gathers, maintains, and equips with the gifts of salvation His Church,—in His office of prophet mediately by sending the *ministri verbi divini*, and in His kingly office by the Word and sacraments, the vehicles of the Holy Spirit. That no mutual connexion between these two facts is traced must indeed be charged against the Reformed divines as much as against the Lutherans. But this error is less fatal to the Reformed than to the Lutheran doctrine. For the Reformed view of Christ's merit is brought into direct connexion with the purpose of founding the Church, and is dominated by the supreme idea of the *regnum gratiæ Christi*, and the *applicatio meriti* has for its object the Church, and the individual only as a member of the Church. This order of ideas could not be destroyed even though it was omitted to ingraft the mission of the ministers of the Word by Christ as a prophet into the active exercise of his kingship in forming and maintaining His Church.

The Lutheran view of the matter, on the other hand, does not satisfy the interests of the Christianity of the Evangelical Church, and therefore tends to injure it. Inasmuch as the two facts are brought into close conjunction, that Christ in His state of exaltation sends the ministers of the Divine Word as a Prophet, and gathers and maintains the Church by Word and sacrament as King, it certainly seems, when viewed from one side, that the connexion of the thought of the Church with the doctrine of the *meritum Christi* is very strongly brought out. It seems as if we had only to note that the ministers are the mediate organs of Christ in His state of exaltation, the depositaries of the Divine Word, and the administrators of the sacraments, in which the merit of Christ is applied to believers, in

order to draw the conclusion that the community of believers is to be regarded as the immediate product of the official functions of the ministers, and as the mediate product, in His state of exaltation, of the God-man, who made them possible by His merit in His humiliation. But this is not the intention of the Lutheran doctrine. For the article "Of the Church" declares that *vocatio ordinaria* is the constitutive characteristic of the minister of the Word. Now the *jus vocationis* indeed pertains in the last instance to Christ, but *ecclesia est minus principalis causa vocationis ministrorum* (Baier). In other words, the Church is not merely the product, but also the efficient prerequisite or the intermediate cause of the ministry of the Word. But why do we not meet with these conditions earlier, viz., in the doctrine of the application of grace, where it is much needed to prevent the wrong conclusion that has just been pointed out? Because, we answer, theologians did not rise above the isolation of theological *loci* to a systematic arrangement of the thoughts that demand to be brought into mutual relation. Lutheran theology maintains indeed its evangelical character unstained in the proposition that the Church of believers is the immediate cause as well as the end of the *ministerium ecclesiasticum* (p. 184), that the latter accordingly is only a middle term in the notion of the Church. But this truth, which was never denied, falls short of its full effect in the Lutheran doctrine, because the idea of the Church is not brought directly into connexion with the doctrine of Christ's merit, and laid at the foundation of the doctrine of the *applicatio gratiæ*. What the Reformed doctrine has done in this respect is quite the reverse of being anti-Lutheran in principle. The Reformed divines have only soared above the Lutherans, and advanced their common task from which the latter shrank.

But not merely does the evangelical character of Lutheranism fall short in this representation; the churchly character of Christendom does so also. The *applicatio gratiæ*,—first the *donatio fidei* (*regeneratio*), then also *pœnitentia*, and, in consequence, *justificatio* come to pass, according to the Lutheran doctrine, in such a way that the individual sinner experiences the appropriate influence of law and gospel, which are set before him by the ministers of the word. As passing through

contritio he attains faith, *i.e.* confidence in the promise of grace and in Christ's merit, objective justification, as an immanent act of God,¹ coincides, in point of time, with his consciousness of it, that is, with the awakening of *consolatio conscientiae* and *lætitia spiritualis*. In this view no account is taken of a feeling of fellowship with the Church of believers, without a previous impression of which, however, no individual religious consciousness finds place, and without which that consciousness has no Church-quality. As rather the *justificandus* or *justificatus*, in spite of the instrumentality of word and sacraments, is confronted with God in a position of individual isolation, he is led by an inevitable craving to recognise his objective justification in the constancy of his *lætitia spiritualis*, and so to an artificial tension of sentiment which at best can be gained in the smaller circle of persons who share his aspirations, *i.e.* in a state of sectarian separation; and, even in that case, only with interruptions by moments of despair, or with the risk of lasting self-deception.² Now, Schneckenburger³ calls attention to the fact that the course of the Reformed doctrine of justification, referring to the individual only in so far as he is counted a member of the Church, corresponds to those demands which Catholicism alone pretends to satisfy, and that too in a higher sphere of spirituality. Lutheranism, on the other hand, maintains the principle of individualism; or, in its interpretation of justification, it represents the individual as an independent and special quantity determined by the transcendent judgment of God. But at the same time, Schneckenburger notices that the Lutherans recognise the value of the external objectivity of the Church as the means whereby that

¹ If such a Reformed theologian, as, for example, Witsius (Lib. iii. 8. 59, 60), represents the objective justification of the individual *in foro cæli* as taking place at the moment when the regenerate person attains to faith, he, at all events, distinguishes from this the *insinuatio sententiæ Dei per spiritum sanctum*. Conversely, Maresius (*Syst. Theol.* loc. 11. 57, 58), like the Lutherans, teaches that God's sentence and the consciousness of it coincide in time; but to make up for this he represents the dispositive acts of striving after righteousness, which fall within the justification of the individual, as proceeding from God; and these, as they proceed from faith and presuppose the general sentence of justification passed upon the elect, betray the Reformed type of doctrine which quite excludes the idea that God's objective sentence and the subjective consciousness thereof should coincide in time and in experience.

² The Autobiography of Albert Knapp serves as a proof.

³ *Zur kirchl. Christologie*, p. 141.

judgment of God is conveyed to the consciousness; and that herein this system also appears to approximate in a special manner to Catholicism. Further comparisons associated with this opinion I leave untouched, because in them are presented uncertain deductions from a statement which is itself incomplete. For the more spiritual character which is ascribed to the Reformed use of the idea of the Church as distinguished from the Catholic must be attributed to the circumstance that the justification of the individual is, in the Catholic view, made to depend upon the *ecclesia repræsentans*—upon the legal guild of sacramentally privileged clergy; while in the Reformed sense it is made to depend upon the Church as the *ecclesia electorum*—upon the previous consideration that the individual possesses all the benefits of grace, and above all, justification only in the *corpus mysticum Christi*, within which the word of God and the sacraments assert their objective significance as indispensable Divine means for the realization of the idea of the Church. Between these two positions there is nothing but opposition. If now the Lutheran apprehension of the matter appears to approach the Catholic, because it makes the justification of the individual to depend upon these objective things—the word of God and the sacraments—the difference still holds good, that however distinctly the *ministri ecclesiæ* are here presupposed, yet those instrumentalities of the Divine activity are never at all identified with, or referred to, any empirical prerogative of the clergy. But as in the Lutheran representation of the doctrine it is not stated in the right place that the keys *principaliter ecclesiæ traditæ sunt*, and that the sacraments cannot be conceived of apart from and previous to the *communio fidelium*, it is easy to understand why the continued obscurity on this subject causes the appearance of a community of interest between the Lutheran and Catholic conceptions of the matter, and in the case of many leads to an aimless grasping at this phantom. But the negligent treatment of the idea of the Church on this point avenges itself in the way that has been already specified, in that the justification of the individual, although subordinated to the Church instrumentalities, seems to require to be maintained as a conscious possession in the way of isolated excitement of feeling. The defect of the Lutheran doctrine on this point thus explains why, within the

limits of Lutheranism, the problem of evangelical Church-life is always hampered, either alternately or simultaneously, with aberrations towards Romanizing over-estimation of the ecclesiastical office, or towards pietistic isolation and self-torture of individual Church members, as well as spiritual pride on the part of these in their narrower fellowship with each other.¹

44. The divergencies between the two evangelical Confessions in the doctrines of reconciliation and justification do not betray any generic difference. For the tendency of the doctrine is in both cases the same, namely, to guarantee to the believer, standing in the Church or under the influence of the Church's means of grace, the right of religious intercourse with God, notwithstanding the presence of actual sin. The steps of the progress of the thought are identical in the leading points, and the differences in this respect partly arise from the diverse degrees of scientific zeal, and partly from mutual misunderstandings which did not admit of being cleared up in the then state of exegetical knowledge and of dialectical culture. But the community of interest between the two confessions in these doctrines is seen most clearly when they are brought into conflict with unchurchly and antichurchly efforts to set aside the doctrine of reconciliation through Christ. These culminate in Socinianism, and have been worked out with the greatest technical care by the founders of that school. But they have their origin within the circle of the Anabaptists.

The phenomenon of Anabaptism, in the many forms in which it appears, proceeds, *first*, on the principle that Christianity must be realized as the fellowship of actively holy persons—of such holy persons as attain to the highest possible degree of freedom from all sin, or to inability to sin. In the *second* place, it results from this effort (analogous to Donatism), that the Church is represented as the sum of actively holy and sinless persons, but not as the prior whole within which the individual receives his Christian character. The mark of this principle is the rejection of infant baptism as worthless; and, from the circumstances of the time, the practice of re-baptism of adults,

¹ I do not mean to affirm that the Church development of Calvinism has been so normal that no similar aberrations have occurred within its sphere. The phenomena of Independency (analogous to pietism) have manifested themselves even much more extensively in it, but they connect themselves with other points of doctrine and with special historical occasions.

whereby they made public profession of their adherence to the party. *Thirdly*, all our common Christianity that has existed up till now—the Christian state as well as the Church—is declared to be worthless, as being an inadmissible commixture of the kingdom of God with the world. In the expectation of the hyper-historical kingdom of Christ, therefore, a complete reconstruction of society, both religious and social, is aimed at; in the regulation of which the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are adopted as the law-book, and in the realization of which, at one time, abstinence from military service, from public offices, from oaths, was prescribed; at another time, violent outbreak was attempted. In all these points the revolutionary reform that arose from the principle of mystic piety conflicts with the Reformation properly so called, which maintains the ground of the Christian fellowship of the Roman Empire, which takes into account the interests of the universal Church, and which, finally, in its opposition to the legal character of Catholic Christianity, is all the less allied to the Donatistic pursuit of active sinlessness, which however really resolved itself into low views of sin, and therefore of the moral law. Anabaptism rather originates in motives which specifically belong to the stage of Christianity that preceded the Reformation, and each of which was tolerated by the Catholic Church of the middle ages. But, when mysticism no longer chose to continue as *ecclesiola in ecclesia*; when the principle of flight from civilly-organized society no longer chose to confine itself within the limits of the monkish orders, and to submit itself to Church authority; when active sanctity sought other aims than canonization by the Pope; when, on the contrary, these forces sought to overthrow the Christian world, and to lead it back to a visionary ideal of primitive Christianity; then of course Anabaptism came into conflict with the mediæval constitution of Christian society at large.

Since the Anabaptist sect is as guiltless of theology as it could well be; since, as a revolutionary movement, it was propagated among the uneducated classes by means of practical watchwords only,—there are but few persons of theological culture in whose writings instructive consequences crop up, whereby they remove themselves still further from the common convictions of Christendom. Thus when the task of active holiness was prescribed, and the significance of sin de-

preciated, the religious craving of man's nature sought in Christ only the pattern of doing and of suffering, not the mediator of forgiveness of sins. In this the Christian ideal that had been set up by the mendicant orders shows its continued influence as transmitted by German mysticism. In accordance with this Thomas Münzer accentuates the exemplary character of Christ, but passes in silence over His significance as the Reconciler.¹ John Denk,² on the other hand, got so far as to deny Christ's vicarious fulfilment of the law. Though he allows himself to be drawn to a repudiation of that only by a misinterpretation of the Reformation doctrine, as if our fulfilling of the law were rendered superfluous by Christ's substitutionary work (p. 249), yet his denial has to himself the value of a principle. For he is of opinion that every one can atone for his own sins by assenting to his own condemnation, by mortifying his own flesh, and thus re-instating the law in its due place so far as he himself is concerned. And along with his rejection of reconciliation in general through Christ, Denk abandoned his faith in the Divinity of Christ. The former view, and partly also the latter, passed from Denk to the Anabaptists of upper Germany, Jacob Kautz, Balthasar Hubmaier, Ludwig Hetzer.³ In like manner David Joris, the Anabaptist prophet, explains faith in the blood of Christ as the life of the spirit of Christ, as the experience of God's Almighty Word and everlasting power, which is attained in faith.⁴ On the other hand the party of the Mennonites or Baptists, in which the wild Anabaptist movement was moderated, and therefore gained a more enduring existence, couples with the task of building up a community of actively holy persons the recognition of the Reformation principle of justification by Christ's perfect obedience as the sole ground of salvation to which good works belong, only as necessary results of faith. At the same time, the Quakers again, in whose society the later movement of the revolutionary sectarian spirit found rest in the seventeenth century, showed

¹ Seidemann: *Th. Münzer*, p. 120. Erbkam: *Protest. Secten*, p. 502 sq.

² Heberle: *Johann Denk und sein Büchlein vom Gesetz*; *Stud. u. Krit.* 1851, pp. 156, 168.

³ Heberle: *Johann Denk und die Ausbreitung seiner Lehre*; *Stud. u. Krit.* 1855, pp. 841, 849, 854. Keim: *Ludwig Hetzer*; *Jahrb. für Deutsche Theol.* 1856, p. 267 sqq.

⁴ Nippold: *David Joris von Delft*; *Zeitschr. für histor. Theologie*, 1868. Heft 4, p. 513.

themselves so hostile to the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction, as to specify that doctrine as a distinctive mark of the church of Babylon.¹ For the Quaker principle of the inner light, the operation of which, as Barclay admits, is independent of historical knowledge of Christ, excludes the possibility of attaching any real significance to His work, either in doing or in suffering. When, therefore, Barclay in his *Theologiæ vere christianæ apologia* undertakes to show the harmony of the principles of Quakerism with Scripture, the ancient church, and the Reformers, the ambiguousness of his procedure becomes palpable precisely when it takes up the doctrines of reconciliation and justification. For the Reformation form of these doctrines is gainsaid as soon as it is formulated. God did not treat Christ on the same footing as sinners, He is only *quasi in Christo nobis reconciliatus*; Christ's death therefore is only the offer of reconciliation, is only the type and symbol of that true redemption and change which Christ's spirit, the divine light, brings about within the man. This is also real justification, and though it is conceded to Protestantism that man is not regarded as righteous on account of works (which, however, he is capable of producing), Barclay betrays a radical misunderstanding of the fundamental principle of the Reformation, and approximates the Catholic view regarding good works in justification as *causa sine qua non*.²

Previous to this the Mystics alongside of the Lutheran Church, and the Theosophers within it, had expressed themselves much as Barclay does. Not merely do they let the doctrine of the sacrificial death of Christ pass, it is even of some value to them as the victorious struggle with the evil principle; but that historical event is not regarded as the manifest and openly efficient cause of the change which every individual must undergo, but only as a more or less important presupposition of that inner experience upon which the decisive weight is laid by sectarian indifference to the historical central points of the Christian religion. Caspar Schwenkfeld³ sometimes felt himself able to regulate the consciousness of justification by referring to the cross of Christ as the Reformers did; but the

¹ Weingarten : *Revolutionskirchen Englands*, p. 359.

² As above : pp. 208, 375 *sq.*, 381 *sq.*

³ Compare Erbkam : as above, pp. 431-443, 456 *sq.* Baur : *Versöhnungslehre*, p. 460 *sq.*

conflict between his main effort after active sanctity in those who were Christians, and his caricature of the Lutheran doctrine, as if it meant a merely historical faith and an imaginary righteousness, obscured that truth as a whole and made it ineffectual. That lively religious realization of the doing and suffering of Christ, which overleaps the significance of Christ's state of exaltation and only rests upon that ethico-historical representation of Christ's historical works which takes place by the preaching of the word, is combated by him; and against it he maintains that redemption and satisfaction, as well as all other gifts of Christ, must by faith be sought in the spiritual and reigning Christ, in whom everything is summed up and everything is to be found; from Him it must really be derived and conveyed into the ministerial work and office. Rightly considered, this amounts merely to a completion of the fundamental view of the Reformation which has been accomplished by theology; it is no instance of a genuine contradiction. But this last it really is in the intention of Schwenkfeld, for as a Mystic he isolated himself from the historico-ethical and churchly surroundings of Christianity, and taking faith as the means of participation in Divine nature overleaped all historical intermediate agencies. The assumption that the true faith which comes immediately from God rests on God himself in Christ, that it is based upon Being and lays hold of eternal truth, gives so abstract and supernatural a tendency to piety, that it naturally gave the preponderance to the intuition of the exalted Christ over the consideration of His earthly life and death. But now if the soul in its religious exercise moves between a faith thus understood and the intuition of an exalted Christ, it is only consistent that Schwenkfeld will not hear of an imputed righteousness, but rather refers justification or righteous-making to the gracious dealing of God with man, with a view to his blessedness, from first to last, wherein the sinner is converted, regenerated, made devout, righteous, holy, and blessed. If in regeneration Christ imparts His own righteousness, His own piety, His own nature, and the fellowship of His being, it is easily explained why we seek them in Him not in His first state historically viewed, but in His other state, as He is now glorified in order to dispense heavenly blessings, and also has been appointed by God the

Father to be Head of the Church.¹ For the former standpoint is suited at most for the children who are satisfied with the milk of the word; grown men need strong food, the knowledge of the exalted Christ.²

John Denk and his followers abandoned the doctrine of reconciliation because it was practically indifferent and superfluous to them; Schwenkfeld was able to let it pass because he deprived it of its real practical meaning. In opposition to this circle of ideas Socinianism has in the first instance a theoretical motive for its opposition to this doctrine, which indeed became operative in that direction only under certain practical conditions. All the arguments of Faustus Socinus against the doctrine of reconciliation by Christ as a whole proceed upon the idea of the unlimited arbitrariness of God, as conversely the Reformation view of the doctrine is based upon the assumption of a relation of God to men regulated *a priori* by law. The former idea of God is that of Duns Scotus, the theologian of the Franciscan Order. Now I have shown in another place³ that this theological principle, the serious effects of which upon the doctrine of reconciliation had already been hinted at by Duns as possible (p. 69), took effect in this direction through Bernardino Ochino upon Lælius Socinus, and through him again upon his nephew Faustus. Duns, however, had only hinted it to be *possible* in God's unfettered arbitrary choice that a mere man might make atonement for all, or that each man might do so for himself; in all other respects he had categorically adhered to the profession of the Church's faith in

¹ The coincidence between Schwenkfeld and Andreas Osiander upon this point is clear, and obviously betokens a common origin. Yet the view of Osiander the theologian is practically conditioned and limited by his connexion with the Church, in a very different way from the view of the anti-churchly sectary.

² I do not enter upon the analogous trains of thought of the Theosophers, Valentin Weigel, and Jacob Böhme, for these pursue merely theoretical interests, and not those of religious fellowship. The biblical colouring of doctrines which are at once dualistic and pantheistic surely does not oblige us to incorporate them in a history of theology, for theology must always have as its characteristic feature the purpose of serving the religious community, however that may be represented. Neither do the protests against the idea of imputation, and the allegorizing interpretation which seeks the appeasing of God's wrath in individual experiences, which these men put forward each on his own behalf possess any critical value for the treatment of the orthodox form of the doctrine of reconciliation.

³ *Geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott*. (Art. iii., *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* xiii. p. 268 sq., 283 sq.)

the atonement by the God-man. Now the fact that Faustus asserted that hypothesis to be the actual and necessary fact presupposes a complete breach on his part with the universal faith of the Church. But to this his uncle was brought, like himself and so many other Italians, by the state of Christian society in Italy. Here the empire had not regained the power it had lost to Gregory VII. and Innocent III.; here, therefore, the Romish Church presented itself as the only possible form in which Christian society could be organized. It dominated the masses of the people, which was not prepared by any expectation of Church reform for accepting Reformation influences from Germany and Switzerland. Men who had received a literary education were almost the only persons that were accessible to these influences; but these were almost invariably prevented by the state of public opinion, and by the unshaken power of the agencies of the Church from forming themselves publicly into congregations, and were thus compelled to meet only in secret. Their part in the Reformation therefore, even though it originally directed itself towards the ethical central points of that movement, found neither the stimulus nor the restraint which were needful, and which are guaranteed by the public activity of the general church consciousness. This is the reason why amongst so many of the Italians, who attached themselves to the Reformation, it was not the churchly spirit, but, on the contrary, either Anabaptist sectarianism or the inclination to scholastic criticism of all dogmas, or both together, that was cherished. For, to the interests of the school, criticism of the doctrine of the Trinity and of the doctrine of reconciliation lies quite as near as the construction of the right idea of justification.

The idea of Christian society, which the Socinians define and strive after under the name of church, is nothing but a school. The Reformers had defined the Church as the fellowship of believers or saints, the marks of which fellowship are the preaching of God's word and the right use of the sacraments, by means of which instrumentalities God accomplishes and secures the existence of sanctified believers. As a condition of the Church (in subordination to the word of God) was also required the recognition of those theological truths which betoken the right understanding of God's word, and without

which therefore the exhibition of the contents of the Divine word comes to nothing. But it was always firmly maintained that this *pura doctrina evangelii* is only a mark of the Church, and that participation in that function of the Church does not necessarily imply that one actually belongs to the number of persons set apart by God. In opposition to this line of thought, now, the Racovian Catechism maintains: Qu. 488: *Ecclesia visibilis est castus eorum hominum, qui doctrinam salutarem tenent et profitentur.* Qu. 489: *Salutaris doctrina, quam quicumque castus habet ac profitetur, est vera Christi ecclesia. . . . Tenere salutarem doctrinam, cum ecclesie Christi sit natura, signum illius, si proprie loquaris, esse non potest, cum signum ipsum a re, cujus signum est, differre oporteat.*¹ This thought is thus antithetically elucidated by Faustus: Though it is necessary to salvation that one should be within the true Church of Christ, it does not follow that he must set himself to seek out the true Church, but only that he should set himself to discover the saving doctrine of Christ. He who attains to this will also find out the others who possess this doctrine in common with himself. For it is not enjoined upon anybody to learn the doctrine of salvation from the true Church. For the true Church itself can only be recognised by its saving doctrine, which therefore must previously be recognised and possessed as such; and hereby participation in the true Church is already attained.²

Now the fellowship, the essence of which is a doctrine, and which therefore continues to exist only so long as that doctrine expresses the convictions of the members of that fellowship, is a school. The doctrine, moreover, which is polemically and dialectically set forth in the Racovian Catechism as the result of technical investigation of Scripture, makes only a school possible. It is thus an illusion, or a fiction, or an expression

¹ *Bibliotheca fratrum Polonorum*, i. p. 323 sq.

² The idea introduced into the common practice of the Lutherans by Melancthon (p. 238) coincides almost entirely with this view. The editor of the Racovian Catechism, Oeder, Dean of Feuchtwangen (1739), declares himself to be in agreement with the definitions cited above, only stipulating that the Church consists of men, and therefore *sana doctrina ad pascendam regendamque ecclesiam summe necessaria* is to be regarded not as the essence but as the mark of the Church. But in so far as the Lutherans seek their orthodoxy in the affirmation that pure theological doctrine is the chief mark of the Church, they approximate most closely, by their attachment to Melancthon, to the Socinians.

of embarrassment when Socinianism, which in these principles opposes itself to all churches, still at the same time embraces other churches with itself under the idea of the universal Church. For the other churches in fact affirm neither in form nor in substance the salutary doctrine of Christ as Socinianism understands it. It is also a mere illusion on the part of Faustus, in which he has been followed by modern theological radicalism, when he thinks that, by his denial of the doctrines of reconciliation and the Trinity, he is carrying out to its true consequence the reformation of Luther and Zwingli.¹ For the school as such is not a thing higher than the Church; two views of Christianity, which are specifically opposed and mutually exclusive, arise according as its destination is to be realized in the religious community or in the school of theology and morals. In fact the Socinian form of Christianity as a school has relationship only with the sectarian manifestation of Anabaptism. In both Christian fellowship is regarded exclusively as a product of special activity on the part of the members. Both, too, oppose themselves to the conditions of the Christian fellowship of the Roman Empire. It is, therefore, not an accidental circumstance that Faustus found a congenial soil for his principles in the Anabaptist circles of Poland; and although the community he founded, like the Mennonites, refrained from direct opposition to the power of the state, it never attained to any clear and undisputed principles respecting the right and duty of military service, and of investiture with public offices as long as it existed in Poland.² That, on the other hand, Faustus strove after the abolition of Anabaptism in the Unitarian congregations all his life, and accomplished it shortly before his death (1603, at a Synod at Rakow) shows that he was able to direct the enthusiastic tendency of sectarianism into the path of scholastic moderatism, the theological apparatus of which was designed merely to put

¹ I do not in this deny that the doctrine of the Trinity, which the Reformers adopted, and the doctrine of reconciliation to which they and their disciples gave a new shape, admit of improvement both in respect of matter and of form, or that they demand it both exegetically and dialectically; but I do deny that the significance of these doctrines for the Church character of the Reformation can be understood only when one imagines the purpose of the Reformation to have been fulfilled in the *shelving of its problems* by the Socinians.

² Fock, *Socinianismus*, p. 704 sq.

on a secure footing the moral self-culture of the individual, the effort after ethical perfection in accordance with the commandments and promises of Christ as against the opposing pretensions of the universal faith of the Church.

45. If the tendency of Socinianism is ascertained to be this, then the positive motive power of its rejection of the Church's doctrine of reconciliation is also known. Accordingly, at the outset it must be doubted whether the Socinian arguments against it, however acute, reach so far as to prove the falsity and untenableness of the tendency of the Church doctrine. But unless we should state the issue *thus*, the controversy would appear insoluble. No standpoint could be reached from which both parties could be judged, and it would be impossible to draw any lesson from the history of the dispute. The peculiar Socinian view of the purpose and of the contents of Christianity is historically conditioned by that mediæval doctrine which regards God as the absolute Will, that is, the law and perfect rule of all things, whose attitude to man is determined by no *a priori* fixed universal principle, and therefore is necessarily referred to the standard of judgment that the principles of private law afford. This is seen, in particular, in the principle stated by Thomas with which we are already acquainted (p. 52), that sin has the character of a personal injury or of a pecuniary obligation, and that God therefore, like any private individual, is entitled to forgive sins without anything further. Socinianism has brought this tendency to its full issues after its own fashion, having carried out the character of finitude, which this freedom from moral restrictions implies, in other directions also, particularly by explaining away the eternity of God into a life enduring without beginning and without end. With the rights and reasonableness of God are confronted single men in their individuality, conceived as possessing a freedom equally devoid of all moral contents. By the man Christ Jesus they, according to a free determination of God, are led out of their natural condition away to immortality and eternal life. Christ contributes to this end, having as Prophet in His historical existence declared the commandments and the promises, and having also given the example of a perfect life, and ratified it by His death. Christ transcends the limits of the Old Testament, inasmuch

as He reformed the Mosaic law, added to it new moral precepts and sacramental appointments, gave a strong impulse to the observance of these by the promises of everlasting life and the Holy Spirit, and assured men of the general purpose of God to forgive the sins of those who repent and seek to reform themselves. It is admitted that no man can perfectly fulfil the moral law; and justification, therefore, results not from works but from faith. But faith means that trust in the giver of the law which includes in itself actual obedience to Him so far as that is practicable to men. Now Christ, by His resurrection, by His having obtained Divine power, guarantees to all those who in this meaning of faith attach themselves to Him,—in the first instance, actual liberation from sin according to the measure in which they follow the impulse He gives them to newness and betterness of life; and, further, the attainment of the supernatural end set before them; and also by the Holy Spirit, which He bestows, the previous assurance of everlasting life, with the commencement whereof the forgiveness of sins of the individual is complete. In this we have a palpable indication of the practical antithesis between Socinianism and Church Protestantism. In the latter the forgiveness of sins is regarded as the beginning, in the former as a more remote result of the Christian life. The opposition of Socinianism to the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction, which lies at the foundation of the former view, thus admits of explanation from this point; but this Socinian estimate of the forgiveness of sins as an accident of the Christian life is at the same time an indication that in Christ the founder merely of an ethical school is discerned, and not the founder of a religious fellowship. And if this contrariety does not always show itself with clearness, if rather it must be allowed that Socinianism establishes peculiar religious aims, regulative principles and conditions, the circumstance is to be accounted for by the fact that Socinianism, as being the first attempt at an exhibition of Christianity as an ethical school, was still exposed to the influences of the view of Christianity which up to that time had exclusively prevailed, and from which it had in principle withdrawn itself.

The arguments of Faustus Socinus against the Church view of Christ's place as a Saviour, are directed against the necessity

and against the possibility of the idea of satisfaction.¹ The necessity of satisfaction in relation to sin, and to God's purpose to forgive sins, had been founded by the Church-theology on the consideration that God is necessitated by His Being to punish sin, and if He does not punish the guilty persons directly, He must yet punish their innocent representative. Faustus, on the other hand, from his diametrically opposed idea of God, maintained that He is at liberty to punish or to forgive sins : that His penal justice or His wrath and His pity are not habitual properties, but only momentary alternating acts ; that sin is analogous to an insult to honour, or to a pecuniary debt, and, therefore, just like these, can be remitted without further condition. If God under the Old Testament forgave sins without receiving satisfaction, He can do so also under the New ; and the parable in Matt. xviii. 21 *sqq.* evidences that absolute unconditioned mercy is a fundamental principle of action with God. All the less can God's justice be regarded as laying the foundation of the idea of satisfaction, because it is simply unjust to let the guilty go unpunished, and to punish the innocent in their stead. The *impossibility* of satisfaction is clear to him (1.) from the relation that it is asserted to have to the purpose of forgiveness. For here between the purpose proposed and the assumed means, a pure contradiction emerges. Remission is conceivable only where a debt is presupposed ; but there is no longer any debt to be remitted where satisfaction has been given. Remission involves in itself two conditions—that the debtor is freed from his obligation ; and that the creditor renounces his claim to satisfaction. Should, perhaps, Christ's satisfaction be judged of in accordance with the analogy of the legal proceeding of novation, then it is quite clear that the debt is not remitted, but the debtor only deceived. (2.) Satisfaction is unthinkable when viewed in connexion with the scheme of substitution which is applied. For (a.) pecuniary mulcts can indeed be paid by other persons than the debtor, because one person's money can easily become another's ; but not personal, corporal punishments, such as eternal death. Or their transference to an innocent person would be unjust. Undoubtedly it may be

¹ *De Christo Salvatore*, Lib. iv. 5. *Praelectiones theologicae*, cap. 18 *sqq.* ; in the *Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum*. I think it right to indicate the arguments only in their main points, and refer to the full statement in Fock : *Socinianismus*, 615 *sq.*

observed in history that sins not their own are imputed to men, and that men suffer in the punishment of a guilty person. But that always presupposes implication in the sin that is punished : at all events, companionship in another's punishment has not for an innocent person the character of punishment. The orthodox doctrine, finally, cannot support itself by the assertion that Christ as Head of the Church was qualified to take punishment upon Himself in room of His members. For that relation first came into existence in virtue of His resurrection ; but as an earthly Man, and with respect to His suffering unto death, Christ does not stand in any special connexion with other men, and His dying does not deliver His disciples from the necessity of undergoing death. (b.) Neither can the positive fulfilment of the law have any substitutionary value for others ; for Christ was bound to fulfil the law for Himself, and His obedience, no more than His passion, can be separated from Him in thought and transferred to others. (c.) The assertion, that Christ in our room has fulfilled the law and also endured the punishment, is inconsistent with the righteous exercise of the law, which demands either the one or the other, but not both together. (3.) Christ's suffering unto death does not as matter of fact come up to the necessities of the case implied in the idea of satisfaction. For (a.) satisfaction, as full payment of a debt, can only be thought of if every one who was liable to eternal death had found a special substitute. (b.) Christ as our substitute would have had to endure eternal death, against which His resurrection shows that He did not suffer such a penalty. (c.) That His passion did not amount to eternal death, cannot be explained by asserting Christ's Godhead, and the infinite value of His death that resulted therefrom. For, in that case, it were cruel in God to impose upon Him so bitter a passion ; when a much smaller degree of suffering would have been sufficient in room of the punishment deserved by us. But Christ's divinity cannot give any higher value at all to His passion, for His Godhead itself could not suffer. But even were this possible, and even if the divinity had suffered in Christ, still the infinite value of Godhead ought to be attributed only to the being of God, but not to the temporal acts or moments of suffering. But, finally, the infinity of punishment necessary for every sinner would demand an equal

number of satisfactions of infinite value. (4.) The connexion of the idea of imputation with that of satisfaction is superfluous and contradictory; and so is the exhortation to have faith in Christ's satisfaction. For, assuming that Christ gave to God satisfaction for our guilt, the matter is then at an end. An imputation finds place in legal transactions only where no prestation has preceded; but where, as in the assumed case of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, the prestation has been made, then an imputation (*accepti latio*) has no meaning.¹ Just as absurd is the assumption that Christ's satisfaction requires our faith ere it can be valid. For either that act of His is perfect in itself, in which case its validity for the individual does not depend upon the circumstance of his believing it to have been done for him; or, if the latter condition holds good, then is the satisfaction not complete in itself. (5.) The doctrine of Christ's satisfaction is inconsistent with the recognition of the duty of a righteous and law-abiding conduct of life, and opens up the way to sin, or, at least, to carelessness with respect to sin. While Faustus thus denies the validity of the idea of satisfaction at all points, it is not without interest to notice that he admits the idea of Christ's merit in a certain sense. Indubitably, if the strict sense of duty is to be accepted, then every merit of Christ, whether for Himself or for us, is excluded: *Nihil fecit quod ipsi a Deo injunctum non fuisset. Ubi debitum, ibi nullum verum et proprium meritum.* Thus the idea admits of application only in an improper sense, on the presupposition of definite divine decree and of divine promise. As, however, the latter adds nothing to our idea of the obligatory character of a course of action, it can explain the idea of merit only by bringing into consideration in an exceptional way, not the

¹ *De Christo Servatore*, iv. 2 (p. 216): Si pro ipso solutum est, ut acceptum illi feratur, nihil est opus.—Acceptum ferre significat pro soluto habere, licet vero solutum non sit. Accepti latio est per-sola-verba-obligationis liberatio.—Quodsi vel ipse vel alius pro eo revera solvat, accepti lationi nullus est locus. It is incredible, but a fact, that the expression *acceptilatio* is used by almost every one as synonymous with *acceptatio*, as if it came from a verb *acceptilare*. For example, Schneckenburger (*Lehrbegriffe der kl. prot. Kirchenparteien*, p. 18) speaks of acceptilation of Christ's merit in Duns Scotus. So already H. Altling (*Theol. probl. nova*, p. 726) in *judicio forensi absolutio a reatu prior est acceptilatione personæ et imputatione justitiæ*, where the forensic term is quite unsuitable, and only *acceptatio personæ in gratiam* would be appropriate. The relation of the two ideas is also wrongly explained by Strauss: *Glaubenslehre*, ii. p. 315.

obligation in duty, but the voluntary nature of the action criticised. This thought virtually amounts to the definition of the idea as laid down by Duns and by Calvin (p. 205). And even when Faustus contradicts the latter, applying like Thomas the *strict* idea of merit to the legal judgment upon an action, he is nevertheless in the admission of Christ's merit, which as matter of fact he makes, at one with Calvin. This is a new proof of what has already been said, that the ideas of Christ's merit and of His satisfaction are derived from quite different modes of viewing the question. That of satisfaction is derived from the presupposition of a reciprocal relation, regulated by purely legal considerations; that of merit from the presupposition of a reciprocal ethical relation which, however, is not viewed from the highest standpoints of law and duty.

46. The objections raised by Faustus against Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy have their consistency, *first*, in the presupposition which he makes that the doctrines of reconciliation and justification point to a relation between God and man that is apprehended in an exclusively forensic sense. From this point of view he thought he could discover a contradiction between the ideas of Christ's satisfaction and the imputation of that satisfaction in faith, and also between the recognition of that thought and the duty of moral life. But the assumption itself is erroneous. The historical connexion is, that the Reformers by means of the thought of the imputation of Christ's obedience, sought to attain the religious regulation of the moral self-consciousness in a way that should be at once individually true, and also in conformity with the conditions of Christian fellowship. The idea of justification has, in relation to faith, moreover, only the appearance of a forensic idea; for the circumstances under which it is always maintained that the unrighteous is pronounced to be righteous quite exclude the juridical standard of judgment. But as the moral obedience of Christ, which as *moral* obedience, as merit, is graciously imputed to the believer unto righteousness, is at the same time as satisfaction set over against the retributive justice of God, the doctrine of atonement is developed in the line of the legal relation between God and men. Thus the doctrine of justification, which in its highest sense is religious and moral in its intention, is only led up to by the doctrine of the propitiation

of God's justice, which, in the strict sense, is juridical. Such is the fact in Lutheran and Reformed orthodoxy, which has not been recognised by Faustus, and by means of which his two last arguments are proved to be wrong.

Secondly, his other objections proceed upon an idea of God which, while it is diametrically opposed to the idea of God maintained by the orthodox party, exhibits the opposite defect. From the premisses assumed by orthodox divines, even when they need considerable correction, certain features of the doctrine of satisfaction do not appear to be so very absurd as Faustus represents them to be. In particular, the assertion of Christ's twofold satisfaction to the law (which at a later period was combated by Piscator also on the same ground) is quite correct, on the assumption that the strict forensic position in relation to God had to be done away with by Christ, not merely so far as sinners were concerned, but for men in general; not merely for the past, but also for the future. And, in general, if the problem is to understand Christ as the Bearer and Mediator of a public relation between God and men, the Socinian way of resolving that into merely private relations between God and individual men is undeniably at a disadvantage as compared with the tendency of orthodox theology. This shows itself all the more clearly in that John Crell was not able to avoid limiting in a very important respect his assertion of the *potestas Dei* by means of the idea of *honestas universa*, and in that the exception he makes from this in favour of God's full power to forgive sin cannot escape the charge of arbitrariness.¹ But if the arbitrary freedom of God, which the Socinians assert upon this point is regarded as form without contents, it cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the orthodox assertions of the inevitable necessity of His penal justice to God in no way harmonizes with the formal conditions of the will; and thus on this point subjects the idea of God to an appearance of natural necessity.² The want of dialectic skill in establishing the

¹ Compare the analysis of Crell's tract *de Deo ejusque attributis* in my *Geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott*. (Art. iii., *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.*, xiii. p. 259 sq.)

² Compare in the above cited article, p. 291 sqq., the account of the attempts made by John Hoornbeek in his *Socinianismus confutatus*, and by Lambert Velthuysen in his treatise *De pœna divina et humana*, to reconcile the orthodox assertion with the claims of the idea of the freedom of the will.

superior principle, is manifestly equally great on both sides. But the evil consequences of this deficiency appear to be greater in their effect upon orthodoxy, inasmuch as the scientific problem it had to solve surpassed in difficulty that of the Socinians, and inasmuch as the latter had the advantage of being assailants while the former had the disadvantage of being put upon the defensive. The unfortunate complication of the orthodox principle shows itself in the following circumstance. The juridical construction of the idea of Christ's satisfaction was originally intended only as a *condition* for the religious and moral certainty of justification in Christ; while the Reformers recognised the providence, or grace, or love of God, as the leading resort of the entire religious consciousness, and His justice, to which satisfaction is required to be given, as the subordinate principle in accordance with which the bestowal of grace through Christ had to be procured. In the theology of the period subsequent to them, this view of the relative value of the two ideas involuntarily underwent a change. The contemplation of God's habitual justice gained the preponderance over the view of His active grace. As God's saving purpose became limited to the narrower idea of grace towards sinners, and was not extended to that of help to men—to the idea of a dominant providence towards the creatures who were destined to become the image of God—His law-giving and law-maintaining justice came to assert to itself the first place in the idea of His character; and if grace towards sinners was not to appear as an exception opposed to the law, some scheme must have been devised such as that which is laid down in the doctrine of satisfaction. Thus the juridical condition of the doctrine of justification changed itself into the dominant principle of that doctrine. In the logically sound development of this principle in its application to the entire material of the doctrine, Reformed theologians have even been able to represent justification, not so much as an act of grace, but rather as an act of God's justice (see above, p. 278). We cannot therefore take it amiss in Faustus that, under the impression caused by this circumstance, he found the ultimate aim of the orthodox doctrine (which lay beyond the juridical train of thought) to be unintelligible, and inconsistent with the premisses. With this prominence given to the juridical idea

of God's justice, the doctrine of election undergoes no change at all. Even in its supralapsarian form, election has its full force, inasmuch as sinful man is regarded as its object; the election of grace, regarded also as eternal, always regards man in the quality which, by the justice of God, is viewed as contrary to the law. The Lutheran doctrine, moreover, assumes nothing else but what Reformed theologians denote by the term *foedus operum*,—that men originally were set over against the law as independent persons with legal rights; that their fulfilment of the law by their deeds had the promise of the reward of eternal life, and that a plan of grace on God's part was occasioned only by sin. All this denotes justice, in the juridical sense, as the fundamental idea of God, which unfortunately leaves unanswered only the question wherein it is that man's legally privileged independence finds its explanation; for creation by God presupposes the thought of man's dependence even in so far as he is a moral power, or one endowed with free will. It is natural that all these difficulties should not have been solved at the outset by the Reformers. On the contrary, it was they who made the difficulties which their successors could not solve; but at the same time the latter, as so often is the case, were unable to apprehend or to appreciate the theological conceptions in which the high religious tact of the Reformers reveals itself. I refer, in the case before us, to the logical subordination of the thought of God's retributive justice to those of His love and of His providence. In this way it was that Faustus Socinus, in his true biblical idea of God's justice, which he brought up in opposition to the orthodox theologians of his time, had none other than Luther for his pattern (p. 202).

The objections of Faustus, in the *third* place, against the juridical references of the doctrine of satisfaction proceed from the forensic and ethical ideas which are generally acknowledged. In this field lies his strength, and with respect to these arguments he has not been confuted by the orthodox. Most incisive is the assertion that obligation to punishment cannot be cancelled for the man who has made himself personally liable to it—that men, indeed, can indirectly be sharers in the punishment of another person as such, but only under condition of a measure of companionship in guilt with the punishable act of another; so that if an altogether innocent person

suffers from the evil results of other men's sins, he cannot regard his suffering as punishment, the personal consciousness of guilt being absent. It is astonishing that the orthodox theologians attempted to evade the force of this objection to their doctrine, by diminishing the distance between the two modes of viewing the matter in the light of civil law and criminal law, when, with reference to the idea of sin, they did not know how to give sufficient emphasis to this distance. Sin must not be compared to a pecuniary debt, or to a private injury to honour, which one may overlook if one chooses, but is violation of public law, comparable to crime, which the legal authorities must punish. But the same Abraham Calovius, who judges in this way, consoles himself with the idea that if a pecuniary debt admits of being discharged by some other person than the debtor, such a possibility in civil law offers an analogy whereby the penal satisfaction of Christ may be explained.¹ The idea also of the surety, which is current with Reformed theologians,² as an expression of the mutual relation that subsists between Christ and the elect, does not serve at all to explain the possibility of the transference of personal punishment from the client to the surety, since it has its place in relations that are regulated by civil law. Bold also, but not convincing, is the assertion of Reformed theologians, that the vicarious fulfilment of the law in suffering of punishment and in action is not in contradiction with the law itself, for this way of fulfilling the law is not forbidden by the law. It is not therefore to be wondered at that even the orthodox side ultimately became convinced of the irrationality of this main point of the doctrine of satisfaction. In this sense the half-orthodox Cartesian Velthuysen declares, that only positive revelation in Holy Scripture establishes the truth of Christ's penal satisfaction, and it is only with

¹ *Scripta Antisociniana*, ii. p. 597 : Satisfactio in pœna pecuniaria, si debitor eandem persolvat, est propria ; si alius quispiam nocentis nomine, est vicaria. —Per similitudinem vel analogiam accommodari possunt satisfactioni penali, quæ in civili proprie reperiuntur. P. 605 : Nihil obstat, quominus analogice et per quandam similitudinem explicetur satisfactio Christi natura civilis satisfactionis.

² Heidegger : *Corpus Theol. Christ.* Loc. xxii. 31. Sicut debitor æs quidem alienum expungere tenetur, sed non ita, ut nonnisi ex peculio suo illud expungere teneatur et non per sponsores seu vadem expungere possit—ita peccator omnino Deo solutionem debet, et justitiam præstare tenetur, sed non ita ex peculio suo, ut aliena sponsoris satisfactio et justitia peccatori in iudicio Dei imputata non sufficiat.

the courage of theological despair that Hollatz supports the authority of Holy Scripture in this regard by saying that what were unjust in men, if they were to punish the innocent, is exactly the reverse in God—a proof of His justice. And even then it was not possible to meet the further objection that, in Christ's suffering and death, the objective equivalent to the eternal death of all sinners is not found. If the difference in respect of quantity between the two things compared was undeniable, then the infinite value of Christ's Godhead had to supplement the quantitative limitation of His suffering and death, so as to bring it up to an equality with the infinitude of the guilt and of the eternal punishment of all sinners. I may here call to mind that these lines of thought taken by Protestant orthodoxy, while they surpass in certainty similar assertions of Thomas, turn just as much as the latter upon a play with the negative word "infinite," the fruitlessness of which had already been pointed out by Duns (p. 60). For, that we do not penetrate to the full compass of the Divine will, its ends, its ways, and its means, and that we are not able to conceive the extent of sin and the infinity of punishment, does not serve to make Christ's divinity and the punishment of sin comparable and, much less, equivalent quantities. However much therefore the orthodox of both schools are confident that Christ's penal suffering corresponds to the strictest justice,—in the case of many, such as Amesius and Maresius, the Scotist word *acceptatio* occurs as an indication of an involuntary impression that God, by an act of equity rather than strict justice, must constitute the equivalence, demanded by the premisses, between Christ's satisfaction and the law's demand for punishment. The objection, on the other hand, raised by Faustus against the satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience, to the effect that it represents only Christ's inalienable duty, could be admitted within the circle of Reformed theology without disparagement to the substitutionary value of that prestation. This was possible in accordance with the view that Christ is the Head of those for whom He acted. Faustus, indeed, at the outset rejected this thought on the ground that such a title was not applicable to Christ before His exaltation.¹

¹ Here the difference between Duns and Thomas reappears between Faustus and the Reformed divines (pp. 66-7).

At the same time, leaving out of view the biblico-theological controversy on this point, it must be admitted that Faustus exhibits with regard to it the method (which has been censured by previous critics) of linking on data one to another in an external way while no inward connexion is discernible between them. What in this respect is least satisfactory is the distance expressed by him between the merely human individual personality of Jesus, which is equally removed from all men, and His position gained by His resurrection as Head of humanity invested with Divine honours. If the Reformed position is not to be at the outset rejected, then the value of Christ's dutiful action, as available for the Church that was to be founded thereby, and His representation of the church before God cannot be denied; especially as in their application to His active obedience, either the ideas of satisfaction and merit are but vaguely distinguished, or the former demands to be so supplemented by the latter that the legal estimate of the matter passes over into the moral. Still the prospect of successfully overcoming Socinian criticism on this point is connected with the position of a new problem, which did not present itself to the older theologians in the form which it must necessarily assume, and therefore had not been at the outset solved by them.

47. "The Socinian doctrine," says Baur (p. 414), "presents such a contrast with the church doctrine as *of itself* must have elicited a mediating theory;" and, according to him, such a theory is to be found in the tract of Hugo Grotius *Defensio fidei catholicæ de satisfactione Christi* (1617). But the real course of theological knowledge on this point is not so compliant with the claims of Hegelian dialectic as this announcement would lead us to expect. Not only had Grotius no intention of mediating between those opposing views, or of discovering their higher logical unity; he had rather the intention of vindicating the church doctrine against Socinian criticism. Why he was unsuccessful in this, why for the idea of penal satisfaction for past sins he substituted that of a penal example for the prevention of future sins, will be seen in the mistake in virtue of which Grotius made the transition from the orthodox premisses to those of Socinianism. His purpose is to confute the statement of Faustus that there is a

contradiction between the thought of the remission of sin and the vicarious satisfaction for sin as the condition of that remission; and he wishes to show how the two are in harmony with each other. For this purpose Grotius lays it down (cap. 2) that God assumes towards men the position of the Head of a moral fellowship analogous to the family or the state. For only there has the thought of punishment and the remission of punishment any place. Hereby is excluded the double assumption upon which the Socinian solution of the problem proceeds. We are to proceed neither according to the scheme of private law, nor according to the idea of the *dominium absolutum*. For on these two analogies Faustus bases his representation of God as personally insulted by sin; so that He is able without further condition to forgive it, as a creditor remits a debt, and as an absolute Master who is bound by no law can disregard an act of disobedience to his personal authority. As the Head of a moral and legally ordered Commonwealth God is distinguished from the *dominus absolutus*, inso-much that He would be unrighteous were He, like an arbitrary master, to remit the punishment of the impenitent. If, however, in this respect the position of God is similar to that of a judge, His position is not in all respects identical with that office, for a judge is subject to the law. But God is not so, inso-much that for the common weal He may remit punishment or partially dispense from the obligations of the law; and this does not belong to a judge as such.

If now the presuppositions of the orthodox doctrine of satisfaction are in all essential points accurately laid down in this representation,¹ the following elucidation of the case to be accounted for (cap. 3) at once departs from the line of orthodoxy. Satisfaction, regarded as the punishment of one, in order that the others may be suffered to pass unpunished, is to be considered (according to Grotius) *firstly*, in the light of the law that every sinner ought to undergo the punishment of eternal death; but

¹ The orthodox theologians do not distinguish so clearly as Grotius does between the characteristics of the *dominus absolutus* and those of the *rector*. Sin as a transgression of the law of God is yet at the same time regarded as a personal offence against God, just as in the Middle Ages. And therefore they continue to assign to sin an infinite value merely in respect of that rule for measuring the different degrees of injuries, the gravity of which is judged according to the value of the person injured, so that the gravity of a sin committed against an infinite person is itself infinite.

secondly, in the light of the fact that this law has merely a positive character, is not grounded on the very nature of God, but is a mere manifestation of His will. If now in accordance with this a remission of that punishment *for believers* be granted on condition of satisfaction, then there is not any abolition at all of the law in this, for it still remains in force for unbelievers. But all laws are capable of relaxation in so far as the opposite of what they require is not in itself something unbecoming or unjust. But this is not the case when the *guilty are not punished*. From the nature of sin it follows only that one deserves punishment, but not that it should be carried out upon him. If now God had for dispensing with that law the important end of maintaining religion thereby, and showing forth His own goodness, He committed no unrighteousness in doing away with eternal death as the punishment of sin. In this train of thought Grotius falls into an error. I do not lay any weight, to begin with, upon the circumstance that he abandons the orthodox view of God's penal justice, regarding as he does the eternal condemnation of the sinner, not as a necessary consequence of that function, but merely as a chance product of the will of God. But the proposition that the guilty are not punished, which is laid down as in opposition to that law, and yet as an arrangement that is not unjust in itself, but elicited by God's goodness and regard to the maintenance of religion, contains something quite different from what we are prepared for by the previous more limited exception from the law. In the last mentioned case, it is only asked whether the law which threatens *all* sinners with eternal death can be abolished for *some*, so that these last get off unpunished, and under the condition that their punishment should be transferred to an innocent person. As Grotius hastens past this question to the far more comprehensive declaration, that *in no case* is it unrighteous to leave merited punishment unexactd, he enters upon the Socinian mode of view which on this ground affirms vicarious penal satisfaction to be superfluous in order to the remission of sins.

On this account also he deflects the treatment of Christ's death as penal into a course which is foreign to the supposition which has hitherto been accepted. By means of examples taken from the Old Testament (cap. 4) it is shown that God

has punished relatively innocent persons together with the guilty. The guilty person indeed in these cases does not remain unpunished ; but Grotius concludes that if, according to Faustus, it is not unjust to let a guilty person go unpunished and not unjust to punish any one for other people's sins, the two together cannot be unjust either,—namely to lay upon Christ the punishment of other people's sins, and, *at the same time*, let the guilty go free of punishment. For by this argument nothing more can be got than this sameness of time ; and thus already the traditional idea of satisfaction, which points to a causal connexion between the two data, is abandoned. Grotius next brings forward, after the Reformed fashion, as a condition for the transference of the punishment of others to the innocent, that both must be parties in a natural or definite moral fellowship. The transition to his peculiar view he makes by means of the principle that in the essence of punishment it is of necessity implied that it should follow upon a crime, but not that it should fall upon the guilty person alone, or overtake precisely him ; just as in the case with rewards or with vengeance. Moreover, all appearance of injustice disappears in the case of Christ, for He consented to take upon Himself the punishment of others. Finally, we cannot point to any inevitable necessity for God's having ordained this arrangement (cap. 5). The only question is whether God had sufficient ground for it. Such a reason Grotius finds in the thought, *quod tot et tanta peccata sine insigni exemplo Deus transmittere noluit*. For, on the one hand, God is benevolently disposed towards men, and therefore inclined to remit the punishment of sinners. On the other hand complete exemption from punishment would bring with it a contempt of sin ; and fear of punishment is the best deterrent from sinning. Both these considerations are duly respected in the punishment of Christ, which expresses God's hatred of sin, while the punishment of sinners is remitted.

John Crell¹ had little trouble in proving the baselessness of this hypothesis, and vindicating against it the doctrine of Faustus. Particularly he shows it to be unjust to punish an altogether innocent person, and unthinkable that such a person

¹ *Responsio ad librum H. Grotii quem de satisfactione Christi adversus Faustum Socinum Senensem scripsit* (1623) : *Bibl. Frat. Pol.*, vol. vi.

should regard the evil imposed upon him in the light of punishment. The cases taken from the Old Testament show that God indeed punishes many even for the transgression of others, but always only inasmuch as these have some sort of active share in the action of the actually guilty, be it by counsel or by consent. Or, if God, in order to make an example, visits a family or a people for the crime of the head, and in doing so smites even innocent children, the evil in the case of these is *afflictio* but not *pœna*. For also a reward that accrues to those who have not deserved it is in their case not *præmium* but only *simplex emolumentum*. In fine, the weakness of the whole view of Grotius discloses itself when he tries, by a rule of Roman law, to justify his own view against the thesis of Faustus, that forgiveness of sins and penal satisfaction are mutually exclusive (cap. 6). He subsumes Christ's punishment under the case that deliverance ought to result *antecedente solutione aliqua ipso facto non liberante*, where accordingly *non solum solvit alius, sed etiam aliud quam quod est in obligatione*. This manner of meeting an existing obligation by the prestation of another person, who does not lie under obligation, and by the payment of some other value than the stipulated one, of course demands the concurrence of him who possesses the claim. With reference to Christ this is urged as applicable on the presupposition of the approval of the head of the commonwealth. But all this argumentation is idle, for it applies only to relations that are regulated by private law, while Grotius at the outset repudiates the consideration of God's attitude to men in the light of this standard. Finally it is only an unproved assertion, and one that does not admit of proof, that such a rule is valid also for the transference of corporal chastisement.

It is quite clear that this hypothesis arrives at quite another conclusion from that which Grotius originally appeared to be aiming at. The orthodox doctrine, which he bound himself to defend, treats Christ's penal suffering as the equivalent for *past* sins; Grotius refers it to *new future* offences. If the death of Christ be thus regarded as a penal example, as a deterrent warning, this interpretation of it is analogous to the Socinian one, that the death of Christ has saving value as an attractive example of moral earnestness and fidelity to duty sustained to the end. Even Baur (p. 431) acknowledges this fact, affirming

(p. 442), "that the church theory and the Socinian theory still remain unreconciled by the theory of Grotius, however natural it is that some mediating view should fall in between their antitheses." On the other hand he holds that the theory which reconciles these two views, and occupies a middle position, was brought to its adequate expression by the companions of Grotius,—the Arminians, Stephen Curcellæus and Philip van Limborch.¹ I shall show that this middle theory does not overcome their mutual opposition, and thus is as little in correspondence with the assertions of the Hegelian theory of the development of ideas in the history of theology as is the theory of Grotius.

For the idea of God, which is propounded by these theologians, is hardly distinguishable from that of the Socinians.² In particular the necessity of penal justice in God is denied. For the independence of God is held to make it possible for Him to renounce His rights without prejudice to His justice, especially if a strict exercise of the Divine rights is against the interest of the other party. Since, then, the natural attitude of God toward men is one of reasonable indulgence, He can therefore, if He will, forgive their sins without exacting satisfaction as a condition. The giving of the law by Christ is distinguished from that of Moses precisely by the fact that it is not accompanied by a strict demand of its fulfilment, but by the promise of forgiveness of sins and of eternal life. As this view of the essence of Christianity coincides with that of Socinus, both Arminians substantially repeat the arguments of Faustus against the idea of satisfaction. On this account the death of Christ is in the first instance subsumed under the prophetic office, as a guarantee of the truth of His doctrine and as a motive to a law-abiding life; this last inasmuch as it is at once the highest proof of God's love and the most brilliant example of moral character. To this is added what is likewise a Socinian thesis, that the death of Christ has the effect of making his resur-

¹ Curcellæi *Institutio Religionis Christianæ* (unfinished), Lib. v. capp. 8, 18, 19. *Op. theol.*, Amstel. 1675. Limborch: *Theologia Christiana*, Amstel. 1686. ed. iv. 1715, Lib. iii. capp. 16-22.

² The Arminian doctrine of God is fashioned after the model of the treatment given to it by the Socinian Crell, through Episcopius (*Institutiones theologicæ*). Compare my *Geschichtl. Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott*. (Art. iii., *Jahrb. für deutsche Theologie*, xiii. p. 267 sq.)

rection possible, by which He opened heaven to His followers ; hereby the death of Christ is marked out as a means or condition of His kingly office. The Arminians, however, break off from their companionship with the Socinians, in so far as by their recognition of the sacrificial value of Christ's death, they attach themselves to the view of the universal church. This divergence from the Socinians is more strongly marked in Limborch than in the older Curcellæus. The latter follows the Socinian interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews, discerning the sacrificial act in the High Priestly intercession of the *exalted* Christ, so that His death, as the analogue of the slaughter of the sacrifice, is the preparation for His " appearing before God." If then the New Testament *usus loquendi* places the fact of Christ's death in immediate connexion with redemption, this arises from the consideration that in Christ's passion is manifested the difficulty of His priestly activity. The expiation of sin by loving self-surrender to death and by the intercession of the exalted One is designed (of course assuming our *resipiscentia*) *ne unquam propter peccata nostra severum Dei iudicium subire cogeremur* (v. 19. 14). But the death of Christ considered in itself has for Curcellæus no other meaning than it has for Grotius—namely, *ut ostenderet Deus quantopere peccatum odisset, et nos efficacius ab eo in posterum deterreret*. For inasmuch as the sacrificial character of Christ must be judged after the analogy of the sacrifices of the Old Testament, Curcellæus declares (sec. 15) that the thought of penal satisfaction has nothing in common with the idea of sacrifice. *Pecudes quæ mactabantur pro peccatoribus non luebant penas quas erant commeriti,—sed erant tantum oblationes, quibus studebant flectere Deum ad misericordiam, et obtinere ab eo remissionem admissorum*.

Limborch, on the other hand, who in a special chapter (iii. 20) combats the Socinian view of the High Priesthood of Christ, removes himself in the same degree from his own predecessor. Curcellæus too is hit by Limborch's observation that the priestly function of Christ, if it is only exhibited in His intercession in His exaltation, is absorbed in His Kingship, and that the mere presence of Christ before God has no value toward that appeasing of His wrath on account of our sins, which is the Priest's function. In directer agreement with the orthodox

view, Limborch affirms, with regard to the sin-offerings of the Old Testament, that their meaning was, *ut, in ipsas quasi ira Dei derivata, homo ea liberaretur, hoc est ut ipsis infligeretur mors violenta, cujus intuitu hominem peccato suo mortem meritum in gratiam reciperet.*—*Unde mors a Christo suscepta rationem habet gravis mali Christo impositi, quo pœnam peccatis nostris commertitam quasi in se transtulit, et hac sua passione Deum placavit* (sec. 5). But not merely by the repeated use of the word *quasi* is this view distinguished from the orthodox one; it is so also by all the other statements of Limborch. This kind of penal satisfaction, which God in the plenitude of His power could impose upon Christ, has not the value of a prestation made to God's strict justice, which is utterly denied, but to His will, which is at once just and merciful (cap. xxii. 2), that is, to His reasonableness; and it has decisive value towards this inclination of God in virtue of the divine dignity of Christ's person. But the value of merit in Thomas's sense (that is, in the sense of legal equivalence), is denied to this prestation (sect. 3), and is assigned to it in Duns's sense, inasmuch as God *sanguinem illum tanquam plenariam persolutionem pro peccatis nostris acceptavit, illoque se moveri passus est ad plenam nobis peccatorum remissionem dandam* (cap. xix. 2). On the contrary, Thomas's view is echoed when we are told that the infliction of death on Christ is *ratio homines ad salutem perducendi convenientissima, utpote ad gloriæ Dei illustrationem et homines a peccatis ad sanctimoniz studium convertendos maxime accommodata* (xviii. 5).

Although Thomas's sphere of vision is abandoned, when Limborch explains the last-mentioned thought in accordance with the view of Faustus and of Grotius, by means of the purpose of making a penal example, and by means of that view to eternal life, which Christ by His resurrection from the dead has opened up, the mediæval colouring of this representation is still betrayed by Limborch in the following respects. *First*, and decidedly, in the character of the idea of God. As has been shown in another place,¹ the Reformers in their doctrine of predestination so applied the mediæval idea of the *dominium absolutum* of God, that they set aside as invalid the compromise between divine and human freedom, which was made

¹ *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* xiii. p. 116 sq. 124 sq.

in the doctrine of merit. The greater stress laid upon the doctrine of predestination by the successors of Calvin implied in itself an accentuation of the divine arbitrariness which was prejudicial to the religious interest. For the religious interest demands that in some form or other it should be possible to presuppose a real fellowship with God. Accordingly Arminius and his successors modified the fundamental idea of the *dominium absolutum Dei in creaturas* by the mark of that *æquitas* whereby God arranges the moral order of the world from regard at once to His own dignity and to the natural constitution and position of man. Thus at once is the arbitrary freedom of God upheld against the conditions which Reformation theology deduced from God's justice, and a claim on the part of man to freedom as against God is established, a claim which mediæval theology recognised in the idea of merit. Now, although Limborch waves away the idea of merit as invalid, yet, *secondly*, his own doctrine of justification, as well as that of Curcellæus,¹ really amounts to the Catholic conception (lib. vi. cap. 4), Limborch admitting *in pontificiorum sententia multa esse non improbanda*. With Limborch justification means God's gracious sentence in which He looks upon him who believes in Christ, —*i.e.* who obeys Him with respect to His prophetic priestly and kingly offices, who, therefore, is in a state of penitence and is bringing forth good works, as if this presently inherent though imperfect righteousness were perfect. This view so far shares the Protestant tendency in that justification, according to it, is fitted to awaken the confidence towards God which is forbidden to Catholic Christians. But it is in agreement with the Catholic view inasmuch as it connects and refers the sentence of justification to the faith that manifests itself in works, and thus to the inherent righteousness of the believer. Limborch guards himself merely against the materialistic representation of *habitus infusus*. But the rejection which he at the same time makes of the idea of merit really extends only to the Thomist interpretation of it. It exactly corresponds, on the other hand, to the definition of Duns, that God *justitiam, quam imperfectam judicat, gratiose accipit ac si perfecta esset* (sect. 41). And this assumption is a necessary consequence of *æquitas*

¹ *Diss. de hominis per fidem et per opera justificatione. Opp. Theol.* pp. 933-942.

regarded as the general attitude of God towards men ; and is a proof of the place that it has in the mediation between God and men by Christ. In the difference between this doctrine, however, and that of the Lutheran and Reformed theologians, one interest is perceptible which, although it is operative in the modern evangelical theology, is not brought to any definite examination. The positive expression of justification borrowed from Paul was always used at the Reformation and in subsequent orthodoxy as synonymous with the negative expression of forgiveness of sins ; and for this reason it was that the attainment of such a result by means of good works was utterly rejected. But then the original relation of that idea in the Bible is the relation to works. If justification includes blessedness in itself, and thus positively guarantees that final state of salvation which cannot be thought of apart from works, the natural relationship of these ideas asserts itself, and there results a style of doctrine such as the Arminians offer. It will thus be of importance for every system of dogmatics to decide whether by that idea the negative or the positive meaning is intended to be expressed.

The way in which, as Baur says, the theory of the two Arminians has fallen into a middle place between the strong contrast of churchly and Socinian theology, thus becomes clearer than as it is represented by Baur. For he points out that they in their doctrine of reconciliation approximated to the Church theology, while in their doctrine of justification they followed the Socinians. Of course such a proceeding is very far from attaining to a higher unity of the contradictories ; but neither can one venture to call it a "mediating" position on any other field than on that of dispute upon the basis of private law. In the sphere of scientific knowledge, Arminianism would offer a lamentable middle course if no other sense could be derived from the actual state of the Arminian doctrine which has been thus interpreted by Baur. Now, the thought of justification, as it has been defined by Limborch, is specifically distinguished from the Socinian view, because it is regarded as taking place only in virtue of the worth of the general reconciliation accomplished by Christ's sacrificial offering. Herein Arminian theology, as it is set forth by Limborch, maintains the churchly character of its view of Christianity. But then,

as it does not matter so much in theory that the Arminian interpretation of the death of Christ approximated orthodox Protestantism, as that it coincides with the mediæval interpretation, Arminianism has in both doctrines a unity of character, inasmuch as in both it goes back to the patterns of mediæval theology. Along with this, indeed, in the case of the Arminians, is coupled a protest, all the more marked, against the hierarchical and sacramental apparatus of Catholicism. But if we confine our attention to the two closely connected doctrines of reconciliation and justification, then, in the theory of Arminian divines, it becomes plain that, as they found no higher mediation between the orthodox and Socinian doctrine, the attempted middle course has led them to a connexion of thoughts which is not new but old—which does not lie in advance of the Reformation but behind it, and which at the same time is instructive, in so far as it very thoroughly refutes any expectation that every contradiction that emerges in the history of theology must forthwith find its solution in a logically higher unity.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ENTIRE DISINTEGRATION OF THE DOCTRINES OF RECONCILIATION AND JUSTIFICATION BY THE GERMAN THEOLOGIANS OF THE ILLUMINATION.

48. THE criticism to which the doctrines of Christ's satisfaction and of its imputation were subjected by Faustus Socinus did not prevent these doctrines, which had been derived from the Church Reformation, from reaching their full development for the first time in the century at the beginning of which Socinus died. But the two opposing theories of the condition of the forgiveness of sins could neither of them obtain the victory, not only because they did not understand one another, but also because they had currency in separate communities. The debate that continued in the seventeenth century between the two parties, however, was not carried out without producing a recognisable effect upon both sides. The Lutheran and Reformed divines had undertaken the development of those doctrines, on the assumption that they rested upon a rational as well as upon a biblical foundation. But by the Socinian arguments that assumption was shaken. At the close of the period of orthodoxy, therefore, occur admissions that the Divine plan of Christ's penal satisfaction is contrary to the rules of human justice, and that it is tenable only by the authority of the Bible; but at the same time some did not shrink from recognising in the irrationality of the doctrine a special proof of its divine origin (p. 308). But, conversely, the later Socinians yielded to the force of the authority of the New Testament so far as to adopt the Arminian interpretation of the death of Christ, and renounce on this point the violent exegesis of Faustus.¹ Thus,

¹ This applies to the last important theologian of the party, Samuel Crell, grandson of John Crell; also to George Markoe, of Klausenburg, in Transylvania, author of a *Summa Universæ Theologiæ Christianæ secundum Unitarios in usum auditorum theologiæ concinnata* (1787). Comp. Fock, l. c. pp. 240, 261, 649 sq.

as far as Church Protestantism was concerned, the orthodox doctrine of reconciliation remained unmoved to the middle of the eighteenth century, although for a considerable time previous to that a variety of modifying circumstances had come into operation outside of the Church, by which the continued acceptance of this doctrine was threatened. But in the sphere of the German Lutheran Church which, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, showed itself accessible to the scientific influences that broke up this doctrine, the Wolfian philosophy itself contributed in the first instance rather to the strengthening of the orthodox feeling. So late as the year 1737, the Wolfian, Jacob Carpov, establishes the right of distinguishing revealed from natural theology, by making the doctrine of reconciliation in its Lutheran form, in its speciality as a truth that transcends the reason, the criterion of Divine revelation.¹

Only a generation intervenes between this striking testimony to the acceptance of this doctrine, not merely by the Church, but also in scientific circles, and the efforts made by leading Lutheran theologians to do away with it, and to substitute for it principles of a Socinian tendency. And with these preparatory undertakings is connected the rejection even of the religious thought of the forgiveness of sins which was common to orthodox Protestants and to the Socinians. Without doubt a multitude of predisposing causes can be alleged to account for this radical change in theology. The question, however, ought not to be directed merely in a general way towards the possibility or necessity of this development: it is of particular importance that we should understand why it was that theologians in the Lutheran Church rather than any other men, should oppose themselves most entirely to the doctrine of reconciliation, while theologians belonging to other parties took no part in this undertaking—not even the theologians of those parties which up to that time had chiefly assumed a heterodox attitude. How much the task of *historical* explanation of the theological revolution of the eighteenth century depends upon the limitation of the question, may be gathered from the way in which Baur expresses himself in his *Geschichte der Lehre von der Versöhnung* (p. 479): "So wide a breach had been made in the spirit's consciousness of the objectivity of the dogma,

¹ *Theologia Revelata Dogmatica*, tom. i. p. 29.

that the spirit, now in disharmony therewith, could no longer rest till in pure subjectivity it had again set itself free from the fettering power of all those determinations. Herewith there commences in the Protestant Church itself a movement thoroughly conscious that its cause is good, and which advances with ever-increasing indifference towards orthodoxy. Thus Töllner's inquiry into the active obedience of Christ forms the point of transition to a new era." I am unfortunately not in a position to avail myself of this historical myth for my purpose. What spirit was in disharmony with the objectivity of the dogma? Baur's previous historical sketch makes it possible only to think of the spirit of the Socinians. Now, if I grant that the standpoint of pure subjectivity was not quite reached by that party, then the natural law of the spirit indicated by Baur, to the effect that every tendency of thought that has once been entered upon must be pursued to its utmost consequences, would prove itself correct, if the Socinians, after their founder had made the remission of the punishment of sin to depend on the moral activity of the subject, had gone on to show the utter inconceivability of such a remission of Divine punishment. The Socinians, however, who came into collision with the objectivity of the idea of atonement, not merely gave their spirit perfect rest in that regard, they even in the eighteenth century closed the mighty breach in their spirit's consciousness of the objectivity of the dogma, by reverting to the Arminian type of doctrine. But the Lutherans who, in the second half of the eighteenth century, could not rest until they had rid their subjectivity from the fettering power of all those determinations, previously to that had experienced no breach at all in their disposition to the doctrine of reconciliation, and thus were in no position to complete a movement imposed upon them by the accelerating force of a spiritual impulse once begun. These observations thus prove the necessity of setting about an explanation of the facts by quite other means. For, to demolish the dogma of reconciliation, it was not the "spirit" in general that was the efficient agent, but, as has been said, only a party among the Lutheran divines, who were assisted in their undertaking by no theologian of the Socinian, Remonstrant, Reformed, and much less of the Romish party.

The most general reason why naturalistic and rationalistic

tendencies in theology were able to raise themselves against the supernatural and traditionary character of the Christian religion, is to be found in that strangest actual result of the religious movements of the sixteenth century, namely, in the manifold divisions of the Western Church. In the first stage of those movements distinct germs of a rationalistic tendency show themselves in the mystical individualism of the Anabaptists. This party was the congenial soil on which the rationalistic theology of Socinus could flourish. That party succeeded in establishing itself as soon as the prospect of the restoration of the Church's unity failed. Now, although the other portions of the Church which, by the support of political powers gained a secured existence, maintained no small measure of harmony one with another in their positive apprehension of Christianity, yet none of these ecclesiastical parties had that preponderance of authority, in virtue of which an ecclesiastical stamp had been impressed on all spiritual movements in the middle ages, even on those which were heretical. The philosophical systems, therefore, which were elaborated in the two centuries subsequent to the Reformation, led to such a culture of the reason as indeed, on the whole, asserted sympathy with Church Christianity, but no longer recognised the direct aim of serving the Church and proving all its dogmas.

The divisions of the Church, however, not only lessened its influence upon the course of culture, it also had effects opposed to culture; for religious war arose from the separation of Church-parties and their alliances with political powers. This worst kind of war overran successively France, Germany, England. Under the impression produced by this mischief, and recollection of its origin, there arose, in persons of fine moral sensibilities and of religious earnestness, indifference and even disinclination to the positive dogmatic development of Christianity, and also even to its historical limitation. The diversity of dogmatic systems had brought in its train not merely learned strife and social alienations, but also along with war the demoralization of the people,—a result the opposite of what religion aims at. The impulse to seek a remedy for this was not satisfied, however, with striving after the primitive and dogmatically indifferent form of Christianity, because every Church pretended, in virtue of its own dogma, to be in har-

mony with that; but it directed itself rather to the task of discovering that natural religion which stands above all positive religions, because the theology of all parties pointed men to this neutral basis which was common to them all. In this a peculiar Nemesis visits Christian theology. In the very earliest stages of its history men had commended Christianity to the culture of the heathen by assertions that it was in correspondence with the natural inclination of the reason towards Monotheism, and that its law was no other than the natural moral law. It was, in fact, only in very limited philosophical circles of thought,—the later Platonic and the Stoical namely,—that these assumptions had a positive historical basis. They were therefore pressed too far when they were asserted to be objects of the common consciousness of the human spirit; and, moreover, the specific diversity between the Christian thought and the similarly sounding thoughts of heathenism was overlooked, their analogy to one another being regarded as actual coincidence. Without the error being discovered, the theology of the middle ages, as well as that of Protestantism, continued to assert that the world's reasoning and observation, while still uninfluenced by special revelation, produces the same thought of God as that which Christianity conveys; and that this thought, along with the natural consciousness of the law of love which each one possesses, constitutes the basis of theology, to which revelation adds only special and stronger securities of salvation. Do those men deserve reproach, from the standpoint of orthodoxy, who contented themselves with the natural bases of all religion after the special securities drawn from Divine revelation had come to appear as if they served precisely for man's undoing? They indeed only stretch further the fiction by which Christianity at first had made clear its universal significance for human culture, and by means of which the reasonableness of its contents (which were not differently stated then) had been scientifically demonstrated; thus here also could the unreasonableness of its divided condition be proved!

The first literary advocacy of theological naturalism was undertaken (still in a disguised form), under the impression produced by the religious war in France, by John Bodinus,¹ the

¹ *Colloquium heptaplomeres de abditis rerum arcanis*, written in 1588.

jurisconsult, who was himself a Catholic. He is undeniably the representative of a tone that widely prevailed amongst his countrymen in the sixteenth century. From this atmosphere the Englishman, Edward Herbert of Cherbury, derived the impulse to the first open systematic exhibition of the contents of the religion of nature,¹ which is, according to him, the useful kernel in every positive religion, and which at the hands of all of them has suffered many disfigurements. As we are exhorted to seek to disengage that kernel, it results that all revelation is superfluous, even though its reality be indisputable. The substantial tendency of this master is carried out in the whole literature which is comprehended under the general title of English Deism, although, so far as the formal scientific standpoint is concerned, it is not idealistic after Herbert, but sensualistic after Hobbes and Locke. But the opposition to positive and churchly Christianity in all the many-sidedness of the themes discussed by it, makes Herbert's natural religion to be distinctly recognisable as the fundamental type of all the phases of that literature. This connexion subsists, because the similarity of the occasion, namely, the repulsive impression of religious war, called forth corresponding efforts. When, by the restoration of Charles, the religious war was brought to an end, and by the elevation to the throne of William of Orange its renewal was prevented, the deistic literature which belongs to this period attempts, by means of theory, to make impossible for the future all strife about religion. By simply referring to the work of Lechler, I may venture to excuse myself from giving special consideration to the literature of Deism, which, in fact, has for its problem not the atonement but the possibility of revelation. Its chief result is shown in the final reduction of Christianity to the religion of nature by means of the very assumptions in accordance with which orthodoxy had, in the converse way, asserted the identity of the two.²

49. It cannot be doubted that this English opposition litera-

¹ *De veritate, prout distinguitur a revelatione, a verisimili, a possibili, et a falso*: Paris, 1624. *De religione gentilium, errorumque apud eos causis*: London, 1645; Complete, Amsterd. 1663.

² Tindal: *Christianity as old as the Creation, or the Gospel a republication of the Religion of Nature*: London, 1730. Chubb: *The true Gospel of Jesus Christ Asserted*: London, 1738.

ture contributed in a certain measure to the development of German Rationalism. Subsequent to the introduction into Germany (1741) of Tindal's work by means of a translation, German theologians show their marked attention to this field of literature by numerous translations of deistical and anti-deistical works from the English, by notices respecting them, by independent polemic against Deism,¹ and finally, by adoption of the model set before them. But this last result was only a consequence of a revulsion of feeling which had its sufficient causes in the state of culture at home. It is noteworthy that these did not arise from a preference for natural over positive religion, although one might be disposed to think so, judging by the analogies of France and England. For Germany by its thirty years' religious war had suffered much more severely than had France and England in their similar visitations, and she was not, like them, summoned together to an independent and energetic political existence, but under the form of the Roman empire, which had become useless and untrue, continued to experience political disintegration. But instead of seeking in the religion of nature the healing of the differences between the religious parties, the man of greatest genius in that century since the peace of Westphalia, Leibnitz to wit, vainly exhausted himself only with projects for dogmatic union between the confessions of the empire. I will not here venture a decision, whether in this also we ought to detect a symptom of the weakness of the German people, along with the other symptoms which make the remembrance of that period so painful, or whether we ought not perhaps to recognise in it a token of that spiritual power which knows how to observe moderation, and due moderation. In any case it ought not to be overlooked that the German illumination never belies its descent from philosophical idealism; that it never exchanged this principle for the empirical and sensualistic principle of England and France; and that therefore it never through scepticism forgot its moral tendency, and that in this respect Kant's philosophy, whatever else may be its opposition to the illumination, is at one with it.

The special cause of the reaction towards rationalism on the part of the theology of the Lutheran Church in Germany

¹ Compare Lechler, *Geschichte des englischen Deismus*, p. 448 sq.

is the strong development which religious and ethical individualism received from Pietism and the Wolfian philosophy, in connexion with the fact that Church-consciousness nowhere found feebler expression than in the Lutheran confession. Even if a particular Church possessed fixity and continuity of historical existence, merely in virtue of the fact that it had perfectly reproduced the body of doctrine contained in the Bible in its confession drawn out on paper, the partisans of Lutheranism would still have no right on this principle to maintain that the Lutheran has precedence over all other Churches. For example, the thought of the Church is indeed rightly formulated as a whole in the Lutheran confessions; but, at the same time, it is not perfectly developed according to the standard of the New Testament; and the thought of election which dominates the religion of the Bible is in the *formula concordiæ* placed upon a slippery ground, from which of necessity it had to slide away, so that so far as the practice of Lutheranism is concerned it was as good as lost. But even if this were not so, it is at least childish to determine the value of a particular Church solely according to the theoretical superiority of the doctrine that passes current in it; for a multitude of other conditions must be realized before one particular Church can assert an honourable place in comparison with others. The paper god which has been made of the confession of the Lutheran Church has neither prevented the deep fall of that Church, nor has it again brought about its restoration, nor has it as an object of admiration for ill-instructed worshippers established confidence in the maintenance of the Lutheran Church amid all the difficulties by which it is surrounded. It is not sufficient for the existence of an evangelical Church that the confession should be used as a doctrinal law for its pastors; it is requisite also that it should be supported by the common feeling of all its members; that it for its part should be able to excite and keep alive this common feeling; finally, that this common feeling should by the constitution of the Church be authorized to exert itself in the maintenance of the Church. A legal independence of the Churches was neither attained nor aimed at by the Lutheran Church of Germany in its classical epoch; for the preliminary task was never finished of leading the "common rude man" by the

preaching of law and gospel to conversion and faith. But even irrespective of the right of congregations to have a part in the active shaping of the Church, the common mind of the Church did not attain to maturity, because the thought of the Church was not developed into perfection out of the general fundamental idea, and was not brought into that connexion with the other fundamental thoughts of Protestantism, without which a sense of the value of religious fellowship is not elicited. Instead of this, preaching isolated the individual, while exhorting him to conversion by law and gospel, and while prescribing good works to him as necessary consequences of his faith, and as what thankfulness to God demands. The feast of the Supper isolated the individual, by the propositions that the sacrament is distinguished from preaching, inasmuch as through it pardoning grace is offered to the individual as such. The common praise of the Church was diverted from its proper purpose by a number of hymns, in which either the objective doctrine of the Church is laid down in rhyme, or a purely individual contemplation of self is elicited and expressed in the singular number. And if one observes what sort of Church-consciousness is exhibited in this the single form in which the Christian congregation takes an active part in Lutheran worship, the result is as follows. In the good Lutheran hymn-book of the Hanoverian Church,¹ of all the hymns for Pentecost, at which is commemorated the first public spontaneous action of the community of believers, there is only one that amongst other things reminds us that by the Holy Ghost the people of all languages are gathered into one by faith; but this is only the echo of the mediæval hymn. And even this allusion takes no notice of the fundamental fact of Pentecost, that in the spirit of God the faithful recognised and praised the great works of God wrought through Christ, and by this act of confession took up their place in the history of the world in the presence of foreign witnesses. Instead of referring to this event, all the Whitsuntide hymns bear upon the regeneration of the individual, upon his enlightenment and consolation by the Holy Spirit, and upon the objective place of the Spirit in the

¹ It was gradually put together between 1657 and 1740, and represents an unbroken Lutheran tradition, for only a small portion of the hymns is of Pietistic origin.

Trinity. The hymns also which, in that hymn-book, directly relate to the Church say no more regarding it than that it is founded by the word of God and the sacraments, and that it affords opportunity for hearing God's word preached.

It is clear that a strong impulse to religious individualism is given by orthodox Lutheranism, and that it was not Pietism which first produced that tendency in the Church.¹ Indubitably that element during the period before Pietism found its counterpoise in Church customs, which essentially consisted in regularity of attendance at Church, personal or bodily presence at the preaching of the word, and participation in the sacraments; quite in correspondence with what the hymns in the hymn-book say of the value of the Church. This Church habit essentially maintained itself even long after rationalism had taken hold of the minds of men; it thus was not strong enough to prevent the revulsion thereto. Rather was it obviously favourable to the influence of rationalism that the members of the Church had no other Church consciousness than that they had to be patient hearers of sermons, and to take in their contents. If therefore the theologians and the preachers came to have rationalistic convictions, they were prevented neither by their own feelings nor by regard to their hearers from giving expression to their convictions in an official way, especially when the distance of the new theological conviction from the earlier one was very much concealed from both parties by the dignity attributed to the persons of those intrusted with the cure of souls. But, for this reason too, the theologians who first developed their rationalism, starting from the school of orthodoxy, made the transition without any shock; for originally not only did they connect Wolfian philosophy with orthodoxy, but, at the same time, also they were subject to the influence of Pietism. From Pietism they had derived that concern for the moral treatment of the individual subject, which in rationalism

¹ A Lutheran theologian, untinged with Pietism, once refused to allow me to draw the idea of prayer from the destiny of the elect Church *εἰς ἐπαινον τῆς δόξης τῆς χάριτος τοῦ Θεοῦ* (Eph. i. 6), but maintained that the primary aspect of prayer is the wrestling of the penitent spirit with God. In my opinion, however, this last is worth anything exactly in the degree in which it rises to the level of thankfulness for that grace, which also first renders penitential wrestling possible (see above, p. 143)—to that thankfulness in which first the suppliant assumes his active attitude within the Church, Phil. iv. 6.

rejects the orthodox premisses; but which even in Pietism had begotten indifference towards dogmatic strictness and the connexion of the Church-system.

Pietism makes its appearance in many shapes. As a striving after personal holiness, and a peculiarly conditioned assurance of salvation, it moves between the extreme opposites of the churchly correct attitude of Spener and certain enthusiastic ecstatic manifestations.¹ It is by Francke in Halle that the method of attaining to individual certainty of salvation is first worked out to that demand for penitential exercise which corresponds to the dogmatic premisses of Lutheranism in the *locus de pœnitentia*. But the thorough-going characteristic of Pietism is the great attention it bestows upon the religious and moral development of the individual in more intimate intercourse with those who are like-minded,—in the conventicle. Conventicles are innocuous to the Church only when the latter rests upon a very energetic and active community of feeling. Thus in Lutheranism, where the Church in this respect fell so far short of what was required of it, the Pietistic conventicles could only act in a disintegrating and destructive way against that whereby the members of the Church, as such, were still held together. Much less was it possible that from Pietism should proceed any reforming influence upon the church. The doctrine of the confessions, which was looked upon by official Lutheranism as the palladium of the existence of the Church, was indeed maintained in all essential points by the Pietistic theologians of the eighteenth century; and they are not guilty of the numerous heresies with which they were charged. Nay, more, I must repeat that the practice of penitential exercise, which was insisted upon by the men of Halle, really denotes an intention on their part to give effect to the Lutheran doctrine of *pœnitentia*, which up till that time had held a place merely on paper. But the attention of the isolated individual to his own religious and moral development, which has its roots in Lutheranism, seems to be only strengthened by this undertaking. Hence a line is taken up which is really hostile to the Church as a whole, inasmuch as it is no longer the general guarantees of the Church that constitute the framework for that individualism, but casual changing connexions with like-

¹ H. Schmid : *Geschichte des Pietismus*, p. 191.

minded persons. The first advocates of rationalism in Germany, who at the period of their theological education also experienced Pietistic influences, were thus weaned from influences which a firm public churchism would have exercised. Of course the positive presuppositions and motives that produced theological rationalism were to be found in the Wolfian philosophy. Now, one may well ask the question, why the philosophy of Descartes, which at an earlier period amongst the theologians of the Low Countries had formed an alliance with orthodoxy, precisely as did the Wolfian at first among the theologians of Germany, did not, like it, lead to a heterodox development. Röhl and others prove that the impulse thereto lay in Cartesianism also. But I cannot avoid conjecturing that the strong churchly public spirit, which both by reason of dogma and of constitution, was operative in the Reformed Church of the Low Countries, and was still specially active on account of the struggle with the Remonstrants, suppressed any inclination to rationalism which could arise from the Cartesian philosophy.

50. The rationalism of German theologians and their naturalism, which subsequently developed itself, spread their roots through the philosophy of Wolf into that of Leibnitz. But these germs of theological change are, in the case of Leibnitz, disguised beneath such a mode of contemplating the universe, as in its objective and universal character is comparable with the theology of the Church, and was by its author deliberately brought into friendly connexion therewith.¹ The absolute teleology of that world, which is the work of God, and which is the best that could have been produced,—a teleology in which the smallest occurrence extends its influence to the remotest issues,—finds its proper force only in the moral world, the *civitas Dei*. All beings are created by God as centres of special activity, in such a way that in each one of these the order of the universe is mirrored, while their operations are so directed that they represent the All in a finite way; and accordingly the principle of all their action and passion lies in their spiritual souls. The spiritual freedom of these is never the absence of determination, but the absence of constraint and physical compulsion; it is spontaneity. For the body, and,

¹ *Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et l'origine du mal.* 1710.

through it, the whole material world, has no determining and impelling influence upon the soul; the appearance of this is produced merely by the circumstance that according to the parallelism that has been ordained by God between the movements of the soul and of the body, ideas representing the peculiar movements of the material world fill the soul. And the soul acts in accordance with these ideas, because at the same time in accordance with her own independent ideas she is able to exercise an activity on the world. This pre-established harmony of the factors that form the human individual thus guarantees the spontaneous freedom of that individual, in virtue of the conformity of all things with each other by the will and wisdom of God,—in virtue of the harmony between nature and grace, between God's decrees and our foreseen actions, between all portions of matter, between what is past and what is future. From this hypothesis, therefore, Leibnitz derives the most decided faith in providence, while at the same time he enjoins humble and trustful exercise of freedom in accordance with reason and with the moral law of God, on the understanding that all the future is, without a doubt, determined, although we know not what has been decreed by God or why it has been decreed. Faith in Providence animates also Leibnitz's philosophical principle,—that the world, as it is, is chosen and created by God as the best, and that the fact of sin, and of its prevalence among men, cannot be alleged to the contrary. For evil, as compared with good, may be regarded as zero, if the actual magnitudes of the kingdom of God are taken into consideration. And, as God could not avoid making the things of this world imperfect, and thus making men so that it should be possible for them to sin; and as He has permitted sin actually to take place, He holds moral evil in His hand, not regarding it indeed as the direct means of good, but as the *conditio sine qua non* of what is best.

That Leibnitz by these views does not abandon the strictest judgment of sin is proved by his recognition of the eternity of future punishment. Grotius and Hobbes, the originators of the science of natural law in the seventeenth century, who represented the State as the means, and the welfare of the individual as the end, regarded the idea of punishment within the State, accordingly, as having reference merely to the rela-

tive purposes of reforming or of deterring individuals. Leibnitz was able to prevent this view from extending to the religious theory of the universe¹ by means of his doctrine that the kingdom of God is an end to itself. From this it followed that, for the maintenance of order, there appertains to God a penal justice which has to regard merely retribution and not reformation. On the supposition of freedom, if a case occurs in which a will continues to persevere in sin, then the continuance of punishment for continued sin corresponds only to that fitness which satisfies wise observers, who in the ordering of the kingdom of God look for what shall betoken that it is an end to itself. The lot of endless punishment which falls upon some without any hope of reformation does not, however, give ground for any denial of the presupposition of the universe as being the best, for changes of individual parts to imperfection and to evil,—in other words, a perversion in certain parts—does not contravene the maintenance of the whole in the best condition, but in this case precisely subserves the ends of universal order. Leibnitz does not discuss the retributive justice of God in this application without recognising at the same time reward as one species of it as well as punishment. While he cannot avoid asserting this idea as the correlate of human freedom, he is still far from excluding thereby the Christian thought of grace; for he expressly recognises the difference of grade between nature and grace in that ordering of the moral world towards a definite purpose which he maintains.

Hence it may be also inferred that Leibnitz still leaves room for the doctrine of reconciliation, and his theological disciples, therefore, have expressly defended that doctrine. Still, he determined the thought of sin, particularly the relation between actual and original sin, otherwise than had been done in the doctrine of the Church; and in this way he so altered the premisses of the idea of reconciliation that the final rejection of the latter by disciples of Wolf is explicable. Leibnitz regards the generation of all animated being as a growth and reconstruction of an organic preformation, in which the germs of the soul lie previous to generation, as conversely he does not imagine any existence of souls without body. Accordingly he

¹ Grotius maintains indeed retributive punishment in relation to God's justice, while representing it as unsuited to the use of man.

assumes that future human souls are contained in the semen, in such a way that from Adam downwards they have had existence in a sort of organism, and that, by a creative act of God, they are endowed with reason in the act of generation. From Adam onwards, therefore, human souls would have sin attaching to them; in relation to this sin, however, reason stood as a new perfection. By this asseveration, Leibnitz gives a turn to the idea of original sin which essentially diverges from the line of Protestant orthodoxy. He proposes the question, whether original sin by itself, without exhibiting its effects in sinful action, is enough for everlasting condemnation? For refusing to admit this result with respect to children who die unbaptized, he could appeal to authority in the Catholic and in the evangelical Church. But he thinks it a hard thing, moreover, to assert the eternal condemnation of those grown-up persons who, following the inclinations of corrupt nature, fall into sin without participating in any means of grace. For they have only done what they could not help doing. Leibnitz could not defend this position with the authority of evangelical theologians; Catholic divines, however, who were solicitous for the salvation of the heathen, offered support for the affirmation that where knowledge of Christ is wanting, God bestows blessedness on those who, so far as their human ability went, busied themselves in what was good. Leibnitz, indeed, concedes that those who have opportunity for repentance, but still show no goodness of will, can have no excuse; but he still raises the question why God should not bestow upon them goodness of will for their amelioration, but should even harden them in their evil will. While now he traces this to the influence of the circumstances which as such arise from the general concatenation of causes, he is able to escape the dilemma of the election and reprobation of individuals only by explaining that those who, in respect of original sin, are all alike, are yet not equally bad in respect of their particular freedom. Asserting an innate individual distinction between soul and soul, he finds that in respect of their natural disposition men incline more or less to diverse forms of the good and the bad, or to their opposites. In so far therefore as, in accordance with the arrangement of the whole world, men are introduced into different circumstances, which are favourable or

unfavourable to the development of nobler qualities, they either fulfil a happy destiny by the grace of God, or come short of it. He is of opinion, therefore, that the election of an individual is not according to his excellence, but according to the conveniency between his individuality and God's decree.

Leibnitz, indeed, would have it to be understood that he propounds these views only as a hypothesis in defence of the doctrine of divine providence; and he is very far from claiming any dogmatic value for them. But that he has abandoned the sequence of the Lutheran doctrine of original sin is shown also by the fact that he repudiates the assumption of the infinite demerit of sin in accounting for the eternity of punishment, remarking that he has not yet sufficiently pondered that statement to be able to give a verdict upon it. To him humanity irrespective of Christ is nothing more than the entirely homogeneous *massa perditionis*, in which the kind and degree of the actual sins of the individual are indifferent. He breaks the ban of this conception by concentrating attention on the relative position of individuals, which they take according to their peculiar disposition, according to the peculiar strength of their use of reason, and according to the circumstances in the moral world which have been ordained by providence. The thought of eternal punishment does not come up into view with him in connexion with passive and universal original sin, but as a threat that impends over continued actual sin. Finally, the thought of the world which, in spite of sin, is the best, because sin in comparison with the majesty of the kingdom of God appears as nothing, leads to a tone which is quite the opposite of that wherein the orthodox system manifests its credibility. Orthodox Protestantism has taken up and carried on the dualistic conception of the universe which prevailed in the middle ages, in the modification that life here and life beyond the grave are subject to quite opposite conditions. In accordance with this, ascetic literature kept up the impression that, in spite of redemption, we are always during our earthly life exposed to the hindrances of sin rather than raised above them, and that it is only in the future life that we are first to enjoy the manifest fruits of redemption. As that antithesis was neutralized, or at least considerably modified in Leibnitz's conception of the present state of the universe, the tone of ascetic

melancholy which by rights at least ought to have accompanied the orthodox system, was wholly exchanged for a tone which, with all humility, combined cheerful and assured confidence in the providence of God. Perhaps the inclinations of the generations which followed were alienated from Pietism, and also from orthodoxy, by nothing so much as by the circumstance that such a tone, through the influence of the philosophy of Leibnitz and of Wolf, became universal amongst the educated classes. For the tone of society is the atmosphere of the spirit's life; and, just as all organic beings do not live in one climate, in like manner certain circles of thought lose all their convincing power when certain tones prevail. Leibnitz, also, in order to commend his theory of optimism, could not abstain from calling in fancy into regions which were unfathomable by exact knowledge, and which supplied nourishment to the disposition which was opposed to orthodoxy, all the more because the latter in this respect laid down very definite limits. Orthodoxy recognises earth only as the arena of the spirit's history, and limits the individual's capacity for development to the earthly life. Leibnitz denies that this is an article of faith in the strict sense of that word, and can appeal to others who have preceded him in the assumption that sin continues after the present life. But, as he thinks that a morally good conduct of life is similarly carried on in the life beyond the grave, he gives occasion to suppose that conversion also is possible after death; and in suggesting all the solar systems to be dwelling-places of blessed spirits, with a view to support his optimist conception of the world, he makes that conviction to depend upon the visionary and arbitrary conjecture, that in those unknown regions the quantitative relation between evil and good will be the reverse of that which one feels so painfully in the present earthly state, judging it by the usual standards. These are germs which attain to so luxuriant a growth in the illumination-period as to choke all serious judgment of the moral world upon principles of universal application. For, in truth, the thought of the world as the best is identical with that of the world as relatively bad; but it follows from this that, in adopting the hypothesis of Leibnitz, one becomes in a measure indifferent to sin, and ceases to possess the absolute standard wherewith to judge it.

These elements, however, contained in the *Théodicée* of Leibnitz, did not develop their destructive consequences until the Leibnitzian principles had been applied by Wolf to the problems of ethics in a more comprehensive way, but, at the same time, had been modified after a peculiar fashion. By other disciples of Leibnitz a still stricter conformity between his religious philosophy and the orthodox system was brought about than is set forth in the *Théodicée*. The identity of interest between orthodoxy and the Leibnitzian philosophy is particularly displayed in the defence with which J. G. Canz in Tübingen met the assault made by J. C. Dippel (*Christianus Democritus*) on the Church doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ. This once notorious man, whose mysticism exhibits just as strong a tendency to merge into rationalism as that of the Quakers, introduces into the discussion a previously unemployed argument against the idea of Christ's penal satisfaction, and in this respect is the foregoer of the later theologians of the illumination. The pivots of Dippel's view¹ are the idea current among the enthusiasts of the final conversion of the wicked in the other life ("restitution of all,") and the transference to the relation between God and man of the relative idea of punishment which had become current for civil society in the Natural Law of that time. It is clear that that view of the final end of the human race favours the presupposition that God's punishments as a whole are for reformation and not for retribution, that they have reference to the future amendment, and not to the past misdeed. Still, I conjecture that unless the culture of the time had offered as an assumption familiar to all the notion that the state and civil punishment have only relative significance, neither Dippel's mystical devotion to the task of active sanctification and of perfect victory over personal sin, nor his theory of Apokatastasis would have called forth that sort of criticism to which he subjected the doctrine of reconciliation.

In particular, Dippel's assertion that God's purpose is to destroy sin, but not the sinner, corresponds to that relative idea

¹ Dippel has briefly summarized his repeatedly expressed objections to the Church-doctrine of reconciliation in his *Hauptsumma der theologischen Grundlehren des Democriti*, 1733. They are to be found along with the refutation of them by Canz in Reinbeck's *Betrachtungen über die Augsbургische Confession, fortgesetzt von Canz*, 5 Theil; pp. 476-498.

of the state, which regards it as the means for the maintenance and well-being of individuals. In accordance with this, the traditionary attribute of God, which guarantees the destruction of the sinner, His wrath to wit, had to be partly denied, partly altered. Inasmuch as God is love, there is *properly speaking* no wrath in Him, or His wrath is nothing but a chastisement which flows from love, and which leads men to amend, although it does not take place without great pain. For as sins do no detriment to God's perfection, and cannot hurt or injure Him, but only bring disadvantage to man himself in his relation to God, God has no occasions to take heed of sins committed or demand satisfaction for them, but only in love will He direct His attention to them in order that for the future we to our own advantage may lay aside such bad behaviour. From the relation in which they stand to natural punishment, it can be inferred how positive punishments subserve this end as chastisements. The natural punishment of sin, which necessarily accompanies it, and which therefore is only *permitted* by the love of God, is separation from God as the highest good, is spiritual death or hell. God does not need to make hell; he finds it already made as the consequence of sin. As long then as man continues in sin, and out of fellowship with the highest good, God Himself cannot make him happy. In order to this, or that the sinner may be delivered from natural punishment, God in proof of His active love threatens Him with those positive punishments, whereby one is weaned from earthly things and led to long after eternal blessings; and these punishments extend even to the other life.

Christ's passion, accordingly, has not the intention of doing away with a wrath of God on account of sin which he has not, for He is love, and love and wrath are mutually exclusive, and God is quite ready to forgive the past which cannot be undone. Neither has it any reasonable meaning to say that Christ removed from us the punishments of sin. For its *natural* punishments cannot be separated from sin. That Christ should take them upon Himself were therefore conceivable only were He also to take our sins upon Himself, in other words, were He to do wickedly; but this is absurd. The *positive* chastisements of sin, on the other hand, as the sole means of amendment, ought not to be removed from us, and Christ by His example rather

taught us how to bear them with patience. Christ gave satisfaction to the love of God, having in His passion lent Himself as instrument to the Divine purpose of healing us from our sins; that is to say, He bore our sins in His passion, He successfully withstood the temptation with which the devil, sin, and the world, assailed Him; as Captain of our salvation, accordingly, He opened up the way of salvation, presenting to us the model how we should overcome the temptation of indwelling sin; and for this purpose He communicates to all who obey Him His life-giving Spirit. So that we are not acceptable to God through His imputed righteousness unless we be, at the same time, freed from the dominion of sin. For as the purpose of Christ's mediatorial office is sanctification and renewal, that end is mainly achieved in the appropriation of Christ's example in the destruction of the old Adam in each man. Christ's atoning sacrifice, on the other hand, avails us nothing unless we fully master the sin that dwells in us.

While this change of the meaning of Christ's sacrifice, as if it were only a model of the conquest over sin in man, approximates to the views of Schwenkfeld, the novelty consists in the conception of Divine punishments which is interwoven with it. Up to this time the threat of eternal condemnation, of hell, which was held out against sin, had been regarded as the positive punishment that God in His good pleasure had appointed; and anything else that might possibly be regarded as punishment thereof was not taken into account—not in theological theory at least. Now, Dippel assigns quite an opposite place to these two, but does so at the expense of accurate thinking. It betokens a complete breaking-up of the order of the universe, if God finds ready-made, and acquiesces in, the condemnation of sin, if the so-called natural punishment accordingly is to be regarded as a naturally necessary result, and not as at the same time a positive Divine punishment. It is thus an obvious ambiguity in language to call this condemnation by the name of punishment while denying its retributionary character. In both these respects the dilettantism and superficiality of Dippel betray themselves. At the same time, while regarding hell as in a certain sense a naturally necessary visitation impending over sin, he was in circumstances to regard the otherwise discernible penalties of sin at once as positive, and as means of reforma-

tion. In this respect he had obviously taken his cue from the Natural Law of his age; although his conclusion that all God's chastisements aim at reformation was not what Grotius thought. This discussion by Dippel of the two classes of punishment has the following bearing upon his rejection of the doctrine of reconciliation. As is done by that doctrine, it was his intention also to show how we are freed from the punishment of condemnation. But for this it is not Christ's merit but the amendment of individuals that avails according to him; and so far as positive punishments also subserve this end, to them also is attributed the effect of delivering the sinner from the natural punishment of his sin.

Dippel's lucubrations bear the stamp of individualism in every respect, in their tone as in their terminology, in their up-breaking of the orderly conception of the universe held in unity by the idea of God, as well as in the complete isolation of the ethical progress of the individual subject. But hereby he put himself to a manifest disadvantage as against Leibnitz and his school. These regarded the thought of the *civitas Dei*, of the kingdom or city of God as the absolute ultimate end of moral order amongst mankind. From this consideration Leibnitz had defended the retributive justice of God precisely with reference to the conceivability of eternal punishment from which Dippel drew back. Finally, it was from Leibnitz's idea that Canz received the impulse to set forth the whole of dogmatic theology under the form of Natural Law.¹ In this respect his opponent had the advantage of Dippel, as he deduced from the idea of the absolute theocracy, that not merely are there natural punishments for sin but also judicial punishments. The former convince man of the individual hurtfulness of sin for himself, the latter convince him of the unreasonableness of his behaviour towards the common good of the kingdom of God, in having despised the supreme power and worked the disadvantage of many thousands. But the judicial punishments have not merely this subjective reference; they have, at the same time, the objective meaning of subverting that free consent to sin by which sin as such is constituted; and which, once committed, continues to lie as a blot on the commonwealth. Only herein is the idea of punishment com-

¹ *De regimine Dei universali sive jurisprudentia civitatis Dei publica*, 1731. Ed. novissima 1744.

pleted ; for the threat of calamity in order to check future consent is rather prevention than punishment. Canz moreover finds no difficulty in the thought that Christ endured punishment of this sort in place of men ; he does not even take any notice of the objection raised by Dippel against it. Limiting himself merely to the purpose of defending his own opposite standpoint in fixing the idea of punishment, he did not carry his refutation so far as to point out the region in which Dippel's assertions might find something to justify them. The immature form of that refutation makes it all the plainer that the arguments against the dogma, which were now for the first time emerging, were at the very outset rebutted by means of a view, the authority of which was not merely traditional, but had received a special impulse at the hand of Leibnitz.

51. The rationalizing systematization of Leibnitz's philosophy by Wolf is, on the other hand, unfaithful to what were the most characteristic principles of that philosopher. Wolf abandons the idea of monads, anew regarding the relation between soul and body under a dualistic scheme. On this account also, he exchanges that conception of the universe, which is founded upon the inner conformity to purpose of the individual and of the whole, for the theory of the outward conformity to purpose, or rather subserviency to purpose of all details in succession.¹ This particularly applies to that region of ideas which has to be attended to in the present problem, to wit, the moral and the social.² Wolf draws the rule of moral action from comparison of the successive states of the individual, which are changed by his free actions. Those actions which make more perfect both our inward and our outward state are good ; what, on the other hand, makes both less perfect is bad. This twofold determination of the value of actions holds good even irrespective of the connexion of things in God. As, rather, the result which proves actions good or bad rests upon natural necessity, the value of the motives of actions, according to the result contemplated, is dependent on the nature of things ; this then is the sufficient ground of the

¹ Compare Kuno Fischer : *Leibnitz und seine Schule*, p. 522 sq.

² In what follows I refer to Wolf's *Vernünftige Gedanken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen*, 1720 ; *Vernünftige Gedanken von dem gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen*, 1721, 4th ed. 1736. Compare Erdmann : *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. ii. p. 197 sq.

obligation to act well and not wickedly. Therefore the rule of action, the moral law of nature, issues in the formula : do what makes thee and thy condition or that of others more perfect ; refrain from doing what makes it less perfect. Progress in perfection is the highest good that man can attain ; the prospect which accompanies this progress is blessedness. Now, it is in the highest degree noteworthy that Wolf offers no proof that the task of individual perfection includes the furthering of the perfection of others. The reference of our free actions to the perfection of others is simply asserted in the formula of the law of nature ; and in laying down duties towards others, as well as in deducing the idea of society, recurrence is made to that formula without any proof being alleged in support of its construction. The error of ethical principle that is implied in this becomes perfectly clear when the society in which men with united energies seek to further their best interests is resolved into the idea of a convention of individuals who come to an agreement with one another. Wolf refers to this definition not merely in order to explain the political commonwealth, but also in representing the family as the association of parents and children with a view to the upbringing of the latter.

This individualism in morals particularly displays itself in the fact that the duties of man towards himself,—in other words, the actions which, in accordance with the law of nature, are necessary in order to one's own individual perfecting,—take the first place. This sphere is not transcended when duties toward God are laid down ; for the natural knowledge and recognition of God, as of One who binds us to the observance of the law of nature, establishes these duties in the sense that the perfections of God are employed as motives of action. Wolf, indeed, in his *Theologia naturalis* (tom. i. sec. 975), widens the field of vision by his statement that man, by the dominion of God over the creation, is bound in his actions to aim at his own perfection and at that of other men, yea, even at that of the whole universe. But this idea remains without any rectifying influence upon ethics, for the resort of the Leibnitzian conception of the universe is taken away from it. Now, in view of this peculiarity of the moral principle in the Wolfian philosophy, we can understand that the deliberate recognition of a supra-rational revelation in Christianity, which Wolf and a section

of his scholars make, gave no pledge of its own endurance. The connexion of the dogmatic thoughts of Christianity counts upon a consciousness of fellowship in the Church which precedes the religious and moral training of the individual, and includes it.¹ If, on the other hand, the individual subject in the consciousness of the law of nature is so sure of himself that the thought of God, properly speaking, adds nothing thereto, then immediately the superfluity of the authority of revelation is experimentally proved, and the attitude of indifference assumed towards it ultimately incites to doubt and denial of the value and possibility of truths of revelation that transcend the reason. I venture to leave undiscussed the course of this development of thought amongst the theologians of the Wolfian school. The denials of the doctrine of reconciliation, which immediately ensue, are based as characteristic inferences upon the principles,—that Christianity has only rational contents, that God brings men to blessedness even without special revelation, and that the nurture of the individual in virtue, and the exhibition thereof in righteous action is the chief thing even within Christianity.

Hereby within the German Lutheran Church place is given to the Socinian view that Christianity is essentially the moral school for the production of individual virtue and dutifulness. This view, indeed, has not succeeded in displacing the tradition of Church doctrine and of the Church's requirements; it has rather sought to adapt itself to the continued demands of the Church system in spite of the obvious inconsistency; but the representatives of Church tradition are at a disadvantage when compared with the Neologians, because they themselves maintain only a dubious confidence in the goodness of their cause. On account of these circumstances, and also on account of the undeniably moral tendency which the leaders of the illumination-theology evince, the historian is at once prevented from concurring in the party verdict that the illumination-theology is nothing but apostasy from Christianity. Such a verdict, as it is maintained by the leaders of exaggerated ecclesiasticism in the nineteenth century, is only another instance of the

¹ See above, p. 188, note. In like manner Luther, *Catech. Major* (Hase: *libri symb.* p. 497): *Christianorum communio mater est, hæc quemlibet Christianum parturit ac alit per verbum.*

general experience that, in the immediately subsequent stage of culture, men are wont to show no understanding of that which went before, either exaggerating the errors of the latter in order to get for their own light as advantageous a background as possible, or suppressing the peculiarity of those who went before them in order to recommend themselves the more by the brilliant halo thus gained. Thus Melanchthon blackened the scholastic theology, and the illumination-divines represented the Reformation as if its leading tendency were to carry out the free investigation of Scripture. Now that half a century separates us from the time when the so-called "awakening" to positive Christianity contemptuously turned its back upon that of the illumination, the conviction begins to gain ground that the illumination-period has a positive value for the history of evangelical Christianity. A classical authority on this matter surely is Tholuck, who discerns in rationalism not an episode merely, causally unconnected with what precedes or follows, but a piece of history, a phase of development which was in some respects morbid but in others normal and natural.¹ In agreement with this is the detailed critique of Hundeshagen, that the principles and requirements of the illumination are in the main neither opposed nor yet alien to the gospel, but rather have their origin in it; and that the tendencies to humanism,—these indubitably Christian thoughts,—have come to hold a place outside of and opposed to the Church, because within the Church they were held down and suppressed, and not permitted to take their proper place.²

It cannot be denied that the stand-point of the illumination, the stand-point of individuality, guided by the reason, striving after relative virtue, and elevated above all conventional rules, is not fitted to nourish and promote religious fellowship as such. So far the theological character of this school is unchurchly, or less than churchly. But the illumination did not deliberately surrender that position of connexion with the Church in which it found itself; on the contrary, it maintained it. Standing upon that ground it sought for the first time to give full force to the peculiar value of the moral individual, in setting aside all conventional hindrances—a task for

¹ *Geschichte des Rationalismus*. Erste Abth. (1865), p. 1.

² *Beiträge zur Kirchenverfassungsgeschichte und Kirchenpolitik*, i. p. 474.

which very strong motives are offered in Christianity. The narrowness of apprehension of this task which characterized the school, indeed, had the effect of causing all the forms of church-fellowship which it found existent to be gradually set aside and invalidated. If, however, a charge is to be brought against the men of the illumination in this matter, the same charge must also be laid against the representatives of orthodoxy of the earlier period, in whose tradition the views of their successors found their root no less than in the Wolfian philosophy. The Lutheran orthodoxy of the seventeenth century is jointly responsible for the theological illumination that followed it. For it was orthodoxy that first suffered the force of the idea of the Church to be weakened; it was orthodoxy that connected the individual's gracious development only slightly with the notion of the Church; finally, as matter of fact, it was orthodoxy that lowered the Church to the level of a theological school. The illuminati only carried out further the practical task of the individual's development in such a way as to reject the conditions which orthodoxy laid down; but these conditions had already, by the existence of Pietism, been shown on the one hand, directly, to be inoperative, and on the other hand, indirectly, to be unavailable. Moreover, the illuminati, in exclusively regarding the claims of intellectual culture, thereby only carried forward that tendency by which orthodoxy had been carried on up to the eighteenth century. Finally, the circumstance that they were able only to break up the orthodox traditions, without substituting for them a system of analogous ideas, arises from the fact that the illumination-divines as a whole confined themselves to the very range of notions that orthodoxy embraces. This is seen with peculiar clearness in the rejection which they made of the doctrine of Christ's penal satisfaction. I am well aware that I cannot hope by this criticism to convince all those who think themselves entitled to judge on these matters; still, this cannot prevent me from expressing my view, since, moreover, I very well know why there still continues to be diversity in the judgment formed of the illumination. The illumination-tendency partly continues to be still directly operative among the half-educated masses, and in part it has found new connexions in theological science; it is thus an immediate object of practical and theo-

retical controversy. If now it is always difficult to judge dispassionately of one's opponent during the battle, such an attitude is least of all to be expected from those opponents of rationalism and naturalism who only defend that system of thought, the weaknesses of which made the rise of the illumination to be possible at all, and who therefore are at the very outset unfit to overcome.

52. The opposition of the theologians of the illumination against the doctrine of reconciliation runs its course in two stages of development; Töllner first denying the independent value of Christ's active obedience as a satisfaction to God; and Eberhard, Steinbart, and Löffler proceeding to extend the assault to the validity of the suffering and death of Christ as vicarious penal satisfaction. Even Töllner, however,¹ by no means confines himself to that range of view which Piscator took, when he would have Christ's active obedience to be merely a presupposition and condition of the passive. He rather gives to his view of the latter a turn different from the usual orthodox tradition. In this regard he separates himself from a predecessor who, in the eighteenth century, had repeated Piscator's view without overpassing the limits of orthodoxy.² Töllner's book, moreover, distinguishes itself from the more comprehensive undertakings of his successors by a copiousness in the development of his proofs, which reminds us of the examples set by Wolf and his orthodox disciples; while subsequent divines betoken their advanced illumination also by the fact that they hardly ever experience any difficulties in confuting the traditionary views opposed to their own. However, we may venture to omit an analysis of the exegetical portion

¹ *Der thätige Gehorsam Christi untersucht*, Breslau, 1768. Of Lutheran theologians previous to Töllner, Haferung in Wittenberg, and Christopher Francke in Kiel, both of them flourishing at the beginning of the eighteenth century, stood alone in making the assertion (which is inconsistent with orthodoxy) that Christ fulfilled the law for Himself also. Compare Fr. Walch: *De obedientia Christi activa dissertatio inauguralis*, Göttingæ, 1754; p. 70.

² La Placette (preacher at Copenhagen): *Traité de la Justification*, 1733. The co-ordination of the active with the passive obedience as a means of satisfaction to God rests, we know, on the presupposition that God's justice and the law are the highest rules of the moral order of the world, to which the attribute of grace is subordinate (p. 305). The point of La Placette's argumentation is (p. 190), that he regards the goodness of God as the ground on which salvation is bestowed, and that it comes into operation as soon as Christ's penal satisfaction has removed the obstacle to its manifestation.

of Töllner's work, all the more because hardly any other thesis of the orthodox system has been so satisfactorily proved from general rational considerations, as the assertion of the independent satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience. In the didactic portion of his work, Töllner draws his refutation of that thesis, *first*, from consideration of the person of Christ; *secondly*, from consideration of the office of Christ; *thirdly*, from the idea of vicarious satisfaction. He then develops his positive belief regarding the purpose of Christ's satisfaction in His passion.

On the *first* head, Töllner maintains with Piscator that the true humanity of Jesus gives rise to an obligation on His part to a positive fulfilment of the law, at the same time declaring that the independence of law, which attaches to the Divine nature, could be communicated to His human nature just as little as the other immanent attributes of God,—eternity, necessity, unchangeableness. For the union of the two natures in Christ signifies only the most manifold and extensive co-operation of the Divine nature with the human, in the production of common actions; but in these the man Jesus, who is identical with the Son of God, is still the subject of obedience, and as man is bound to it for his own part, so that it was not possible for Him to give obedience in the room of others. Töllner, moreover, decides upon the question whether Jesus may not by His obedience, even although it was due by Himself, have given satisfaction for others also, at the same time representing in that obedience the whole human race. It is remarkable that Töllner considers this case, which was asserted by the Reformed theologians, subsequent to Piscator, without noticing that it belongs to the doctrinal tradition of the Reformed Church, and without stating it in the technical forms of that Church (pp. 251-2). The way in which he decides upon this problem is very characteristic.¹ That any one should bear a representative character in any affair is conceivable in either

¹ That Töllner was Reformed, as Dorner asserts in his *Lehre von der Person Christi*, ii. p. 954, is merely an inference drawn from the fact that the theological faculty of Frankfort on the Oder officially bore the Reformed name. From the course of Töllner's book, as that has been described, I conclude that he was a Lutheran. For the Lutheran tradition of the doctrine offers the starting-point from which his treatise proceeds; and Töllner manifestly stands at a distance from the Reformed tradition.

of two ways :—either in virtue of authorization by others, as a ruler represents the people, being authorized by the whole people to all transactions which concern the common good ; or by the approval of him who accepts an action, or the manner of acting of an individual, as if it were one which had been done in the name of all. Of these possibilities now, according to Töllner, the first does not apply to the obedience of Christ ; for He has not received from men any authorization to represent them in the actions that He performs in the discharge of His duty. But the other possibility remains a mere possibility, and cannot be asserted to be the actual state of the case, as long as God has not distinctly declared and revealed His acceptance of Christ's obedience as substitutionary in the room of men. Scripture does not contain such a declaration. With what naïveté is the illumination-theory of the origin of moral society associated with the utmost strictness in maintaining the revelation-character of Scripture, in order to justify the genuinely Lutheran notion of the human individuality of Christ as strictly self-contained in relation to others ! But from this is drawn the conclusion against the Lutheran argument for the vicarious value of Christ's active obedience, because at the same time the idea of the two natures in Christ was altered from the indefiniteness of a connexion of substance into the definiteness of a dynamico-ethical connexion.

Under the *second* head, which has respect to the office of Christ, the independent satisfactory value of His active obedience had been partly based upon the fact that in Christ's official work, not merely the negative forgiveness of sins, but also the positive declaration of sinners as righteous, must be secured ; partly also upon the consideration, that the restoration of men to their former condition demands not merely that deserved punishment should be suffered, but also that the righteousness which had fallen short should be made up. Töllner rejects these assertions, and then from the characteristic features of Christ's official character he develops several independent proofs, tending to show the impossibility of the orthodox thesis. Against the real distinction between forgiveness of sins and justification or beatification (p. 256), he appeals, in the first instance, to the original religious feeling of Luther ; that where forgiveness of sins is there is life and

blessedness. He appeals further to the logical rule, that the removal of an injury can only then be conceived as having actually taken place, when the production of the opposite perfection is thought of as having begun. He appeals finally to the right conception of God which must be presupposed, to the richness of God's supreme goodness and love towards men, which of itself is pledge of the salvation of men, if only, by means of penal satisfaction, the obstacle which sin raises between man and the righteous Father be once taken away. Were the active obedience of Christ still necessary to move God to the bestowal of salvation, this would mean that God does not make men blessed although there is no further obstacle to His doing so; but this is inconsistent with the Fatherly disposition of God. The independent satisfactory value of the active obedience of Christ had been deduced from the presupposition that the law as the original standard of the relation between God and man, in order to the attainment of blessedness, had to be abolished by Christ to make room for grace (p. 258). Against this hypothesis of the orthodox system, which corresponded to the usual doctrine of a covenant of works that was binding upon Adam, Töllner could affirm that there is no authority in Scripture for the setting up of a covenant of works, that if the active obedience of Christ as a fulfilment of the covenant of works in the place of men is the ground of their blessedness, then it is not grace but the law that still holds good as the ultimate standard of blessedness; and, finally, that on such an assumption blessedness is no gift, but a grant made by the justice of God to the men who are represented by Christ. This consequence, which is recognised with approval by Reformed theologians (p. 278), appears to be prejudicial to the leading and fundamental view of grace. Töllner, for his part, finds that in the idea of the Mediator and High Priest there is expressed no representation of men towards God, but only a mediation whereby the Divine grace is expressed to the people, that the intercession which is implied in Christ's office excludes the legal validity of His substitutionary obedience towards God, and finally he declares with Piscator, that the continued obligation of believers to yield positive obedience to God leaves no room for the substitutionary value of Christ's obedience. And this argument is cogent

in Töllner's hand, because he for good reasons denies the primary validity of the law as a means whereby blessedness might be gained by man. Into this series of denials there enters yet the following argument—a characteristic one for Töllner,—which is connected with a certain inaccuracy in the technical mode of expression. In reference to the question regarding the necessity of good works, the Lutheran doctrine had identified blessedness and justification; of this Töllner makes use here also where it is the necessity of Christ's fulfilment of the law in order to our justification that is criticised. Now, in opposition to the *formula concordia*, it stands firm and unquestioned that only our own obedience has to do with blessedness; thus it is at once rendered impossible that the vicarious obedience of Christ should contribute to that end. But his moral vision is still further at variance with the principles of orthodox tradition, when he denies that God in any way, whether in the person of Christ or in the persons of all men, demands a perfect obedience in order to the blessedness of men. A perfect obedience without any transgressions is not possible to a finite creature, and cannot therefore reasonably be demanded by God. God thus demands only sincere obedience according to the ability of the individual; only in this relative respect must the obedience be as perfect as possible,—*there is no absolute standard of moral perfection*. Accordingly, even in the question as to Christ's vicarious obedience, the only point would be, whether Christ had offered for fallen men that obedience which, allowing for the bestowal of grace upon individuals, would have been possible to them. In that case, however, it would follow that he would have done more for the obdurate than for the regenerate; but this were absurd. It is quite clear that the opposition of these moral principles (founded in the Wolfian school) against orthodoxy, has far wider effects than are shown merely in the solution of the problem immediately before us. Therefore it will not be possible fully to estimate the significance of these disclosures until later.

In his *third* argument, drawn from the idea of satisfaction considered in itself, Töllner cannot avoid repeating much of what had already been said in speaking of Christ's office. The main point in it is, that the active obedience of Christ as a vicarious prestation does not correspond to the idea of satis-

faction; because the law enjoins upon each individual compliance with its demands in his own actions. The argument of La Placette, on the other hand, which Töllner appropriates, is sophistical. The assumption of Christ's active obedience in the well-known sense would make the necessity of his passion to be superfluous. For that obedience would represent men as individuals who had done all that was good, and committed nothing that was wrong; but if this was the case, they were not liable to punishment, and therefore no vicarious endurance of punishment was necessary for them. According to Töllner's own distinction regarding the reference of Christ's obedience in its two aspects to meet the obligations of men as men, and of men as sinners, men as such were not liable to punishment, but as sinners they stood in need of vicarious penal satisfaction. Thus, this third group of arguments contains only what either is not new or not to the point; but an episode in this connexion betokens the tendency with which Töllner in the *last* part of his work interprets the ground and final cause of the satisfaction which he still recognises to have been made in the passion of Christ. If the vicarious significance of His active obedience be refuted by the allegation that the law demands to be fulfilled by each one on his own account, the endurance of merited punishment seems analogously to be exacted of each one, and satisfaction by any other person seems in this respect to be inadmissible. This inference Töllner wards off only by means of the authority of Scripture. But this he cannot do without in the strangest way abandoning the accepted interpretation of the thought. He keeps to the traditionary paths so far as to recognise in Christ's passion the equivalent of the punishments merited by men; and, appealing to the Divine omnipotence, he is willing to rest satisfied that Christ in a short time suffered as much as all men were bound to suffer. But the thought that this penal suffering was a satisfaction rendered to the justice of God is rejected. For, in his final discussion, Töllner expressly declares against this basis of the orthodox theory, partly because it is not clearly laid down in Scripture, and partly because it is rather the love of God that is indicated as the motive of Christ's surrender to death. Following out this thought, Töllner pronounces against the stress laid by orthodox theology upon the Divine justice in

the problem of Christ's passion, because by the introduction of that element the bestowal of grace, which God decreed and promised, would cease to be a real and true bestowal of grace ; because, moreover, all right and power of showing grace is thus denied to God ; because, finally, the complete satisfaction of His justice, as it is asserted to have been given by Christ as the representative of men, would be an impossible condition of the bestowal of grace. Instead of accepting the forensic idea of righteousness handed down by orthodox tradition, Töllner avows his preference for the idea propounded by Leibnitz that it is goodness tempered by wisdom. From this point of view, he finds satisfaction of God's righteousness to be accomplished in the institution of a representative of men, an institution which partly maintains the motives to obedience which arise from the punishment of disobedience, that is to say, in penal example ; partly, by instituting an exemplary obedience, makes men worthy and capable of receiving grace, and thus provides for their sanctification. More closely considered, however, the satisfaction given in Christ's passion is not so much an immediate condition of God's bestowal of grace upon men, as it is a means for that sanctification of men upon which the bestowal of grace immediately depends. For that Christ has borne the penalties of sin which we have merited does not free us from the natural punishments which are inseparable from actual sin ; this last, therefore, must first be removed in sanctification, before the full bestowal of grace is complete. Sanctification, on the other hand, can again arise only out of the restoration of our confidence in God, which is hindered by the apprehension of the punishments due for sin ; Christ's endurance of suffering accordingly is not merely a penal example, but also the guarantee that punishments no longer impend on account of our sins.

Töllner's treatise demands this full analysis even if, with Baur,¹ we come merely to the conclusion that its substance is not essentially distinct from the doctrines of the Socinians and Arminians. For in this, as in his other works, Töllner is distinguished by a methodical mode of presentation, which ought not to be ignored in giving an account of what he teaches. But when looked at more closely, his doctrine stands related to

¹ As above, pp. 494, 495.

his cognate predecessors that have been mentioned, in the following way. It is a Socinian but not an Arminian feature to make the bestowal of grace dependent on sanctification. It is Arminian, but not Socinian, on the other hand, at one time to recognise a penal example in the death of Christ, at another time to make the remission of the punishments merited by believers dependent upon that death. But at the same time, this representation, as it is made by Töllner, is otherwise conditioned than it is in Limborch (p. 316). For the latter concedes to Christ's passion, although indefinitely, a reconciling effect upon God; Töllner completely denies any such effect, and recognises in the bearing and taking away of our punishments by Christ only a reference to men, the purpose namely of awakening in them the trust in God that is necessary to holiness. From this prevailing point of view we can easily understand that Töllner, in his last treatise bearing the title, *Alle Erklärungsarten vom versöhnenden Tode Christi laufen auf Eins heraus*,¹ could again approach more closely to Socinianism. In that treatise he seeks to show that all theories upon the subject have practically the same effect; inasmuch as all trace in the death of Christ a ground of assurance of the bestowal of grace upon us, and a confirmation of the Divine promises that have been made with respect to that bestowal. Töllner thus sees in this statement of Socinus (p. 298) the neutral point of all theories; but this would not have occurred to him, if his reference of Christ's death merely to believers and not to God had not exhibited characteristic analogy to the view of Faustus.

At the same time, it ought not to be regarded as unimportant that this Illumination divine makes a peculiar advance beyond his predecessors in those parties in the idea of God, although this is not so conspicuous as it might be because the conclusions are the same as those drawn by them. For while the Socinians and Arminians deny the existence in God of the attribute of penal justice forensically viewed, they recognise the specifically *medieval* idea of God's arbitrary dominion subject to no limitation as the deepest expression of His being, which they limit only by the consideration of His reasonableness towards men.

¹ "All ways of explaining Christ's atoning death amount to the same thing." The first part in the second volume of his *Theologische Untersuchungen*, pp. 316-35.

The Socinians explain this attitude of God towards men as the natural result of the *arbitrary* bestowal of certain rights upon men; the Arminians, in a less harsh form, regard it as what is most appropriate to the dignity of God, and the position of the men whom He has created.¹ Töllner goes beyond this view, opposing as he does the full Christian thought of God's supreme goodness and philanthropy (as above, p. 480), to the juristic conception of the penal justice that is necessary to Him. In this he adheres to the original point of view of the Reformers, from which they had immediately apprehended the thought of the reconciliation of men, a point of view which in the orthodox theology of both confessions had been rendered inoperative, partly by recurrence to the Areopagite's idea of God, and partly by pushing into prominence His habitual justice before His actual grace. It will perhaps be said that Töllner does not regard this idea of God as the positively Christian one, but has given currency to it as being the natural and obvious one accessible to the mere reason.² But in spite of this Töllner at the same time expressly says that the sinner in his anxiety about merited punishment is destitute of confidence towards God.³ As, then, the sinner, or natural man, does not recognise God as love, the transference of our punishment to Christ is the means appointed by God whereby He specifically proves His love towards sinners (as above, p. 627), and awakens in them that confidence towards Himself which renders possible the sanctification with a view to which all is designed.⁴ Being able to cite in support of this doctrine expressions of Paul and of John, expressions of an unambiguous clearness such as were not available for the opposite view, Töllner has resuscitated Abelard's leading thought (p. 35). Of course this will not tell greatly in his favour in the opinion of those who adopt Anselm's mode of viewing the question, and from the outset charge

¹ Compare my *Geschichtl. Studien zur christl. Lehre von Gott*. (Art. iii., *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* xiii. p. 268.)

² This is the case in his tract *Beweis dass Gott die Menschen bereits durch seine Offenbarung in der Natur zur Seligkeit führt* (1766), p. 208 sq.

³ *Thätiger Gehorsam Christi*, p. 664.

⁴ In like manner he insists in the treatise cited above (*Beweis*, etc., p. 106 sq.) that even if God by the revelation which He has made in nature brings men to blessedness, the plan of salvation revealed in Scripture is not thereby superseded or changed. For God's revelation in nature does not imply that human nature is not destroyed by sin (p. 103) and demands the use of means whereby confidence towards God may be awakened (p. 116).

Abelard with rationalism. But one partial view has no right to place itself above the other. I have already had occasion to charge the orthodox development of doctrine with having exhibited in a one-sided manner the *God-man* in His doing and suffering as man's representative over against God's justice without at the same time considering the *God-man* in His doing and suffering as representing God's love and grace towards sinners (p. 259). In the New Testament there are utterances which point so distinctly to the last-mentioned thought, that Töllner was entitled and bound to lay stress upon this side of the question, even although he for his part came short of the full extent of his problem, misapprehending as he did the biblical view which represents Christ as men's representative in His doing and suffering (as above, p. 526). If Töllner then deserves credit for having resuscitated the view of Abelard, which justly met with acceptance in the middle ages along with the other, but had died out in evangelical theology, his difference in point of originality from the great French schoolman ought not to be left unnoticed. Abelard, in conjunction with the already mentioned thought of the proof of God's love conveyed in Christ's passion, has given expression to a view of Christ's intercession, in which the independence of Christ's active obedience as representing us before God, is for the first time hinted at (pp. 37, 38),—a thought which reaches much further than Anselm's doctrine. But Töllner one-sidedly maintains the first thought with a view to refuting the last.

53. When measured with this predecessor, Töllner therefore produces the impression that he destroyed more than he built up, especially as his leading positive thought has not received any systematic development. In particular, one is led to ask whether the actual penal value of Christ's passion can be conceived, unless Christ be recognised as men's representative with God, when the necessity of punishment is made to rest on the perfections of God. Sometimes, however, the importance of a theologian does not depend upon the completeness with which his doctrine has been carried out, so much as upon the occasion he has given for starting new problems. When I take upon me to compare Töllner with Abelard in this respect, I refer to the hints given by him respecting the relation between guilt and punishment. These rise beyond the traditional field of

vision, and open up the prospect of a new view of the problem of reconciliation ; even although that did not disclose itself to Töllner himself. All the elucidations which had been put forth subsequent to the Reformation, with regard to the conditions upon which forgiveness of sins is obtained, orthodox as well as heterodox, had been at one in their definition of that idea, that it is equivalent to remission of punishment. The guilt whereby sin, actual or original, had distorted the relation of men to God was regarded as permanent in the impending threat of eternal death ; remission, or the assurance that this punishment will not be carried out, was regarded as the taking away of guilt ; and the only dispute was upon the question whether that result be conditioned by Christ's vicarious penal satisfaction, or by the arbitrary grace of God, and the believing obedience of men. A departure from that identification of the two notions emerged in the case of Walaeus and Quenstedt (p. 258), who discerned in Christ's passive obedience provision against punishment, and in the active obedience provision against guilt ; but this distinction of necessity continued to be unintelligible, not only because no means were used to explain it, but also because it stands connected with the other assumption, that release from liability to punishment, and release from the binding power of the law, render necessary the two co-ordinate sorts of Christ's obedience. Now, that distinction between *reatus culpæ* and *reatus pœnæ* recurs in Töllner, in the introduction to his treatise on the active obedience of Christ (p. 26 *sq.*), and in the following shape : From the *reatus* of divine punishments, which has its ground in the moral perfections of God, must be distinguished the *reatus* of sin in itself, which consists in the fact that a possible perfection remains unrealized in the world, that the joy that God has in the world is diminished, His honour injured, and the respect due to His law set at naught. In the previous question, whether Christ has taken away the one *reatus* as well as the other, he expresses himself upon the possible means of taking away the guilt of sin, to the effect that the imperfection of the world caused by sin must be made good by a perfection equally great, which otherwise would not have appeared in the world. Compared with this, he regards it as a work of much less value that men's liability to punishment should be done away with by the suffering of a representative.

He even finds it to be conceivable that compensation of guilt by the virtue of the representative might make the discharge from liability to punishment through a representative to be superfluous. According to these premisses, one expects to find a vindication of Christ's active obedience in the direction of the hints of Quenstedt and Walaeus, much more than an assault upon its validity. But the expectation is not realized. Töllner after all, at the close of the section in which he argues from the meaning of Christ's official character against the independent value of His active obedience, brings forward that distinction again in the form of an objection (as above, p. 554). If Christ's passive obedience is compensation for man's liability to punishment, it seems to follow therefrom that the justified person is not yet for that reason at once freed from guilt, that he does not receive innocence, that he does not cease to be a debtor in the sight of God. But in this connexion he no longer thinks of the compensation for guilt by means of virtue, which he had asserted at an earlier stage; he maintains, on the contrary, that things must be exactly so in justification, if it is to be really a bestowal of grace. For the latter, as such, abolishes the state of guilt, while any compensation would change the bestowal of grace into an absolution that were legally due. Finally, in a later place (p. 589), he seems to express himself differently. While *reatus pœnæ* includes in itself an actual obligation to suffer, *reatus culpæ*, he seems to say, expresses merely a certain relation of the sinner to God. From this would follow the obligation to make good the injuries done to God by opposite actions, *if this were possible*. "But thus the guilt which attaches to sinful man continues as a melancholy relation, which has as its consequence the liability to punishment. But still it continues to be merely a relation"! By this Töllner merely means to deny a double liability on the part of sinful men, which would lay the foundation for the twofold form of Christ's obedience. He thus refers merely to the continuance of the relation of guilt, under the already explained condition that it will be done away with by God's act of bestowal of grace.

Here for the first time is guilt, considered in itself, clearly distinguished from liability to punishment, and a possibility of freeing the problem of the atonement from the fetters laid upon it by the juridical mode of treatment established. The latter

mode of treatment has for its characteristic feature that the endurance of punishment *eo ipso* is the abolition of guilt. When one who has been found guilty by a judge on account of some criminal offence has undergone his punishment, there can no longer be any talk of guilt on his part, from a legal point of view ; but the *moral* judgment demands quite other proofs of the cleansing of a criminal from his guilt than is supplied by the fact of his having duly undergone the punishment determined by the law. Töllner accordingly sets on foot the moral view of the problem when he maintains that there must be another method for removing the guilt of men, to come into operation in conjunction with punishment, whether in person or in a substitute. I shall not now discuss whether it be sufficient that the moral guilt of sin that is not cancelled by the penal satisfaction of Christ should be taken away by the simple act of God's grace. But as the *reatus pœnæ* is characterized as an actual obligation, while the *reatus culpæ*, on the other hand, is regarded merely as a relation, we are reminded of the antithesis between justification as a real change and the mere forgiveness of sins, which Duns Scotus regards as not identical because guilt and liability to punishment are only *relatio relationis* (p. 85). If the problem of reconciliation through Christ is connected with such relations, a fruitful application of them to the solution of that problem could not of course be expected as long as no recourse was had to criticism of the religious and moral consciousness. Of this also we can very clearly satisfy ourselves by reference to Töllner. While distinguishing guilt and liability to punishment, he still did not know in what relation the two ought to be placed to each other. Accordingly his inquiry into "Divine punishments and the Divine penal justice"¹ leads him into entire uncertainty. For Töllner judges of God's dominion over His creatures after the analogy of a father's power, and not after the example of a ruler ; the purpose of God's punishments therefore is also regulated hereby. A father's punishment has the object of improving the subject ; that of a ruler is designed to prevent the continued commission of actions that are prejudicial, or omission of actions that are beneficial to the common weal and its other members.² Or,

¹ *Die göttlichen Strafen und die göttliche Straferechtigkeit*, in his *Theol. Untersuchungen*, ii. 1. p. 140-177.

² As above, p. 138.

in the language of Wolf, the purpose of punishment on the part of the State is to deter, while paternal punishment is discipline.¹ Proceeding upon this assumption, Töllner raises the question whether God punishes sin, not merely in a natural but also in an arbitrary way? He draws a provisional answer from the certainty of the forgiveness of sins, for the forgiveness of sins must consist in the remission of positive punishments, because natural punishments, as experience shows, are not remitted, and cannot be remitted without a miracle. From the purpose of the amelioration of the subject which is the motive of God's punishments, he infers that those evils are punishments in which it is obvious to the sinner, and *to others also*, that these evils happen to him on account of his sins, and in which it is obvious also for what sins they have been sent. But this occurs only in cases either when they present themselves as natural consequences of bad actions, as, for example, physical evils follow upon the misuse of the bodily organs; or when a direct declaration of God accompanies the evil, or has preceded it as a general threat. Evils in fact assume the character of punishments if they are inflicted in accordance with a decree of God, if they are sufficiently felt, if they are fitted to call forth due repentance; finally, if they are proportioned to the crime. But now, natural punishments do not suffice to keep men back from wicked actions. In consequence of this, God makes use of positive punishments also, in order to the reformation of the sinner. The same consequence flows from the fact that several of the necessary marks of punishment are not wont to show themselves in the class of natural punishments. The Divine decree is not very obvious when they occur, for they would ensue as immediate consequences of certain crimes even if there were no God; "and in fact several truths of natural theology are needed that they may be recognised as Divine penalties." God's punishments, moreover, must be felt, but the greater number of natural punishments are not felt at all, particularly the deeper a man has sunk in wickedness. Finally, in natural punishments, for the most part, there is no proportion to the intention, which makes an action to be sin, for they proceed merely according to the action, even although it may have been unintentional. As, accordingly,

¹ *Von dem gesellschaftlichen Leben der Menschen*, p. 293.

a series of inferences is always necessary to recognise natural punishments as being Divine, it is probable therefore that God imposes positive punishments also, in which everything that pertains to the special nature and purpose of a punishment will be more perfectly discernible. But then Töllner goes on to convince himself that even positive punishments cannot be clearly recognised as such, either by the persons who are visited by them or *by others*, where there is no Divine indication of their connexion, and where their proportion is not clear. While drawing from this the conclusion that they all the more certainly pertain to the future life, he at the same time frankly admits that he has laid himself open to the reproach of having darkened this doctrine instead of clearing it up.

In this the honest man is certainly quite right. But wherein is it that he has gone wrong in this investigation? In having undertaken to give a decision upon the subsumption of evil under the idea of divine punishment in an entirely objective dogmatic way; that is, in such a way that the reality of that idea may be brought to more than probable conviction in the subject of punishment himself and *also in others*. The theme itself certainly betrays the interest taken by the Illumination in the moral conditions of individual life, an interest that orthodoxy had never meddled with. Orthodoxy limited itself to the doctrine that all mankind, from the natural reaction of God's justice against Adam's sin, is liable to the highest conceivable punishments, and hereby the analogous evils of this mortal life were, on the one hand, so much exceeded, and, on the other hand, so fully explained, that it seemed needless to pay any special attention to them. As this dogmatic settlement of the matter was brought into doubt by Leibnitz, and the denial of it, particularly in the assertion of the salvation of the heathen, became common to all the theologians of the Illumination, Töllner's proceeding shows that nevertheless men did not understand how to propound and to investigate the question of the punishment of individuals otherwise than dogmatically. The material opposition between the Illumination and orthodoxy on this point presupposes an identity of method. But by this method no positive results were gained, only the doubtfulness of merely relative conclusions. It is quite of a piece with this that Töllner knows no absolute

standard of morality (p. 350), and that he finds no rule to determine whether and when Divine punishments take place. For definite knowledge regarding the Divine punishments is one form in which the validity of the absolute law of moral action is recognised. If this connexion of ideas was obscured by the dogmatic method of the illumination theology, an altogether new standpoint from which to regard the matter was needed in order to find an escape from this confusion.

One might almost be tempted to believe that the very next author who falls to be considered here had taken up this subjective critical point of view for the treatment of the idea of punishment. J. A. Eberhard¹ recognises as the chief element in God's punishments the purpose of reformation, and though he makes the concession of occasionally taking into account also the purpose of the punishments inflicted by the state, which is to deter, he still insists, against Grotius, that there must always be added even then the reflex influence upon the subject of punishment—his improvement. He asserts moreover that if this purpose be attained, the feeling of punishment must give place to the most blessed results of improvement, otherwise the requisite proportion between punishment and crime would not be maintained. The ground on which he proceeds is the assumption of the supreme wisdom and goodness of God, which does not allow of His being compared to a ruler (i. p. 114 *sq.*; ii. p. 259 *sq.*), and which, as regards the case immediately under discussion, rests precisely upon those scriptural expressions in which punishment is represented as a fatherly benefaction on the part of God (Job v. 17; Prov. iii. 11, 12; Heb. xii. 5, 6). The proof is derived from the rule that the sinner, who has come to have better thoughts, will no longer discern any punishment in the continuing evil; that he no longer feels unhappy in it, however painful it may be to his sentient nature. Eberhard adds an application to the assumption of eternal punishments, to the effect that the representation usually made ought to be reversed (i. p. 422). If eternal punishment is designed, irrespective of the subject of punishment, to maintain the prosperity of the whole rational

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universe, Eberhard claims that the subject of it must needs know the good which his sufferings are producing, and that he should console himself with the reflection that God is just to himself also. On this condition, however, eternal punishments become means of reformation; that is, they are denied in their proper meaning. These observations are accompanied by the general statement that evils, which are materially alike, are punishments or not, according to the constitution of the subject who is visited by them (i. pp. 119, 408). Whether an evil be a punishment or no is thus determined by a subjective judgment on the part of him who suffers. Still, in this theory of Eberhard's, the subjective critical definition of the idea of punishment is by no means gained. He is far from considering the subjective consciousness of guilt to be the ground of our knowledge of punishment according to the law's absolute standard of estimation; for he keeps in view exclusively the analogous fact that the reformed sufferer, having so far as his consciousness is concerned expiated his guilt, no longer feels and considers the abiding evil to be punishment. This observation has not led him to the fundamental truth that corresponds to it, that it is exactly the subjective consciousness of guilt that proves an evil to be punishment. And, if we imagine that this assumption passes as a matter of course along with the other, we are mistaken so far as Eberhard is concerned. For he knows nothing at all of the fact of the consciousness of guilt, expecting as he does that the sinner by his own feeling of proportionate physical evil will be brought to the knowledge of moral evil (i. p. 124).

As the observation of these facts of the moral self-consciousness is thus incomplete, neither is the fact quite accurately expressed that the reformed sinner regards the evils which overtake him as consequences of his sins, no longer as punishments but as Divine benefactions. In the first place, the Bible texts, to which Eberhard appeals to show that punishments coming from God have the value of paternal chastisements and proofs of love, teach no truth that is obvious in itself, teach no truth of natural religion, but convey a conviction which has been hardly won in the region of positive moral religion, in the struggle of the consciousness of guilt with the absolute obligation of God's law, and in the struggle of the consciousness of

election with the hampering and adverse dispensations of God's providence. Moreover, in the contemplation of Divine chastisement the purpose of benevolence is indeed recognised; but, on the other hand, the sense of retribution as an evil is by no means taken away. Eberhard's interpretation of the Divine punishments as means of amelioration, and as absolute acts of benevolence, cannot be recognised as a scientific piece of knowledge that universally holds good; much less his inference from it that a remission of punishment, because Christ had taken it upon Himself, would be to deprive us of what are real benefits, and thus would be absurd on the part of God. The preceding criticism meets with further justification if we compare the view of G. S. Steinbart,¹ which is in harmony with Eberhard in essentials, although differing from him in details. He, too, knows only of the end of reformation as aimed at in God's punishments. But the distinction between natural and arbitrary punishments receives from him a clearer shape than it does from his predecessors, who also make use of it. Töllner had not been able to establish in fact the distinction which he had made; and Eberhard (ii. p. 268) had indeed adopted it but failed to apply it. Steinbart, for the first time, investigates the subject with greater strictness. In order to fix the idea of punishment, he distinguishes the physical from the moral consequences of an action. The former, which have no relation to the moral law, and only proceed in accordance with natural law, which accordingly alike overtake those who have performed the same action, whether they did it as moral or as immoral, have not the distinctive feature which could prove them to be punishments; they remain therefore completely untouched by the question whether punishments could be taken to himself by another person than the offender. The idea of punishment applies only to the moral consequences of an action. In this sphere, the *natural* punishments consist in the disgust with ourselves that arises without regard to the

¹ *System der reinen Philosophie oder Glückseligkeitslehre des Christenthums*, 1778, 2d. ed. 1780. On the other hand, the analogous investigation of the idea of Divine punishment made by C. F. Bahrdt (*Apologie der gesunden Vernunft durch Gründe der Schrift unterstützt, in Bezug auf die christliche Veröhnungslehre* 1781), and by J. F. Ch. Löffler (*Ueber die kirchl. Genugthuungslehre*; two tracts of the years 1789, 1805 to be found in the first vol. of his minor works, 1817) are without speciality or remarkable strictness.

Lawgiver, from seeing that we ourselves have injured our own position; and this feeling is always strictly proportioned to the morality of the action. This punishment, however, is something beneficent, as an incentive to daily repentance, and therefore necessary even for the reformed man. Therefore this punishment also Christ ought not to take away from men. In thinking of the Lawgiver, there follows upon crime, as a natural punishment, the very unpleasant consciousness of having injured him. If now, as the Jews do, we represent Him to ourselves as a tyrant, then, along with slavish fear, hatred to him will be produced; but if, as Christians, we think of the Lawgiver as a bountiful Father, then we shall feel ashamed indeed in our inmost souls before Him, but all the stronger shall we feel the desire by renewed zeal to be well-pleasing to Him. *Arbitrary* punishments are evils which the Lawgiver connects with disobedience to his commands. But, as regards God, arbitrariness in this procedure is limited by His goodness, and by the proportion that is observed between punishment and the purpose of reformation, in such a way that they are made to cease when reformation results. In particular, God's goodness excludes the assumption that in order to the remission of such punishments he requires to be propitiated by satisfaction. Rather the proof of love which God has given in sending and sacrificing His Son, frees from all apprehension of such arbitrary punishments. Thus he who accepts in faith that proof of love has nothing further to fear except the natural consequences of his follies.

The aimlessness of this criticism of God's punishments is at once evident when we compare it with Dippel's view of the same subject; and we do not at all need, by anticipation, to proceed to the manner of viewing the subject that is possible and imperative for us, in order to recognise the unsatisfactoriness of the illumination standpoint. The points of contact between Steinbart and Dippel are,—*first*, the strict, matter-of-fact distinction between natural and arbitrary punishment; *second*, the deducing of the latter from God's love, seeking the reformation of the sinner; *third*, the exemption of natural punishment from direct positive institution by God. But they follow interests that are completely opposed, and therefore come to opposite results, for they assign to what is implied in the

natural punishments a different importance for the sinner. The natural punishment of sin which, as such, can be transferred to no other, means, with Dippel, separation from God as the highest Good; with Steinbart, the disgust of the sinner with himself, and shame in presence of the Lawgiver, who at the same time is the bountiful Father. Dippel, therefore, seeks to ascertain the way in which positive punishments, by the amelioration they produce, help to secure release from natural punishment. Steinbart, on the other hand, requires the continuance of the natural punishments which he recognises, in order to bring about reformation and thereby ward off the positive punishments of sin. The cause of this great divergence is, that Dippel is aware of the whole weight of guilt in sin which never at all occurs to the Illumination theologians. It must be admitted that he did not apprehend that thought in the form that properly belongs to it; he expresses it only according to its objective relation, not as a subjective function. But, when compared with this predecessor, the moral sphere of vision of the theologians of the Illumination appears in all its littleness. Still, if they could not even by him be instructed respecting the *subjective* function of guilt, truly orthodox tradition had not taught them anything regarding this peculiar phenomenon. Rather is the defectiveness of the theology of the Illumination on this point only the consequence of the fact that orthodoxy in this respect had not gained or produced any adequate knowledge. Orthodox theology knew guilt only as what objectively establishes sin as such,¹ and, as regards original sin, as *impersonal* liability to punishment; and found therefore no difficulty in the assertion that the doing away with the liability to punishment that Christ's satisfaction effects *eo ipso* abolishes guilt. Can any well-founded complaint be raised against the Illumination theologians from this quarter, because they did not recognise subjective guilt in its

¹ Baier: *Theol. Positiva*, Pars ii. cap. 1 sec. 15: *Culpa est relatio quædam ex peccato in ordine ad legem considerato resultans,—importat obligationem, qua quis sub peccato, per ipsum peccatum constrictus tenetur, ut revera sit et dicatur peccator.* Hollaz: *Examen theol.*, Pars ii. cap. 2, qu. 18: *Culpa est fœditas vel deformitas moralis ex actu legi difformi et creaturæ rationali indecoro resultans, ac per modum turpis maculæ peccatori adhærens. Reatus culpæ est obligatio, qua homo sub peccato quasi constrictus tenetur ut peccator detestabilis censeatur.*

vision, and open up the prospect of a new view of the problem of reconciliation ; even although that did not disclose itself to Töllner himself. All the elucidations which had been put forth subsequent to the Reformation, with regard to the conditions upon which forgiveness of sins is obtained, orthodox as well as heterodox, had been at one in their definition of that idea, that it is equivalent to remission of punishment. The guilt whereby sin, actual or original, had distorted the relation of men to God was regarded as permanent in the impending threat of eternal death ; remission, or the assurance that this punishment will not be carried out, was regarded as the taking away of guilt ; and the only dispute was upon the question whether that result be conditioned by Christ's vicarious penal satisfaction, or by the arbitrary grace of God, and the believing obedience of men. A departure from that identification of the two notions emerged in the case of Walaeus and Quenstedt (p. 258), who discerned in Christ's passive obedience provision against punishment, and in the active obedience provision against guilt ; but this distinction of necessity continued to be unintelligible, not only because no means were used to explain it, but also because it stands connected with the other assumption, that release from liability to punishment, and release from the binding power of the law, render necessary the two co-ordinate sorts of Christ's obedience. Now, that distinction between *reatus culpæ* and *reatus pœnæ* recurs in Töllner, in the introduction to his treatise on the active obedience of Christ (p. 26 *sq.*), and in the following shape : From the *reatus* of divine punishments, which has its ground in the moral perfections of God, must be distinguished the *reatus* of sin in itself, which consists in the fact that a possible perfection remains unrealized in the world, that the joy that God has in the world is diminished, His honour injured, and the respect due to His law set at naught. In the previous question, whether Christ has taken away the one *reatus* as well as the other, he expresses himself upon the possible means of taking away the guilt of sin, to the effect that the imperfection of the world caused by sin must be made good by a perfection equally great, which otherwise would not have appeared in the world. Compared with this, he regards it as a work of much less value that men's liability to punishment should be done away with by the suffering of a representative.

He even finds it to be conceivable that compensation of guilt by the virtue of the representative might make the discharge from liability to punishment through a representative to be superfluous. According to these premisses, one expects to find a vindication of Christ's active obedience in the direction of the hints of Quenstedt and Walaeus, much more than an assault upon its validity. But the expectation is not realized. Töllner after all, at the close of the section in which he argues from the meaning of Christ's official character against the independent value of His active obedience, brings forward that distinction again in the form of an objection (as above, p. 554). If Christ's passive obedience is compensation for man's liability to punishment, it seems to follow therefrom that the justified person is not yet for that reason at once freed from guilt, that he does not receive innocence, that he does not cease to be a debtor in the sight of God. But in this connexion he no longer thinks of the compensation for guilt by means of virtue, which he had asserted at an earlier stage; he maintains, on the contrary, that things must be exactly so in justification, if it is to be really a bestowal of grace. For the latter, as such, abolishes the state of guilt, while any compensation would change the bestowal of grace into an absolution that were legally due. Finally, in a later place (p. 589), he seems to express himself differently. While *reatus poenæ* includes in itself an actual obligation to suffer, *reatus culpæ*, he seems to say, expresses merely a certain relation of the sinner to God. From this would follow the obligation to make good the injuries done to God by opposite actions, *if this were possible*. "But thus the guilt which attaches to sinful man continues as a melancholy relation, which has as its consequence the liability to punishment. But still it continues to be merely a relation"! By this Töllner merely means to deny a double liability on the part of sinful men, which would lay the foundation for the twofold form of Christ's obedience. He thus refers merely to the continuance of the relation of guilt, under the already explained condition that it will be done away with by God's act of bestowal of grace.

Here for the first time is guilt, considered in itself, clearly distinguished from liability to punishment, and a possibility of freeing the problem of the atonement from the fetters laid upon it by the juridical mode of treatment established. The latter

mode of treatment has for its characteristic feature that the endurance of punishment *eo ipso* is the abolition of guilt. When one who has been found guilty by a judge on account of some criminal offence has undergone his punishment, there can no longer be any talk of guilt on his part, from a legal point of view ; but the *moral* judgment demands quite other proofs of the cleansing of a criminal from his guilt than is supplied by the fact of his having duly undergone the punishment determined by the law. Töllner accordingly sets on foot the moral view of the problem when he maintains that there must be another method for removing the guilt of men, to come into operation in conjunction with punishment, whether in person or in a substitute. I shall not now discuss whether it be sufficient that the moral guilt of sin that is not cancelled by the penal satisfaction of Christ should be taken away by the simple act of God's grace. But as the *reatus poenæ* is characterized as an actual obligation, while the *reatus culpæ*, on the other hand, is regarded merely as a relation, we are reminded of the antithesis between justification as a real change and the mere forgiveness of sins, which Duns Scotus regards as not identical because guilt and liability to punishment are only *relatio relationis* (p. 85). If the problem of reconciliation through Christ is connected with such relations, a fruitful application of them to the solution of that problem could not of course be expected as long as no recourse was had to criticism of the religious and moral consciousness. Of this also we can very clearly satisfy ourselves by reference to Töllner. While distinguishing guilt and liability to punishment, he still did not know in what relation the two ought to be placed to each other. Accordingly his inquiry into "Divine punishments and the Divine penal justice"¹ leads him into entire uncertainty. For Töllner judges of God's dominion over His creatures after the analogy of a father's power, and not after the example of a ruler ; the purpose of God's punishments therefore is also regulated hereby. A father's punishment has the object of improving the subject ; that of a ruler is designed to prevent the continued commission of actions that are prejudicial, or omission of actions that are beneficial to the common weal and its other members.² Or,

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election with the hampering and adverse dispensations of God's providence. Moreover, in the contemplation of Divine chastisement the purpose of benevolence is indeed recognised; but, on the other hand, the sense of retribution as an evil is by no means taken away. Eberhard's interpretation of the Divine punishments as means of amelioration, and as absolute acts of benevolence, cannot be recognised as a scientific piece of knowledge that universally holds good; much less his inference from it that a remission of punishment, because Christ had taken it upon Himself, would be to deprive us of what are real benefits, and thus would be absurd on the part of God. The preceding criticism meets with further justification if we compare the view of G. S. Steinbart,¹ which is in harmony with Eberhard in essentials, although differing from him in details. He, too, knows only of the end of reformation as aimed at in God's punishments. But the distinction between natural and arbitrary punishments receives from him a clearer shape than it does from his predecessors, who also make use of it. Töllner had not been able to establish in fact the distinction which he had made; and Eberhard (ii. p. 268) had indeed adopted it but failed to apply it. Steinbart, for the first time, investigates the subject with greater strictness. In order to fix the idea of punishment, he distinguishes the physical from the moral consequences of an action. The former, which have no relation to the moral law, and only proceed in accordance with natural law, which accordingly alike overtake those who have performed the same action, whether they did it as moral or as immoral, have not the distinctive feature which could prove them to be punishments; they remain therefore completely untouched by the question whether punishments could be taken to himself by another person than the offender. The idea of punishment applies only to the moral consequences of an action. In this sphere, the *natural* punishments consist in the disgust with ourselves that arises without regard to the

¹ *System der reinen Philosophie oder Glückseligkeitslehre des Christenthums*, 1778, 2d. ed. 1780. On the other hand, the analogous investigation of the idea of Divine punishment made by C. F. Bahrdt (*Apologie der gesunden Vernunft durch Gründe der Schrift unterstützt, in Bezug auf die christliche Veröhnungslehre* 1781), and by J. F. Ch. Löffler (*Ueber die kirchl. Genugthuungslehre*; two tracts of the years 1789, 1805 to be found in the first vol. of his minor works, 1817) are without speciality or remarkable strictness.

Lawgiver, from seeing that we ourselves have injured our own position; and this feeling is always strictly proportioned to the morality of the action. This punishment, however, is something beneficent, as an incentive to daily repentance, and therefore necessary even for the reformed man. Therefore this punishment also Christ ought not to take away from men. In thinking of the Lawgiver, there follows upon crime, as a natural punishment, the very unpleasant consciousness of having injured him. If now, as the Jews do, we represent Him to ourselves as a tyrant, then, along with slavish fear, hatred to him will be produced; but if, as Christians, we think of the Lawgiver as a bountiful Father, then we shall feel ashamed indeed in our inmost souls before Him, but all the stronger shall we feel the desire by renewed zeal to be well-pleasing to Him. *Arbitrary* punishments are evils which the Lawgiver connects with disobedience to his commands. But, as regards God, arbitrariness in this procedure is limited by His goodness, and by the proportion that is observed between punishment and the purpose of reformation, in such a way that they are made to cease when reformation results. In particular, God's goodness excludes the assumption that in order to the remission of such punishments he requires to be propitiated by satisfaction. Rather the proof of love which God has given in sending and sacrificing His Son, frees from all apprehension of such arbitrary punishments. Thus he who accepts in faith that proof of love has nothing further to fear except the natural consequences of his follies.

The aimlessness of this criticism of God's punishments is at once evident when we compare it with Dippel's view of the same subject; and we do not at all need, by anticipation, to proceed to the manner of viewing the subject that is possible and imperative for us, in order to recognise the unsatisfactoriness of the illumination standpoint. The points of contact between Steinbart and Dippel are,—*first*, the strict, matter-of-fact distinction between natural and arbitrary punishment; *second*, the deducing of the latter from God's love, seeking the reformation of the sinner; *third*, the exemption of natural punishment from direct positive institution by God. But they follow interests that are completely opposed, and therefore come to opposite results, for they assign to what is implied in the

natural punishments a different importance for the sinner. The natural punishment of sin which, as such, can be transferred to no other, means, with Dippel, separation from God as the highest Good; with Steinbart, the disgust of the sinner with himself, and shame in presence of the Lawgiver, who at the same time is the bountiful Father. Dippel, therefore, seeks to ascertain the way in which positive punishments, by the amelioration they produce, help to secure release from natural punishment. Steinbart, on the other hand, requires the continuance of the natural punishments which he recognises, in order to bring about reformation and thereby ward off the positive punishments of sin. The cause of this great divergence is, that Dippel is aware of the whole weight of guilt in sin which never at all occurs to the Illumination theologians. It must be admitted that he did not apprehend that thought in the form that properly belongs to it; he expresses it only according to its objective relation, not as a subjective function. But, when compared with this predecessor, the moral sphere of vision of the theologians of the Illumination appears in all its littleness. Still, if they could not even by him be instructed respecting the *subjective* function of guilt, truly orthodox tradition had not taught them anything regarding this peculiar phenomenon. Rather is the defectiveness of the theology of the Illumination on this point only the consequence of the fact that orthodoxy in this respect had not gained or produced any adequate knowledge. Orthodox theology knew guilt only as what objectively establishes sin as such,¹ and, as regards original sin, as *impersonal* liability to punishment; and found therefore no difficulty in the assertion that the doing away with the liability to punishment that Christ's satisfaction effects *eo ipso* abolishes guilt. Can any well-founded complaint be raised against the Illumination theologians from this quarter, because they did not recognise subjective guilt in its

¹ Baier: *Theol. Positiva*, Pars ii. cap. 1 sec. 15: *Culpa est relatio quædam ex peccato in ordine ad legem considerato resultans,—importat obligationem, qua quis sub peccato, per ipsum peccatum constrictus tenetur, ut revera sit et dicatur peccator.* Hollaz: *Examen theol.*, Pars ii. cap. 2, qu. 18: *Culpa est fœditas vel deformitas moralis ex actu legi difformi et creaturæ rationali indecoro resultans, ac per modum turpis maculæ peccatori adherens. Reatus culpæ est obligatio, qua homo sub peccato quasi constrictus tenetur ut peccator detestabilis censeatur.*

full significance,¹ and therefore thought so lightly of punishment as to deny the necessity of Christ's penal satisfaction? The insolvency which the Illumination discloses at this point is rather the direct consequence of the long-continued deficit which orthodoxy had accumulated in apprehending of the moral conditions of the Christian religion.

54. Eberhard and Steinbart contented themselves with deducing from the reformatory purpose of Divine punishment, which they had asserted, and from their assumption of God's unconditioned goodness to men, the simple conclusion that no remission of punishment at all, and especially no bearing of it by Christ must be thought of, if we are not to attribute to God an absurd course of procedure. The similar dissertation by Löffler (as above, p. 291 *sq.*), is copious and many-sided; and I give it here only in a more appropriate order than that in which it originally appears: *First*, The thought of forgiveness as an expression of a change of disposition is in contradiction with God's unchangeableness; and the forgiveness of guilt contradicts His truthfulness, which prevents Him from regarding a guilty person as innocent, or from regarding one who is guilty in particular respects as being innocent on the whole. *Secondly*, The thought of a satisfaction, as giving occasion to the forgiveness of sins, is again irreconcilable with God's immutability, but also at the same time incapable of being carried out, both because each individual is bound himself to do the things that are required of him and also because it is impossible that these should be transferred to others. *Thirdly*, the thought of a penal satisfaction is contrary to the benevolent design of punishment generally, and also, particularly, it has no direct connexion with the purpose of amelioration, unless penal satisfaction be at the same time conceived of as a penal example; moreover it is not in accordance with the nature of moral actions. For in these a distinction must be drawn between matter and form, between their harmony or discordance with the law, and the freedom wherewith they are determined upon. As regards the external (juridical) legality of an action, which may even be produced by constraint, a substitute may certainly

¹ A whole series of the discussions in Töllner's *Theol. Untersuchungen* follows the line of showing that the consciousness of guilt in unintentional actions which are contrary to the law is unfounded.

take the place of the person bound by the law in cases laid down by the Lawgiver; but not as regards the free decision which grounds the morality of the action. In like manner can an arbitrary punishment for a contravention of the law be remitted at the pleasure of the judge, or be borne by another. But punishment for the immorality of actions, which God accomplishes by means of the smiting of conscience, can neither be felt by another person, nor can it be removed by God Himself. Finally, the outward arbitrary punishments which God can cause to follow upon immorality of action either are not recognisable as such by the rules of logic, or do not admit of being taken away from the person who is visited by them, if they do not cease when they have accomplished their object in the reformation of the sinner.

This train of thought avoids all consideration of the idea of guilt, and herein betrays its weakness with reference to the problem contemplated; the specification, however, of those marks of actions, in accordance with which they are to be judged legally or morally, offers a point of view which in this generality of application had not up to that time been adopted with reference to the question of the possibility of a vicarious satisfaction. But with this criticism of the traditionary ideas the task of the Illumination theologians was not exhausted. It required to justify its negative result by the positive teaching of those scriptural lines of thought which up till then it had been usual to embrace in the idea of penal satisfaction which it repudiated. The treatment of the Bible representations by the three men who had abandoned the idea of satisfaction is not identical; these results, however, in a certain measure, supplement one another, as they are worthy of each other in the incompleteness and superficiality of their procedure. It must, however, be granted them that after their own fashion they have given weight to certain lines of thought taken by the apostles, which had wrongly been left unheeded by orthodox theology, and which to some extent offer insuperable obstacles to its establishment upon a scriptural foundation.

Eberhard could, with a certain measure of justice, maintain that the most conspicuous passages of the New Testament bring redemption directly into relation with men. He formulated this fact as meaning that the redemption of Jesus saves

man in sanctifying Him, or that Christ's death helps us mediate to receive grace (penitence and reformation being presupposed), or, with Töllner, that that proof of the love of God moves us to counter-love (ii. pp. 248, 276, 306). That the death of Christ should primarily mean a satisfaction to God had for the most part been pieced together from an analysis of those attributes which have a specifically Old Testament stamp. In order to put a stop to such a mode of procedure, Eberhard maintains, in the first place, the principle for which he had the support of Ernesti's authority, that Jesus and His apostles, in their representations of Christ's sacrifice and Priesthood, accommodated themselves to the understanding of their hearers. He then undertakes to derive from the separate biblical expressions some other sense than that which the orthodox obtained.¹ Redemption (*ἀπολύτρωσις*) in the *usus loquendi* of the LXX. signifies liberation in general without implying a ransom-price, reference to which cannot be traced; this predicate then denotes the death of Christ as the means of emancipating us from ignorance, superstition, sin. If, then, Jesus is called the ransom-price of many, this is merely a metaphorical expression for the high value of the trouble and the toil which He devoted to the object of healing the folly and vice of others. The sacrificial predicate of atonement (*ἱλασμός*) compares the

¹ In this direction, certain English writers of the seventeenth century, like Curcellæus (p. 315) before them, had opposed the orthodox assumption that the sin of the sacrificer was transferred to the sacrificial victim, and in it punished by death. Instead of this, Arthur Sykes (*Essay on the nature, design, and origin of sacrifices*, London, 1746, published in a German translation with preface by Semler at Halle in 1778) viewed the sacrifice with regard chiefly to the sacrificial meal as actual display of friendship with God, — John Taylor (*The Scripture doctrine of atonement examined in relation to Jewish sacrifices and to the sacrifice of Jesus Christ*, London, 1751; German translation, 1773) regarding them as penitent supplications for the mercy of God, analogous to prayer. Both hypotheses are combated by James Richie (*Criticism of modern notions of sacrifices*, London, 1761). I have not seen this book; but in the preface to the translation of Sykes, Semler indicates that he agrees with both the others in repudiating the penal value of the Old Testament sacrifices. Taylor develops, from his theory of sacrifices, the thought that God, for the sake of Christ's obedience persevered in by Him until death, has forgiven sins just as on other occasions He has done so for the sake of the virtue, the piety, the prayer of others; of Moses, for example. But this view of the way in which men were represented by the sacrificial death of Christ does not come into a leading position of prominence, but is outweighed by the opposite assumption that the death of Christ reconciles men inasmuch as it incites them to holiness in repentance, and in the imitation of His virtue. This view amounts accordingly to a combination of the teachings of Duns and of Abelard.

death of Christ to the sacrifices of the Old Testament, which were merely civil actions to secure deliverance from temporal punishments, or certifications that one desired to be restored again to the rights of a citizen. Thus also to the death of Christ no substitutionary value is assignable; but He assures us of our gracious acceptance with God on condition of our renewed obedience. The accommodation in this line of thought is all the clearer, because prophets as well as apostles subordinate the outward offerings to the pious disposition. If, then, we can attain to acceptance with God by no other path than that of virtue, the salutary truth of Christianity is herein expressed, that Jesus leads, directs, supports us in this path. Steinbart also supposes an accommodation on the part of Paul to the Jewish sphere of thought, when he recognises at least for the Jews redemption by the death of Christ (as above, p. 136 *seq.*) He assumes slavish fear of God to be the general tone pervading that sphere of thought, a fear in which they held themselves bound to render compulsory service at His arbitrary command, and particularly, thought that all suspended punishments for their offences would be made up for in their being eternally delivered over to Satan. Jesus delivered the Jews from this fear, and led them to child-like confidence in God's goodness, having proved by His death (or rather by His resurrection) that by death one does not fall under the power of Satan. But to the heathen, Christ did not need to announce any deliverance from punishment, God having overlooked the time of their ignorance; on them He has only bestowed more accurate instruction in order to improve their moral disposition. But Jews and heathen by Christ's death have been reconciled with each other and with God, and are besought by Christ and His Ambassadors to be reconciled, that is, to lay aside all dreadful notions of arbitrary proceeding on God's part, to have confidence towards Him, and willingly to follow His fatherly counsels. These views find their support in the epistles to the Galatians, Colossians, Ephesians, inasmuch as in them Paul differently determines the significance of Christ's death for Jews and for heathen. These thoughts, unknown to the commonly received system of doctrine, have been worked up by Steinbart into a picture thus grotesque, because he, for his part, takes no notice of the universal reference of Christ's death, which is no

less clearly declared in the New Testament. This universal reference Löffler undertakes to explain away in a very revolutionary manner. Having propounded the question whether the thought of forgiveness which, without doubt, occurs in the New Testament, relates to the past sins of Jews and of heathen or to the future sins of Christians, he convinces himself, by a survey of all the books of the New Testament, that only the former is the case.¹ To Christians, who by Christ's purging sacrifice are freed from the dominion of sin, that is, are led to the way of reformation, applies the far from extravagant exhortation to sin no more. Against this I can only observe that the dilemma is falsely put, and add to it that the expression, 1 John ii. 1, which directly contradicts Löffler's assertion, cannot be set aside by the whimsical suggestion that the letter is directed to non-Christians.

The results arrived at by Eberhard and Steinbart recur in a dogmatic form in H. Ph. C. Henke.² According to him Christ fulfilled His task as Author of the improved and universal religion by His death also, having thereby vindicated and ratified His doctrine, given the example of finished virtue, attained in the surest way His end, which was not political, but universally ethical, and displayed the highest love towards men. By accommodation to the Jewish mode of representation, His death is represented as a propitiatory sacrifice, and rightly, in so far as in it is manifested the congruence of His obedience with the Divine command, His personal innocence, His full devotion to His task, and the ground on which the human conscience may be pacified with regard to sin. On the other hand, a vicarious significance can be conceded neither to the active nor to the passive obedience of Christ; for the effects of those prestations as they are asserted are absurd. For it is not conceivable that God at once resolves upon punishments and remits them, that, by exhibiting clemency instead of justice, He shows the inadequacy of laws; and it is impossible that evils should not follow upon sins. Forgiveness of sins, therefore, or release from punishment, as brought about by Christ,

¹ In this John William Schmid of Jena, a Kantian, who reverts to the standpoint of the Illumination, agrees with him. Compare his work *Ueber christl. Religion als Volkslehre und Wissenschaft* (1797), p. 307.

² *Lineamenta institutionum fidei Christianae historico-criticarum*. 1795.

only means that it takes place in the case of those who through Christ's instrumentality cease to sin, or that the strict punishments of the Mosaic law no longer impend over those who have been converted to Christ. Reconciliation with God, therefore, is only the expression of the subjective feeling of him who is taught of Christ. The Pauline thought of justification by faith, in particular, which is only thought of in opposition to the strictness of the Mosaic law, is the expression of that subjective peace of conscience which accompanies the acceptance of the doctrine of Christ, and the practical exercise of an amended life.¹

Closely related, if not quite in harmony, is the attitude taken by J. Sal. Semler² and J. F. Gruner.³ Their point of departure for contesting the doctrine of satisfaction is not the theoretical examination of the notion of divine punishments, but the moral estimate of the value of religion which shall make its many-changing theoretical forms to be indifferent. Precisely with reference to the doctrine of reconciliation had Semler's historical learning opportunity for maintaining the assertion that the Old Testament forms of representation are not essential, if we only hold to the fact that Christ is the Author of the spiritual deliverance of men from their state of misery and liability to punishment (as above, p. 448). He who knows Christ as a mirror of God's goodness, so that by contemplation of Him a love to God is kindled in the souls of sinners, assuredly has the best knowledge of Christ (p. 445). In disputing the strict idea of satisfaction upon grounds which

¹ Here ought to be mentioned that movement, parallel to the German Illumination, which led several English divines to Socinianism. (Compare Fock, as above, p. 269 sq.) The application of this tendency to denial of the doctrine of reconciliation is made in Joseph Priestley's *Theological Repository*, vol. i. (1769), in two anonymous treatises, *The end of the Life and Death of Christ*, and *Essay on the Sacrifice of Christ* (the former probably by the editor). The positive views inculcated respecting the death and resurrection of Christ, and respecting the forgiveness of sins that flows from the acceptance of His doctrine, are directly Socinian. The scriptural expressions regarding the sacrificial value of the death of Christ, are understood in the vague sense of a self-denying laborious exertion for the behoof of mankind. Eberhard has appropriated many of the biblico-theological arguments that are adduced in support of this thesis. This Socinianism led its supporters to the formation of the new Unitarian churches, but it comes short of the sphere of thought of the Illumination theologians in the Lutheran Church.

² *Versuch einer freieren theologischen Lehrart*. 1777.

³ *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae*. 1777.

had already been brought forward in the Illumination, he nevertheless admits that Christ's sufferings were the consequence of our sins, and that He fulfilled the law for us also, for our benefit. But he recognises the purpose of Christ's passion not merely in the penal example which it gave, but also in liberation from eternal punishments, making at the same time the reservation that the chastisements for sins subsequently committed are not to be taken away from any one (pp. 462-465). Gruner rids himself completely of the idea of satisfaction. All the more fully does he make use of the idea of merit to express all that Christ did for the benefit of men. Under this head he includes His taking upon Himself the vocation of a founder of religion, His whole righteous life, His endurance of all suffering from the beginning of His life even unto death; but further, the resurrection from the dead, the founding and maintenance of the Church, and the exercise of divine authority. This is in complete agreement with Quenstedt (see above, p. 261). On the other hand, Gruner (as above, p. 414) along with Semler, discerns in Christ's death a penal example and a pattern of virtue, but also, at the same time, the effectual reason why we should cease to fear as evils the evils of life or even death. "For, if they were so, how could God have permitted them in their full extent to overtake His only-begotten, well-beloved Son? But by the pattern of Christ we are taught that they are no evils to those who know how to bear them, yea, to overcome them by confidence in God." However nearly the rationalistic stamp of Gruner's view may approximate the Illumination school, he is separated from it specifically, in a religious point of view, by this avowal. For this estimate of evil, opposed as it is to the impression our sentient nature conveys, he recognises to be a positive effect of historical Christianity; while the Illumination divines gave out that to regard penal evils as blessings is what natural religion teaches, and thus neutralized the impression—traditional yet natural—which the suffering of the innocent was fitted to produce in the way of establishing and heightening human guilt. To the doctrine of justification, the fundamental idea of which he establishes in a correct Protestant form (p. 559), Semler assumes an attitude just as neutral as that which he takes to the different forms of the doctrine of reconciliation. It is not of any im-

portance to him whether Christ's righteousness be imputed in lack of our innocence, for this formula is not a directly scriptural one. Why then might not one say with equal correctness that the man who fulfils the condition of faith is directly pleasing to God, and has the moral fitness that is necessary for attaining the promised blessings? He goes on to say that undeniably a subjective justification, whereby the man becomes *materialiter* and *formaliter* even *inhæssive justus*, can find place in an evangelical and right manner (pp. 564, 565). "It is thus sufficiently clear, from various considerations of this sort, that the spiritual well-being of a Christian is not bound down to a single series of thoughts and descriptions ; but that all depends upon the really new and improved state of the man, which arises as a spiritual result from Christian truth" (p. 567). Gruner abandons this dogmatic neutrality altogether, denying the forensic idea of justification, and instead of it, making bold to prove the Scripture doctrine to be that the beginning of conversion, in other words, the turning away from a life of sin, is the beginning of righteousness, that the forgiveness of sins which makes evils to appear no longer as punishments is indeed connected with justification, but ought to be separated from it in idea, and in a certain sense is a result of it. This advance beyond Semler is in harmony with that principle of moral subjectivism which Semler himself most decidedly maintains. Semler's neutrality, however, is none the less to be regarded as a characteristic expression of this subjectivism, inasmuch as by these means he sought to establish the existence of his standpoint in the Church ; but it is at the same time the expression of his feeling for Church organization, which urged him to keep the rights of private religion in harmony with those of public Church order. By this problem he is quite specifically distinguished from the illuminantists, and for this reason has been to them a stumbling-block.

The weakness and depressed vitality of the religious and moral principles of the Illumination, particularly in their failure to understand the Christian idea of reconciliation, and in their rejection of it, is so plain that it is superfluous to say another word upon the subject. Historical justice, however, demands that we should add two remarks. For these principles also deliberately rank themselves under the Christian idea of

God, and we must recognise it as a quite specific effect of Christianity that the assertion of His Fatherly goodness, and the rejection of the doctrine that His position is analogous to that of the head of a State, are regarded by the illuminati as self-evident. Of course this idea of God accepted by the Illumination was not perfectly in harmony with Christianity, in so far as it quite rejected the analogy between God and a ruler. But there is no retrogression, at all events, to be recognised in so far as it was proposed to make the meaning of God's name as Father independent both of the arbitrariness which was expressed in the *dominium absolutum* and of that natural necessity which juridical justice implied. In the line of the former mediæval idea, the Socinians and the Arminians had supposed that they could meet the claims of the Christian name of God by the limiting attribute of reasonable indulgence. With the attribute of juridical justice the theology of the two evangelical confessions had undertaken to co-ordinate the recognition of the grace of the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, but had narrowed and obscured its significance, for the impression of His habitual justice outweighed that of His actual grace (p. 305). Shall we blame the illuminati for not having sought and found any more satisfying adjustment between the two ideas of God's grace and God's justice, when neither their orthodox, nor their pietistic, nor their philosophical teachers had awakened in them a perception of the moral order of the universe as a whole? Nay rather, in comparison with the middle ages, it is an important result of Christian culture that *Fatherly Goodness* is recognised as the natural representation of God, no longer the universal Being, the ultimate First Cause, the unlimited Will. Just as surely as these fundamental ideas of the scholastic theology fall short of the Christian standard, so surely is that fundamental doctrine of the theologians of the Illumination positively Christian, even though they know it not. It is in comparing it with the middle ages that one recognises the specific superiority of the Illumination period as a whole. For it is the acknowledged merit of the Illumination to have finally cleared away the manifold remaining traces of the continued influence of the middle ages. Comparing it, on the other hand, with orthodox Protestantism, we are led to the conviction that in the Illumination an interest in Christianity

is expressed in a direction previously neglected, and very one-sidedly; but that the antithesis between the two forms of Protestantism was so direct and so thorough-going, because the Illumination did not rise to a wider sphere of vision but only obeyed in all its problems impulses which had already been at work in the orthodox period.

This may be observed particularly in the following points. The fundamental position of the Illumination, that God exacts from no man more than his condition and circumstances permit him to give, means that the relation of men to God is determined not by a law which is absolutely binding, but by the rule of ordinary intercourse between man and man. The antithesis between *justitia spiritualis* and *justitia civilis*, which the Reformers had maintained, was thus neutralized; and *justitia civilis* was the only notion recognised. Doubtless this was a fruit of that interfusion of the Church and the State which had developed itself since the Reformation, and which, through the so-called territorial system, had already been modified in the direction of the secularization of religion, and in the direction of Illumination, long ere the latter began its course in the region of theology and morals. But, from the official currency of that Reformation distinction, we must not by any means conclude that in the bosom of the Lutheran and the Reformed Church the task of *justitia spiritualis*, of dutiful conduct based upon religious character, was taken up and carried out generally and fruitfully at the time when theology and preaching were following most strictly in the line of the doctrinal ideas contained in the symbols. The fact is rather, that public opinion, as it was represented by the ministers of God's Word, was perfectly satisfied with that relative *justitia civilis* which is reckoned according to the circumstances and abilities of individuals. Lutheranism, which had never got so far as to develop out of the principle of Christian faith a moral order of life, but which rested satisfied when the law was preached to the unregenerate and the life of the regenerate set on foot by the leading impulses of faith, thankfulness to God, and the Holy Spirit, was accordingly entirely destitute of adequate guidance in ethical matters. As Tholuck expresses it,¹ the general

¹ *Das kirchliche Leben des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts.* 1 Abth. (1861) p. 202. Comp. pp. 212, 268.

impression which the orthodox period of Lutheranism leaves is, that faith in justification *and* good works were preached alongside of each other. Life was regulated only by regard to the commands of the law, and the terrors of it were moderated by the consolations of confession and absolution. To the ordinary man it was all the more natural to identify civil with spiritual justice, as the arrangements of the Church bore a police character. Tholuck particularly cites, as a sample of the spiritual characteristics of that time, the funeral sermon preached over the Elector Palatine Frederick IV., which contents itself with the following evidences that the deceased was a child of God: "In spite of a sinful life, his Electoral Highness ever retained in his heart some spark of the fear of God, and some resistance to sin, and therefore never omitted prayer, and always highly esteemed the Word of God; and he never went to such a length in the life of sin as to be impatient of exhortations to reformation from the Word of God." What is this verdict but a most indulgent application of the principle that God does not require of a man any more than his conditions and circumstances enable him to give? The Illumination accordingly only formulates as a principle what as practice had already been current in the orthodox period. The eudæmonistic theory of the Illumination also cannot justly be regarded as the simple contradictory of any *Théodicée*, clear and exhaustive in itself, which had dominated the tone of the orthodox period. On the one hand, the inquiry into the cause and purpose of evils had not yet been gone into with the clearness of Schleiermacher; on the other, the view of all penal evil as means divinely employed for the reformation of the subject was only a continuation and generalization of the Christian motive to patience in suffering. But we may convince ourselves, from the hymns for comfort of the afflicted which date from the orthodox period, with what *naïveté* a thorough eudæmonistic expectation not merely of happiness in the other world, but, in general, of a reversal of the afflictive dispensation, which God may possibly bring about, is conjoined with the considerations that in suffering one has the comfort of God's nearness, because in it one is following Christ as a pattern, or experiencing God's loving discipline. With that eudæmonistic tone which *also* was encouraged in the orthodox

school of piety the Illumination stands connected. The distance between the two tendencies therefore as regards the matter under consideration is not that of specific opposition, but of difference in degree,—of difference in the extent assigned to the common conviction, and the emphasis laid upon it.

55. That the theology of the Illumination is more than an episode which could have been prevented, that it was the result of all the joint influences that were working upon theology, even of those which flowed from orthodox tradition, is finally confirmed by the attitude which the defenders of that tradition assumed with reference to the doctrine of the atonement. Those who show the old strictness respecting it¹ do not at all enter upon the consideration of the opposite arguments. But those who do so depart so far from the strict form of the doctrine they undertake to defend, as to exhibit a difference in degree rather than a specific opposition to the Illumination. The closest approximation to the latter appears in the case of John David Michaelis,² although, with the Leibnitzian idea of the best possible world, he couples the assumption that God rules the moral commonwealth with the right and the duty of supremacy. If, therefore, it is logically denied that punishments as a whole are designed for the reformation of the subject, then there can be attributed to them only the other subjective purpose of deterring. That Leibnitz explained punishment, particularly eternal punishment, from God's necessary position towards the commonwealth as such, was not intelligible to Michaelis. And the orthodox view of divine punishments, as revealing the holiness of God and His horror of wickedness, are misunderstood by him in an almost frivolous way, to the effect that a Being who establishes everlasting evil simply in order to reveal His own attributes, the revelation of which no one desired, were deserving of hatred, and could not be regarded as God. He appeals rather, like the Illuminantists, to the goodness of God even in respect of His threat of punishment, which is intended to deter. His fundamental views of

¹ Franc. Walch : *Breviarium theologiae dogmaticae*. 1775. J. Ben. Carpzow : *Liber doctrinalis purioris theologiae*. 1776. Chr. F. Sartorius : *Compendium theologiae dogmaticae*. 1782. Compare Gass : *Geschichte d. protestant. Dogmatik*, vol. iv. pp. 100, 110, 113.

² *Gedanken über die Lehre der heil. Schrift von Sünde und Genugthuung, als eine der Vernunft gemässe Lehre*, Neue Ausgabe, 1779.

sin, and of the relation in which punishment stands to it, are as low as possible. The obligation not to sin is made to rest upon God's right of punishment, and as standard of moral evil he would set up the physical evil of the mischief which arises from a certain course of action. Michaelis here and there gives way to a perfectly offensive casuistry, in order empirically to establish the relation between punishment and sin; with no better result, however, than, like Töllner, to gain the conviction that the other life will first unfold the experiences which were to be expected. In these inquiries he occasionally approaches the Illuminantists; for example, when he concedes that all punishments in this life are chastisements designed for the reformation of the subject; but he still maintains that, although it be desirable that all punishments should at the same time improve the subject, amelioration is not their universal purpose. That purpose being rather to deter, he on the one side regards as altogether doubtful the inference drawn from God's goodness that punishments will be remitted to the reformed sinner, and on the other side he refuses to insist upon equivalence between the degree of the punishment and that of the offence. Even eternal punishments, as the natural consequences of sin persevered in, present themselves to him as deterrents, keeping in view as he does the reciprocal relation, which Leibnitz had indicated, between human spirits and the other incorporeal creatures in the *civitas Dei*. Even for the objects of eternal punishments he concedes to Eberhard, that a merciful visitation is not inconceivable; but he declares it unlikely, in view of the consideration that Christ has suffered punishment and applied the dispensation of grace for those who acknowledge Him as their Mediator. If Michaelis in this seems to follow the traditionary doctrine, it is worthy of note that in the short discussion of Christ's penal satisfaction, with which the book closes, the thought of penal example is insinuated into that theory. He does not here take into consideration any of the objections raised by Faustus Socinus against the Protestant doctrine, not entering at all into their connexion; but as he applies the general assumption of the purpose of deterring to the case in which Christ took upon Himself to endure punishment, he contents himself with defending this view by the consideration that Christ had merited

no penal suffering by sins of His own, and that His consent thereto excludes the suspicion of injustice having been done to him (*volenti non fit injuria*).

The other theologians, also, who maintain more distinctly than Michaelis does, the traditional theory of Christ's penal satisfaction, associate with it the very disparate view of Grotius. But in Michaelis himself it is very clearly shown that the traditionary doctrine had become unintelligible, because its premisses had fallen away. The punishment of Christ in the room of the sinful human race as a whole, stood originally connected with the implication in guilt which by Adam had been brought upon the whole race. The guilt of original sin was regarded as infinite, because it had done despite to the honour and law of the infinite God; and the punishments which Christ took upon himself were those of eternal condemnation, which no individual could essentially augment by the amount of his actual sin. Exposure to eternal condemnation readily presented itself as an arbitrary judicial punishment, because original sin itself was regarded only half as a natural heritage, while it was further regarded as a positive judgment with which God visited Adam's act. This connexion had already been broken up by Leibnitz (pp. 333-4). Michaelis prosecutes the undertaking. Leibnitz had declared that he had not yet adequately considered the thought of the infinite demerit of sin, upon which the eternity of future punishment was based, so as to be able to pronounce an opinion upon it (p. 335). Michaelis makes up for this, laying down, like Duns (p. 60), the rule in accordance with which Anselm originally had measured that assertion. The odiousness of the crime and the magnitude of the punishment, according to that rule, increase in proportion to the dignity of the person against whom it is committed. Since, now, God is the infinite Being, sin is of infinite demerit, and liable to infinite punishment. But here Michaelis finds the fallacy of *conclusio a particulari ad universale*. The rule is drawn from the crimes of regicide or of *læsa majestas*, which are more severely punished than the analogous offences committed against private persons. But in crimes, such as theft, which violate the common law, he finds no gradation of punishment according as they are committed only in a free city, earldom, principality, or in an electorate, kingdom or empire;

in other words, according as they have offended a higher authority. "Consequently our sins will not merit infinite punishment, merely because they are committed against a Divine law." Moreover, treasonable acts can disturb the peace of the state, but the boldest blasphemy cannot injure God in the least. Finally, the purpose of deterring excludes the possibility that the amount of the punishment is regulated in accordance with the inherent odiousness of the crime. It might *a priori* have been conjectured that Leibnitz's verdict upon the question would not follow so closely in the line of the imperial jurisprudence of Göttingen as that of Michaelis, although both were members of the judicial Privy Council of the Electorate of Hanover; but that the former would argue after the manner of his philosophical colleague of the Franciscan order. But the substantial agreement between Michaelis and Duns is further completed by the assertion the former makes, that Paul, by the universal death which followed upon Adam's sin, is as far as possible from intending eternal death. It is impossible validly to dispute the exegetical accuracy of this assumption, though we need not commit ourselves to the position, that by the universal consequence of the sin of Adam must be understood the loss of immortality which the eating of the poisonous fruit of the tree of knowledge occasioned. These negations being premised, the thought which Leibnitz maintains comes forward all the more obtrusively,—that eternal punishments are not attached to original sin in an arbitrary way, but are the natural consequences of sin persevered in to a specific degree. In this sense of constant continuance in sin, Duns also had admitted the assumption of infinite sin. Now, Michaelis alleges, on behalf of his idea, no reasons that surpass those which Leibnitz gave, and which Lessing also has developed in his treatise against Eberhard, *Leibnitz von den ewigen Strafen* (1770).¹ The sin therefore, which at Leibnitz's suggestion was regarded as individualized, which in the light of God's efforts against it was distinguished into final sin, and sin ad-

¹ Eberhard, in spite of his intended denial of that theme, has not been able to avoid recognising the endless effects of sin in Leibnitz's sense. But, at the same time, the reply which Lessing directed against him is connected with such an inclination to his views, that in the second volume of his *Neue Apologie des Sokrates*, Eberhard was able to show that the difference between them was not fundamental.

mitting of repentance, occasioned quite different views of what the act which should secure liberation from punishment must imply. For if, at the outset, eternal punishment had not to be endured by the whole race, but only by the individuals who, irrespective of redemption, should sin infinitely, it came to be necessary, not only that the punishment should be endured on their behalf, but also that, by penal example, they should be deterred from continuance in sin. The grounds upon which the idea of Grotius finds acceptance, alongside of the doctrine of penal satisfaction, in the half-orthodox circles of this period, are therefore other than those upon which it had been substituted by its author for the thought of penal satisfaction.

The purpose of Michaelis to take together the two meanings of the death of Christ as a penal satisfaction, and as a penal example, is carried out more clearly by other theologians related to him.¹ But this very grouping together of two thoughts, which are so diverse in their origin, in itself betrays that the idea of penal satisfaction, which is retained out of deference to ecclesiastical tradition, continues to pass current only under very different conditions. The theologians of this class, in the first place, follow their opponents into the field of purely biblico-theological investigation, and reject more or less decidedly the peculiar church-forms of the doctrine. Particularly, the premiss of God's habitual penal justice, and therefore of His personal concern in Christ's substitutionary endurance of punishment, is no longer shared by them. The theory of the wrath of God, in which tradition had invested that thought, made them regard it altogether with suspicion. In this way also is gained only a relative necessity of Christ's death towards the purpose of the forgiveness of sins, which God's love proposed. In this respect these Lutheran theologians offer the

¹ G. F. Seiler: *Theologia dogmatico-polemica cum compendio historię dogmatum*, 1774. *Ueber den Versöhnungstod Jesu Christi*, 2 Theile; 1778. J. Chr. Döderlein: *Institutio theologi christianę*, 2 Tomi; 1780. S. F. N. Morus: *Epitome theologię Christianę*, 1789. G. Ch. Storr: *Pauli Brief an die Hebräer erläutert*. Zweiter Theil: *Ueber den eigentlichen Zweck des Todes Jesu*, 1789. *Doctrinę christianę pars theoretica e sacris literis repetita*, 1793. G. Ch. Knapp: *Vorlesungen über die christl. Glaubenslehre* (unchanged since 1789), 2 Theile; 1827. F. B. Reinhard: *Vorlesungen über die Dogmatik*, 1801. That all these theologians recognise in Christ's death in the first instance penal satisfaction, and then penal example only secondarily, is not clearly brought out in the account given of them by Baur, p. 537 seq.

right hand of fellowship over Arminianism to the Thomists. Naturally they reject also all the detailed determinations of the old school respecting the formal equivalence between Christ's passion and the eternal condemnation of sinners, as already had been done by the otherwise orthodox J. D. Heilmann.¹ This circumstance, taken along with the interests of the doctrine of the penal example in Christ's death, is enough to explain why Seiler and Döderlein affirm with more or less clearness that the penal satisfaction given in the death of Christ was not designed to propitiate God so much as to soothe the alarms of men. Even when Storr, at the same time, vindicates the reference to God's justice, he only intends to say thereby that God's providence ordained Christ's penal satisfaction for the vindication of the law, in order thereby to make us more heedful of the beneficent commands of God. In the case of the others there is no word even of this reference to the law in Christ's substitutionary work. There is, therefore, no proper sequence when Seiler maintains the independent satisfactory value of Christ's active obedience; Döderlein, on the contrary, expressly rejects this assumption, while the others do not enter upon its consideration. As against the Illuminantists, however, these theologians are unanimous in maintaining that by the authority of the New Testament, when rightly understood, the death of Christ is to be regarded as the immediate instrumental cause of our gracious acceptance, and not mediately only on condition of our reformation. But at the same time they participate sufficiently in that regard to ethical interests which characterizes the Illumination, to discern at every possible turn the impulse to reformation which is secured by the proof of God's love in the death of Christ. In part also they follow the hint given by Leibnitz to look for the significance of Christ's penal example in the moral conformation of the spiritual world beyond the grave.² On the other hand, as against the Illuminantists, represented by Gruner (p. 372), it is pointed out that the sense of the beneficence of divine chastisements for believers proceeds first from the forgiveness of sins, which is secured by the death of Christ. Yet here again it comes

¹ *Compendium theologiæ dogmaticæ*, 1761.

² Baur, p. 554, here thinks of Origen, being less familiar with the *Théodicée* of Leibnitz.

out as a characteristic of this group of theologians, that one writer who is distinctly conscious of belonging to them, and explicitly avows himself to be a disciple of Morus—Ch. A. Schwarze¹—disavows the interpretation of Christ's death, both as a penal satisfaction and as a penal example, that he expressly rejects the thought of its usefulness for the angels, and, quite in the Socinian style, treats it as a confirmation of His doctrine, and also as a condition of His personal exaltation. For what is the value of the thought of forgiveness of sins if it be regarded merely as remission of punishment, and if nothing but deliverance from the punishments that had been deserved be associated with Christ's satisfaction? Döderlein and Knapp expressly declare no otherwise that does Löffler the illuminantist (p. 366) that, in this connexion, a removal of the guilt and of the consciousness of guilt cannot be thought of. For as God does not err, He cannot judge that the sinner is guiltless, and his conscience will always convince the sinner that he has sinned; but it is not necessary, and it does not conduce to the true pacification of the sinner, to know that the guilt of sin is forgiven if he only know himself to be delivered from punishment (Knapp, ii. p. 251). When the essence of evangelical Christianity is trifled away in this fashion, Socinianism has the most perfect right to exist. But how is Knapp (who in other respects is praised to the skies as a guardian of the sanctuary) put to shame by the illuminantist Töllner! When once the correct observation obtruded itself that the punishment, or the penal satisfaction of another party, as a legal act, cannot undo the *moral* blame, it was at least an indication of religious tact, when Töllner (p. 357) appealed to the free grace of God, in order to establish in Christianity the removal of moral guilt also. But that Knapp should leave this guilt of sin, as something which does not need to be taken away from between man and God, betokens unconscious despair of Christianity. That despair is manifestly to be attributed to that dulness of thought which is the inseparable result of abject subjection to theological tradition.

Of the monographs belonging to this group, the dissertation appended by Storr to his exposition of his Epistle to the Hebrews merits special attention. The mosaic-work of New

¹ *Ueber den Tod Jesu als ein wesentliches Stück seines wohlthätigen Planes sur Beglückung des menschlichen Geschlechtes.* 1795.

Testament expressions which he has pieced together in order to refute the theory of the Illumination, that reconciliation is connected with the death of Christ through the instrumentality of reformation, is the first attempt at biblico-theological method within the limits of Lutheranism. His view is not, of course, on that account, quite independent of the shape of the dogmatic Lutheran doctrine of the atonement, but at the same time it brings about in one point an important correction in that doctrine, which unintentionally leads into the path of Reformed theology. As the Lutheran form of this doctrine was throughout determined rather by certain dogmatic postulates than by consecutive exegesis, Storr's exhibition of the doctrine is a not insignificant proof of the possibility of deciding the confessional disputes in this doctrine by reference to the New Testament as a rule. I do not understand how Baur (p. 541) can assert that Storr developed his theory upon the basis of the idea of a penal example in the death of Christ. For this assumption is, in the case of Storr, as in the case of the theologians who are allied to him, only appended to a recognition of the penal satisfaction of the death of Christ, and the series of ideas which Baur reproduces in the passage which has been cited has absolutely nothing to do with penal example. Storr abides by the path of Lutheran orthodoxy in distinguishing forgiveness of sins or remission of punishment, and beatification or justification as two operations of Christ; but he ceases to be orthodox in pointing to Christ's death (*obedientia passiva*) as the only ground of the former negative result, and to Christ's active obedience as the ground of the positive salutary effect. For he indirectly denies that the active obedience has independent and satisfactory value, as well as the death, towards the abolition of the law for believers. For on the one hand his view as a whole is not dominated by the consideration that the law holds good absolutely and essentially for God; and, on the other hand, he holds Christ, as a creature, to be bound to obedience towards God. The law indicates only the beneficent intention of God for the public ordering of the universe, and accordingly it was of importance to Storr only that, in the bestowal of grace upon us, the law should not be entirely evaded. It has in fact been respected, and indirectly confirmed, by Christ's undertaking to give penal satisfaction; although Storr

does not venture to assert formal equivalence between Christ's sufferings and the punishment due to humanity, but will have it that the sufferings of Christ, which in the case of sinners would be punishments, only *pass* as such in His case.¹ In the entire obedience of Christ, which reaches its climax in His voluntary passion, Storr moreover includes that which, as the material of Christ's merit, is regarded by Quenstedt (p. 261) as the ground of positive justification or beatification. But Storr views this prestation after the Reformed manner, maintaining that by it Christ earned also as a reward (*sibi ipsi meruit*) the majesty which pertained to Him by nature. "As Christ's obedience was made more splendid by His suffering of death, so was also the honour which He on account of that obedience reaped from the consequent enjoyment of His glory." And this consists herein, that He is "able to permit His brethren, who ordinarily had no claim to heavenly glory, also to enjoy the great blessedness to which He had a natural right in His own person" (pp. 664-669). This train of thought has suggested Anselm and the Socinians to Baur; it might suggest Thomas, Duns, and the Reformed divines just as much (p. 263). Of course the theory of the latter is plainly as unfamiliar to Storr as to Baur; otherwise with its help he would have found material enough in the New Testament for explaining how the glory which Christ earned is extended to His brethren also, in the fact that He acted and suffered in the capacity of Head of the kingdom of God. Not having this point of view, Storr does not indeed exclude the possibility seized hold of by Baur, of being understood in the Socinian sense, that the connexion of men's blessedness with Christ's glorification depends upon an arbitrary arrangement made by God (p. 309). But still, as Storr recognises, in opposition to the Socinians, the penal satisfaction of Christ, he has much closer analogy with the Reformed party than with the Socinians in the question before us; and Baur would doubtless have refrained from instituting the comparison had he been acquainted with the Reformed doctrine.

In Storr's essay we are to recognise the positive fruit which, as regards method, the period of the Illumination was able to yield. For the doctrine of reconciliation, which had become the subject of so much controversy, it was essential to discover

¹ *Bemerkungen über Kant's philosophische Religionslehre* (1794), p. 20.

the connexion of the New Testament representations, apart from the formulæ and tendencies of the several dogmatic systems; partly in order to judge with certainty of their accordance with Scripture, partly in order to gain religious points of view which, up to that time, had been overlooked by the contending parties. That everything was not gained in the first attempt is clear; neither does the neutrality towards many distinctions of theological parties, which is shown by Storr, guarantee that the biblico-theological material is exhausted; nor is his exhibition of the doctrine in some of its main features independent of the shape of that confessional system of doctrine in which Storr had been brought up. But this can all the less be brought forward to his disadvantage, because we still, after the lapse of eighty years, have to contest the first steps in a really biblico-theological method of investigation.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PROBLEM OF RECONCILIATION DEFINED ANEW BY KANT—
REGRESS OF HIS DISCIPLES TO THE STANDPOINT OF THE
ILLUMINATION.

56. THE high importance of Kant's contributions to the right understanding of the Christian idea of Reconciliation lies less in any positive contribution to the structure of doctrine, than in the fact that he established critically—that is, with scientific strictness—those general presuppositions of the idea of Reconciliation which lie in the consciousness of moral freedom and of moral guilt. In impressing on the present generation this service done to Christianity and theology by the great philosopher, it is not necessary to upbraid as superficial the men of the Illumination whom he left so far behind him, and not just to impute to them frivolity, a way of thinking low and yet unclear, and want of reverence for the spiritual attainments of earlier generations. On the other hand, it is not sufficient to delineate and criticise only Kant's direct views on the philosophy of religion. For, judged by these, he would appear simply as a member of that group of rationalists which belongs now to the past, and his superiority to the men of the Illumination would seem by no means very marked. But in the point on which he really rose above the Illumination, he still—after endless variations in the direction of theological thought—presents us with a canon that cannot be superseded for the right estimation of the fundamental idea of Christianity. The Illumination had trifled away the Christian problem of reconciliation on the one hand by referring men's obligation towards God's law to the relative criterion of their internal and external situation, and on the other hand by denying all internal conviction of guilt. Töllner, in particular, had applied the criterion of the existence of a set purpose in acts of transgression in such a manner that

the consciousness of guilt was limited almost in the same way as by Bauny, the Jesuit branded by Pascal (p. 366); and Eberhard had expressed the opinion that the fact of subjective moral evil could be established only through the experience of physical evil (p. 362), while all the discussions of those who shared his sentiments pointed to the conclusion that it was only in the very rarest cases that these two kinds of evil were experienced together. In opposition to the insecurity of this view, Kant not only maintains that the law which springs from the practical consciousness of freedom is absolutely binding, but at the same time asserts that the imputation of the whole empirical course of action and transgression flows with necessity from the intelligible (noetic) notion of freedom. By demonstrating the necessary and indissoluble correlation of freedom and moral law, Kant enables us to understand how the aimless empirico-dogmatical discussion of the notion of guilt, which is found in the men of the Illumination, accords with the fact that they refuse to acknowledge any absolute standard of moral law. That conception of the absolute obligation of the moral law which Kant developed in accordance with the notion of freedom, provides him with the means of establishing, on a surer basis than was afforded by the old Protestant doctrine of original sin, the corresponding subjective consciousness that we are in effect guilty in the eye of the law. For the old doctrine, though put forward with a thoroughly practical design, had never been able to produce a corresponding practical consciousness; since the attribute of guilt in original sin was never adequately proved, and indeed could not be proved. Now, any attempt to prove too much is sure to be avenged by the loss even of that subordinate truth which was actually capable of demonstration from the premisses. When, therefore, the Illumination directed attention to the actual sin of the individual, the just valuation of which had been hindered by the pre-eminence accorded to the doctrine of original sin, the experience formed in connexion with the latter notion operated towards causing sin to be defined for the most part as natural weakness attaching to man's sensual constitution, and not to be recognised as thoroughgoing guilt.

It lies in the peculiar distinction between will and nature, that the laws of the former, when discovered by the methods of

scientific knowledge, are recognised as guiding points for the activity of the will, and so are capable of producing specific changes in the practical course of that faculty. On the other hand, our knowledge of the laws of nature has no influence on the character of their course. Although, therefore, Kant was quite conscious that he as a philosopher did not make morality, but presupposed it as a fixed datum of which it was his work to discover the principles, yet it lies in the nature of the case that his express unfolding of the laws of the will could not find scientific recognition without at the same time becoming a practical motive to influence the lives of his contemporaries. For the knowledge of those laws was attained only through the activity of the practical reason. But that faculty is at the same time the sufficient ground of the whole direction of man's life, and cannot therefore be expressly enlightened by the knowledge of its own inmost laws without being at the same time recalled from possible deflections and strengthened in its impulse towards the right goal. Hence Kant's *Ethic* had a peculiarly stimulating influence on the moral development of character. The Illumination itself was more than a link in the development of theology and moral philosophy. It was at the same time a peculiar phenomenon in the sphere of morals and religion, entering into the latter sphere because the principles of the school were at once dogmatic and popular. On the other hand, Kant's way of looking at the universe, which was critical, not dogmatical, was not one that could have a direct importance for religion. But indirectly the system has this importance, that it secures that a man shall pass upon himself the very same moral judgment as is presupposed as the normal estimate of self by Christianity in its Protestant form. Hence the quite specific advance in epistemological method made by Kant has at the same time the significance of a practical restoration of Protestantism. Protestantism is quite as decidedly marked off from mediæval Christianity, by asserting in the sphere of ethics the absoluteness of the public law, as by resting in the sphere of religion on the absoluteness of God's grace. The characteristic test of the prevalence of these two tendencies is to be found in the orthodox development of the doctrine of Reconciliation. That doctrine, it is true, had not proved impregnable either to the deliberately-aimed criticisms of

the Illuminantists, or to the inarticulate feeling of incongruence in its elements which took hold of their semi-orthodox assailants; for in reality the purely forensic view of law and punishment is not adequate to the ethico-religious problem of the removal of guilt and the consciousness thereof. Accordingly, both parties alike lost the sense of the absolute validity of the law, based on the essential nature of God. And so when Kant furnished a fresh proof of this thesis from the nature of man—from his legislative freedom—a step was taken which marks not only the defeat of the principles of the Illumination, but also the renewal of the *moral* view of the universe due to the Reformation. For only a superficial criticism will hold it for an irreconcilable contradiction that the Reformers deduce the law from God, Kant from human freedom. Whether indeed Kant succeeded in his undertaking to supply a formal proof of the harmony of religious faith with the practical reason, is a question that we must decide hereafter.

Let me recapitulate the fundamental thoughts of Kant's Moral Philosophy.¹ Its object is the Good. Good is to be understood only as an attribute of Will. That will is good which suffers itself to be determined only by duty laid down in the moral law, and not by its inclinations; which performs duty purely for duty's sake, not from any inclination thereto, but from reverence for the law. Duty, as the expression of the universal validity of the law, is the measure of the Good; accordingly, objective duty is apprehended in the subjective maxim of action when the latter takes such a shape that it also can pass as universal law. *So act as if the maxim of thy action were through thy will to become universal law.* This result is gained simply by giving clearness and precision to the usual moral way of thinking, which ascribes moral value strictly and exclusively to a disposition purely regulated by duty. Thus scientific ethic begins with the question how morality so defined is possible. This question again cannot be answered from experience, which almost never offers a case in which a sense of duty operates without any admixture of inclination or self-love. Hence the scientific problem finds its solution only in a knowledge *à priori* of the peculiarity of the will, which does not simply, like everything in nature, work according to its own law, but

¹ Chiefly from the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1785).

as practical reason works according to the representative conception of its own law. The first point, however, in the "Foundation of the Metaphysic of Ethics" is to complete the purely formal statement of the maxim of morality already given, in accordance with its contents and fundamental conditions. "If reason absolutely determines the will, the actions of such a being, which are recognised as objectively necessary, have also subjective necessity, i.e. the will is the faculty of choosing *that only* which reason apart from inclination recognises as good." "The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it lays necessity upon the will, is called a command of reason, and the formula of the command is called *imperative*." The imperative of duty is not hypothetical but categorical. Commands of the former kind refer always to special relative ends, lying outside of the actions enjoined, and so in relation to these special ends have an analytical character. On the other hand, the categorical imperative of duty is always synthetic, expressing the fact that morality, which is to be realized in accordance with the imperative, is an end in itself, an absolute end. "Suppose, then, that there is something the existence of which has in itself an absolute value, which as an end in itself might form the basis of definite laws; in this something, and in it alone, will lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative." As such an end, which can never without offence against its essential nature be viewed simply as a means to be used as one pleases, we are to regard man, or in general every rational being, who in this view must never be estimated as a thing, but always as a person. The maxim of action will therefore reach the value of a universal law in this form of the categorical imperative. *So act as to use humanity, whether in thine own person or that of another, never merely as means but always also as end.* The universal validity and objectivity of this formula show that is not derived from experience. It is a rule that springs from pure practical reason, viz., from the reason of the being which in apprehending the rule exerts itself as an end to itself. Hence, as the third practical principle of the will appears the following law, *that the will of every rational being is moral only inasmuch as it lays down general laws, that is, in its autonomy.* "Thus the will is not simply subject to the law, but is so in the sense that at the same time it legislates for itself, and in this way first comes to

be subject to the law." Hereby all particular interests are excluded which might perhaps mingle with and disturb the act of willing from duty, and thus at length the distinction between the categorical and hypothetical imperative is completed. But hereby also it becomes possible to carry out the final end of moral action to a concrete universal determination. Suppose rational beings to be united by common laws, under the condition that each of them in its general legislative capacity abstracts from all that distinguishes and makes up his own private ends. This supposition contains the notion of a *realm of ends*, of which each one is a member, in so far as he becomes in virtue of his autonomy subject to the law. The law that each individual shall treat himself and all others never merely as means, but always also as an end of independent value, is, however, the index to man's dignity, his elevation above every material equivalent. In the last resort then the practical necessity of duty rests on the idea of the dignity of men united by the moral law; and to this it corresponds that humanity is obedient to no law save one, which is at the same time self-imposed.

The notion of the moral law being completed in the character of universal validity, the dignity of all rational creatures as end, and obligatoriness through autonomy, we are led by the question as to the possibility of this categorical imperative to consider the *freedom of the will* as its real basis. This notion, however, which is not given in experience, and so lies also beyond the limits of metaphysical explanation, is proved by the "*Critique of the practical Reason*" to be thinkable, valid, and necessary.¹ Freedom in the negative notion of unconditioned causality is not cognisable by experience. The latter relates only to phenomena in time, which are all linked together by natural necessity, in whose sphere each cause is conditioned by that immediately preceding. If, then, freedom is to be conceivable as the predicate of a being which as member of the phenomenal world cannot escape from natural necessity, it must be to the said being as a thing in itself, as a member of

¹ The hints in the third section of the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* are based upon the solution of the third antinomy of pure reason given in the *Critique of pure Reason* (1781), and are carried out in accordance herewith in the part of the *Critique of the practical Reason* (1788) entitled *Critical illustration of the analytic of pure practical Reason*.

the intelligible world, that this freedom is ascribed. Only as a transcendental notion is freedom conceivable, not as a psychical function which would imply that it enters into combination with the natural necessity of the series of representative conceptions. Freedom denotes the will as unconditioned causality out of time, in distinction from the phenomena of will that run on in time and are subject to natural necessity. The question whether all our actions are not determined by God as supreme Cause, is answered by this distinction. In so far as God is our Creator, He and His creation lie as much out of time as our freedom does. And if God does not act in time, our actions considered as phenomena are not to be referred to His causality. If, then, our freedom can be conceived as unconditioned causality, by distinguishing ourselves as members of the intelligible world from the temporal course of our actions and representative conceptions, then it follows that this is really a valid point of view for self-contemplation. We do, as a matter of fact, act under the idea of freedom when we contemplate ourselves not under the temporal conditions of our actions, but as capable of being determined by laws which by our reason we prescribe to ourselves. In the character of intelligible beings, we posit nothing as antecedent to the determination of our will; but every action, in general every determination of our existence that varies according to the internal sense, even the whole sequence of our being as sensitive creatures, has in the consciousness of our intelligible being always the value of a consequence—never that of a determining ground of our causality. Kant summons as witness to this truth the “wondrous faculty” of conscience which refuses to allow an action contrary to law to be excused on the plea of *unintentional oversight*, criticising and condemning the act and habit of carelessness from which such an oversight springs, not in accordance with the natural necessity that pertains to its empirical character as phenomenon, but in accordance with the absolute spontaneity of freedom. So, too, the reason why every recollection of an act committed long ago calls forth sorrow, is that reason, in all that pertains to the law of our intelligible existence, recognises no distinctions of time, but asks only if the action was really mine. And it is no mere contingent validity that belongs to the idea of freedom. We cannot withdraw ourselves from it

without doing violence to our essential nature, in short, it is necessary. We must conceive this faculty as really ours. For freedom or autonomy of the will is the indispensable basis of the moral law; the law would lose its absolute stringency were the idea of freedom less than necessary. Nor can we abstract from the categorical imperative; from it (as ground of knowledge) the freedom of the will follows of necessity, just as from the legislative function of the latter (as ground of fact) proceeds the moral law.

It is no accident that the essential peculiarity of man—the fact that he judges himself under the idea of freedom—is demonstrated by reference to repentance and the condemnatory sentence of conscience. For, though men are involved in sin, the consciousness of guilt is the most luminous proof that they have still not utterly fallen a prey to natural necessity. And conversely the practical certainty of freedom is the indispensable and fundamental condition of our making ourselves responsible for the transgressions of a past time, or for the whole chain of our empirical character. That which led the men of the Illumination to limit the imputation of an action as sin to intentional transgressions, was Leibnitz's conception of the will as a power moved by representative notions. Kant rightly affirms that this expression does not in any essential rise above the idea of a machine, and that it gives no more than a relative freedom. There is nothing thought of in this freedom—defined as it is by merely psychological determinations—that is opposed to natural necessity; and so it is no wonder that it excludes responsibility for undesigned transgressions. Hence the sharply-marked and continuous consciousness of guilt, without which the whole Christian idea of reconciliation is unintelligible, becomes methodically possible only when we judge ourselves after the idea of transcendental freedom. But, moreover, guilt as an objective thing hanging over us can be comprehended only because and in so far as the subjective consciousness of guilt can be generated by the idea of freedom. He who has not learned to judge himself in this way, regards his sin either as his right or as a weakness which it does not fall to him to answer for. But whoever has carried out the opposite view in his own case, is in a position to recognise guilt in others too, and in men otherwise minded, and to find

in others the confirmation of its operation in intensifying sin. And as the idea of freedom establishes its objective reality in its action and reaction with the moral law, that is in the practical aspect, which has a longer range than speculative theoretical knowledge,—so also the objective place claimed by guilt in the course of the life of the individual, as well as in the union of men one to another, is proved in a way to which the orthodox treatment of the notion (p. 365) does not attain. That which the tradition of the Church desires to express in the notion of original sin cannot be apprehended as guilt by any one who does not draw a distinction between *himself* (himself as he should be under the idea of freedom, and under the obligation of the moral law), and the empirical course of his own life in itself, and along with the life of the race. If original sin brings down the knowledge of the moral law to the well-known “faint spark” of the *formula concordiae*, it cannot be known as guilt. If, on the contrary, the latter is necessary in relation to the truth of reconciliation, then freedom in the Kantian sense must be conceded—*i.e.* the power to produce autonomously the moral law, which in form and content is universal and absolutely binding. What are the *empirical conditions* under which this resort can become practically effective is a point to be determined later. But let no man object that this assertion is Pelagian and so unsound; for he who cannot distinguish the Pelagian from the Kantian notion of freedom is in no position to pronounce a judgment in this matter.

A characteristic mark of the moral standpoint of the Illumination, which operated directly towards the breaking up of the idea of reconciliation, was the general reference of the notion of punishment to the end of reformation (p. 361). Or if others, having regard to the nature of legally constituted society, opposed this individually eudemonistic distortion of the idea of punishment, and urged that punishment aims rather at deterring others from crime, yet this view also was dependent on the eudemonistic principle in morals, with the single difference that the welfare of human society, and not merely that of the individual, was set forth as the ultimate object sought. The similarity of standpoint between Michaelis and Eberhard is accordingly manifest, not merely in the fact that the former

was able to admit reformation as an end secondary to that of deterring, but inasmuch as both are agreed in regarding the physical evil which follows a given course of action as the only criterion for its immorality (pp. 362, 378). To this Kant objects¹ that the essence of punishment is requital. From the idea of our practical reason, which sets the transgression of moral law in the light of guilt, it follows also that transgression *deserves punishment*. "Now the notion of punishment as such is by no means connected with participation in felicity. For though he who punishes may at the same time have the gracious purpose of directing the punishment to this end also, yet the infliction must first be justified by itself as punishment—i.e. as pure evil. In every punishment as such there must first be *justice*, and *this constitutes what is essential to the notion*. Kindness may be combined herewith, but that is a thing on which the man who deserves punishment has from his conduct not the slightest right to reckon. Punishment then is a physical evil, which though it were not attached to moral badness by *natural* sequence, would yet necessarily be so attached according to the principles of a moral legislation. If then all trespass is in itself punishable—i.e. merits loss of happiness, it would plainly be absurd to say that that which constituted the trespass was the drawing down on one's-self of a punishment, by making a breach in one's own happiness. In this way *punishment would be the ground on which any action is called a trespass*,² and righteousness could consist in nothing else than the remission of artificial punishment, and the counteracting of that which is natural. For then nothing bad would remain in the action, since the evils which would otherwise have followed from it, and *which alone gave to the action the name of bad*, would now be averted."

57. The critical process in the recognition of the conditions of the practical reason means that the principles so disclosed accompany the experienced course of action as the conditions and marks of its real morality. A certain stage of development in the empirical character must be reached before we can venture to seek for a consciousness of the responsibility that a man has

¹ *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. 1ster Th. 1stes Buch, 1 Hptst. sec. 8 (vol. v. p. 40 of the new edition of Kant's works by Hartenstein).

² This was precisely what Eberhard's opinion came to (above, p. 362).

for the whole course of his action, before we can expect action to possess its value in regard for the law and in all-sided respect for man's dignity; and only under these conditions can that consciousness of moral autonomy be engendered which submits itself to the law as to a law produced by itself in the process of constructing correct conceptions of duty to guide action. Now, be it correct or not to say that morality is realized only in opposition to all instincts and natural appetites, and that a right respect for the law excludes all admixture of moral inclination with the idea of duty, it is at least certain that the Subject of phenomenal moral action is that Self, (free in the intelligible sense, but at the same time influenced through the senses and marked by individual peculiarities) which distinguishes itself from every other being. From this regard the *Critique of Practical Reason* determines the notion of the highest Good, not as virtue, but as the union of virtue and felicity, so that the former is viewed as the supreme condition of the latter, and the union of the two as the most perfect state for man that can be conceived. Now the causal relation between felicity and virtue cannot mean that the effort after felicity is the motive of virtue, and reciprocally no necessary connexion between felicity and virtue can be demonstrated within the world of sense. Thus the relation of the two must be apprehended to be that virtue as the intelligible magnitude (as Noumenon) is the cause of the felicity which falls to be realized in the world of sense. Kant enables himself to think of this sense of the highest good as practically possible, by postulating (in virtue of the practical Reason) the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as conditions of the union of moral worth and felicity. In this way, guided by the idea of the highest Good, we arrive at religion; that is, at the recognition of a divine command in all duties. This conception does not involve a surrender of moral autonomy, but flows from the consideration to which the idea of God corresponds, that the moral law which binds to the pursuit of the highest Good must be brought into connexion with the indispensable objective conditions of that Good.

Since now the *Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der blossen Vernunft*¹ is guided by this connexion of thought, the question

¹ "Religion within the limits of mere reason."

arises whether that connexion is equally convincing with the critical excision of the essential principles of moral action. In positing the unity of virtue and felicity as the substance of the highest Good, or as the final aim of the pure practical reason, Kant yet repeatedly reminds us that this must not be viewed as the motive that determines the pure will, but that the moral law is our sole motive for taking as our object the highest good and all that produces or facilitates it. Not only then must the manner of our action towards that final aim have regard for duty for its motive power; the very idea of the highest Good itself is to be regarded primarily as duty, and as subordinated to the moral law. For, says Kant, heteronomy and a falsification of the moral principle is the inevitable result if, without regard had to the law, any object is chosen under the name of good and allowed to determine the will, so that from it the highest principle of practice is deduced. But now the highest Good in that compass of the idea which Kant himself admits, is not conceivable by deduction from his notion of duty. If the thought of duty is pure only when it excludes all sensual and individual impulses, nay even moral inclination towards duty, then the only corresponding expression of the highest Good is the virtue which is indifferent to felicity. If, on the contrary, the notion of the highest Good includes felicity along with virtue, it cannot be morally dependent for its apprehension on the point of view of duty. The inconsistency of which Kant is guilty, is discernible also in the fact that the subject of the highest Good is conceived as the intelligible being *which at the same time* is a creature of sense, while the subject of the legislation of duty is conceived as intelligible being *though at the same time* a creature of sense. If now, notwithstanding this the highest Good in the full sense which Kant gives to it, and in accordance herewith the truth of the idea of God, is claimed as a postulate of the practical reason, this doctrine at once passes beyond the critique of practical reason, and falls under the empirical doctrine of ethics.¹ But the latter of course can assert the critical principles of morality

¹ This last point is conceded by the Kantian C. Chr. Erhard Schmid in his *Versuch einer Moralphilosophie* (1790); for he states (p. 148) his doctrine of the highest Good under the title "Absolute union of pure and empirical practical reason." Yet he reckons the doctrine as part of the critique of practical reason, and so does not attain to the distinction expressed above.

only by calling in the aid of other rules and conditions. So far, therefore, as the critical principles of Kant are asserted by him to be also the sufficient grounds of the doctrine of the highest Good, he commits an error, and really treats them as *dogmatic* principles.

That the critical principles of morals which go back to intelligible freedom do not exhaust the circle of conditions under which man exerts himself as a moral being, is evinced also in the following discussion in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, which treats of the springs that move the practical reason.¹ The free will is determined purely by the law, to the exclusion of all impulses of sense and all inclinations, in so far as these might be contrary to the law. But since these inclinations and instincts become operative through feeling, the law counteracts them by itself producing a feeling, to wit the sense of respect for the law. Now, all inclinations taken collectively are called self-seeking, but the law takes up a varying attitude towards this last, according as it takes the shape of self-love or self-conceit. The latter stands in pure contradiction to the law, which accordingly absolutely excludes it; while self-love, on the other hand, which *naturally stirs within us before the moral law*, is only limited by that law. Supreme complacency in one's-self is wholly smitten down by the law; but supreme benevolence towards one's-self is a quality in every man which is moral, provided only that the condition of harmony with the law is fulfilled. In this case it is *reasonable self-love*. The distinction prepares us for the fact that regard for the law, while casting down the self-conceit which is inconsistent with it, enters into a relation with reasonable self-love, so that each conditions or includes the other. For feeling—even such feeling as springs from the purely intellectual ground of the moral law,—can be conceived only as existing in the concrete individual subject, who is at once a creature of sense and of intelligible freedom. Moreover, the value of no object and no thought, not even that of the moral law, can be felt apart from self-respect, which belongs to the category of feeling. In admitting, therefore, that this feeling of respect for the law is not merely the spring that urges us to morality, but is *morality itself*, Kant seems to indicate the point at which

¹ *Erster Theil, erstes Buch, drittes Hauptstück*, vol. v. p. 76 seq.

ethical doctrine in order to attain completeness and demonstrate that the critical principles are those effective in human life, must pass over to the empirical development. But this is not what he really does. He manipulates the problem so as to lose sight of the synthesis of rational self-love and the feeling of respect for the law. The reason of this is that he cannot free himself from the schema of contradictory opposition between reason and the functions of the senses, even on this point, where the moral feeling of respect for the law is absolutely incomprehensible unless it is recognised that the empirical Ego is not merely the self-conserving centre of the instincts of sense, but as such is at the same time the organ of intelligible freedom. Instead of this the schema of antithesis between the instincts of sense and moral legislation—a schema which is rightly used in criticising the faculty of will—is applied as a dogmatic canon to the scientific interpretation of moral feeling. We are not to use moral feeling in the criticism of actions, *much less in establishing the objective moral law itself; it must serve purely as a motive impelling us to take the law in itself as our maxim.* Now this sentence draws a dogmatic distinction between things which, by Kant's critical process, should have been thought of as united. The subjective maxim is just the form in which the objective law is recognised and applied as universally valid. If now moral feeling is the faculty to discover maxims of universal validity, it is the subjective empirical organ in which intelligible freedom evinces itself as legislative, that is, as the objective ground of objective law. The same result may be reached by a different course. The second maxim of the *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*—that which looks to the substance of the law—runs thus: So act as to use humanity whether in thine own person or that of another, never merely as means, but always also as end. But this cannot be accomplished save on the assumption of a developed feeling for the worth of mankind, which again is impossible apart from a sense of one's own worth. And such a sense is rational self-love, in which the individual equipped with sensitive functions no longer allows his animal life to roll on against the law or independently of it, because he finds his vocation by taking a place in the fellowship of spirit. It is characteristic that the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* does not repeat this formulation of the law that rests

on its substance. For in proportion as the notion of law is determined only formally, Kant abstains from observing the conditions under which the doctrine of Ethics would necessarily become empirical. But in the same ratio he overstrained the critical point of view, and applied its schema to that problem in which he should have recognised the empirically operative root of the principles of morality which his criticism had detected.

Now the fact that the critical principles of morality are dogmatically handled and used as exhaustive conditions of moral consciousness and action, is also the reason why Kant has presented religion as a kind of appendix to morals. If respect for duty, and the autonomous recognition thereof in the application of its maxims in their widest possible scope, come to exist *without more ado*, then through the idea of the highest Good which the moral law prescribes we are led up to religion, *i.e.*, to the recognition of a Divine command in every duty. Kant makes the express reservation that even on this view everything remains unselfish and based on duty alone, that neither hope nor fear can be suffered to operate as motives, since the moral law is still the ground that determines the will which is directed to further the highest Good. Thus the thought of God adds nothing to the conception of the law, and if this is so one can imagine that the highest Good might also be sought purely from respect for the law, without any conscious postulation of the existence of God. While these considerations may serve to suggest to us what expectations we are to form of the "Religion within the limits of pure Reason," it is manifest, on the other hand, what position is to be assigned to the thought of God or religion if the Kantian conception of the highest Good and the moral feeling of respect for the law be recognised as functions of the empirical moral subject. As the respect paid by the individual to a law universally valid presupposes moral fellowship with all its manifoldly linked elements, so the effort after a harmony between worthiness and felicity presupposes a relation of human morality to the world of nature. Both alike can be recognised as practically valid, and so proper moral autonomy can be assured, only by the postulation of the idea of God as of the Being necessarily presupposed in this practical situation

of man in the world, and of the moral subject in the moral community.

These remarks become operative in the hands of Kant himself, when in the 3d part of the *Religion innerhalb der Gränzen der blossen Vernunft* (1793), he treats of the victory of the good over the evil principle, and of the founding of a kingdom of God on earth. For what is evil in the individual gains strength by his position in the fellowship of men ; but in like manner the advance and final victory of what is good can be procured by no surer means than by the founding and spread of a society constituted by laws of virtue ; which by reason is enjoined as the task and the duty of the whole human race. Now the idea of this Whole is distinct from all moral laws ; the duty of working for a Whole, of which we cannot know whether as a Whole it is subject to our powers, is diverse from all other duties in kind and in principle. For this duty demands that we presuppose the idea of a higher moral being, by whose ordinance the powers of individuals, inadequate by themselves, are united to a general result. For if an ethical commonwealth is to be instituted, all individuals must be subjected to a public legislation, and all the laws by which they are bound must be capable of being viewed as commands of a common lawgiver. Now in a merely legal (juristic) society, the Many must themselves be the lawgiver, because the point to be legislated for is the restriction of each man's freedom. But in an ethical commonwealth the people cannot give the law, because all laws are directed to morality, *i.e.*, to the inner character of actions. And so this legislation must proceed from some other than the people, *viz.*, from that Being as whose command we can view all the duties (including moral duties) ; who knows the heart and can estimate the value of every moral action. Now this is the notion of God, as moral ruler of the universe. Therefore an ethical commonwealth can be thought of only as a People of God, ruled by laws of virtue ; or, being the kingdom of God, such a commonwealth can be taken in hand among men only by means of religion—and that it may be a public society, only in the form of a visible Church.¹

If these considerations are sound, they furnish a test whereby we may judge that the attempt to comprehend religion without

¹ *Cf.* in the above-cited edition of Kant's Works, vol. vi. pp. 175-177, 249.

passing beyond the limits of mere reason (as Kant drew these limits) was from the first doomed to failure. Subjectively, religion always arises from the necessity felt to secure that spiritual freedom from the constraint of nature, of which man is conscious *a priori*, in relation to his no less undeniable dependence on nature (in all its gradations up to human society). This security is sought by postulating the idea of a spiritual Being to whom spirit and nature alike owe their origin, and by whom the connexion between these is regulated. But mere (practical) reason, in the sense in which that faculty was interpreted by Kant's criticism, points to the unconditioned causality of freedom, and the independence with which its law is produced. In the circle of these notions Religion finds not even a subjective necessity, since the dependence of man—in which lies the other and subjective premiss of a possible religion—is wholly left out of sight. And so from Kant's mere reason no necessary inference for the validity of religion can be drawn, but only an inference of an arbitrary kind. Therefore in relation to the intelligible notion of freedom, and the autonomous production of the law, a merely accidental addition to the scientific principles of morals is made, when the law is regarded as the law of God. Or if a necessary conclusion as to the importance of religion is to be drawn from practical reason, then we must mean the practical reason of the empirical subject, who is in part free, in part unfree, who, as member of the world of sense, aims at felicity conditioned by virtue, and who, as member of the ethical and yet terrestrial kingdom of God, postulates the idea of God, and that as the necessary presupposition of his moral position in the present, and of his cosmical position in the future. And this confirms our conclusion, that the postulate of the idea of God made by Kant in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* is either not convincing in the sense in which he means it—for the idea of the highest Good is no longer supported by critical but by empirical arguments—or else that the postulate must react on and so limit the notions of freedom and autonomy of the practical reason, if once it is found to have a hold in the field of empirical Ethic. Though Kant then expressly assures us that the idea of God grows out of ethic, and so cannot be at its root,¹ yet the fact is that the

¹ As above, p. 99.

idea of God either is not the necessary issue of (the critical series of notions in) Ethic, or if necessarily postulated by Ethic (in the totality of its conditions) must be regarded as the foundation of the validity of human freedom in the world of sense.

58. The religious point of view, in accordance with which Kant, in the third part of his philosophical doctrine of religion, accounts for the possibility of the moral commonwealth, has no influence on the preceding discussions on the "Indwelling of the evil principle along with the good; or the radical moral evil of human nature," and on "the struggle of the good principle with the evil for the mastery over man." Although the first of these themes necessarily relates to empirical humanity, and although in his treatment of radical moral evil the influence of human fellowship upon the individual is considered; in the discussion of the second point, on the other hand, the individual subject is brought before us in complete independence of all his neighbours, and the conditions of the struggle against moral evil are judged exclusively in accordance with the points of view from which the critical philosophy contemplates Ethic. Moral evil, moreover, is not brought into any specific relation to God whatever; the doctrine of it accordingly bears only the character of an empirical doctrine of Ethics. The Christian thought of reconciliation comes in for the first time in connexion with the doctrine of the struggle of the good principle with the evil; and only this presentation can fitly claim to exhibit religion as it is within the limits of mere reason. In this discussion Kant accordingly confirms his assurance that the idea of religion proceeds from Ethic (as its real foundation), and does not constitute its basis (so as to make Ethic to be the ground on which the validity of the religious idea might be known). That is, he here elaborates the doctrine that the Christian idea of reconciliation is only the unreal reflection of a purely individual process of the moral will, or the incidental circumstance attaching to that which actually exists only in the independent development of the moral subject. It is indeed very significant, when we compare the case of the Illumination, that the traditional doctrines of the satisfaction of Christ, and of justification for His sake, made such an impression upon Kant that in them he recognised precisely that idea

which, by the standard of unaided reason, exhibited itself as the kernel of religion ; and after all it does not in the end come to the same thing whether these doctrines be accepted merely as play of the fancy of the subject, who is judged in accordance with the critique of the practical reason, or whether their truth in the religious sense be made to disappear by the theoretical criticism of the illuminantists. But still the idea of radical moral evil gives to Kant's maintenance of the idea of reconciliation at most the significance of a prophecy ; and it is just his recognition of radical moral evil in men that makes an epoch in opposition to the Illumination. On this account it is indispensably necessary for the business we have in hand to take into consideration also this substitute for the doctrine of original sin,—the doctrine the theoretical difficulties of which led the Illumination to hold itself justified in surrendering its tendency also as worthless.

Kant acknowledges that the propensity to moral evil displays itself in man just as soon as the use of freedom makes its appearance in him. When he calls that propensity natural or innate guilt, he certainly in doing so makes the reservation that it consists not in any impulse of nature but in a maxim. For if it were the former, the use of freedom would be referred entirely to determination by natural causes. But this is inconsistent with freedom. Accordingly, when man is said to be evil by nature, this means only a principle in him, prior to all experience, which leads to the adoption of maxims that are contrary to the law, and that too to such an extent that herein is expressed what, as matter of fact, is a generic character of man. That principle cannot be looked for in an inheritance from the first parents, because that would assign to it a natural cause, viz., generation, and so all imputation of the evil propensity would have to be excluded. Nor can the principle consist in the instincts of sense, for the natural inclinations have not in themselves any direct connexion with moral evil, at all events none more direct than they have with virtue, for in their nature they supply the material of the latter also. Neither does the bad maxim which constitutes the form of the propensity include in itself any rebellious repudiation of the moral law as a whole. For this last irresistibly forces itself upon the attention even of the worst of men, in virtue of their ethical con-

stitution. If then this is so, and if, on the other hand, the impulses of sense are active in the evil maxim in accordance with the subjective principle of self-love, Kant concludes that the evil maxim originates in the subordination of moral order to the inclinations. That is, while the moral law ought to pass as the highest condition of the gratification of self-love, the evil maxim proceeds upon the rule that the *impulses of self-love and its inclinations assert themselves as conditioning the observance of the moral law*. The opposition between this treatment of radical moral evil and the doctrine of original sin, whatever their analogy may be, extends both to the formal and the material side of the matter. According to Kant, moral evil is not naturally inherited, and it is not absolute rebellion against the moral law; it is not wickedness in the formal sense; it is not disposition to evil as such; it is not the tendency to contravene the law as a whole, as original sin is represented to be. Rather does Kant, in accordance with experience, find that perverseness of heart can also co-exist with a tendency to conformity with the law, and that wickedness in many men does not exceed the grades of infirmity and impurity, and only on a third and higher grade exhibits itself as intentional guilt. But then the usual manner in which egoism treats with the law, where an egoistic legality alternates with unintentional transgressions, is not regarded by him as guiltless weakness; on the contrary, he recognises in it already the radical perversity which, in the maxim of the supremacy of egoism over the law, displays opposition to the law, *i.e.*, moral evil. If now we inquire into the origin of radical moral evil, it cannot be conceived as an origin in *time*, for man's action in time does not appear as free; rather is every manifestation of evil imputed in such a way as if one had immediately passed out of the state of innocence into transgression of the law. The *rational* origin of the evil propensity is undiscoverable, because the quest would involve an endless regress from evil to evil. If accordingly nothing is left to us but to represent the maxim of evil as an act of spontaneous arbitrariness, the intelligible idea of freedom still contributes nothing to its explanation, because this last is rather at the root of our recognition of the law, and accordingly, as ground of the opposite also, would be contradictory to itself. The Bible narrative also of the fall from the

state of innocence experienced by our first parents, has only the allegorical meaning that the propensity to evil which is always present with us, must be represented as free and arbitrary. But if the imputation of actual sin confirms the intelligible idea of freedom, we should yet greatly misinterpret Kant's express declaration of the inscrutability of the origin of sin, if in the intelligible freedom of man we should also seek to discern the ground of the possibility of moral evil.¹

For the thought of freedom rather establishes the possibility of restoration to its old strength of the original disposition to the good. However hard it is to think that a naturally bad man should make himself into a good one, it is yet possible, because respect for the moral law abides even in the evil propensity. While this respect expresses the subjective certainty and objective necessity that we ought now to be better men, it follows inevitably that we must be able also to be so. While freedom, in the noetic sense, is the ground of the consciousness of our moral destiny, it is also the power of realizing that, the power which, in spite of the corruption of the empirical character, calls forth that revolution in man's disposition, which is comparable to a new birth or new creation. The susceptibility for the good which is herein attained, needs of course to be continually confirmed in the way of improvement. But to God who sees through the intelligible motives of the heart, for Whom the endlessness of moral progress is a unity, the regenerate person is as good as actually a good man. It is with this declaration that Kant first transfers to the religious sphere

¹ Kant's words are the following (as above, vi. p. 137): "The rational origin of this propensity to evil remains undiscoverable to us, *because it also must itself be imputed to us; consequently that highest ground of all maxims would again demand the assumption of an evil maxim.* Evil can only have arisen out of moral evil; and yet the original disposition is a disposition to the good. *For us accordingly there is no conceivable explanation whence moral evil can first have come upon us.*" Thus I do not find that it is Kant's thought that is expressed by Dorner (*Lehre von der Person Christi*, 2^{te} Theil, p. 974): "This propensity must have its ground in freedom; but as it lies in no act in time, it points away to an intelligible free, original act, by which the highest maxim was perverted;" and by Gass (*Gesch. der protest. Dogmatik*, Bd. 4, p. 290): "Conceived as original sin (?) sin resembles an intelligible act which comprehends in one the aggregate sum of human offences." These misinterpretations are doubtless produced by the confusing impression of a mythologizing travesty of Kant's doctrine. Kant's meaning is exceeded when the actual derivation of evil from intelligible freedom by one act is asserted. For hereby freedom also is made to be a cause in time, which in its idea it ought not to be.

the discussion which up to this point has been purely ethical; and it is not difficult to see the reason of this. It is the necessity for placing securely in comparison with the complexus of all phenomena, *i.e.*, with nature—the value of human freedom which expresses the peculiar destiny of man, but phenomenally is never fully manifested. Accordingly the struggle of the good principle with the evil had to be brought under the religious point of view, because in the empirical mode of contemplating its appearances, the struggle would not be recognised at all in its true character.

For if it is a universal duty of man to raise himself to the ideal of moral perfection, *i.e.*, to the pattern of moral disposition in all its purity, Kant concedes further that we are not the authors of this idea, that rather it has assumed its place in man without our being able to understand how human nature could ever even have been capable of receiving it. And, therefore, it is truer to say that that pattern of moral perfection in which God is eternally assured of the purpose of the world, has come down to us from heaven, and that it has laid hold of humanity. If, now, God judges the man who has converted himself to be well-pleasing and good, in spite of the fact that his prestations always fall short of the ideal of the good, this takes place under the type of the personified idea of the humanity that is well-pleasing to God. In that personified idea, not merely the highest possible dutifulness of action, as well as example and teaching towards the spread of dutiful activity, are embodied; it contains also readiness to undertake for the good of the world all suffering, even to the most shameful death; for our notion of the degree of strength in the moral disposition includes this test by obstacles. "In practical faith in this Son of God, in so far as He is conceived as having assumed human nature, man can now hope to be well-pleasing to God, and thereby to enjoy felicity also."

Thus far has Kant appropriated the train of Christian ideas; and if we leave out of account the fragmentary manner in which his meaning is conveyed, as well as many reservations, it corresponds in some measure to Arminianism, *i.e.*, to the dogmatic type which, with unimportant differences, was also adhered to by the rationalism of the school of Semler, as well as by the contemporary supra-naturalism. But if Kant had

seriously dealt with the religious idea, even though only in this way, he would have been compelled to abandon the standpoint of unaided reason, and to pass over to historical empiricism. This, however, is not his intention. On this account his concessions to the fact of Christian revelation alternate, in his brief presentation of the above train of thought, with various reservations. Not only does he teach that the moral ideal of reason is only represented as personified; the proposition cited above, with which the section closes, is also carried out and interpreted in a sense quite different from that which seemed to be meant. For that practical faith in the incarnate Son of God, in which man becomes acceptable to God, does not mean religious faith, or subjection to an ordinance which must necessarily be regarded as Divine. On the contrary, the subject of this practical faith is declared to be the man "who is conscious within himself of such a moral disposition that he can believe and repose firm confidence *in himself*, that under like temptations and sufferings (as they are made to be touchstones of that idea) he would remain immoveably attached to the pattern of humanity, and with faithful imitation follow His example; such a man, and such a man alone, is entitled to regard himself as one who is a not unworthy object of God's complacency." Here Kant again passes over to the point of view which regards the religious idea as springing indeed out of morality, but not as constituting its basis. When he had developed the idea of regeneration and of acceptance with God, as against radical moral evil, the impression was produced that the regenerate man, in that merely relative improvement which he experiences in himself, has to found his moral self-confidence *realiter* upon the Divine judgment on the transcendental depths of his heart; and what was needed was to indicate the actual and necessary mode of obtaining this postulate. But now, instead of taking this in hand, Kant affirms that the regenerate man, in spite of his empirical imperfection, has the ground of his self-confidence in himself, and only reflects the sureness of that confidence in his inferential representation of the Divine complacency. If this is so, then the judgment is again confirmed that religion within the limits of mere reason has only a contingent validity, and that the subject of the practical reason can just as well omit as complete the reflexion

of his worth in the thought of God. In contradiction of a statement previously made, Kant declares that no example in experience is needed to make the idea of a man morally well-pleasing to God become a pattern for us, but, on the contrary, that this idea is offered to us as an example by the reason itself. As we *ought* to be conform to it, so also of necessity we *can* be. Were it imperative to deduce the necessity for being a man well-pleasing to God from anything else than the absolute validity of the law, and from freedom, the dignity of the law, as the unconditioned and sufficient determining cause of action, would be lowered. This reflection again implies that the critical principles of morality are *directly* made use of as the dogmatic principles of the empirical doctrine of ethics; and so serves to confirm the judgment already expressed, that in this confusion Kant's fundamental error in his interpretation of religion consists.

For while the complete change of the radically evil man is *possible* (*potentia*) from his noetic freedom, because man's destiny to the good which is therein expressed is inalienable; by Kant's own remarks¹ this *moral obligation* does not imply that the *capability* (*actus*) of conversion flows from noetic freedom in itself considered. None the less does Kant afterwards assume this capability as effectual towards that end. This assertion (in contradiction with his own premisses) of the unconditioned power of the lawgiving freedom in the man who empirically is bad, next leads to his altering the constitutive significance of the ideas of religion into what is mere subjective reflection. In conformity herewith, Kant also changes the thought (which at first had been recognised as a necessary one) of the Divine justification of the man who has been converted by himself into the thought that this same man, in his self-reliance based upon his freedom, justifies himself, although there can be attributed to no man that insight into himself which belongs to the "Searcher of hearts."² But he also explains away in the

¹ P. 139. "How now it is possible that a man who by nature is wicked should make himself good is a thing that transcends all our conception; for how can an evil tree bear good fruit?" But still as we ought to become better men, "we must also be able to become such, even though what we are able to do should in itself be insufficient, and only serve to make us capable of receiving a higher aid inscrutable to us."

² Therefore Kant, after this change of opinion at p. 156, returns in p. 162 to the religious thought.

same direction the idea of penal satisfaction which the Church-doctrine refers to Christ. For, since the man who began with evil cannot make up for the infinite transgressions he has been guilty of even by subsequent dutifulness, there attaches to him a guilt which would bring with it infinite punishment and banishment from the kingdom of God. This guilt cannot be wiped away by another, for it is not transferable like a money-debt, but is personal in the highest degree, and can only be borne by the culprit himself. But when the culprit is regarded as regenerate, he is indeed the same, and yet at the same time another than he was before. While thus his having forsaken his depraved ways already in itself involves self-sacrifice, and the entry on a long series of ills which the regenerate man submits himself to simply for the sake of the good, in this very thing he endures what was due to him as punishment in his previous state. This, according to Kant, is the cogitable truth of that which is represented as having been a death endured once for all by Christ, the representative of humanity.

It cannot be doubted that Kant discovered for himself this solution of the problem of the doctrine of satisfaction, corresponding as it does to his own point of view. And yet it is far from new. For the Anabaptist John Denk (p. 291) before him had reconciled the ethical autonomy of the individual subject with the thought of the penal satisfaction rendered necessary by past sins, by the assumption that the regenerate person, in acquiescing in his original condemnation and mortifying the flesh, establishes the validity of the law that demands the punishment of his previous sins. This coincidence, moreover, is quite explicable. The one as well as the other places the active ethical subject in atomistic independence, and so finds the endurance of punishment by a representative to be unthinkable; they both accordingly make the dialectic between punishment and reformation end in the change of the subjective circumstances. Both, however, at the same time express a characteristic Christian truth. The endurance of merited ill has for the regenerate the value of retributive punishment, but no longer that of reprobative punishment which it has for the sinner. Herein Kant's opposition to the Illuminantist treatment of the idea of punishment (p. 396) holds firm ground; and in itself the thought before us is one of indubitable truth.

Only it is not evident how those conflicts and troubles, which the regenerate man takes to himself for the sake of the good principle, are to be recognised as punishments of his sinful past. In this particular application of the principle, Kant undoubtedly has gone wrong, just as Denk did, who groundlessly includes in one the ascetic side of the moral conflict in the regenerate with his acquiescence in his original condemnation. The question, moreover, presents itself whether the doctrine of Christ's penal satisfaction can actually be interpreted, as Kant at the close asserts, to be the personified presentation of that idea, or whether it is not a truth which offers the key to that view of salutary endurance of punishment.

At least Kant in the third part of his philosophical doctrine of religion (the victory of the evil principle and the founding of a kingdom of God upon earth) has succeeded in gaining from the doctrine of reconciliation a further-reaching significance. It has already been indicated (p. 402) that in this connexion Kant has been unable to avoid entering upon the specifically religious explanation of the association of men by laws of virtue. This, of course, does not prevent his calling to his aid for this purpose at the same time the self-activity of men. By this instrumentality the moral kingdom of God is realized as *Church*. Now, though the kingdom of God is to be grounded only on the pure reasonable faith of religion that we have to fulfil all duties as being at the same time commands of God, yet in this it is only the goal of association in the Church that can be contemplated. For the weakness of human nature is responsible for the fact that such pure faith can never be counted on,—not at least from the beginning. Rather therefore does the existence of the Church rest on statutory laws, which being represented as Divine point back to revelation, and are comprehended in a historical faith. If, accordingly, this historical Church-faith in moulding men to an ethical commonwealth naturally precedes the pure moral faith of religion, the place of the latter as being the goal to be aimed at must be upheld in the preparatory stage, and confirmed by the moral interpretation of the records and institutes of religion, in order that the Church may gradually be transferred into the complete realization of the kingdom of God. The relation is illustrated by Kant precisely in his criticism of the traditional

doctrine of reconciliation. The hope of blessedness, he admits, connects itself with two conditions, namely, that transgressions become in the eyes of the Judge as if they had not been committed, and that we walk in a new life conformably to duty. The two conditions of necessity go together; and the attempt is made to prove this by deducing the one from the other. But the two possible combinations of the thoughts lead to antinomies of the reason. For, assuming *first* that a satisfaction for sins has been made, it is not easy to see how a reasonable man, who knows himself to be deserving of punishment, can apply to himself the penal satisfaction intended by another, and believe that a good life (in which he has not formerly busied himself) will follow from this view. Rather in the reverse way will he deduce the validity of that satisfaction for himself only from his life which he has reformed as well as he can. Thus that last-named element of the faith of the Church will only hold good when the currency of the pure moral faith is presupposed. But assuming, *secondly*, that man is by nature depraved, and finds in himself no ability to amend in the future, he then needs faith to be reconciled with God through the satisfaction of another, and may in this faith regard himself, so to speak, as born again, in order then to enter upon the new course of life. Thus this faith must precede all effort after good works,—which contradicts the previous proposition. Now this contradiction, according to Kant, does not admit of being theoretically resolved, for we can recognise no causes of freedom's determination either to the good or to the evil. Practically, on the other hand, the decision is made in favour of the soundness of the first train of thought, as we must always begin with that which we ought to do in order to become worthy of that which God may have done for us. For, even if the historical Church-faith begins with the latter truth, that faith is yet only a vehicle for the pure faith of religion. Since, then, this last is the proper aim to be pursued, we must make a beginning with the corresponding maxim of action, and use the maxim of theoretical faith as the means of confirming and completing the first until such support is no longer needed.—Kant presents the antinomy also in the following form. Living faith in the pattern of the humanity that is acceptable to God (the Son of God) *in itself* relates to a moral idea of the reason, in so far as the

latter serves us not merely as a rule, but as a stimulus, and it is therefore all one whether I begin with it as *rational* faith or with the principle of a good course of life. On the other hand, faith in that same pattern *in its phenomenal manifestation* as historical faith in the God-man, is not interchangeable with the principle of a good course of life, which must be wholly rational. But yet in the manifestation of the God-man it is after all the pattern which has its place in our reason, and which we think of under the historical figure, that properly speaking is the object of saving faith; and such a faith is identical with the principle of a course of life that is well-pleasing to God. Thus the antinomy of the two standpoints is only seeming; because the same practical idea, only viewed in different aspects, is by a misunderstanding taken for two diverse principles. But were it sought to make historical belief in the actual manifestation of the God-man a condition of saving faith, in that case, of course, two conflicting standpoints would be indicated.

Undeniably Kant concedes to the idea of Christ's satisfaction a more specific meaning than that it exhibits the type of the proper appreciation of punishment on the part of every regenerate person. And in fact his recognition of its necessity stands in immediate relation to the stress he lays on the deep depravity of every man. When, however, he disregards its constitutive influence on the moral life, when he estimates it as a contingent instrumentality only in the solution of this practical task, when he finds it superfluous just in the measure in which this task admits of being discharged in accordance with pure critical principles of morality,—all this only evinces his general tendency, to which he adheres in spite of all the concessions that are wrung from him by the impression of religion. The immediate ground of the issue reached by him is given, however, in the attitude towards one another which he gives to the ideas of the Church and of the kingdom of God. For it is a mistake to identify these ideas in substance, and distinguish them only as steps in the realization of the same thing. In this mistake Kant follows the tradition, which on all other points he withstands—the churchly, to wit—whether mediæval and Catholic, or orthodox and Protestant. Only he modifies the simple identity of the two factors (which is taught in the

earlier development of Christianity) by the assertion that the Church is the immature stage of the moral kingdom of God; and on this condition he gains that attitude of opposition to Church-Christianity which outweighs all seeming approximations thereto on his part. If we regard Kant's rationalism from this point of view, the observation (which has already been made with reference to the Illumination) holds good in his case also, that the most incisive attacks made upon Church-Christianity are due to the fact that the criticism of tradition is not gone into with thoroughgoing earnestness, and that tradition is faithfully adhered to in isolated points in an uncritical way. The Church and the kingdom of God denote the association of men that Christ founded, in diverse aspects which hold good contemporaneously without the one ever passing over into the other, although they act and react upon each other. The association of those who believe in Christ is conceived as the kingdom of God, in so far as they pursue the common task of love towards all men—i.e., the moral task of forming them into an association intensively and extensively most perfect. These same believers are conceived as church or religious community, in so far as they show forth their faith in thanks and praise to God, in the recognition of His general and special guidance. The task of the kingdom of God cannot be undertaken as a common one if there be not formed a fellowship for God's worship. And this last again requires, in order to its maintenance and extension, a multitude of activities of an ethical kind, which in having love for their motive at the same time are connected with the realization of the kingdom of God. But as the functions which essentially belong to the Church have their direction towards God, while the functions which essentially belong to the kingdom of God are directed towards men, these two forms of human fellowship cannot stand related to one another as lower and higher grades. If, moreover, the idea of reconciliation means that to the man who is led astray in sin the way to God is rendered possible; then the validity of this thought can never become superfluous even if he who has to contemplate himself under this point of view is at the same time called to activity in the kingdom of God. Kant therefore retrogrades into the path of the Illumination, when he disregards the import of the evil of our nature, and shares

with the Illuminantists the conclusion that we must strive with all our powers after a walk acceptable to God, in order to be able to believe that God's love to humanity (of which our reason already assures us), taking into account our honest intention, will make up the deficiency of our action, where-soever that may be.

This aimless struggle between the impressions of the religious ideas of Christianity and the desire to gain for morality an unconditioned dependence, which Kant's philosophical doctrine of religion displays, arrives at no conclusion of scientific certainty. Particularly, for the doctrines of reconciliation and justification there is brought about neither their advancement nor a restoration to their former position. He who is accustomed to view the doctrines of Christianity in the form of a determinate formulated law, will even recognise in their treatment by Kant nothing but the continued influence of the apostasy into which the Illumination fell. Irrespective of this appearance, it must still be maintained that Kant gave the Illumination an insuperable check, and that his never-ending vacillation in determining the relation between morality and religion, shows that the specific ideas of Christianity had an attraction for Kant which they had not for the Illuminants, and by which Kant is completely contrasted with them. Nor can the fact that the sympathy has borne no more solid fruit for Kant's philosophical doctrine of religion be explained from "unbelief" on his part, for that very sympathy for Christian ideas which he shows is faith; his failure can be explained only from a scientific mistake—viz., the premature dogmatizing of the critical principles of his doctrine of ethics.

59. The authority which Kant wielded over a certain group of theologians is not yet fully explained by the trains of thought of an ethical and religious-philosophical nature which we have been presenting. Besides these, his concession of the possibility of revelation contributed partly to the result; and also the morally teleological view of the universe developed in his *Kritik der Urtheilskraft* (1790), in connexion with the moral proof of the existence of God, who must be conceived not merely as Intelligence, and as giving laws to the natural world, but also as legislative supreme Head in a moral realm of ends. That a revelation, as a means towards the introduction of the

true religion, should proceed from God, is declared by Kant, speaking from his philosophical standpoint, to be a matter against the possibility of which reason can no more decide than it can dispute its necessity. If, accordingly, we should become convinced by the worth of the moral principles of Jesus, and by the ideal impression of His personality, that His claim to reveal God is well founded, such a judgment would lie beyond the competence of philosophy. But as the conviction of Christ's historical significance was dominated by the consideration that His doctrines mirrored back the philosophical truth of the absolute worth of the law, and of its fulfilment in human action, belief in revelation, while admitted on this ground, was subjected to the limitation that revelation ought to maintain precisely the truths of the practical reason which, by its means, should be made more easily accessible to the world of men than they would be by philosophical investigation.

But now from this there arose the possibility of a twofold procedure in appreciating the positive religious dress of the truths of the practical reason. On one side they were regarded, as by Kant in his philosophical doctrine of religion, merely as symbols of the necessary course of the practical reason. It cannot be doubted that Kant has framed the "personified idea of the good principle" by abstraction from the manifestation of Christ; and that too under the impression of His value as a revelation of God.¹ That he nevertheless assigns in the sequel no decisive value to the empirical individual actuality of this Person is explained by the circumstance that he regards this occasion for the contemplation of the statutory truths of religion, as compared with the purely rational and independent apprehension of the laws of morals, as a vanishing transition-point, corresponding to the schema in which he recognises the Church as an intermediate step towards the realisation of the kingdom of God. But on another side, the single empirical fact with which the historical founding of the community was connected could, while it offered itself as the peculiar embodiment of the truths of religion in general, be looked upon as

¹ *Werke*, vi. p. 155: "As we are not the authors of this idea, it on the contrary having taken its place in men without our being able to comprehend how human nature could ever have been so much as able to receive it, we may rather say that that pattern has come down to us from heaven—that it has laid hold of humanity."

causing an *extension* of religious knowledge beyond the limits of the science which is attainable by the unaided reason. For this it was of course necessary to include this fact, *i.e.*, the manifestation of Christ, definitively within the sphere of the Divine wisdom, and so within the teleological reflexion on the connexion of the universe with God, as a fact of God's designing, the necessary interpretation of which is immediately connected with its occurrence. Undoubtedly these "symbols," the doctrines of Christ, must prove their religious value herein that they fit in with the theoretical and practical ideas that find place in the reason; but the alliance of their universally rational meaning with the individual manifestation of Christ evinces its origin in revelation, and offers a knowledge that surpasses the powers of the reason. This is the properly *theological* standpoint which J. H. Tieftunk of Halle assumes.¹ It is particularly characteristic of his position that the doctrines of the Logos incarnate and of reconciliation are regarded as in conformity with reason, and the assertion of an opponent, that the contents of these doctrines are altogether supra-rational, is rebutted.

Tieftunk² holds forth, as the general idea of the Logos, the truth that God creates, legislates, sustains, and rules by ideas of wisdom; and, as the general idea of the Logos incarnate, the idea of the humanity that is acceptable to God, which results as a determining purpose from the moral consciousness of the law. But this idea denotes at the same time also the eternal and divine final purpose of the universe; and therefore not only was everything made by it, but also it realizes itself just in proportion as men's consciousness is determined by the moral law to the effort after acceptance with God. "Accordingly we may say that the primordial wisdom became flesh by the union of the Idea of itself with Being in a fleshly shell." But this general rational train of thought is transcended by the fact that in Jesus the Logos and the fulness of the Godhead dwelt

¹ *Censur des christlichen protestantischen Lehrbegriffs*. Drei Theile, 1791-93. The first part in a second edition, 1796 (thus having been prepared subsequent to the appearance of Kant's "Religion within the limits of mere reason.") It is this second edition that I use. With reference to what is said in the text, compare p. 146 *sq.*

² As above, p. 149 *sqq.* See also a dissertation, "Is the forgiveness of sins a Postulate of the Practical Reason?" in Stäudlin's *Beiträge zur Philosophie und Geschichte der Religion u. Sittenlehre* (1797), pp. 112-201.

bodily, in that He, so far as history allows us to judge, exhibited the character of acceptability with God in an ideally perfect manner.¹ As now He exercised His activity in such circumstances, that He founded a religious community which received from Himself the rule and the impulse for their moral development, this complexus of special and peculiar circumstances is the distinguishing feature of revelation: the doctrine connected with them is, however, in itself no universal truth of the reason, but intelligible only in its connexion with the truths of the reason which it indicates. In this general sense, then, the Christian doctrine of reconciliation also is shown to be conformable to reason, or deduced *a priori* from the demands of the moral law. It signifies "the supplying of a self-caused deficiency of our own righteousness before the divine Judge, in so far as this last requires to be thought and believed as a condition of the realization of the final purpose of the world." For while we find in ourselves a guilt which we have brought upon ourselves, the law whereby we know that guilt works in us a consciousness of our worthlessness, a loathing of ourselves, and a fear and a shame in the presence of the lawgiver which cannot be taken away by moral reformation, which, when it takes place, is no more than our duty. Rather is pardon by the judge the uppermost need of the guilty one, on the satisfying of which need the further advancement of the morality of the penitent subject rests. For the ideal of a moral way of thinking consists in *love to the law*, so that the law is observed with joy of heart and with good cheer. This attitude towards the law and the lawgiver is, however, possible only on the condition of a bestowal of grace; this is the ground from which reason *a priori*, as the principle of the unity of the reason with itself, demands an abolition of guilt. That this bestowal of grace is connected with the person of Christ, expresses the fact of revelation; but this fact has its peculiar value, not as an empirical datum—for as such it would be merely contingent—

¹ This is not the place specially to elucidate Tieftrunk's Christology; yet I allow myself the remark that the neglect of it in Dorner's *Lehre von der Person Christi* is not justified; while the ironical notice of Tieftrunk's work, "Then came the time of critiques of all revelation, or of the religion of Christianity, and of Judgment on the Protestant doctrinal ideas,"—as well as the wrong dates, 1790, 1791 (*ib.* p. 973), betray Dorner's want of acquaintance with it.

but in its relation to the aforesaid postulate of the practical reason.

Therefore it is also possible to recognise the means and the conditions of the postulated bestowal of grace as logically resulting from the fundamental principles of the practical reason.¹ The imperative command of the practical reason points to the final purpose of the realization of the kingdom of God, of the commonwealth in which the moral law alone has authority, and the natural state of the citizens appears merely as a consequence of their moral behaviour. In order that this goal of one's own action may be conceived as possible, the practical reason demands the existence of God, who, by moral ideas, is Creator and Lawgiver, Sustainer and Ruler, Judge and Executor of laws. Now, our realization of the kingdom of God is always thwarted by our original sinfulness, which also constantly hampers the prestations of the amended man. If then the moral final purpose of the world is nevertheless to be maintained, it follows from the guarantee contained in the thought of God, that the reason is justified in thinking of God as the efficient cause of all that which man himself cannot give, and which is yet necessary to make the attainment of the moral final purpose possible. Consequently the reason must conceive of God as supplying our deficiency in our inability to pass from the bad to the good, to wipe out the guilt we have incurred, to persevere in good maxims, and to attain full blessedness. Now, as is reasoned out in the dissertation already cited,² it is essential that the removal by God of the criminality we ourselves have incurred towards the law be brought about not merely for the sake of the law, but also by means of the law. The first requisite is fulfilled if the realization of the universal moral final purpose, and particularly if love to the law is made impossible where forgiveness has not preceded. The second requisite implies that forgiveness is not to be understood as the expression of a divine arbitrariness opposed to the law,—that rather in its analogy with that placableness which is incumbent as a duty between man and man, it signifies nothing else than the directing of God's working in accordance with law towards the

¹ Compare the second part of the *Censur des protestantischen Lehrbegriffs*, pp. 210-229.

² Pp. 120, 157, 172.

realization of the kingdom of God. For implacability, regarded as the universal law of a moral kingdom, would be self-contradictory. If then, God is a lawgiver only with reference to the moral commonwealth, He can maintain this last and also the validity of His law only by the opposite of implacability, that is, by forgiveness as a procedure that is in accordance with law.

If, then, God must be thought of as author of the forgiveness of sins, to this on man's part corresponds faith, not as a dead holding-for-true, but as a living trust. Such a faith must proceed from the observance of duty. "In doing what our duty requires, we may also believe that God will do His part in showing us grace." This proposition, repeatedly stated by Tieftrunk, does not require to be so understood as if the forgiveness of sins were made objectively to depend upon reformation, as the Socinians and Illuminantists think. For the sense in which the Kantian understands the connexion is, in the first instance, not objective and dogmatic, but subjective and critical. In the dissertation already cited Tieftrunk clearly declares that reformation is the indispensable condition, but not the producing cause, of the forgiveness of sins. These words may denote a relation identical with the position of justifying faith as held by the Reformers, viz., that it is grasped by him who is active in the regenerate state.¹ Tieftrunk does not, however, come up to the Reformers' apprehension of justification by faith; but, following Kant's example, also expresses himself to the effect that faith is only a real result of the observance of duty, just as religion is an appendix of morality. On this account the absence of merit in man, in the act of justification, does not with him mean that man's prestations are altogether disregarded, but only that the observance of duty is no merit but a due, and yet that it is taken into account while the forgiveness of sins comes in to *supplement it*. The difference therefore is, that justification is not conceived as the principle of amelioration, but as God's completion of the inde-

¹ The same thought gets characteristic expression cognate to the Kantian view from E. R. Stier (in his biography, vol. i. p. 216): "For all that is yet in the future [we ought] to live only strictly according to the law as if only by the fulfilment thereof we were to be saved,—then for the past only to comfort ourselves with grace, and for God's sake presuppose no forgiving grace for the future."

pendent conversion of the man. Now, although Tieftrunk, in the further development of the conditions of the doctrine of the forgiveness of sins,¹ appears to seek to measure God's doing therein by the contrast of His justice and grace, he does not for all that enter upon the path of the traditional doctrine of satisfaction. He again obliterates the peculiar significance of God's justice, which he had recognised, by insisting upon the harmony of the Divine attributes with one another. He thus obtains from Christ's prestation of obedience, which ended in death for the good of men, only the meaning that, as representative of God's loving disposition, He procured the non-imputation of sins and the restoration of peace. Tieftrunk certainly gives casual expression also to the thought that in Christ's obedience unto death humanity also is presented to God as justified (p. 346). But this formula conveys, so far as he is concerned, only the truth that he who follows the example set in Christ's death, and trusts in the disposition of God that it betokens, may hold himself assured of peace with God. Thus Tieftrunk's view of reconciliation by Christ's death, like that of Töllner (p. 354), essentially agrees with Abelard's interpretation.

In this result a truth discloses itself which had not received currency in the orthodox Protestant doctrine of reconciliation, —while at the same time a one-sidedness of view is displayed which does not treat fairly the converse thought of the representation of humanity by Christ. Tieftrunk's indifference to the thought of penal satisfaction is, however, based upon yet another special ground. For with him what has to be considered in the problem of reconciliation is not the removal of outward penal evils, but the abolition of consciousness of guilt regarded as the cause of man's inward loss of self-respect in presence of the law, and of dispeace and mistrust towards God. He gives full force to Töllner's hint (p. 356), in order to *define the problem of the doctrine of reconciliation in a new and characteristic way*. For although he recognises consciousness of guilt and external penal evils to be both of them consequences of sin, he yet maintains, and lays it down as a rule of common moral knowledge, that in reconciliation the removal of the first is so preponderant or even so exclusively in question, that if

¹ *Censur des prot. Lehrbegriffs*, ii. p. 276 sqq.

an injured benefactor were to remit the outward penalties to the ingrate, and yet always spurn him from himself with unaltered contempt, that sort of forgiveness would be absolutely worthless.¹ I do not at all doubt that this knowledge owes its origin only to a judgment rendered keener by Kant, even though Tieftrunk rightly adduces the common practice of education as showing the validity of the principle. When I compare the facts that, while Tieftrunk publicly expressed himself in this sense, Knapp at the same time in the same university was able to teach that in reconciliation by Christ there can be absolutely no thought of the removal of men's consciousness of guilt towards God (p. 383), I conclude that Kant's special impulse contributed to make that fact of "common moral knowledge" as such valid in its universal significance even for our relation to God. And it is obvious that it was Kant's discovery of the value and weight of the consciousness of guilt that drew after it the conclusion that in reconciliation the first thing aimed at is the removal of this obstacle to peace with God. Now, under this condition no direct liberation from merited punishments is counted on by Tieftrunk. Rather does he infer² from the congruence of nature with the moral world that *all* evils ought to be conceived as punishments, as results of guilt personally incurred, while the necessary congruence between happiness and worth supplies the impulse to amendment in the sense that we become free from evils only in proportion as by our amendment we fit ourselves for being so freed. The object of this idea, however, is conceived as attainable in an eternity only, and so withdraws itself from our penetration. Now, although no use is made of the idea of reconciliation in this last problem, yet this exposition of it has some analogy to that idea in so far as the view of evils inculcated by Tieftrunk can and must be conjoined with cheerfulness, because a joyful frame of spirit is an evidence that we have come to love the law. Thus love to the law, which is possible only in the consciousness of reconciliation with God, awakens also that appreciation of evils which is the opposite of the feelings they naturally produce. More clearly is it laid

¹ *Censur des prot. Lehrbegriffs*, i. p. 169. Also the dissertation in Staudlin's *Beiträge*, iii. p. 153.

² *Censur des prot. Lehrbegriffs*, iii. p. 127.

down in the dissertation cited (pp. 154, 187) that the amended subject who obtains forgiveness will *gladly*, if he only can obtain that, bear the punishments which he has deserved. This hint refers to a more comprehensive view of evils than that which Kant regarded in the solution of the same problem (p. 411). But Tieftrunk himself was not distinctly conscious of this divergence, for he (p. 174) again adopts the Kantian theory which limits punishment to those sufferings which the amended subject experiences in his struggle with the inward results of previous sinfulness. So difficult is it in scientific knowledge to apply a newly discovered thought to such inferences as are seemingly unavoidable.¹

The peculiar attitude assumed by Tieftrunk in his doctrine of reconciliation by Christ expresses itself yet again in the assertion that the *death of Christ is symbolical*. He starts the question whether this be the case or whether the death of Christ as a fact have a really atoning power, so that men by it and for its sake are freed from sin.² By a symbol in religion he understands a representation which rests upon an analogy, in which, accordingly, is expressed either a similarity

¹ It is no less remarkable that Baur (as above, pp. 568, 570) assigns to Tieftrunk's line of thought in the *Censur des prot. Lehrbegriffs* the purpose of deducing from Kant's principle the necessity of the remission of punishments. Baur therefore finds in Tieftrunk's essay in Stäudlin's *Beiträge* a "new application of his deduction," but in respect to this finds at the same time that "it is not said wherein forgiveness consists" (p. 574). It has entirely escaped the notice of the historian of the doctrine of reconciliation that Tieftrunk has made the great advance of postulating in reconciliation with God nothing but the removal of guilt and of the consciousness of guilt, and leaving aside that of punishment. A fellow-countryman of Baur had indeed before him overlooked this peculiarity of Tieftrunk's doctrine. In Süskind's essay *Ueber die Möglichkeit der Strafenhebung oder der Sündenvergebung nach Principien der praktischen Vernunft* (in Flatt's *Magazin für Dogmatik und Moral*, 1st part, 1796), an abstract of Tieftrunk's view taken from the 2d part of the *Censur des prot. Lehrbegriffs* is to be found which does not reproduce his characteristic tendency. Süskind deserves a certain measure of indulgence in this, not being acquainted with Tieftrunk's first part in its 2d ed. (1796), where the dominating point of view is stated in an unmistakable way. In fact he inadvertently assumes the eudæmonistic point of view and loses himself in aimless talk (compare the notice in Baur). In spite of this Baur has reposed such confidence in Süskind as to reproduce almost word for word (pp. 568-570) his abstract of Tieftrunk's view (as above, pp. 23-25), citing the very numbers of the pages in Tieftrunk's work which Süskind has referred to. From that theological local patriotism, which is customary with others also of his countrymen, Baur has thus altogether neglected to look at the North German theologian's chief work, of which he treats.

² *Censur*, ii. p. 348 sq.

of the things, or at least a similarity of relation between the things. A symbol, therefore, as being an intuition of the object of thought, would be the opposite of merely discursive knowledge. Now, it is in this sense that he recognises the atoning death of Jesus to be a symbol of God's relation to men. As God's disposition towards us can never be directly shown, we have to think of the disposition which Jesus evinced by His suffering and dying, as existing also in God in so far as we hope for forgiveness of sins from Him, and that too by the same rule which holds good for the symbol. By this view Tieftrunk excludes the other alternative,—that the death of Jesus is the intuition corresponding to the Divine act of absolution itself, that it is the schema of a course of Divine action that can be recognised in accordance with reason. This judgment is opposed to the whole dogmatic course of the doctrine of reconciliation, and thus far flows in direct succession from Kant's principles of knowledge. The rational calculation of the relation between grace and justice in God, on which the dogmatic doctrine of reconciliation rested, entangles itself in antinomies, just as the entire dogmatic treatment of the idea of God does. However certainly, then, those attributes of God are drawn by necessary consequence from our practical teleological knowledge, their relation in God and their bearing upon the occurrence in time of the death of Jesus are theoretically unintelligible. So that we must satisfy ourselves with contemplating in that symbol the undoubted harmony of the Divine wisdom in itself, with God's benevolent disposition towards man.¹ The Christian doctrine of reconciliation in Christ is thus a revelation, in so far as the universally reasonable connexion between the forgiveness of sins and our obligation to the law is connected with the intuition of the individual empirical person; but it is none the less a mystery in so far as the ground of the unity of the efficient and final causes, which by God are united in that person, continues to be inscrutable to us.² Or, as Tieftrunk puts it in the course of the dissertation already cited,³ it is practically necessary that from the same law reprobation and grace proceed; but how this is possible we do not understand. For without any

¹ *Censur*, ii. p. 328 *seqq.*; 357 *seqq.*

² *Ib.*, p. 201 *seqq.*

³ Stäudlin, *Beiträge*, iii. p. 186.

doubt the maxim of implacability, when regard is had to the purpose of the kingdom of God, would be contrary to law (see above, p. 421); but in this cognition, which is to be applied to God's mode of dealing with men, *i.e.*, in the enunciation of the general lawfulness of forgiveness, there is expressed no principle whereby the latter may be reconciled with the absolute obligation of the law; in other words, the relation between the justice and the grace of God remains quite undetermined, even when the problem is treated thus.¹

60. Tieftrunk's express distinction between forgiveness of sins and remission of punishments was contemporaneously supported by other theologians, partly by interpretation of Scripture and partly by philosophical ratiocination. Amongst them J. Aug. Nösselt² indeed takes up the standpoint of illuminated supra-naturalism, setting forth that punishments in part have for their object to reform and deter, and thus can be remitted only when these objects have been gained; and in part (as the feeling of guilt or an unlooked-for misfortune) have the value of retribution, and can only be modified by the awakening of opposite feelings in the converted person. He makes use of the aimless dogmatic mode of treatment which Töllner had devoted to this question (p. 358); and thus it is possible that he may have been led by him also to the distinction which is expressed in the title of his program. For although he concedes (what still held its ground in exegetical tradition), that the Scriptural *usus loquendi* presents both formulæ with the same meaning, he nevertheless raises a doubt whether an identical definition of the two ideas is thereby in-

¹ In Dorner's *Geschichte der protest. Theologie*, pp. 750, 751, there is to be found a notice of the controversy (touched upon by Baur also) between Tieftrunk and Stäakind, which is quite unintelligible to me so far as I am acquainted with the original documents. In particular, I do not understand upon what basis Dorner's remark against Tieftrunk rests: "he failed to perceive, that if sin be forgiven spontaneously, and that too previous to amendment (for forgiveness of sins must establish the possibility of the latter), then in place of God's righteousness an indifference to the distinction between God and evil must come in." For I have nowhere read in Tieftrunk the premisses that are here given as his. Just as little do I find in him the assertion attributed to him by Dorner, that "instead of the promulgation of forgiveness of sins by revelation, there is needed only the knowledge of it as an eternal truth of the reason." And in fact Tieftrunk could not at all have expressed himself so.

² *Disputatio de eo quid sit Deum condonare hominibus peccata pœnasque remittere?* Halle, 1792.

tended. For in the Bible the part is often enough put for the whole; the conclusion for the premisses; attributes for the thing itself. That in like manner remission of punishment is put for forgiveness of sins appears to be possible from the consideration that men are more afraid of punishment than of guiltiness. But Nösselt concludes, from Rom. viii. 32-39 and Heb. v. 16, that what is of importance before everything else in Christianity is that we should be acceptable to God, and be in a position to expect what is best from Him; and he recognises in the expectation of exemption from punishment only a result from this state of forgiveness of sins, which is made to depend upon the converted man's faith in the promise of God, and not upon his change of mind, *i.e.*, upon his good deeds.

By this Nösselt has only hinted at the theme, but not solved the problem. At the same time he found hearty concurrence in theologians of the Kantian school, such as J. W. Schmid in Jena, C. F. Stäudlin in Göttingen, C. Chr. Flatt in Tübingen.¹ Stäudlin, in his dissertation (which was published in parts), begins by maintaining that there is no difference between the utterances of Jesus respecting His death and those of the Apostles, and that brief and vague though the words of Jesus are, they yet are to be understood more probably in the sense of vicarious endurance of punishment than as meaning that He establishes deliverance from sin, and thereby also deliverance from punishments. Subsequently, however, he confesses, appealing to Nösselt, that the forgiveness of sins which is promised in Christianity, does not mean the removal of punishment and presuppose a proper transference of that to Christ, but rather betokens the goodness and blessing of God upon sinners who amend themselves, whom otherwise He cannot allow to go unpunished for their sins. The death of Christ, he maintains, is an actual proof of God's love and ratification of forgiveness of sins in that sense, being, as it was, a sacrifice on behalf of the doctrine which was to raise men's happiness, and a finishing of that virtue by the imitation of which they were

¹ J. W. Schmid: *Commentationis in qua remissionis peccatorum notio biblica indagatur* Partes i. et ii., Jena, 1796. C. F. Stäudlin: *Ueber den Zweck u. die Wirkungen des Todes Jesu* in the Göttingen Bibliothek der neuesten theol. Literatur, Erster Band, 1795. C. Chr. Flatt: *Philosophisch-exegetische Untersuchungen über die Lehre von der Versöhnung der Menschen mit Gott*. Two Parts, 1797-98.

designed to enter upon the way of blessedness. At the same time, however, the death of Christ is a symbol of God's penal justice, not as meaning the transference to Him of the sinner's punishment,—for his sufferings have only a certain general resemblance to the punishments which ought to overtake sinners,—but only in the sense that every sin on the part of men ought to be visited with punishment as surely as God gave Jesus over to suffering and to death. With this reminiscence of Storr's assertion of the penal example in the death of Christ,—a reminiscence clothed in Kantian forms,—Stäudlin further conjoins Kant's supposition that Christ symbolically represents what the regenerate man suffers as penal satisfaction for his past sins. For the punishments of sin, which are properly Divine, cannot be taken away.

The more extensive researches of Flatt in their first (philosophical) part first turn upon the demonstration that forgiveness of sins in the sense of removal of punishments is impossible by the principles of the practical reason. Upon this, reconciliation is represented as being God's approval of the change of the sinner's maxims. This view of it is held to be demanded by the practical reason and also contained in the Christian revelation. The exegetical proof of this last statement is gone about in the second part. The negative assertion is based upon the principle, that either the law is not unconditioned and of universal validity or that the case can never occur in which the execution of punishment could lay obstacles in the way of morality. Particularly the thought is wrought out against Eberhard, that if the happiness-principle holds good, if therefore it had to be assumed that man is made better in order to enjoy so much the more happiness, the remission of punishments would be better suited to this end than their execution ; if, on the other hand, the moral principle holds good, then the removal of punishments would weaken the inseparable connexion between morality and happiness. This elucidation, however, as well as the opposite proof which Süskind has adduced,¹ for the "possibility of the removal of punishments or forgiveness of sins according to the principles of practical reason" sails in as shallow a channel as does the corresponding ratiocination of the Illuminantists. I do not think fit to follow

¹ In Flatt's *Magazin für christl. Dogmatik u. Moral*, 1tes Stück, 1796.

it further, but appeal to the true remark of Baur (as above, p. 584), that just as sin is the joint deed of the human race, so also evil, depending as it does on sin, can only be explained from the joint guilt. Only I would add that this Schleiermacherian way of regarding the question transcends the Kantians' sphere of vision. But in proportion as they do not rise to it, they revert to the aimless reflections of the Illuminantists, for the problem of punishment and guilt cannot be resolved when only the individual life is considered.

In the second (exegetical) part of his work Flatt finds the purpose of Jesus in taking death upon Himself to have been to destroy earthly expectations of His kingdom, and to give an impulse to the moral meaning of his doctrine. He leaves it uncertain whether the words of Jesus treat His coming death as a tangible guarantee of the grace of God. But according to him this last is the view of the apostles who under definite conditions by the guidance of God derived that view from the impression of the death of Christ. The presentation of Christ as an offering is very significantly brought into connexion with admission into the number of the new people, into God's community founded by Christ, and with abiding membership therein, just as the sacrifices of the Old Testament were the condition of continuity of membership in the covenant nation. Flatt has undertaken with some good grounds to show that the idea of transference of punishment is not expressed in the ancient sin offerings; but his exegetic procedure upon this point as well as in his treatment of the majority of passages in the New Testament is too fragmentary; so that Süskind, his countryman, who contemporaneously with him came forward with weighty exegetical arguments in favour of the assumed penal value of sacrifices,¹ was able to counteract the impression produced by Flatt. For the thought of reconciliation by Christ is not made clear by Flatt when he interprets Christ's sacrifice as an act of assumption into the Christian community. Instead of recognising in the religious fellowship of Christ the previous ground of all valuable moral self-activity, he understands by the people of God only the number of those who are destined to enjoy happiness in the everlasting kingdom of the Messias. He then

¹ *Ist unter der Sündenvergebung, welche das neue Testament verspricht, Aufhebung der Strafe zu verstehen?* In Flatt's *Magazin*, parts iii. and iv., 1797.

carries out his deductions to the effect that the uneducated men who entered the Christian Church lay under contradictory impressions of the Divine goodness and the Divine penal justice, that in their purpose of amendment they found themselves hampered by the fear of Divine punishments, particularly of exclusion from the kingdom of Messias, that against this the sacrificial value of the death of Christ was maintained by the apostles with the intention of maintaining in Christians the memory of their penal deserts (penal example again!), and securing to them in a sensible way the assurance of God's love. Of course, the realization of these prospects really depended upon Christians' own amendment of themselves; and the evils of withdrawal of God's love and of exclusion from the kingdom of the Messias were either punishments, the warding off of which depended upon each individual himself, or were such as never could happen, and thus were imaginary. Flatt thus carries back the representation of Christ's death as a sacrifice to an accommodation, in spite of which the irreversible dependence of happiness upon amendment ought rather to be insisted upon. In the progress of the latter, he expects it to ensue as an experience that sufferings as results of former offences are compensated for by growing self-satisfaction, and the certainty of the inseparable connexion between virtue and happiness.

From this aspect of his view it is now explained wherefore Flatt, in spite of his seeming approximation to Tieftrunk, opposes his theory. With the latter that assurance of the removal of guilt, and of its separating influence upon the religious relation of man to God, which precedes all amendment, is a postulate of the universal practical reason, and is the decisive kernel of truth contained in Christianity. Flatt sees in this development of thought by the apostles only a device for their converts, who were too uneducated to realize to themselves in a sufficiently lively and powerful way the idea of a gradual and never-ending process of moral perfection and happiness. Tieftrunk's view has its root in those expressions of Kant which most definitely point to the founding of all morality in the ideas of religion. Flatt, on the other hand, takes his stand upon the independence of the moral power of the will (which at other times is maintained by Kant), to which the religious manner of contemplation is only a statutory clothing which is destined to

give way to the moral self-consciousness whenever that shall have become so mature as to be able to dispense with accommodations. When, accordingly, Flatt asserts that self-loathing in the presence of the law and the consciousness of having displeased God, which accompany the purpose of amendment, form no *necessary* obstacle in the beginning and in the course of amendment, but that rather the firm determination of a change of mind, and the consciousness of freedom possess the power to lessen in continuous progression the feeling of remorse; such an assertion cannot be gainsaid if we either confine, or at least principally assign, the moral task to the moral self-perfecting of the individual, *i.e.*, if we take up our standpoint on the doctrine of virtue which Kant has not carried beyond what Wolf had reached.¹ But, if with Tiefrunk we take as our guiding star the idea of Kant that the humanity which is acceptable to God as a kingdom ruled by laws of virtue is the final purpose of the world, and that the Church founded by Christ is called to the fulfilment of this task, it will then be capable of proof that active participation therein does not rest merely upon endless perfectibility in the consciousness of moral freedom and of the purpose of amendment.

The philosophical harmony of these Kantians with Tiefrunk is thus only seeming, and the exegetical means they use do not serve to establish their distinction between forgiveness of sins and remission of punishment. It is therefore easy to understand why these attempts soon died out, and have exercised no subsequent influence. Tiefrunk altogether assumes a very isolated attitude, for the other Kantians move in the direction which has just been illustrated in the doctrines advanced by Flatt, and which is pointed to by Kant himself, in so far as he has treated the autonomy of law-regulated action as an attribute of the individual empirical subject. In this direction, for example, J. W. Schmid of Jena² declares it to be the doctrine of reason and of Christianity that man receives pardon of God when he seriously amends himself, and now lives all the more virtuously as he previously had been wicked, that sorrow over

¹ *Metaphysik der Sitten*, Zweiter Theil, 1797, in the *sämmtl. Werke* vii. p. 195. The duties of virtue are the perfection of one's-self and the happiness of others.

² *Ueber christliche Religion als Volkslehre und Wissenschaft* (1797), pp. 197, 303-311, 315.

past sins cannot be taken away, and can be lessened only by persevering progress in good, that merited punishment is not taken away, and least of all transferred to Christ, but that God who judges according to the totality of the life will count as punishment the unpleasant feelings of sorrow and shame over past sins; that He will not overlook the extenuating circumstances of sin; that He will reward the good that a man does according to the measure of the disposition lying at the bottom of it. Inasmuch as man has no legal claim hereto, this procedure is called forgiveness of sins and bestowal of grace. The apostolical doctrine of forgiveness of sins by the death of Christ is represented to be an accommodation in order to save the recently converted from discouragement in pursuing the path of virtue, since the proper purpose of the death of Christ is the promotion of virtue. Wherefore also trust in the death of Christ and justification by faith are only warranted in so far as the practice of good actions is strictly connected with them, and receives from them the strongest impulse. And the formula of the Reformers which is otherwise framed is absolved from blame only because it was directed against self-complacency in self-appointed ascetic prestations.¹ The establishment of the foregoing theory of the goodness of God may be supplemented by what another theologian of Jena, C. Chr. Erh. Schmid had laid down regarding imputation on God's part.² "If all immorality of a finite being ultimately has its ground in limiting conditions operating upon the self-activity of the reason that knows the Godhead, which are transcendental and lie outside of experience, and the consequences of which the Godhead in no way imputes to the rational being that has not itself produced them, there is accordingly *in the judgment of the Infinite no such thing as guilt, but only higher and lower merit*. The idea of guilt rests in its reality upon the thought of a possibility of an activity of the reason without its actuality; this thought

¹ These trains of thought had already occurred in Stäudlin and Flatt. I refrain from citing proofs at large of their presence in the writings of other theologians, and simply refer to the accordant teachings of C. Chr. Erh. Schmid: *Philosophische Dogmatik* (1796), p. 177; Stäudlin: *Dogmatik und Dogmengeschichte* (1800), 2ter Theil, pp. 758-785; *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik und Dogmengeschichte* (1801), pp. 485-494; Chr. F. Ammon: *Inbegriff der evangelischen Glaubenslehre* (1805), pp. 220-238; J. A. Ludw. Wegscheider: *Institutiones theol. Christ. dogm.* (ed. v., 1826) §§ 140-142; Tzschirner: *Vorlesungen über die christliche Glaubenslehre* (1829), p. 414 sq.

² *Versuch einer Moralphilosophie*, 1790, p. 295.

rests upon the ignorance of a finite being with regard to the super-sensuous limitations which take away that possibility. But the Godhead sees no possibility where there is no actuality; here accordingly the ground of imputation of guilt falls quite away." Now I do not assert that this argumentation is consciously assumed by the Kantians in their illuminantist treatment of the doctrine of reconciliation, but it affords the clearest expression for the divergence of his thoughtless followers from Kant's critical self-judgment of the moral subject. The mistake of Erh. Schmid lies in the definition of guilt as proceeding from the thought of the *possibility* of an operation of the reason without its actuality. In Kant's sense it must be asserted that guilt arises from the thought of the *morally binding necessity* of an action without its actuality. If, accordingly, this idea of guilt is given up, with which Kant opposed himself to the Illumination (p. 394), it is easy to understand that the treatment of the subject again lost itself in the doctrine that God demands of men only so much as they are able to give in accordance with the individual conditions of their moral strength (p. 375); and hereby also is the problem of reconciliation again trifled away.

It was a significant fact for the Church history of the nineteenth century that the old Church-doctrine of reconciliation was, in a well-known Fast-day sermon of the year 1800, opposed by Reinhard to the Illumination that had only been intensified by the Kantian school. By it Krug was led anew to bring forward the antinomy in the idea of reconciliation (p. 413) that had been put forward in the third part of the *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, and to solve it in Kant's sense.¹ This Kantian then was still conscious of the problem. That problem presents itself to him in the contradiction of the propositions: Man by his own instrumentality comes to find acceptance with God; and Man by his own instrumentality cannot find acceptance with God, and must therefore become acceptable through another. The meaning of the propositions according to him is, that man, on the one hand, must do what is his part; but on

¹ *Der Widerstreit der Vernunft mit sich selbst in der Versöhnungslehre* (1802); in Krug's *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. i. pp. 295-352. Baur (p. 589) remarks with reference to this that no mention is made of one antinomy of the practical reason that affects this doctrine by Kant himself. He has read very imperfectly the philosophical doctrine of religion of the latter.

the other hand, cannot do all that is necessary in order to gain acceptance with God. The propositions, therefore, do not actually exclude one another, but agree in the rule: Work with all thy might towards thy moral perfecting with firm confidence that God, notwithstanding the imperfections that still attach to thee, will, for the sake of another's merit, have no displeasure with thee. But the merit of Christ denotes the ideal of human perfection as that which man can always become, if he practically believes in it, *i.e.*, independently strives after it. Thus there results the solution, which is in harmony with Kant, that the consciousness of reconciliation with God, of forgiveness of sins, and of gracious judgment really rests hereupon, that one strives according to his powers after the moral ideal without regarding whether consciousness of sin admits of this. And that is always again the thesis of the Illumination. For, as Kant in the course of this procedure leaves out of view his own assertion of radical moral evil which guarantees its full weight to the antithesis, so neither has Krug perfectly reproduced that assertion, but has weakened its meaning by saying that man cannot do *all* that is necessary to gain acceptance with God. He ought to have said that man can do *nothing* to that end. But this proposition has been adjusted with its opposite neither by Krug nor by Kant.

61. De Wette's religious philosophy also¹ has its root in Kant's principles. That philosophy markedly separates itself from the rationalism of the Illumination inasmuch as at the same time it attaches through Fries to hints taken from Jacobi. He shows that to discern the mechanical concatenation of things and of ourselves is an insufficient grade of knowledge, because the consciousness of our own freedom and of our imperishable value is not covered by that discernment. The idea of freedom, under which we act, thus leads to a way of contemplating things that reaches much deeper—the contemplation of them from ideas which find their connexion in the idea of God. Ideas are not objects of knowledge, for they are not accompanied by sense perception, and have not their origin therein, nor can the connexion of things in time be explained from them; but they are objects of faith and of feeling which apprehend the true being and everlasting purpose of things in

¹ *Ueber Religion u. Theologie* (1815), 2nd ed., 1821.

the beauty and sublimity of nature and of the spiritual life of man. The ideas, which are discovered to be valid by the analytical processes of the speculative reason, are originally operative in religious faith. We ourselves live as citizens of the kingdom of God, with our immortal souls in the objective eternal Being, not merely apprehending the true being of things in the idea of God, but at the same time also gaining from the idea of freedom and of moral dignity the practical idea of man's destiny, as the idea which expresses the absolute eternal purpose of the world. De Wette goes on to divide religious feeling into three Genera, or "into three æsthetic ideas." The idea of man's destiny is apprehended by the religious feeling as *elevation of spirit*, as the cheering view of the universe which enables us to divine in temporal phenomena their direction towards an everlasting purpose, namely, a kingdom of God upon earth. The antithesis between the idea of Good and of Evil finds its solution in the feeling of *resignation*, in the belief of the existence of a spiritual connexion of things which cannot be doubted in spite of the contradiction that is constantly asserting itself in the moral world. The feeling of *devotion* takes away the contrast between the sublimity of the ideas in the phenomenal world on the one hand, and our littleness on the other. The religious feelings, however, do not constitute a religious life of the individual until by the reflection of the understanding they are brought into a permanently connected system, and that too in such a way that the understanding symbolizes the various attitudes of the feelings by analogous intuitions or actions. Religion thus gains the social and historical form which it is impossible to apprehend without recognising in the individual's dependence on the community the divine influence of historical revelation. And although by the communication of the symbols of religion that are addressed to the understanding, superstition may be elicited in so far as the properly corresponding feelings are not awakened in the individual, yet the existence of social religion is always connected with the propagation of one doctrine of religion or another. Those who in this region call into life new truths, manners and laws that make epochs in the history of religion, are the founders of religions. "Whence they come is a mystery." For even though it is assumed that their appearance and their activity

follow certain laws, these last remain undiscoverable to us. On the other hand, as it is precisely by the founders of religions that the training of the human race by God is maintained, these personalities must appear as God-inspired, as bearers of His revelation. But that founder of religion who brings into actuality the possible destiny of men as the divine purpose of the whole world, who establishes God's kingdom upon earth, will have to be revered and honoured as the manifestation of the Divine understanding itself, as God in human shape, after whom no new grade of revelation is to be expected.

In what the idea of reconciliation postulates, *i.e.*, in his apprehension of guilt, De Wette repeats Kant's view ; but this is done with a very questionable modification upon the relation between radical moral evil and freedom. The latter is recognised by Kant only as the critical principle of imputation—as the ground on which we believe that in the causal connexion of our actions we do not come under the law of nature but under the moral law. De Wette on the other hand admits, on the one side, that conscience traces, in the preponderance of sensuous impulse over the law, voluntary fault springing from an original propensity to evil, but maintains on the other side that that circumstance is only the result of finite existence in nature, and therefore he repudiates the excuse for sinning which might be obtained from this position, by the proposition that *this our finitude is our own voluntary fault*. He indeed admonishes himself to push this view no further, lest he should be betrayed into mythological dreams of an apostasy of souls and of their banishment into a world of matter ; but he has already fallen into the error of this hypothesis, and that because he has dogmatically misapplied what Kant critically insists upon. But as we usually prove nothing where we try to prove too much, the idea of moral evil, properly speaking, loses its sharpness in being referred to the ingress of infinite freedom into finitude. Therefore De Wette does not scruple to connect the removal of the consciousness of guilt with that consciousness of infinite ideal freedom which accompanies the foregoing judgment upon the finitude of human existence. The same consciousness of freedom which displays our finitude in the light of inculcation serves also as the ground and the key of speculative knowledge to conduct us to the highest unity in

the world of ideas. For if we determine the idea of God by the idea of purpose, we find the Almighty good Will to be the unity of will and of power, and thus think within ourselves of the good as absolutely realized by His omnipotence. This is the optimistic faith, or faith in the Divine government of the world, whereby the former contradiction is made to disappear and the guilt of sins taken away.¹

This train of thoughts finds its complement and, relatively speaking, its correction, in the interpretation which De Wette gives to reconciliation by Christ. In place of the customary rationalistic explanation which he had given earlier in life,² De Wette declares that Christ not only taught the love of God and His kingdom, but that what He taught He also lived and acted and in a living way communicated. In highest love toward men and highest obedience toward God, He showed Himself to be the Son in whom God was well pleased, and united men with the bonds of love into one family of God, of which He became the Head. As their pattern, He at the same time bestowed the power of striving after His example. And though He could not entirely free them from the burden of sinfulness, He yet filled them with trust, whereby the struggle with sin can always be more and more successful. Having taken them up into His own fellowship, He at least allowed them to share, by faith and hope, in His perfection and God's complacent regard. In this faith fear of God's wrath vanished; He established reconciliation between God and men, and this He consummated by His death, in which He manifested the highest moral sublimity, highest love and highest obedience, and sealed the covenant which He had made between Himself, God, and men. Himself, accordingly, His manifestation, His life, and His death, were symbols, *i.e.*, visible representations of the eternal, unseen world of God; a symbolism in which idea and expression mutually interpenetrate one another, and, therefore, in a purely æsthetic way, take irresistible hold of the feelings; and in which is involved the impulse to activity in the moral fellowship of the kingdom of God.³

¹ *Ueber Religion u. Theologie*, p. 50-55.

² *De Morte Jesu Christi expiatoria* (1813), p. 89: Nihil aliud dicere voluit Jesus, nisi mortem suam saluti fore generi humano, ea quidem ratione, ut doctrina sua, per mortem confirmata, homines a peccatorum miseria liberaret.

³ *Ueber Rel. u. Theol.*, 117-119.

In order properly to understand this view, we must secure against misapprehensions the æsthetic character of religious faith, as De Wette understands it. He regards faith as an æsthetic function, inasmuch as God's intelligible world, when by symbols it makes its appearance in the world of phenomena, presents that harmony which experience fails to find in the causally-connected world of sense, and which yet the reason must perceive if it is to be sure of itself. Let it not be objected to this: "*Ein Schauspiel, aber ach! ein Schauspiel nur!*"¹ For in the first place, the need of harmony between ourselves and the universe, in other words, a wholly æsthetic motive, is the one trustworthy subjective argument we possess for the idea of God; but, moreover, ethical exertion and the struggle against opposing subjective impulses are not excluded. They are not excluded by De Wette himself. For if, in the beginning, he seemed to wish to set aside the certainty of guilt by speculative exaltation into the ideal world, he yet lays it down as a condition on which alone the life and death of Christ can exercise their reconciling power, that we must crucify ourselves with Him and withdraw ourselves from the dominion of the flesh, in order to rise again with Him to new life.² Undoubtedly his treatment of this subject, which is rhetorical rather than dialectical, gives occasion for supposing that with him as with Kant (p. 410), what is really meant is only a symbolical transference to Christ of what, properly speaking, man himself does. "Christ on the cross," says he, "is the image of humanity purified by self-sacrifice." But such expressions are overruled by the whole course of Divine revelation with which De Wette incorporates the life of Christ, while in Kant this background is wanting. There remains indeed the question whether the exhortation given by Paul in the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, by which Dippel (p. 339) and Gruner (p. 373) had already interpreted the idea of reconciliation through Christ, corresponds to the full significance of Christ and to Paul's own view. But it is beyond all doubt that in this combination are operative at once a sincere religious recognition of reconciliation by the death of Christ and also a regard to the due ethical use of that event. For so far as De Wette is con-

¹ A show, but, alas! only a show.

² *Ueber Religion u. Theologie*, pp. 192, 256.

cerned, he has censured the theology of the Illumination, and its fundamental position that we can merit God's complacent regard, for its want of faith or its want of ideality. In this sense he has acknowledged the orthodox form of the doctrine of justification to be the foundation of the whole Christian faith, and the true antidote to the moral theology of the new school.¹ Thus he shares that enthusiasm for the strengthening and awakening power of the Christian faith which arose after the wars of liberation. At the same time indeed he bears witness to the theological shiftlessness and dissipation which manifested itself at that period of "awakening;" and this he had a right to censure, for the treatise which we have just been using to show his standpoint is to this day not superseded,² but very vigorously maintains the problem which lies before the religious science of our century.

¹ *Ueber Religion u. Theologie*, p. 258.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 148-152. In this last opinion I am at one with Hagenbach in his article on De Wette, in Herzog's *Realencyclopädie*, xviii. p. 65. On the other hand, De Wette's *Wesen des christlichen Glaubens* (1846) is a work without style and without importance.

CHAPTER IX.

THE REVIVAL OF ABELARD'S TYPE OF DOCTRINE BY SCHLEIER- MACHER AND HIS FOLLOWERS.

62. BY those who see in the nineteenth century a peculiar theological development of decisive value, Schleiermacher is esteemed to be its epoch-making founder. Having to state what his contribution to the doctrines of redemption, reconciliation, and justification really was, I cannot avoid taking at the outset a definite position in relation to this view. The question is purely a historical one; but I think I ought at the same time to add that, so far as I am concerned, it touches no personal or party interest. For that very reason, however, I am not able simply to assent to the above assertion. Rather do I feel no small degree of doubt on the question whether Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*, his chief theological work, and that which is principally looked to, has exercised on subsequent theology an influence at once decisive and undoubtedly wholesome. If we were to consider that Schleiermacher, by means of this work, was influential as a law-giver as well as a model, he would then have to be recognised in the strictest sense as a founder of a school. But this is exactly what he did not propose to do by his *Glaubenslehre*, as he himself declares in the preface to the second edition, and as the event itself confirms. Rather when such a man as Dorner¹ speaks of the school of Schleiermacher, he only means by that expression to say, that "of the more distinguished systematic theologians of recent times there is no one that is not indebted to him for essential aid;"—while they "who most loudly declare that they are Schleiermacher's heirs often display but little of the truly progressive, fertile, and constructive genius of their predecessor," other men, on the contrary, "notwithstanding their independ-

¹ *Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie*, p. 813.

ence, are to be regarded as genuine maintainers or promoters of the spirit of Schleiermacher, having carried forward a regeneration of theology in the most diverse fields." These declarations of Dorner are all the more important, because, from the place which is assigned to Schleiermacher by the historian of Protestant theology, one is rather led to expect that the strictest solidarity between him and his "school" is about to be made out. For Dorner is pleased to give his first notice of Schleiermacher immediately after a criticism of D. F. Strauss as author of the *Leben Jesu*. His point of transition is that the influence of Schleiermacher, and of the "theology which he led," proved to be the most effective check to the effects of that work.¹ I submit that the boldness of this historical grouping would avoid the appearance of violence only if really everything which the opponents of Strauss have produced could be attributed to Schleiermacher, and if everything of a special character which he originated had been taken up by those successors. That would have been possible only in a closely united school; but such a school, as I willingly concede to Dorner, never arose. Hence I would now, in the first place, question whether the "genuine conservation of the spirit of Schleiermacher" can be really traced in the theologians whom Dorner in his book is pleased to enumerate, or whether this predicate be not applied to them simply in order that the dialectical or providential course of the history of theology may not appear as resultless. For, if we take Dorner's own view of the significance of Schleiermacher, as expressed in a number of characteristic features of his *Glaubenslehre*, which undoubtedly have a truly fundamental importance, I believe that I can prove that subsequent theologians either did not desire to take him as their model, or at all events have not succeeded in doing so. For his idea of religion has not been adopted by any of his successors without amendment or substantial alteration; or then they have, by the name of feeling, understood something quite different from what was meant by Schleiermacher; the reconciliation of the antithesis of supernaturalism and rationalism in the *Glaubenslehre* rested upon Schleiermacher's own incommunicable individuality, so that his followers have again reverted to one or the other side of

¹ As above, p. 793.

this antithesis; the idea of the Church which Schleiermacher not merely "was the first to reassert with power and enthusiasm,"¹ but also in particular has applied in the *Glaubenslehre* for the purpose of fixing the doctrine of redemption, has not in this respect been appreciated by those who came after him. This appears nowhere more clearly than in Dorner's exhibition of the principle of the Reformation already examined (p. 158). If Schleiermacher's epoch-making position required to be proved by the fact that this, or even other doctrinal points taken up in the *Glaubenslehre*, have been followed as patterns with great results, it had been wiser altogether to cease from asserting it. But if scientific method and art have to be looked upon as the standard of Schleiermacher's influence as a leader, then in the systematic theology of the following age, there betrays itself a general failure to reach that measure of strength of thought and constructive power, which, in spite of all errors and lurking inequalities, is clearly to be seen in the *Glaubenslehre*.

It is not then as a pattern of theology fruitful in results, that Schleiermacher marks an epoch, but as a theological *law-giver*. To be a lawgiver it is confessedly immaterial whether subsequent generations perfectly observe the law or partly depart from it. Schleiermacher was qualified for the work of lawgiving in theology, first by the original part which he took in the movement of the general culture of his age; and next by his familiarity with all fields of theology save the Old Testament. Accordingly, in the code of his theological legislation, his *Kurze Darstellung des theol. Studiums* (1811), fitness to lead the Church is made to depend upon an independent command of all theological departments. What Schleiermacher has here laid down respecting exegetical theology, and respecting historical theology in the narrower sense of the word, it would hardly be possible even to-day to state otherwise; and the supplementary treatises and lectures upon "hermeneutics and criticism" are recognised even by philologists as authoritative. His principles regarding philosophical, and particularly regarding systematic, theology, must of course be looked at from other points of view; for it is precisely in them that the individual limitation of Schleiermacher's theology appears; in any case no one will be able to avoid coming expressly to a distinct

¹ As above, p. 794.

understanding with these principles, because in them the basis of the heterogeneous developments of the subsequent period may be recognised. It is immaterial whether Schleiermacher himself has in all branches of theology produced work equally masterly; in every case his theological writings reflect his legislative power, even where they do not so much solve as propose problems to the discerning, or solve the problems so far as to render necessary a putting of the question in a new form. Assuredly Dörner has not done well in leaving out of sight the *Darstellung des theol. Studiums* in characterizing Schleiermacher. For in order to establish Schleiermacher's importance to the sciences of exegesis, criticism, and Church history, he appeals partly to his *Beispiel einer aus dem Glauben stammenden Kritik*, partly to his arrangement of the tasks of biblical theology, partly to his discussions on the Athanasian and Sabellian doctrines, and on the doctrine of election. But these discussions are partly not historical, partly not models of the exercise of historical objectivity, and the "criticism that proceeds from faith" is either everywhere a criticism concealed under his criticism, or at least is not discernible in his writings upon the Gospel of Luke and the first Epistle to Timothy.

At the same time it must be admitted that Schleiermacher's leading importance for theology is expressed in the laws he lays down for the study of it only because he at the same time brought into currency a peculiar standard for the understanding of the Christian religion. It will be expected that, as is usual, I should find this expressed in his idea of subjective religion. I am very far from undervaluing his effort to separate religion from objective knowing, and from moral acting, and to place it in a position of superiority as a peculiar subjective function over these activities so far as they have religious value. And even if his exposition of these relations does not offer the solution of the problem, to have proposed it is at all events of pre-eminent consequence. But what I am alluding to lies beyond the region of the *Glaubenslehre*. For Schleiermacher has established the much more general truth, that the religious moral life of the spirit cannot at all be conceived of outside of the *fellowship* that corresponds thereto, and that, in reciprocal action and reaction therewith, the individual attains his peculiar

development. Hereby Schleiermacher has given a new aspect, primarily to ethics, and secondarily to theology; and has risen above the field of vision alike of the Wolfian and Kantian schools. This thought has a greater range than his attempt to form a peculiar idea of subjective religion; and even his *Glaubenslehre* is perhaps still more strongly characterized by the feature that sin and redemption are from the beginning exhibited in the form of social life, than by the feature that their essence and operation are referred to the weakening and strengthening of the consciousness of God, which lie in the region of feeling. Schleiermacher's importance in this respect is put in a clearer light by the fact that Kant also, at a particular point of his philosophical doctrine of religion, found himself obliged to assume for the dutiful acting of the individual, and to explain by religious considerations, the existence of a moral fellowship (p. 402); though, indeed, he did not hold fast by this thought, because his dogmatic application of the critical principles of morality ordinarily brought the moral subject before him as an individual, and pointed towards a real dependence of religion on morality. But though Schleiermacher, by his conspicuous assertion of the social character of all the activities of the human spirit, actually accomplishes what Kant's thought had only casually touched upon, it still is not right to take for granted that by means of this advance of Schleiermacher, Kant's commanding importance in the science of ethics, as well as in the science of religion, was altogether put out of date. This would be the case only if Schleiermacher had appropriated Kant's leading thought, namely,—the specific distinction of the power of the will from all powers of nature. But this he has not done. As he rather in the main reduces the movement of the powers of the spirit to the category of operative cause, and the antitheses of morality to the category of quantitative difference, he has fallen short of Kant in these respects. And we shall see further on whether it was possible for Schleiermacher, labouring as he did under these defects, to carry out, in a masterly way, his idea of moral fellowship in application to the material of the Christian doctrine of faith. The ethical views of these two men, and their views in religious philosophy therefore, serve to supplement each other in so far as they mutually correct one another; and in both respects

they maintain the elements of that problem with the solution of which the theology of the present day also is occupied after its own fashion. We can therefore understand Schleiermacher rightly, as the leader of the theology of our century, only in so far as we give the same position to Kant also. I do not doubt that the undeniable decline of the influence of Schleiermacher upon the theology of the present, and the decay which has overtaken the group of theologians who attached themselves to him, is accounted for by this, among other things, that from the beginning men allowed themselves to be influenced by Schleiermacher without at the same time taking counsel with Kant. But people supposed that they might carry their contempt for the Illumination theology of the Kantians, even to disregard of Kant himself. The fault is of course partly to be attributed to the fact that the contemporaneous development of the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel pretended to have superseded Kant. But he who at this time of day appeals to Schleiermacher cannot afford to forget Kant.

63. To his remarks upon the religious feeling in *Der christliche Glaube*,¹ Schleiermacher appends this proposition:—"The devout self-consciousness, like every essential element of human nature, in its development necessarily becomes fellowship, on one side, indeed, indefinite and vague, but on the other side, distinctly limited, that is a Church" (sec. 6). As this truth admitted of being completely developed only in the course of a scientific theory of morals, he satisfies himself, in the passage referred to, with announcing the essential elements of the process as a fact of which every one is supposed to be aware. The religious feeling, he says, will display itself without a definite purpose and reference, and the social consciousness which is to be found in every man will call forth in others lively imitation of the thing which is expressed; for the social consciousness finds its satisfaction only in stepping out from the limits of its own personality, and in taking up into its own personality the things pertaining to other personalities. Now, as every one must concede, as matter of experience, that it is his natural condition to stand always in a many-sided fellowship of feeling, and that his feeling of absolute dependence on God

¹ In what follows I make use of the second edition of 1830, unless when I expressly cite the first, 1821-2.

has been awakened in him by means of the communicative and stimulative power of human utterance, this fact also implies that he would have established such a fellowship had it not as matter of fact already existed. The necessity of fellowship, even for the religious feeling, though asserted, is not proved in this place. The proof here assumed has been led by Schleiermacher in his first dissertation *Ueber den Begriff des höchsten Gutes*.¹ In it he shows that if moral science be restricted to the doctrines of duty and of virtue, it is scientifically imperfect and practically inoperative. By means of those ideas, action comes to be so considered that it seems unimportant what results from it, or fails to result from it. The idea of purpose, however, by which an action receives moral character, is not indifferent to the result; and the greater part of what occurs in the world of men, and conditions and determines our life, does not come to pass in virtue of moral determinations of will and dutiful actions on our part, and on the part of other individuals, but in a different way. The totality of our conceptions of moral ends is therefore not exhausted until the field in which virtue and duty are exercised, and produce practical effect, has been taken independently into consideration and not committed to chance or to the providence of God. To remedy these defects, he then suggests that the idea of the *summum bonum* be taken up, an idea which in Greek philosophy was regarded as the chief problem of ethics. In the idea of the Good is denoted something proceeding from human activity, and which always anew calls forth and propagates that activity. The *summum bonum* is not that which by comparison surpasses all Goods, but includes them as parts in itself, in such a way as to bring out their essential connexion with each other, and the perfect solution of the ethical problem, through their existence side by side with, and on behalf of, each other, inasmuch as in them all moral activities always reproduce themselves. If in this totality dutiful action and virtue are not included, these, separated from it, cannot be perfectly defined in accordance with their idea. Schleiermacher hereby steers clear of the error of Greek ethics, which brought this notion to bear

¹ *Philosophische und vermischte Schriften*, vol. ii. pp. 446-468. The dissertation belongs to the year 1827, but was published for the first time in 1830. Compare also the second dissertation : as above, p. 469 *sq.*

only on individual men as such, and which only asked the question wherein consists the highest good of the individual, and therefore could not bring this idea to its perfect shape. For such a question implies that we have to disregard the result of the action, for that never concerns the individual as such, or at least not necessarily; and, for that reason, nothing remained to the Greeks but to define the *summum bonum* as something quite internal, as virtue or as felicity, which, however, can never be represented as in a state of isolation, and never as a private good, and thus also never as a *summum bonum* of the individual. For the moral productivity of the individual does not admit of being separated from the concurrence or from the appropriation of others. Hence, only that can be exhibited as something definite and special which proceeds from a joint activity, and the sum and substance of all good things can only be referred to a resultant operation of the reason, in which every part is a member of the whole, but no part finds a place which has not sprung from moral action and so is not fitted to propagate and repeat it. In this connexion, the ideas of virtue and of duty also find their proof and their limitation. This they do not gain, if they have to be defined in accordance with the paltry and confused relations of the isolated person. But the idea of the highest good is the standard for the entire concatenation of our common history; and as each of us is merged in this history, that idea is also the highest expression of the personal consciousness.

In this way Schleiermacher has proved the social character of all activities of the spirit which possess moral value to be a necessary thought, from the theoretical presupposition that moral science ought to include not merely the inner region of virtue and dutiful purpose, but also the mutual relation between these and their results. This conclusion is derived in following the line of real knowledge; or flows from the special physiology of human existence. The law of human existence is the destiny of men to rule earthly nature by reason, and this under the condition by which our reason itself is attached to earthly nature, i.e., the condition that the principle of soul manifests itself in a life sexually differentiated and determined in part by the cycles and oscillations of physical nature.

The physical antecedent condition, on which rests the first beginning of the solution of the ethical problem, is the co-existence of the sexes; an independent sphere for the moral exercise of reason is thus not the individual as such, but only the association of the sexes for the propagation of individuals, that is, the family; and the individual is such a sphere only within the other, or at least presupposes it. Now in judging physiologically of genera, we recognise the human race, endowed with the principle of soul, as the most perfect species; that is, that principle is the same in all men, and only in men; and at the same time exists in each individual in a way separate from all others and peculiar. But the reciprocal relation between the one common type of the race endowed with soul and the inalienable stamp which characterizes the individual soul is thus ordered, and becomes the occasion of so rich an abundance of varieties, because it is subdivided into various parts by national distinctions. But in that nationality which extends at once to the physical character and to the spirit, the family does not disappear, but maintains its fixed relation to humanity as a whole. Thus step by step, through family and nation, each personality discloses itself as a moral magnitude influencing the spirit-life of the human race in most manifold gradation, always in accordance with the prevailing types of generic identity or individual peculiarity. According to this rule, nations display Reason in their life only in proportion as each one opens itself to fellowship with all mankind; and so the activity of reason first rises to its level as a revelation of itself when by it the spirit announces that its home is above the earth; that is, when morality takes a religious direction and is founded upon religion,—that is, in the Christian stage of development, in the conception of the kingdom of God. The morally organized totality of the human race is thus to be thought of as the moral Good which embraces all Goods.

Such is Schleiermacher's proof of the necessity for every religion having the character of fellowship. With respect to the Christian Religion in particular, it is defined in the *Glaubenslehre* (sec. 11), as all know, to be that monotheistic phase of faith within the teleological (moral) line of piety, in which everything is brought into relation to the redemption wrought by Christ. For, as all Christians refer the fellowship to which

they belong to Christ, their common possession is herein summed up, that they recognise their translation from slavery in an evil state to a qualitatively better state in which they now stand as having originally been brought about by Christ; further, that this assurance of redemption is not, as in other religions, something of casual importance, but is the main thing towards which all their religious exercises are characteristically directed. Moreover, the relation of the Christian religion to the Person of its founder is of a different sort from the relation of the other monotheistical religions to Moses and Mahomet respectively. In both these the main business is the founding of a society upon a definite doctrine, and after a definite form. By Jesus and in Christianity, on the other hand, redemption has become operative as a principle for the moulding of the devout self-consciousness, which does not take its shape from a legally enjoined doctrine and constitution, but from the never-ending value of the Redeemer for the society founded by Him. The ideal contents, and the definite historical form of this religion, thus coincide in such a way that the thought of redemption prevails in every devout Christian consciousness, simply because the beginner of that Christian society is the Redeemer; and Jesus is the Founder of a devout society only in virtue of the fact that the members of that society become conscious through Him of their redemption. While Moses and Mahomet are elevated as it were arbitrarily from the body of like or only slightly different men, in order to receive the commandments of God for themselves as well as for others, Christ the Redeemer stands out in contrast with all as being He who alone did not need to be redeemed. If this distinction between the monotheistic religions be not admitted, and Christ be represented in the same light as the other founders of religions, that is to say, as a lawgiver, there is then set up between the religions only an outward distinction of doctrines and of precepts. Either then, as such, they remain separated in definite distinction, in which case their values can be distinguished only relatively; or they admit of being perfected, in which case this distinction of their values is shown to be relative herein, that reason would altogether sweep away the limits that separate between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Such an advancement of Christianity being an advance beyond Christ, would leave to Him no

higher dignity than that of an eminent point of development, and would present itself as a redemption from Him, from His specific influence. But here again we recognise that Schleiermacher's formula does justice to the peculiar value and the inner excellence of Christianity above the two other monotheistic religions. For, even although in this place he carries his regard to his illuminantist contemporaries so far as to imply that the assertion of the perfectibility of Christianity ought not to break up the religious fellowship of Christianity so long as it is sought at the same time to maintain a living consciousness of God in and through that fellowship, he yet sees apostasy from Christianity in the case where "one actually believes himself to have been emancipated from the need of clinging to Christ."

I will not dispute the question whether this expression be not too loose; in any case, the test offered by the doctrine of the perfectibility of Christianity serves to confirm Schleiermacher's definition of it. That definition is an excellent expression of the central importance of those doctrines, the history of which we are now tracing,—an expression of their value to the height of which none of the theological schools hitherto under consideration has risen. In it, for the first time, is taken up into theology, as a principle, that thought which, as a practical motive, dominates the Reformation and genuine Protestantism. In it, for the first time, is the attempt which Kant made so carried forward to its goal that all temptation to a relapse into Illuminatism is taken away. Schleiermacher has been able to accomplish this by having for the first time applied the philosophy of religion, which fixes the contents and value of other religions, to the defining of Christianity as a *positive historical religion*. Here one sees that, if the orthodoxy of both parties alike in the seventeenth century failed to render this service, the fact is to be accounted for not so much by the improper accentuation of the authority of Scripture in theology, as Dorner represents, as by the circumstance that that form of theology could not then raise itself to the points of view afforded by the science of comparative religion. Under the idea of revelation it was always the Christian revelation that was then kept before the mind; the contents of Christianity were imported into the religion of the Old Testament, and the contents

of this, the one acknowledged revelation, were defined as a doctrinal law, such as Islam claims to be. And therefore the value of Scripture was expressed in no other terms than those in which Islam previously had expressed the value of the Koran.

It is thus of great importance that Schleiermacher indicated the form of Christianity to consist not in a doctrine like Islam, not in a social constitution like Mosaism and Catholicism, but in the idea of redemption by Christ. In addition to this, there is the fruitful truth that this religion, like all religions and like all activities of the spirit, can be rightly set forth only in that fellowship,¹ which, presupposing the redeeming activity of its founder, exists as the communication and diffusion of that redeeming activity (sec. 11. 4). As this predicate of Christian fellowship is subsequently restricted (sec. 122. 3) the predicate of complete receptivity on the part of the society for the original redemption is included. If, then, redemption by the founder be the form and essence of this fellowship, that thought has necessary reference to this object. To the theological discernment, redemption, the Redeemer, and the community that is the subject of redemption, stand in inseparable relation to one another. Hereby for our scientific knowledge is again fixed that which I have already pointed out to be, the culminating point of the religious and practical consciousness of the Reformers (p. 157). Certainly this combination had continued to be operative only in the Reformed theology by means of the thought that the effect, as also the purpose of Christ's redemption, bears upon the community of the Elect; that, in particular, justification in the first instance belongs to it, and only on this presupposition comes to the consciousness of the individual

¹ Although Schleiermacher (sec. 14. 1) affirms that every one can join the Christian fellowship only by means of a free decision of his own, he does not disclose any grounds of such a decision that lie outside of the religious impression that Christ produces. But this impression, where it is made, constitutes the religious fellowship of which it is the principle. Therefore he declares, in the appendix to sec. 14, that he assumes no intermediate step between the faith of the individual and his participation in Christian fellowship, but rather that, with faith, that participation is *ipso facto* given, not only in so far as this depends upon the spontaneous activity of him who has become a believer, but in so far as it depends upon the fellowship itself as the source from which the testimony that awakens faith had proceeded. This is to exclude the possibility of a personal believing persuasion of the individual's membership in the Christian fellowship by demonstration drawn from the miracles and prophecies.

(pp. 271, 283). In the Lutheran theology, on the other hand, this connexion has not been maintained as such. We might be tempted, perhaps, to conjecture that this leading thought of Schleiermacher is a heritage which he derives from having originally belonged to the Reformed Confession. But his idea of the redemption-fellowship does not take the same form as that which it has assumed in Reformed dogmatics; and his view of justification, however nearly it approaches that of the Reformed school, betrays in its departure from them that he was all along unacquainted with these models. Rather does Dilthey's minute investigation of Schleiermacher's life show that one of his earliest and most independent conceptions lies in the thought of the *summum bonum*. If, then, the consciousness of community belongs to the fundamental conditions of religion, and religion cannot be rightly apprehended or practised apart therefrom, then German Protestantism in which this consciousness had been obscured ever since the time of Melancthon, and as good as lost by means of the Illumination, owes a debt of gratitude to the independent, scientific discernment of Schleiermacher, for having opened up to the religious contents of Christianity the path of a richer development than that which it had found in the entire course of Lutheran theology up to his time.

64. As in all other cases, so with Schleiermacher also, the doctrines of redemption and of sin correspond. The former is not intelligible without the latter. It is all the more necessary, however, to direct our attention to the doctrine of sin, because Schleiermacher distinguishes the data of the positively Christian consciousness from those which are common to religion as a whole, in that he refers the dissatisfaction and the satisfaction, in which the religious feeling reveals itself as Christian, to the antithesis between sin and redeeming grace. The method of the *Glaubenslehre* has upon this point the important effect that the subjective consciousness of the Christian is applied as a key to the ascertainment of what the general objective estate of sin is; that is, the idea of sin is conditioned by the assurance of redemption. Up to that time, in all forms of theology, the doctrine of atonement and of redemption had been framed in accordance with the objective idea of sin which men had constructed for themselves from diverse intellectual considerations,

and from the influence of these upon their interpretation of Scripture. This procedure was in accordance with the assumption that Christian revelation consists in statements concerning all the conditions of true religion, and that these statements are fixed in given writings; but in this way Christianity, or the Divine revelation made in Christ, was formally put on the same footing with Judaism and Islamism. But, if we are to preserve for Christianity its peculiar character, not merely in its contents, but also in the form in which it exists, then all the truths which are peculiar to it, and so also the idea of sin, must be deduced from the common consciousness which accompanies participation in the fellowship produced by Christ's redemption. For redemption being correlative to sin, the consciousness of redemption which is necessary in the Christian fellowship implies a continuing and peculiarly determined consciousness of sin. Schleiermacher expressly holds to this in his representation of the idea of original sin.

This specific view of sin is not, however, inconsistent with the fact that the universal of God-consciousness also furnishes a standard whereby sin is known. In this sense Schleiermacher, in his introductory discussions, elucidates the fact that sin is apprehended as a struggle of the flesh against the spirit even outside of the sphere of the Christian life. Consciousness of sin always presupposes a consciousness of the Good, a bad conscience always implies in itself the craving for harmony with the God-consciousness. These phenomena thus have their root in the original perfection of man, which, not being in every respect extinguished by sin, is the pledge of the possibility of redemption (sec. 68. 2). But the psychological scheme in which the fact of sin is shown to be a datum of consciousness is the weak point of Schleiermacher's theology. While religion in general may consist in the reciprocal relation of the God-consciousness (the feeling of absolute dependence) and the sentient self-consciousness (the feeling which moves between the poles which constitute the world), Schleiermacher has defined the Christian religion as a *teleological* kind of piety. But this has for its characteristic mark "that prevailing reference to the moral task constitutes the fundamental feature of the pious disposition." "The figure of a kingdom of God which is so important in Christianity, which indeed is so all-comprehensive.

is only the general expression of the fact, that in Christianity all pain and all joy are pious only in so far as they are related to activity in the kingdom of God" (sec. 9. 1, 2). It were now to be expected that this particular characteristic of the Christian God-consciousness should at once be carried out with reference to the doctrine of sin. But Schleiermacher has omitted to do this; rather, in that doctrine he makes use only of those dim and indefinite categories under which he has apprehended religion as a whole, without applying the particular teleological direction of the God-consciousness towards the actual realization of the kingdom of God as the regulative point of view. I explain to myself this omission, which makes Schleiermacher's own fundamental propositions inoperative towards the chief problem of the *Glaubenslehre*, from the circumstance that the notion of indifference which is brought out in his idea of God, as in that of the feeling of absolute dependence, stands in a relation of indifference also to his own religious philosophical insight, and therefore has thwarted its influence upon the *Glaubenslehre*. For if the teleological character of Christianity had been carried through, then neither would that idea of God have been maintained, nor that idea of religion in general which is so highly praised.

The teleological point of view presses itself upon Schleiermacher, however, at his very first step in the doctrine, in his judgment of sin. Apprehending as he does the normal movement of the human personality in such a way that every factor in life begins in the Spirit or God-consciousness; and the flesh, the sentient self-consciousness, or the totality of the so-called lower faculties of the soul, stands related to it only as a living link, as a healthy organ, he adds to this that the Spirit *presses* towards that perfect oneness (sec. 62. 2), *i.e.*, that every factor of the world-consciousness and the activity corresponding thereto, *ought* to be appropriated by the God-consciousness or determined by it. But he immediately neutralizes this cognition, refusing to explain sin as a transgression of God's law. His reason is, that in this definition the law is separated from God as if it were a single and perhaps arbitrary act; and in this sense law is no originally Christian expression. But that is neither the only, nor the necessary, nor the traditional significance of that definition. Schleiermacher, therefore, in resisting it, shows that

he renounces the teleological judgment of human action in the same measure in which he strives to maintain that God is the indifference of all antitheses. If he had carried out as the standard of his *Glaubenslehre* that peculiarity of Christian piety which was recognised by him, it was incumbent on him to take up into the idea of God also the ultimate purpose of the kingdom of God, *i.e.*, to differentiate that idea by distinctions lying within itself.

If, then, what Schleiermacher recognises as sin is not teleologically conceived, there is nothing else left to him but to apprehend it mechanically as "the *impediment* to the determining force of the Spirit which is caused by the independence of the sentient functions;" as the "*incapacity* of the spirit;" as the "positive *struggle* of the flesh against the spirit," which is possible because both must be thought of as *intensive magnitudes*, of which the former attains to its development at an earlier time than the latter, and is not prompt to give up to the God-consciousness, which is developed at a later period, the scope for exertion which it has acquired for itself by its self-directed activity (sec. 67). Now, it is by no means doubtful that the life of the created spirit is subject to mechanical conditions. But the conception as sin of the mechanical preponderance of the flesh over the spirit always depends upon the fact that the spirit-life is not covered by the laws of mechanism, but that it is accompanied by the consciousness of freedom; freedom I mean, in Kant's sense, which gives itself the absolute law, and therein sets an absolute end before itself. But who in attentively reading Schleiermacher's treatise can suppress the thought that that mechanical impediment of the spirit by the flesh is conceived of as sin, only because the spirit knows that this *ought* not to find place?—that, accordingly, it is only the teleological self-judgment of the spirit that makes that fact to be sin? Schleiermacher himself cannot avoid asserting that if from the moment of awakening of the God-consciousness the spirit were gradually and increasingly to acquire power over the flesh, the self-consciousness would hardly have such a character as that of consciousness of sin. The latter arises because we always advance in unequable, impactual development, which makes the impediment of the spirit by the flesh to be keenly felt precisely in the futile attacks made upon the

latter. "The *claims* of the spirit being uniformly the same, it appears uniformly where it falls short of attaining these claims as if it were repulsed and conquered; *therefore* the man is in a state of sin" (sec. 67. 2). Thus the impediment of the flesh is made to be sin by the claims of the spirit; that is, because the spirit judges itself in accordance with the absolute end. Nothing else than this involuntary because unavoidable intrusion of the teleological point of view is expressed also in the statement that we apprehend sin from the unequable development of the discerning faculty, and of the power of will (sec. 68). By this is not meant scientific apprehension, but the practical consciousness of each one, which, finding itself in the presence of fleshly habits, judges them to be sin. But this happens in accordance with the subsequent perception that the sensuous direction of life, although it actually exists in men, yet *ought* not to exist at all. To this finally are we led by the cognate assertion, laid down by Schleiermacher, that we do not recognise sin as unavoidable. This verdict he establishes for the Christian consciousness particularly upon the ground that faith in the human perfection of the Redeemer excludes the possibility that sin should be unavoidable; for the view of the absolute strength of the God-consciousness which we get in Him shows sin to be a *disturbance* of human nature. The person of the Redeemer being to him therefore the expression of the law in accordance with which a certain direction of life is sin, it follows that in every degree of the God-consciousness, that is recognised as sin which *ought* not to be in man.

It has been necessary for me to accompany with this criticism Schleiermacher's psychological representation of individual sin, because, after having openly repudiated the sole valid standard by which the facts can be judged, he yet always recurs to it secretly; and because this peculiarity of his doctrine cannot otherwise be clearly brought to light, except by calling the thing by its name. We are led now to expect that the idea of redemption, which is correlative to that of sin, will suffer from that deliberate suppression of the decisive factor in the idea of sin. But, on the other hand, the idea of redemption receives the benefit of what Schleiermacher states respecting the social character of sin. "We are conscious of sin, partly as grounded in ourselves, partly as having its ground beyond our own being"

(sec. 69). The first is implied in the idea of sin in itself; the truth of the latter is connected with the fact that the development of the sentient self-consciousness, which is known to be sin by means of the subsequent discernment, reaches back to congenital tendencies, and through them to the succession of generations, from which the individual receives his origin and his up-bringing. That the moral fellowship transcends the personal activity of the individual thus justifies, in a general way, the Christian doctrine of original sin. But this as the opposite of the Good, and, in so far as it is taken away by means of redemption, is to be thought of as perfect inability towards what is good (sec. 70), reserving always that indestructible fitness for redemption, which the doctrine of the symbols upholds by means of the recognition of *justitia civilis* in the state of sin. As we must regard everything which in our circumstances is not sin as a result of redemption, Schleiermacher will have us recognise in the tenacious resistance which sin continues to make even in the sphere of redemption, that in and by itself sin must be regarded as *really infinite*. But one cannot mistake that this concession to the tradition commencing with Anselm gains a different meaning from that which tradition gave, being due to other motives; and on that account will not bring with it the well-known inference for the value of satisfaction. As that predicate of sin is not derived from the infinity of the God who is injured, but only from the human discernment of the difficulty of the struggle against it, it is really only the relative greatness of sin that is shown. It can therefore only be called infinite in the negative sense, that, it is neither possible experimentally to measure its extent and power of resistance in the human race, nor can any individual overcome it by his own good will.

In like fashion Schleiermacher seeks to accommodate himself also to the doctrine of the symbols that original sin is guilt in each one (sec. 71). He denies, indeed, that any one ought to impute to himself as guilt original sin irrespective of actual sins. He declares it to be contrary to nature and inconsistent with the right and universally recognised rule to separate original sin from its connexion with actual sin. The Church-doctrine, however, which does not profess to take experience for its guide, but relies upon the *dicta probantia* of Scripture in the

order of the *loci theologici*, exhorts us on the contrary rather to recognise the guilt of original sin before passing any judgment upon actual sins, which really can add nothing to that guilt. Schleiermacher has tried here to smooth over the difference between his view and that of Church tradition. But he has not succeeded in proving the truth of the above proposition from his own point of view. Taking together original sin and actual sin in looking at the matter, he asserts that the former is to be regarded as the *sufficient* cause of all actual sins in the believer, so that it is only something external to himself, and *not anything new within him* that has to be added in order that actual sins may be developed. He further maintains that, as any disposition in man becomes a dexterity by practice, so connatural sinfulness grows by exercise—by spontaneous exercise. If now by this increase of the propensity we draw upon ourselves an inculcation which, however, at the same time is *identical with that innate to us*, it follows that the latter also is guilt in man. This argument is sophistical, and proceeds upon contradictions. If original sin is the sufficient cause of all actual sins, it is no mere disposition. If it is a disposition, then something new must be added to it in man before effect can be given to it, namely, the decision of the will. In virtue hereof, actual sin and the increase of propensity thereby is proved to be guilt, but, at the same time, proved to be different from the connatural disposition. Thus it cannot be conceded that Schleiermacher in pronouncing, in common with the old theology, that the *individual* is the subject of original sin, only taking actual sin into the account at the same time, has convincingly proved independent guilt to be predicable of original sin. It admits of no doubt whatever that in comparison with this statement of the problem, the service rendered by Kant (p. 405) surpasses both in positive and negative respects the attempt which Schleiermacher has made.

That attempt could have been foregone all the more easily, because Schleiermacher goes on (sec. 71. 2) to represent the whole race as the subject of sin, from the point of view which takes together in one original and actual sin. "If, in every individual, sin is, on the one hand, produced by the sins of others, but is, at the same time, on the other hand, by the personal actions of each individual propagated to others and

confirmed in them, then is sin *in all points a thing of society*. Whether it be regarded rather as guilt and as work, or as a life-principle and a state, in either respect it is thoroughly social, not accruing to each individual apart and relating to him alone, but in *each one the work of all and in all the work of each one*; indeed, only in this social character can it be truly or wholly understood. Hence also, the doctrinal propositions which treat of it are *by no means to be understood as expressions of the personal self-consciousness*, with which the doctrine of actual sin has to do; they are *expressions of the common consciousness*. The state of fellowship implies the solidarity of all places and all times in regard to the matter before us." "Guilt it is called with perfect accuracy only if it is regarded simply as a *joint deed of the whole race*, for it cannot be guilt of the individual, at least so far as it is produced in him." Schleiermacher then insists upon the importance of this mode of viewing the question (sec. 71. 3). "Were the consciousness of sins no common feeling, but a personal one in each individual, there would not necessarily be connected with it a consciousness of a general need of redemption. Hence also the two things are wont to go together, that original sin as common to the race is denied, and that the worth of redemption by Christ is rated at a lower value."

By these sentences the Christian thought of general sinfulness is transferred to an essentially different field of contemplation from that which it had occupied since the time of Augustine. In consideration of this, we may perceive that Schleiermacher might well have spared himself the trouble of that accommodation to the traditionary point of view, which he undertakes at the beginning of the section; for that point of view is directly rendered invalid if the doctrinal statements respecting original sin are not to be understood as expressions of the individual self-consciousness. This resultless and yet ambiguous procedure arises simply from his mode of putting the problem of the *Glaubenslehre*, as if it were a branch of historical theology,—an exhibition of the prevailing doctrine of the Church. Unfortunately, however, he has not guarded the above vindication of the fact of sin as a totality from accommodation to the churchly expressions. For he speaks of it always as "original sinfulness," and he will have it that in all

men actual sins always proceed from original sin (sec. 73), although, in his view of sinfulness in general, all actual sins have been included as media. For this reason he has also omitted to analyse the acknowledged state of the facts in a satisfying manner, and has exposed himself to the charge that his idea of collective sin curtails individual freedom. If we, accordingly, liberate Schleiermacher's opinion from the perplexing influences of his concession to the expression with which tradition furnished him, then the real difference between his view of collective sin and the idea of the Church is to be calculated from the fact that Augustine has postulated the guilt of naturally-inherited sin in the individual, irrespective of any actual display of sin, in order to maintain the sacramental character of infant baptism, and the retrospective action of the forgiveness of sins conveyed therein. This is the sole and the direct ground of that doctrine which is so fruitful of consequences. But Schleiermacher neutralizes the distinctions of naturally-inherited sin, of inbred sin, and of sin that has been increased by one's own personal action, and also propagated to others, in order clearly to bring out by the inseparable reciprocal action, between the state of the community and the action of the individual, that the guilt with which redemption has to deal is that of the actual race. Warned by Socinianism and rationalism he takes this course, in order to maintain a *redemption in general*, as what is positively contained or declared in the Christian religion. Augustine's combination also was regulated by regard to the general redemption-character of Christianity; but his regard expressed itself in his case in the Catholic form,—namely, in the thought that the redeeming power is connected exclusively with the sacraments, and that the fellowship of the universal Church is founded upon these secondary vehicles of grace. Schleiermacher, on the other hand, defends the evangelical view which apprehends redemption in its historical source, in the Person of the Redeemer, as the efficient power of religious fellowship and what constitutes its special character. And having to withstand a much more fully developed Pelagianism than was that with which Augustine contended,—having also observed, as matter of experience, that the Pelagian principle, since the Reformation, had risen up in rebellion against the general character of redemption,

Schleiermacher was led to give a more comprehensive, more concrete, more ethical expression to the thought of common sin than was given by regarding it as the natural heritage of the individual.

How far Schleiermacher withdrew from the traditional path is specially shown in his denial of the significance of original sin as punishment; for this is an essential feature in Augustine's doctrine. He alleges that punishment is always a superadded infliction; but sin can never be a thing superadded, therefore punishment must always be something which is not sin in him who suffers it (sec. 71. 2). In the same direction, he guards himself against the view that the true feeling of the need of redemption is to be brought about by means of the consciousness of having deserved punishment (sec. 71. 4). The purity of Christian piety would be disturbed if one hoped, above everything else, to be free from the evil consequences of sin, and not directly from that which impedes the God-consciousness. This demand promises to the doctrine of redemption a different aspect from that which it receives in the traditionary form; while at the same time the thought touches on the distinction between remission of punishment and remission of guilt, which had been set up by Töllner (p. 356) and Tieftunk (p. 423). Finally, Schleiermacher's view of evil as being the consequence and punishment of sin connects itself with that position which the problem had assumed from the beginning of the Illumination; but yet reaches a result which could be brought forward neither by the illuminantist successors of Wolf nor by those of Kant.

The old form of the doctrine of the reconciliation of God was designed to exhibit redemption from the punishment of sin. As such, from Anselm's time, the everlasting condemnation of the whole human race had been assumed,—a punishment grounded on the one hand by original sin, and on the other hand on the necessity under which God lay, in virtue of His honour or of His penal justice. If the condemnation of the whole human race was upon this ground regarded as a necessary consequence of original sin, it still could not be forgotten that original sin itself represented a punishment where-with God arbitrarily visited the fall of the first man. In the assumption of the eternal condemnation of men, therefore, the

marks of arbitrary and natural punishment were confounded (see above, p. 379). While that infliction moreover was treated as a perfectly clear and distinctly defined thought, and the conditions of redemption were strictly accommodated to it, no attention whatever was paid to all those evils, which, so far as present experience is concerned, must stand in one relation or another to active sin; for just as the guilt of active sin had no importance attached to it in comparison with that of original sin, neither could present evils be made any account of in comparison with everlasting condemnation. The problem of present evil had come, however, into closest relation with the design of the Christian religion, if not with the idea of redemption, ever since the Illumination had exchanged the old assumption of the condemnation of the whole race for the conjecture of the possibility of reformation after death. Inasmuch as it was inferred from Christ's proclamation of God's loving-kindness, that He threatens the punishments of this life only as means of the sinner's reformation, and inasmuch as people no longer chose to believe, with Leibnitz, in such a degree of obstinacy in active sin on the part of individuals as could withstand God's purposes of reformation (see above, p. 362), there was left for the redemption by Christ no other purpose than that of amelioration or of incitement to virtue. On the other hand, neither the dogmatic method of Wolf's disciples, nor the critical method of those of Kant, was able to solve the question as to the marks of the congruence, whether of natural or of positive punishments, with actual sins. Now Schleiermacher entered directly into the problem thus defined without taking notice of the assumption of the eternal condemnation of the sinful race. He does not directly handle the problem as it presents itself under the point of view of redemption. Still we cannot fairly say that in this respect he falls short of Gruner (p. 372); for his idea of sin, which is followed by the doctrine of evil, is framed with reference to the certainty of redemption, and the same circumstance is clearly enough brought out in the judgment he forms of evil.

Evils are those hindrances in life which arise in the relation between man and the world, in consequence of the fact that the original perfectness of man has given place to sin. Evils are partly those which arise from human activity, the original

harmony between the world and man having ceased (social and immediate evils), partly those which, independently of human activity, arise from the fact that the world appears differently to the sinner (natural and mediate evils). The circumstances which in the latter sense are felt to be evils, have their root in relative opposition to the world ; into which opposition men as finite creatures are forced, but which in itself belongs to the original perfectness of the world, it having been designed as a stimulus to the exercise of the God-consciousness, and of moral decision. The conditions of finitude and transitoriness come thus to be impediments of life only through the weakness of the God-consciousness, and that because the circumstances, which are materially the same as before, produce in the sinner a different impression from that which they formerly produced (sec. 75). Now, all evil is to be regarded as punishment of sin, —as punishment in this sense, that evil is connected with wickedness by a Divine arrangement, which arrangement, however, exhibits itself in the general ordering of the universe and in the whole system of nature (sec. 76. 1). For that the world is the place of evil corresponds to the truth that sin is the joint deed of the human race (sec. 75. 3). On this account the congruity of penal evil with sin admits of being proved experimentally in this sense alone, for it is a Jewish and Pagan error to look for it in the life of the individual man as such. For not only did Christ declare this rule to be inapplicable in the case of the man born blind, He even set before His disciples the prospect of persecution and suffering in the prosecution of the work to which He had called them (sec. 77). While, now, resignation to the evil that God ordains is the expression of the simple feeling of absolute dependence, which elicits also our understanding of the connexion between punishment and sin, it would still contradict the full meaning of redemption if we were to try to fix Evil as such, and it would at the same time contradict the spiritual character of redemption were we to seek to do away with Evil in and for itself, inasmuch as Evil, materially considered, always offers the impulse to spiritual and moral development.

In this doctrine the importance of the conception of sin as the joint action of the human race is confirmed in the first instance ; and then more remotely Schleiermacher's idea of the

summum bonum as the standard whereby its opposite can be measured. The moral common consciousness of sin, which had been asserted to be the truth embodied in the doctrine of original sin, is shown to be the view appropriate to Christianity just in so far as it accounts for the implication of the individual in the common evil, while to require a harmony between the happiness and the worthiness of the individual belongs to the religion of the Old Testament and to Greek philosophy. In this standpoint, which is beneath the Christian level, the illuminantist view of the problem of sin and punishment had its root. Their distinction between natural and positive punishment, which they were never able to verify within the bounds of individual life drawn by themselves, is refuted by the new distinction of natural and of social evil, by the mediate reference of the former and the immediate reference of the latter. The appearance of Divine arbitrariness in so-called positive punishments is obviated by referring social evil to the common consciousness of sin, and at the same time to the congruity of the Divine arrangement with the order of the universe. If anything is lacking in Schleiermacher's presentation of this matter, it is again to be found in the teleological or ethical point of view. The merely mediate significance of natural evil as punishment first comes to be clearly seen when the consciousness of special guilt is indicated as the ground of that judgment. But, again, the like judgment pronounced upon social evil can only be arrived at when the individual bethinks himself of what he has himself contributed personally to the common guilt. Without this, neither is the common consciousness of sin shown to be consciousness of guilt, nor is the significance of the individual personality as an independent member of moral society secured, nor is the subjective truth of the idea of punishment evinced. I unreservedly concede that the whole human race must be regarded as the subject of sin, and that God's justice ordains common evil as the punishment of common sin (sec. 84. 2); but the religious conviction of that can exist only in the individual subjects whose personal consciousness of guilt widens into the recognition of that truth, and who accordingly patiently submit to the measure of social evil which falls to their lot,—conscious that by their own fault they have implicated themselves in the coil of evil. This fact of

the Christian consciousness is not brought into clearness by Schleiermacher, because, with him, in consequence of his overlooking the teleological point of view, the standard for the freedom of the individual in the community disappears.

For this reason, neither does his objective idea of Divine punishment come into the clear light that were to be wished. In so far as he allows this idea to have validity at all,—as being the expression of the necessary thought of God's justice (sec. 84. 2),—he finds himself compelled, in spite of all his efforts, to test it by the individual consciousness. The question therewith is naturally turned, though still indirectly, to the ascertainment of the purpose of punishment. But in the doctrine of Christian faith this purpose must be determined by reference to the teleological relation of that religion to the kingdom of God. While omitting this he decides alike against the purpose of reformation, and against that of bare retribution or revenge. For the latter function of civil judiciary procedure he declares to be unsuitable so far as God is concerned, because originally moral evil and other evil are incommensurate, and become commensurate for human law in so far as the bad will inflicts what is bad on another,—civil punishment being merely a modification of private vengeance, and such a procedure being credible only where crude notions of God are entertained. Nor does he allow that punishment is designed for the reformation of the subject; because, if fear be set over against pleasure, a different distribution of the motives that appeal to the sentient nature will certainly ensue, but no greater force of the God-consciousness can be produced thereby. He decides therefore in favour of the "protective or intimidative design of punishment" (sec. 84. 3). "For it is a thing which must of necessity intervene, where and in so far as in the sinner no force of the God-consciousness yet shows itself, in order that the prevalent sensuous tendencies may not, through unbroken custom, become predominant before that be developed." Schleiermacher supports this affirmation by reference to the design of the Mosaic law as preparatory for the *future* redemption (Gal. iii. 22-25). Herein it is implied that from the standpoint of the consciousness of redemption evils can no longer be regarded as Divine punishments at all. Upon this

question a special consideration of Christ's reconciling function will give the requisite elucidation.

65. In the consciousness of redemption or of being brought nigh to blessedness, we are from the outset conscious, according to Schleiermacher, of being partakers of a joint life just as in sin. The Divine origin and the historical continuity of that life is guaranteed by reference to the activity of Jesus, which communicates His sinless perfection. As the sin, however, to which redemption relates, does not point back, like the latter, to an ordinance of God, the institution of the new joint life is to be regarded as the perfecting of human nature. As the personal significance of the author is measured in accordance with these purposes of the new joint life, the doctrine of the Redeemer is not merely included in an external way within that of redemption, but also is innerly regulated thereby, so that His specific value is made clear and intelligible precisely by reference to the matter of His peculiar activity. In this way, of course, the individual characteristic in Schleiermacher's definition of the Christian religion (p. 448) comes conspicuously into prominence; but the recognised specific difference of this religion, which had been already overlooked in his doctrine of sin, fails also in his doctrine of redemption to exercise its befitting influence. Schleiermacher certainly at one point calls the new joint life, which Christ aimed at, by the name of the kingdom of God (sec. 87. 3); but he has entirely shunned the historical determination of this undoubtedly ethical thing by reference to the discourses of Jesus. To demand this of him would not be to run contrary to the general method in accordance with which Schleiermacher has planned his *Glaubenslehre*, the method, namely, of describing the subjective consciousness of grace. For as this comes under consideration as a common consciousness, and, in fact, as one which directs itself to the purpose of the Redeemer, it can therefore receive its normal form only from regard to the design which Christ set before Him for His own work; and that design is the kingdom of God regarded, as Kant expresses it, as a fellowship of men regulated by laws of virtue. There is not one word of anything of this sort, however, in Schleiermacher. Rather the explicit substance of redemption, being, in fact, the communication of that sinless perfection of Jesus, which consists in the

strength of the God-consciousness, and in unclouded blessedness, is set forth only within the framework of those lines of thought which the idea of the religious feeling as a whole offers, and in accordance with the idea of God which is correlative to that subjective function.

Suppose now we assume it as proved that Jesus, regarded as possessor of the absolutely effective God-consciousness, is as archetypal as historical, and that the abiding power of His God-consciousness was a proper in-being of God in Him. According to Schleiermacher the consciousness of redemption by Him is produced by the instrumentality of His religious fellowship, in so far as the picture of His life, which is fixed in Scripture, arose and is preserved only in that fellowship. Our interest in Christ is not hereby lessened however, because the power of that fellowship to awaken faith is also only the result of Christ's personal perfection (sec. 88. 2). This instrumentality of the Church, however, cannot be empirically verified; for we are not to think of an infallible representation of Christ in the Church; the mass, on the contrary, seems to be so entangled in sin that it is, on the whole, doubtful whether it can be regarded as the subject of redemption. In spite of this, not only have we experience of the historical image of Christ, and, therefore, of His redeeming power in the Church, but by faith we also recognise that in the perplexity of the general state of Christianity, which is still so great, a tendency which proceeds from the perfection of Christ, and which resembles it, makes itself felt as an impulse (sec. 88. 3). In the work of Christ which is accomplished throughout the whole self-revelation of His life Schleiermacher distinguishes the redeeming and reconciling activity. His *redemption* is the actual liberation of believers from the sin that prevails in them, by communication of the power of His consciousness of God, which the individual receives in the fellowship of those who resemble Him (sec. 100). It is at once clear that what is here treated of is a positive function, without which the opposite state could not, as matter of fact, be abolished. But the thought of redemption, moreover, is so extensive as to include within it the doctrines of regeneration and of (active) sanctification. It therefore reckons upon the presupposition of human freedom; that is, the promotion of a higher life, which is sought by means of

redemption, assumes that the act of the Redeemer is represented at the same time as the proper act of the individual believer. Christ having possessed the consciousness of sin as a sympathetic feeling, while yet in His sinless conduct of life He had shut out sin from Himself both as an act and as a state, He takes up believers into the fellowship of His activity and of His life on the condition that they die to sin. But, in virtue of the in-being of God in Him, His activity is creative, liberative, even although it be regulated according to the free constitution of the human spirit. This operation being, with respect to its initiation, supernatural, and, with respect to its manifestation, natural and historical, extending itself at once to the individual and to the aggregate, Schleiermacher expresses himself as content that his view should be called mystical, in order to distinguish it from others that are current. Of these he characterizes as magical alike that fanatical separatist view which, without taking any account of the religious commonwealth, derives regeneration from the exalted Christ, as also the Lutheran theory which derives regeneration from the exalted Christ, but through the instrumentality of the preaching of the Divine Word. The empirical view, or the moral rationalistic, which derives growing perfection from the doctrine and the example of Christ, likewise refuses to regard the influence of religious fellowship, and, as Schleiermacher adds, the truth of redemption as a taking away of sin.

In order now to arrive at a decision respecting the mystical view of Schleiermacher, we must test the figures of which he avails himself in describing the matter. For if he offers a scientific formula, then the pretext of mysticism will not suffice to preclude us outsiders, who do not "belong to the circle," from "coming within it" in the prescribed way, if we only can. I think I perceive that Schleiermacher defines the peculiar activity of Christ when he refers it to the individual freely-acting subject *æsthetically*, and when he refers it to the aggregate in a *physical* and *physiological* way. The former is proved by his words—"the original activity of the Redeemer is best conceived under the form of an *impressive* activity, which, however, is received by its object as an *attractive* activity, in virtue of the free movement with which he yields to that impression, just as we ascribe a *power of attraction* to

any one to whose formative spirit-influences we willingly surrender ourselves" (sec. 100. 2). Respecting the new joint life on the other hand, he says—"When regard is had to the Redeemer himself, it is no miracle, but is the moral *naturalization* of the supernatural, for every distinct power draws masses to itself and holds them fast" (sec. 88. 4).¹ "According to the law of the historical continuity of human nature, the higher perfection of the second Adam must act upon the like nature by *stimulating* and *communicating*, primarily in order by means of the difference to bring to perfection the consciousness of sinfulness, but also in order to take away infelicity by means of *assimilation*" (sec. 89. 2). The former æsthetic appreciation of Christ's personal influence, and the latter comparison with mechanical and organic processes of nature, are not heterogeneous. For a character which exercises an attractive influence by means of the harmonious impression of beauty exhibits morality developed into spiritual nature, which therefore appears to work after the fashion of nature. Conversely by means of the attractive power of gravity the harmony of mechanical motion is produced; by assimilation the elective affinity of matter towards a possible fellowship in organic life is evinced; thus something is brought about which is analogous to beauty. Now, even although the redeeming activity of Christ is not altogether misinterpreted by the above formula and these figures, Schleiermacher has hardly exhausted the problem by means of them; for certainly the teleological character of Christian piety, of which he himself (sec. 100) again reminds us, demands yet another display of the redeeming power of Christ, besides that which is expressed in the beauty of His character. That beauty will assuredly contribute its influence towards the conversion of a man, but æsthetic complacency in the contemplation of Christ's figure, as displayed

¹ With this may be compared the manner in which Lavater in his *Briefe über die Schriftlehre von unserer Versöhnung mit Gott durch Christum* (in his posthumous writings edited by Gessner, vol. ii. pp. 56, 57) explains the operation of Christ. "Can there be a power without effect in the world? Can there be merit or self-earned power in the moral sphere of being without its effect? Merit must be rewarded, that is, to the self-earned power material must be afforded upon which it can act. He who is best attracts, so to speak, by a physical law of nature, the best circle of operations. Inner worth forms around itself a circle in correspondence with it. I should like to give all possible clearness to this thought, which is so important in throwing light upon the great matter before us."

in His life, cannot be recognised as being alone the adequate motive of the decision of the will that leads to a change of mind. The want of a properly ethical point of view is also the reason why Schleiermacher could remain satisfied with expressing the relation between the Church and its Founder simply in the figure of physical processes. When this kernel of the mystical view has once been discovered, the others, which are rejected by Schleiermacher, rise in value. For the rationalistic has certainly an ethical direction; and that it does not explain the actual taking away of sin does not serve to distinguish it from the mystical. And the Lutheran view ceases to be magical, in so far as the preaching of the Divine word reckons upon an ethical effect; rather by placing in the background Christ in His state of exaltation it shows itself to be at the same time of a mystical character.

As the redeeming function of Christ transplants the believer into a state where he successfully strives against the sin that is in him, so reconciliation by Christ consists in the taking up of the believer into His peculiar blessedness (sec. 101). This function is as far-reaching as the redeeming function, and manifests itself therefore just like the other in the regenerate. Now, although in Christ Himself blessedness and the power of the God-consciousness are made to be regarded as independent of each other, and as reciprocally conditioning each other, the operation of reconciliation in the regenerate yet depends simply on his redemption, because the latter is accomplished only when the receptivity shows itself in hatred of sin, and not in aversion to the evils which flow from sin. For by reconciliation Schleiermacher does not understand what the apostle Paul intends by the thought which has been thus translated—the turning of the will towards God,—but the reconciliation of man with suffering—with his position in the world, which as sinner he had traced to his guilt; thus he means that determination in his emotional sensitiveness, which rests upon the judgment that evils in his case no longer have any connexion with sin. As reconciled, the believer knows himself to be no longer *worthy of punishment*, “consequently the first thing in reconciliation is the *forgiveness of sins*.” For in Christ Himself blessedness was secured by His having regarded all the hindrances which the sinner feels to be evils always only as incitements to

His activity; He always meeting them at once with the impulse of His God-consciousness, and they never coming to be felt by Him otherwise than as they were determined by that consciousness. Since blessedness thus co-existed in Christ's case with this experience of the hindrances of life, the forgiveness of sins does not exclude the experience of evils, but only makes them to be no longer judged of as punishments for sin. If Schleiermacher had not always cherished a dislike towards that teleological manner of viewing the question, which in words he acknowledged, he could not have found means to make this thought more clear than by saying that, in the forgiveness of sins, what is treated of is the removal of guilt, and of the consciousness of guilt, and not of penal evil as such. His distinct opposition to the Illumination, as also to the orthodoxy of Döderlein and Knapp (p. 383), could be proved by nothing more strikingly than by his declared adherence to this view of Töllner and Tieftrunk (pp. 356, 423), of which he was the first to undertake the proof.

In order, however, to show the cogency of this proof, it is necessary to follow out further the elucidations of Schleiermacher. For he designates this doctrine also as mystical, and contrasts it with the magical and the empirical view of the matter. With regard to the latter, he approves of it in so far as it reckons upon the decrease of evil along with the decrease of sin, but he objects to the application of this principle to the life of the individual. For as the principle is true only of the moral joint-life, the other view is always refuted by the fact that the masses of evil gravitate exactly to the point where growing perfection makes its appearance. If the Illuminants saw themselves compelled on this account to postulate the equalization of these abnormalities in the future life, they in doing so admitted themselves unable to prove that blessedness follows moral amelioration in equal ratio. According to Schleiermacher, it is the magical view that is expressed, when the forgiveness of sins is derived from the transference of punishment to Christ without the mediating influence of the thought of a life-fellowship with Him. The Church tradition which is alluded to has never been chargeable with this, for it connects the forgiveness of sins with faith. It is, however, really touched by the reflection that though the prospect of

punishment is taken away, the moral consciousness of being worthy of punishment will continue to show itself for all that. This is exactly the point wherein the carelessness of the old school had been unmistakeably shown in the cases of Döderlein and Knapp. It must be conceded that the mystical form of the idea of reconciliation does not suggest the same objections as had to be made against the idea of redemption. Christ's attitude towards the hindrances of life that befell Him, an attitude which is pointed to as the pattern and as the key to that change which the believer experiences in his judgment, and in his sense of evils, can be apprehended only in a directly teleological or ethical manner. Although it be left undecided whether Christ's personal blessedness can be proved even independently of His active consciousness of God and of His vocation, that blessedness is perfectly intelligible by the consideration that He by constancy in His life-purpose transformed all hindrances into instrumentalities towards the aim He had in view. The imitation of this attitude by believers in correspondence with the pattern, although only relative and approximate, has its root also only in the specific direction of the will towards the kingdom of God as its chief end. But if this result is to be recognised as brought about by the archetypal attitude of Christ, it is made by Schleiermacher to depend upon the influence of redemption—upon that life-fellowship which includes in itself the believer's effective resistance to his sins. But redemption was not adequately expressed by means of æsthetic attractiveness, by means of the impression of beauty that the picture of Christ's life produces; and nothing confirms this criticism more fully than the reflection that if we "give ourselves up however willingly to the formative spirit-influences of Christ," and that too with the result of a constant resistance to our own sins, there reveals itself in this no necessary transition to a deliverance from the general consciousness of guilt which would evince itself for us in an altered judgment regarding the significance of evils. The impression on the spirit of believers of Christ's similar attitude would be nothing but a magical result were these premisses accepted.¹

¹ Schleiermacher (sec. 101. 3) acknowledges that even in the course of growing perfection there arise life-hindrances of such a nature that they obviously appear to the believer, that is, to the reconciled person, to stand

In his investigation of those two ideas, Schleiermacher has purposely refrained from taking Christ's passion into consideration, because he discerns in it no "primary element" for those ideas. For he is of opinion that he must leave open the possibility that a man might have been perfectly absorbed into life-fellowship with Christ, even previous to His suffering and death. He declares, moreover, that the passion belongs to redemption only mediately, in other words, only in so far as Christ's God-consciousness displayed itself also in active self-surrender to suffering. It was immediately connected with reconciliation on the other hand inasmuch as it perfectly proved that blessedness of the Redeemer which maintained itself even in His fellow-feeling with sin and its misery, and which was strong enough not to be overcome by the depth of His suffering. But now, before we can pass to the consideration of the question what position Schleiermacher in accordance with these two ideas assumes towards the doctrine which passed current as that of the Church, it will be necessary to enter more fully into the understanding of their meaning, which we have already tried to gain in particular points.

For, as has already been shown with reference to his idea of reconciliation, the *usus loquendi* which Schleiermacher adopts in his indifference to tradition may easily confuse. What he calls reconciliation is *reconciliation with evil*; what he calls redemption ought in reason to have been called reconciliation with God. For the uplifting of the God-consciousness as a free act of the believer means, teleologically considered, that directing of the will towards the Divine end whereby the sin which previously had prevailed is repressed. If, now, this operation of Christ be called redemption, it is not the primary but the secondary element of the process that is brought into prominence. But if in consideration of the chief matter this operation of Christ must be called reconciliation with God, then that abolition of the general consciousness of guilt which is included in this might suitably have been called redemption if it was to be brought into prominence as a characteristic feature. For the removal of actual sin is to be counted on only in a

in connexion with his sins that still remain, and so to be punishments. By this concession the whole idea of reconciliation becomes illusory in relation to the premisses from which it is deduced.

relative measure, even where the general direction of the will seeks the Divine end ; on the other hand, with it the reversal of the judgment regarding evil, and therefore redemption from its pressure as the prevailing mode of feeling, must not merely be connected with a will so directed, but also must admit of being firmly held. If thus it seems permissible to correct in this fashion Schleiermacher's unfamiliar use of language, in order to make his meaning more intelligible, that meaning amounts to the following : that Christ, having in the abiding powerfulness of His God-consciousness given the Being of God in Him to be plainly seen, elicits the like direction of the consciousness towards God in the individuals who surrender themselves to Him. From this it is clear that he, like Töllner and Tieftunk (pp. 354, 422), follows Abelard's type of doctrine. But when he represents Christ's influence upon men not directly as ethical, but rather as æsthetic, he gives a peculiar modification to Abelard's thought.

Neither has Schleiermacher satisfied the expectations which he had awakened by his introduction of the idea of life-fellowship into the problem in question ; nay, rather the previously established meaning of this expression is involuntarily distorted in his doctrines of redemption and reconciliation. For what he calls redemption in this place is nothing else than what he subsequently presents under the title of conversion, and what he calls reconciliation subsequently comes up again under the title of justification. Now the latter notions are expressly referred to individuals ; but it cannot be ignored that Schleiermacher has in his eye no other reference in analysing the work of Christ into redemption and reconciliation. For with regard to the former, he counts upon its becoming a proper act ; but this is only conceivable in the individual will. Reconciliation in like manner can only alter the individual feeling by the change of judgment regarding evils. While then in this connexion regard is always had in a secondary way to the fact that Christ's operation takes effect on the community, this community is only explained as the product of all individuals who are similarly determined. But this thought runs counter to Schleiermacher's original tendency. Since Christ, as endowed with the Being of God, is in this place set over against the entire mass of mankind upon whom He is to exercise His redeeming

and reconciling work, and since these influences are presented to our view only in individuals, the idea of the life-fellowship into which He takes them up becomes tacitly the expression of an entirely individual relation, and the new joint-life, instead of being regarded as a pre-requisite, comes to be a simple consequence thereof. This divergence from the original purpose is also far from casual, for every view of reconciliation that follows the type of Abelard will be framed so as to seek its direct verification by reference to the individual.

The divergence operates also in a characteristic way upon Schleiermacher's doctrine of the Church. Empirically (according to the method of his treatment of that subject), he finds that "now indeed the new life of every individual proceeds from the joint-life" (sec. 113. 1); but the origin of the Church he represents as being the association of individual regenerated persons for the purpose of orderly co-operation (sec. 115). When now side by side with this statement, he yet asserts that the origin of the Christian Church is the same as that which daily takes place before our eyes (sec. 114. 1), he thinks of the joint-life only as the sphere of preparatory grace, as the outer fellowship of expectancy of salvation (sec. 113. 2), out of which one must pass in a twofold sense in order to enter the inner circle of the really regenerate, who as individuals first constitute the community of believers, the Church. For if he viewed the matter otherwise he would not be able to regard himself as the defender of Protestantism, which, according to its well-known formula, makes the individual's relation to the Church to depend on his relation to Christ, while Catholicism makes the individual's relation to Christ to depend on his relation to the Church (sec. 24). Accordingly, he so interprets the instrumentality of the Church in the attainment of Christ's perfection and blessedness, an instrumentality which is expressed in the designation of the Holy Ghost as the common spirit of the Church (sec. 116. 3), as to see in it only a preparing and rousing of the individual to that self-exertion in which one comes to experience Christ's properly redeeming influence (sec. 122. 3). If, accordingly, Schleiermacher formulates the problem of the doctrine concerning the Church by saying that we always both distinguish and connect our independent personality in the life-fellowship of Christ and our life as an integral part of

the whole (sec. 114. 2), it is easy to perceive that here too he gives to the idea of life-fellowship with Christ as an individual relation the pre-eminence over participation in the Church. The formal congruity between the doctrine of redemption and that of sin is not therefore carried out; and the expectation which had been awakened by the general idea of religion is corrected by this result. I point this out merely as a fact without drawing from the incongruity any inference against the accuracy of his presentation of the doctrine. But we shall now go on to consider how Schleiermacher, with his view of redemption analogous to that of Abelard, approximates precisely the opposite Church tradition which he is bound to set forth according to his definition of the doctrine of the Christian faith.

66. In spite of his disinclination to Old Testament relations, Schleiermacher adopts, in setting forth the ecclesiastical doctrine, the scheme of Christ's threefold office current since the Reformation. In accordance with his principles he could not escape this accommodation, and he justifies his procedure on the ground that, were he to leave out any one of the three parts, the security for completeness of apprehension of Christ's saving work would be impaired. In this he has not regarded the objections which Ernesti had brought against the distinctions conveyed by that scheme,¹ and which may appropriately be mentioned here. Ernesti in testing the value of the individual types of Christ, by reference to the whole material that Scripture offers on the subject, finds that Jesus is not to be regarded as a prophet in general, but as the prophet that is like unto Moses—a notion which according to the type includes kingly power (Deut. xxxiii. 5). For Moses, as prophet, was the liberator of the people, and the founder and leader of its commonwealth. The Kingship or pastoral office of Christ moreover relates to the sphere of super-sensuous truth, that is, to the sphere which it is the vocation of a perfect Prophet to direct. The kingly and prophetic office thus coincide in Christ, for the *regnum potentiae et gloriae* cannot be regarded as *officium*. The kingly or pastoral office again has its highest function or task in self-sacrifice for those who are its subjects (John x. 15),

¹ *De officio Christi triplici*. Opuscula theologica (1773; ed. sec. 1793) pp. 371-396.

and thus includes in itself the character which is expressed by the priestly office. For the general idea of that Divine service which the priest discharges on behalf of the people belongs to the king also, and is by Christ applied to His own offering up of His life under this attribute, while He Himself never assumes the name of Priest. The three titles thus do not exclude but include one another, and the whole series of Christ's activities in discharge of His vocation can be developed from His title of Prophet as clearly and completely as from that of King. By this biblico-theological criticism of the traditional teaching the Lutheran treatment of the matter is indubitably confuted in the most conclusive way. For in Lutheranism the order of Christ's offices had been laid down only according to the order of their appearance in time, and therefore His kingly office was applied merely to those attributes of His *status exaltationis* which Ernesti rightly refuses to regard as expressions of an *officium*. The Reformed theology, on the other hand, had followed Ernesti's main point of view in so far as it conceived of Christ's priestly substitution of Himself in the room of believers as a token of His Kingship.

While presenting the parts of the doctrine in the usual order, Schleiermacher certainly modified the Lutheran view of the kingly office, but did not discover between it and the office of priest the connexion which Calvin and the Reformed divines had carried out, and which Ernesti had hinted at. He recognises the kingly office as expressing that Christ designed an organic fellowship outside of which no individual comes into relation with Him. He guards himself against the Lutheran view that the kingly power of Christ begins first after His exaltation to heaven; for Christ Himself declares, not that He is to be a king, but that He is one (sec. 105. 1). He confirms this truth, however, only by the consideration that Christ has given unchangeable laws for His commonwealth, and directions for its organization. On the other hand, it is a thought perfectly foreign to Schleiermacher that Christ accomplished the offering up of His life precisely in the assured conviction of His Kingship, and that it was as Head of the Church that He chose to die for it. Schleiermacher's representation thus subordinates the kingly office to the priestly, just as in his doctrine of redemption he made the joint-life to proceed from the individual life-fellow-

ship of believers with Christ. His interpretation of the prophetic office, on the other hand, is so framed as to embrace all that Christ did or spoke. For He could effectually induce men to enter the fellowship which He offered them only by making known His peculiar dignity; wherefore His practical exhibition of Himself, in active as in passive obedience, belongs to His prophetic office (sec. 104. 1), and His doctrine relates to His *Person*, being at once outwardly the doctrine of His vocation, or of the communication of eternal life in the kingdom of God, and inwardly the doctrine of His relation to *God as His Father*. Hence everything pertaining to His kingly and priestly office must likewise occur in His teaching, as He published His *destination* to raise men to fellowship with God and spiritually to rule them. Under these conditions His self-exhibition is the publication of God's will by word and deed; He is a prophet as God's representative towards men (sec. 103. 2; sec. 104. 3).

If, then, Christ's twofold obedience is to be regarded also as the matter of His priestly function, that function sets Him forth in a relation quite opposite to that of prophet; for the High Priest is the agent of the people with God; His actions serve to represent men in the presence of God (sec. 104. 1). Under this point of view Schleiermacher lays down the following propositions:—(1.) Passive and active obedience are in Christ unseparated and inseparable from one another in every moment of life, as well as in His life as a whole. For in all suffering there is a reaction of activity, namely, of the God-consciousness which, as impulse and standard of what takes place, gives value to the suffering. On the other hand, every movement of the activity has its occasion in pain, and the limited nature of every result as compared with the purpose of the activity, is always reflected in a feeling of pain. In accordance with this, Christ's full self-surrender to suffering without flinching and without bitterness was the crown of His active obedience; and His entire active life was so entangled with hindrances through the sin of others, that these served, in His sympathy with sin, to maintain and intensify His activity. (2.) The active obedience, which thus includes the passive along with it, has its standard *not in the Divine law but in the Divine will*; for law invariably betokens a discrepancy be-

tween a superior commanding will and an imperfect subordinate will, but such a discrepancy cannot be assumed in the relation between Christ and God. Thus it would only amount to a contradiction in itself, were we to assert that Christ voluntarily made Himself subject to the law. What is to be understood by the Divine "will" in this connexion Schleiermacher has not explained otherwise than by citing John iv. 34 ; v. 19, 30 ; vi. 38. But if we remember that he found Christ's prophetic discourse to point to His special vocation, and if we consider that He discerns the moral measure of Christ's spontaneous offering up of His life in the consciousness of the duty to which He was called (sec. 104. 4), then the Divine will amounts to the idea of that particular moral vocation, the objective validity of which can never be recognised without the subjective determination to accept it, and in which therefore no distance between Him who commands and him who obeys can appear. (3.) Christ did *not* fulfil the Divine will *in our room* or *for our behoof*. For, irrespective of the false interpretation of these words, as if we thereby were released from the fulfilment of God's will, it is only what is perfect that has any value before God ; but in Christ there cannot, by reason of His perfection, be supposed to exist any surplus of pleasingness to God which might be transferred to us, in order to make up for our deficiency therein. And, looked at in and by itself, irrespective of our assumption into His life-fellowship, the obedience of Christ cannot possibly have achieved anything for us, or changed anything in relation to us. (4.) In particular, Christ by his passive obedience has *not* endured the *punishment* of human sins in the sense that His passion represented exactly the sum of the evils which would have corresponded to the amount of human sins and the Divine righteousness. For, irrespective of the fact that the Divine nature is incapable of suffering, such an assumption, taking the shape of the assertion that Christ endured the wrath of God, is in contradiction with that particular character of the life of Jesus in virtue of which He was free from guilt, and stood in any relation to sin only in virtue of His sympathy. In that assumption is at the same time presupposed the idea of the Divine justice that it renders punishments necessary even without any natural connexion with wickedness ; but this is derived from the example

of the rudest states of human society. As against these negations Schleiermacher proceeds positively to affirm: (5.) As the acceptance with God of the Israelitish people was brought about by its participation in the official action of the high priest, so the *active obedience* of Christ has the significance of *satisfaction for us*, inasmuch as it is the fountain of a spiritual and blessed life, and inasmuch as God judges each one of us not as he is in himself but as he is in Christ, who presents us before God in that purity to which we receive the impulse from Him. But this satisfaction is *not vicarious*, because neither could we be expected to begin the spiritual life of ourselves, nor are we allowed to regard ourselves as released from the continued conduct of this life by our own activity. (6.) In His *passive obedience* Christ has taken away the *punishment* of sin. For in human society, where there is just as much evil as sin, but where every one does not fully and exclusively experience in himself the evil that corresponds to his guilt, the innocent suffers, in the undeserved evil that overtakes him, what to the guilty would be punishment. The fellow-feeling with which Christ was ready to take upon Himself His suffering of death as a consequence of the sin of His enemies accordingly guarantees such a separation between punishment and sin that these shall no longer be felt to be connected with each other in the fellowship of His blessed life. Christ's passion is thus *vicarious* for us in His fellow-feeling for sinners, and in His endurance of the evils that are appropriate to them; but not *satisfactory*, because precisely in our fellowship with Him must we lay our account with similar suffering.

I must confess that I cannot, with Gass,¹ recognise a masterpiece of dialectic in this new shaping of the doctrine of Christ's priestly office. Rather does it leave upon me, in so far as it seeks to be dialectical, an impression just as painful as is produced by Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* almost throughout; and so far as it is critical it is imperfect and precarious. I admit that the inseparableness of Christ's active and passive obedience in the contemplation of His life is admirably shown. This, however, is nothing new; for even the old school apprehended this whole as being the matter of the *meritum Christi*—as being that positive datum which by faith is imputed as

¹ *Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik*, Bd. iv. p. 621.

righteousness, or which is the ground of forgiveness of sins. But if to view the life of Christ in this light is ethically necessary, if patience in suffering is only a mode of Christ's positive moral activity, a powerful objection arises against the distinction and co-ordination of the two kinds of Christ's obedience, which, out of deference to dogmatic tradition, are treated as severally productive of diverse effects. The fact is that Schleiermacher assigns to this distinction a reference that is quite out of harmony with the old school. The old school distinguished the two kinds of obedience as the matter of a twofold satisfaction to God in accordance with the terms of His law, which at once exacted punishment of sinners and fulfilment of its demands on the part of men, in order to their obtaining eternal life. Thereby accordingly a negative prerequisite was assigned to the positive bestowal of grace, but the latter as a single act in itself was founded upon the entire merit of Christ's obedience. Now, Schleiermacher connects with the two separate kinds of obedience those effects *upon men* which he describes as redemption and reconciliation. Christ, he says, in His active obedience gave satisfaction, not however to a universally valid demand of God, but simply to our need of new spiritual life. And He wrought reconciliation by His passive obedience; not, however, reconciliation of God with men, but of us with the misfortunes that befall us. The old school really carried out the distinction of the two kinds of obedience to a co-ordination, for the fulfilment of the law in deed is different from the fulfilment of it in penal suffering. Schleiermacher, in his interpretation of the active and of the passive obedience, brings out a co-ordination of the effects just as little as he does so in his dominant presentation of the ideas of redemption and of reconciliation. For as, when the life of Christ is rightly considered, the elements of suffering have their value altogether only in subordination to His active obedience, so in like manner the change in the way in which misfortune affects us is invariably and of necessity carried back to the awakening of that God-consciousness which has the power to counteract sin; in other words, to redemption. The consciousness of reconciliation can hold good only as a phase of the assurance of redemption. But if, moreover, the two kinds of obedience that are distinguished from one another as conveying the redeeming and reconciling influ-

ence of Christ respectively have their reference to men, then they are not embraced in the scheme of Christ's priestly office, which can only comprehend the representation of men before God.

The above refutation certainly does not affect the whole connexion of Schleiermacher's theory ; but it is only by its aid that we pick our way through the various parts of the investigation. For example, in the first instance, where he keeps strictly in view the analogy with the high priest of the Old Testament, he says "we are presented pure before God by Christ, in virtue of His own perfect fulfilment of the Divine will, whereunto by His life in us the impulse arises within us also, so that in this connexion with Him we also are objects of God's complacency" (p. 133). But it cannot be conceived according to this that Christ's action ought in no sense to be called vicarious (p. 142). For in the judgment of God the perfection of Christ surely stands in the stead of the imperfection of His kindred who are connected with Him, and thereby are becoming more and more like Him. But this reflection upon the judgment passed by God upon the state of redemption derived from Christ occurs only in an altogether casual way, and exercises no abiding influence. For as early as p. 134, precisely when he is setting forth the distinction between the prophetic and the priestly office, he loses sight of the analogy with the Old Testament institution. "The high-priestly value of Christ's obedience has reference to *His alliance* with us, in so far as His pure will to fulfil the Divine will *is operative in us also* in virtue of the living fellowship that subsists between us and Him, and thus we have part in His perfection—if not in achievement, at least in aspiration ; so that our alliance with Him, although phenomenally it does not develop itself except in other aspects, is yet *recognised by God* as absolute and everlasting, and is assumed as such in our faith." This direct elucidation of Christ's high-priestly value is so incorrect as almost to apply to His kingly function ; in the apodosis certainly we catch a reference to Christ's priestly relation to God ; but even this proposition is not in harmony with the original meaning given to priesthood. For the point to be made out is not merely that our alliance with Christ is recognised by God ; but also that in it we are personally acceptable to God in

spite of our individual shortcomings. But where (p. 142) the significance of the active obedience as satisfactory is recognised, where, namely, it is recognised that Christ has done what is sufficient in order to be *for us* the fountain of spiritual life, and where at the same time the relation of substitution is denied, Schleiermacher has completely lost sight of the scheme of the priestly office. The same had already been the case (p. 139), where, with reference to Christ's passion, we read that therein "pure self-denying love is shown, and in that love is exhibited to us the manner and way in which *God was in Him*, in order to reconcile the world to Himself." "The high-priestly value of the passive obedience consists chiefly herein, that we *see God in Christ*, and behold Him as the most immediate partaker of the everlasting love which *sent and equipped Him*."¹ So masterly is the dialectic shown in this section, that even the scheme of the three offices which had been accepted for the treatment of the matter is not maintained! The last proposition now being directly in harmony with Abelard's view, the result of this investigation may be stated thus, that Schleiermacher in general follows Abelard in seeking to understand the saving influence of Christ as proceeding exclusively from God to men, and so has failed to appropriate that element of dogmatic tradition which, after Anselm, gives expression at the same time, in one or another shape, to a reciprocal effect wrought by Christ upon God. For what in this respect he almost under compulsion concedes, namely, that God in view of Christ's perfectness accepts with complacency the men who are united with Christ, Abelard also has expressed in a slightly modified way, in saying that the merit and intercession of Christ make up for the imperfection of our love in the Divine judgment (p. 38).

Doubtless Schleiermacher's aversion to those ideas which formed the standard for the assertion of Christ's twofold satisfaction—the forensically viewed penal justice of God and the Divine law—contributed to the above result. What he urges in objection to the former idea (under No. 4), certainly affects the traditionary doctrine as much as the similar observations of

¹ In connexion with this proposition, it is affirmed yet again that the high-priestly value of Christ's active obedience lies in the fact that God regards us in Christ as sharers of His obedience. But this mode of formulating the doctrine also is incorrect, and made it possible to append the totally erroneous exposition of the high-priestly value of the passive obedience.

Faustus Socinus do (p. 301). Not so manifest is the force of the objection against measuring Christ's active obedience by the law (under No. 2), viz., that by the law there is always expressed some interval between the will that commands and the will that obeys, and that any such union between these as is to be found in the case of Christ is precluded. For the special vocation of Christ, which Schleiermacher recognises as the measure of His action under the biblical expression of the will of God, does not find its ethical value if it falls outside of the general moral law, but only if it is included thereunder. If by vocation is understood that special sphere of ordinary activity in which an individual has to work towards the purpose of society, he is bound by this very speciality to the observance of the universal law. No doubt this is just what excludes the idea that Christ's active obedience can materially have superseded man's duty of obedience to the law in any respect (under No. 3); but yet it is precisely from the notion of vocation introduced by Schleiermacher that the inference which he rejects flows—that Christ worked on our behalf. For His special vocation was the founding of the kingdom of heaven. So insecure and indefinite is the position of this idea with Schleiermacher, that he only casually designates it by its right name, and does not fully recognise the reference of that name. And yet this hint is the most valuable in his whole treatment of the high-priestly office. Piscator anticipated him in apprehending Christ's historical appearance under this point of view. For, in order to support his denial of the vicarious significance of Christ's active obedience in respect of His fulfilment of the law, that theologian maintained that the Divine will, which Christ by His atoning death obeyed, was not the universal law, but a special prescription laid on him alone.¹ And the distinctive feature of voluntariness whereby Schleiermacher contrasted Christ's vocation-task (the will of God) with the Divine law, had already been brought into prominence by Cocceius.² Still both Piscator

¹ Cf. ap. Gerhard; *Loci theol.* tom. vii. p. 65: *Voluntatem illam celestis patris, quam Christus in officio redemptionis implevit, non intelligendam esse de lege mosaica, sed de speciali mandato satisfaciendi et moriendi pro electis.*

² *Summa doct. de fœdere et testamento Dei*, cap. v. 93: *Mandatum hoc a patre accepiſſe cenſetur, ut ipſe ſolus et unus hominum omnium non quidem animam invitus amitteret, ſed ſponte et ex libera poteſtate tanquam liberimus ſponſor in ſatisfactionis pretium poneret poſitamque reſumeret.*

and Cocceius, following Heb. x. 7-10; Pa. xl. 9, limit the contents of the special will of God to Christ's dying, while Schleiermacher was the first to comprehend under the idea of vocation the whole conduct of His life. He certainly has failed to give this cognition its due importance in estimating the priestly office of Christ, just as he has failed clearly to apprehend it as a whole. For if that idea of vocation as a whole embodies a more definite form in which the life of Christ may be understood, it were surely worth while to try whether, by the guidance of the idea something more satisfying in regard to Christ's action on God could not be reached than what the old school expresses by means of the idea of the law.

It still falls to be explained why Schleiermacher plainly never thought of such a task, and why, moreover, the whole problem of Christ's priestly office slipped through his fingers. I think I find the explanation in the fact that in pursuance of the plan of his *Glaubenslehre* he sets about exhibiting the idea of redemption without summoning up the specific thought of God which corresponds to the consciousness of redemption. He might of course have set it forth in accordance with his plan, by way of appendix, under the attributes of love and wisdom. But as the religious consciousness of redemption knows itself to be dependent for that benefit on the love of God, it is quite a mistake when the treatment of redemption by Christ pursues its course in utter indifference to this distinctive feature. But this explains why Schleiermacher was unable steadily to adhere to the schema of Christ's high-priestly work. For the representation of believers before God through Christ's official obedience is thinkable only in relation to a quite definite idea of God. The old school regarded God in this connexion under His attribute of legal justice, vindicating the eternal law. Now, to reject this idea was not enough; it required to be superseded by another. That a blank was left instead, has led to the result that Schleiermacher's elucidations glide from the schema of the priestly office into those of the prophetic and of the kingly. The dialectic which makes this possible is not masterly.

67. Redemption and reconciliation by Christ had substantially been referred to individuals by Schleiermacher, and regarded as influencing the functions of the individual self-consciousness.

If, then, the way in which fellowship in the individual soul with the perfection and blessedness of the Redeemer is expressed is yet to be specially considered, it is to be expected that the immediately following idea of regeneration, which subdivides itself into conversion and justification, will present only a specification of those operations of Christ that have already been exhibited. This expectation seems justified all the more, as those ideas are developed irrespective of their being directly conditioned by the joint-life. It would correspond to the original significance of the idea of life-fellowship if the doctrine of the Church were unfolded before that of the regeneration and sanctification of the individual; and Schleiermacher himself acknowledges an inducement thereto in the fact that the doctrine of Christ's work issues in the reference of His kingly office to the fellowship of His people. But for all this he adheres to the usual Lutheran procedure of treating the individual's salvation prior to the doctrine of the Church. For he expressly recognises only the equal possibility of this and of the converse order, setting up a complete reciprocity between the social and the individual factor of the life of the redeemed. But he decides in favour of the precedence of the latter aspect, from the empirical consideration that, in the first instance, it was individuals that were laid hold of by Christ, and that even now it is by an operation of Christ, through His spiritual presence in the word, that individuals are taken up into the fellowship of the new life (sec. 106. 2). Schleiermacher assuredly did not originally think that the individual and the fellowship stand related to one another in the bare schema of action and reaction; his doctrine of the *summum bonum* is certainly not exhausted by this schema. But when in the doctrine of redemption the idea of life-fellowship had been carried out in the sense of an entirely individual relation, we can no longer wonder at the decision arrived at. Moreover, the empirical consideration of the subjective circumstances involves the treatment of justification as the correlate of conversion under the comprehensive title of regeneration. For the transition of the individual from the joint-life of sinfulness to life-fellowship with Christ, when regarded as an altered form of life, as a direction of the will, is conversion; in the reflection of the God-consciousness upon this process is at the same time expressed a new relation to

God, namely, justification (sec. 107. 1). That neither of these two factors can be separated from its neighbour is perfectly true in the line of consideration undertaken by Schleiermacher (that is, in reference to the empirical subject), and is in harmony with the original practical self-consciousness of the Reformers. In this respect it may readily be granted also that the two factors must be regarded as contemporaneous. But the other assertion, that the one is the unmistakeable token of the presence of the other, does not, however, mean that the two stand in real reciprocity of action. On the contrary, Schleiermacher makes justification to depend on conversion. This view ought not to surprise us if the appearance of the two acts in the subjective consciousness were what was being considered. For in this respect the theologians of the old school also agree with him. But Schleiermacher does not appeal to subjective psychological observation, but to the objective theological point of view, when he says, "Justification presupposes something in consideration of which one is justified; and as in the Supreme Being no error is possible, it is assumed that something has occurred to the man between his past and his present, whereby the previous displeasure of God is taken away, and without which he could not be an object of the Divine complacency" (sec. 107. 2). Although this has a rather vague sound, it cannot be understood in the sense of the Reformed theology (which had no existence for Schleiermacher) as referring to the high-priestly representation of men before God by Christ. For Schleiermacher, in so far as he adopts this thought, acknowledges its force only when the union of the believer with Christ is supposed to have actually taken place.

All doubt about the proper meaning of the quotation is set aside by this direct doctrinal position: "that God justifies the man who turns himself to Him, implies that He forgives his sins, and acknowledges him to be a child of God. But this change of relation to God takes place only in so far as the man has true faith in the Redeemer" (sec. 109). To elucidate this proposition, I remind my readers in the first place that Schleiermacher, in treating of reconciliation, had already made allusion to the forgiveness of sins as the disappearance of the consciousness of having deserved punishment, as being "the first step of reconciliation." The doctrine before us thus helps to make the

doctrine of reconciliation more specific. Now by this idea had been denoted only that operation of Christ consequent upon redemption, whereby the believer is reconciled with the misfortunes that befall him, no longer feeling them to be penal (p. 470). No reference to God in this consciousness is bound up with this declaration of Schleiermacher. The doctrine of justification therefore, the precise function of which is to define the relation of the believer to God, affords a supplement to the doctrine of reconciliation. This actual bearing, however, of the doctrine comes less into prominence, because Schleiermacher chiefly adheres to the Church tradition regarding it, and particularly to the schema adopted by the Lutheran theology. For he accepts the distinction usual in the latter between negative forgiveness of sins and positive justification; taking the two in the order in which they are named. Only he chooses the expression of Divine sonship through adoption to denote justification on its positive side which, besides the removal of penal desert, guarantees the assurance of perfect blessedness. In this, too, he has had anticipators. But, moreover, he defends this sequence of the forgiveness of sins and adoption by means of their congruence with the two parts of conversion, repentance and faith, which in like manner he accepts from Lutheran tradition, although for his own part he cannot quite close his eyes to the original opinion of Luther (pp. 143-4) and of Calvin (p. 193), that true repentance presupposes faith (sec. 108. 2). Finally, he also attaches himself to Lutheran tradition in striving directly to connect the consciousness of forgiveness of sins and of justification with the process of conversion. And in this the dependence of the former on the latter comes clearly to be seen. Consciousness of guiltiness before God and of penal desert must cease only when by and in faith living fellowship with Christ has begun. Here now one or other of two things is conceivable. On the one hand, it seems self-evident that the longer and the more uninterruptedly we are led by Christ, so much the more do we forget sin, and thereby also our guilt. But this would be no change of relation to God, and would not in itself convey any assurance that the consciousness of sin should never return. For this reason only the other alternative can be regarded as what actually takes place; viz., that justification is contemporaneous with conversion. "Forgiveness of sins must have

place in us even while sin also and consciousness thereof continue still to dwell in us. Only, indeed, if the reference of sin to the holiness and justice of God is to cease, the consciousness of sins must also have become different from what it was before." We should be mistaken were we to expect that this exigency would be met by bringing forward another thought of God, namely, His love. On the contrary, Schleiermacher refers to the fact that the converted person "who has been taken up into the life-fellowship of Christ is a new man, and knows himself to be such, inasmuch as he has been appropriated by Christ." "Thus in the new man sin no longer operates; it is only the after-effect or remaining influence of the old man. The new man accordingly no longer takes sin to himself, and also works against it as against something foreign to him, *whereby the consciousness of guilt is taken away.*" "By reason of faith the consciousness of sin changes in him to that of the forgiveness of sin." In adding that positive justification or the consciousness of adoption also follows from the fact that Christ lives in us, and thus also allows us to share His relation to the Father, Schleiermacher lets us see that this last is no second element separate from the first. On the contrary, just as against his own mind he had to confess that faith is the ground of true repentance, so at the foundation of his elucidation of the forgiveness of sins lies the thought that the new man as child of God no longer stands in any relation to His holiness and righteousness.

But what is the connexion of thought in this view? Its inconsistency not only with the doctrine of the Church, but also with the universal Christian consciousness, has already been alluded to in the passing remark, that while the reference of the consciousness of sin to the holiness and justice of God was recognised, the foundation of the forgiveness of sins in the love of God is not distinctly stated. This reticence is analogous to that to which I have already (p. 485) adverted when the reference of the obedience of Christ to the justice of God was denied, and no reference of it to any other attribute of God maintained. As it resulted from this that the reference of Christ's obedience to God was changed into its influence upon men, so the failure to refer the consciousness of forgiveness of sins to God virtually means that that consciousness is regarded merely as a consequence

of the consciousness of conversion. The syllogism elaborated by Schleiermacher is the following. Sins and the consciousness of sins pertain to the old man—in life-fellowship with Christ I am a new man—the sins therefore which, as an old man, I committed, are no longer any concern of mine. This conclusion is the correct epitome of a statement with regard to which Schleiermacher flatters himself that it is not easily liable to be so misunderstood as if each justified himself, for it carries back everything to the influence of Christ. For it is precisely under this presupposition that the converted man passes this judgment upon himself. Nor is this result very different from the suggestion which shortly before had been rejected in the same quarter—the suggestion that sins are forgotten in the course of continued and progressive sanctification; nay, the view now put forth has less to commend it than the rejected supposition, for the self-bestowed forgiveness of sins is prematurely appropriated by the subject of conversion, under the title (to which he has as yet no claim) of being a new man. Hereby is confirmed the objection already urged (p. 472), that from Schleiermacher's view of redemption there can be seen no necessary transition to the pacification of the universal consciousness of guilt. Finally, this issue shows how little the merely æsthetical view of redemption through Christ (p. 468) is adapted to the exigencies of the problem. But although the theoretical failure of this argument may seem to be Schleiermacher's individual fault, we cannot ignore the fact that in it he has given expression to the solution of those self-assertive æsthetical Christians who, from their life-fellowship with Christ, assume the right to forgive themselves certain sins out of hand.

The roots of this view, however, spread beyond the doctrine of redemption into that of sin. But what is advanced in this line in sec. 81 of the second edition of the *Glaubenslehre* is not so distinct as what is to be found in the original text, though the former has no different meaning from the latter. In the first edition (volume second, 1822) Schleiermacher expresses himself as follows: "In so far as sin cannot have its root in the Divine will, so far also it has no existence at all for God. But in so far as the consciousness of sin is actual within us, it must also be ordained by God as that which makes redemption

necessary" (sec. 102. 5). "For God **has** undoubtedly ordained that the strength of sensuous impulse, and the powerlessness of the God-consciousness (which, so far as He is concerned, are simply the state of human nature while still imperfect and awaiting its perfection through a Redeemer) should become one in our consciousness as sin; and this Divine ordinance is one and the same with that of redemption, because aspiration after a better state of things can be intensified into a longing for redemption only through the consciousness of sin. Therefore, in accordance with God's ordinance and will, sin, so far as we are concerned, must be regarded as something real and necessary (he should have said; sin must of necessity be conceived by us as a correct idea); while so far as God is concerned it is no more so than any one of those things which we figure to ourselves only by negation is the same to Him as it is to us" (sec. 103. 4). In accordance with this position Schleiermacher cannot understand by the forgiveness of sins any change of God's present judgment as compared with a previous one; for God always judges of that which ought to be regarded by us as sin in its connexion with the order of the universe; so that to Him it is only the still imperfect nature of man. In like manner, if we view this state as sin in order by the rule of logical antithesis to develop in ourselves aspiration after redemption, it follows that in the consciousness of redemption the judgment that our moral defectiveness is sin no longer finds place, because the subject of that defectiveness is no longer present; only in living fellowship with Christ, a subject of sinless perfection. Yes, indeed! if only the ethical opposition between sin and redemption were extensively and necessarily a motive to aspire after the latter, and not just as often a motive to hardening!

The result of the doctrine of justification, the connexion of which with the nearer and remoter Schleiermacherian principles has thus been shown, is not cancelled by the development which is appended to it (sec. 109. 3). The traditional doctrine lays particular stress upon the fact that God is to be regarded as the author of justification. Schleiermacher accordingly undertakes to bring his own view and this formula into harmony. In the *first* place, he can appeal to the fact that the Divine act of justification stands related to the receptivity of faith; it

therefore *cannot be thought of as independent* of Christ's activity in conversion. This is held also by the old Lutheran school, which makes the *donatio fidei* to precede justification (p. 279). But he diverges from the old school when he declares, in the *second* place, that justification cannot be conceived as an act distinct in point of time in its reference to individuals as such ; but only as an individual operation in time of one Divine act and decree. For, following out the general idea of God that he upholds, he affirms that there is only one eternal and general decree of the justification of men for Christ's sake, which is identical with that of the sending of Christ, and indeed with that of the creation of the human race, inasmuch as in Christ alone is human nature perfected. From Christ onwards the proclamation in time of this Divine act has continued without interruption, yet in its efficacy *appears*, in an isolated way, in the union of individual men with Christ. So that justification, as a single act of God, presents itself only in the self-consciousness of him who is apprehended of Christ. As God cannot be set forth under the antitheses of abstract and concrete, general and particular, the justification of the individual depends simply on the condition that that individual apply to himself, in syllogism, the general decree of God to accept the human race in His Son ; but the middle term of this syllogism must be conversion. Moreover, we are reminded that consciousness of guilt and of penal desert is appointed to men by God only with a reference to redemption, and with a view to its disappearance when the individual enters on the redeemed state. From this general truth it follows, that the individual subject of redemption as such pronounces himself free from guilt by a logical syllogism. Finally, Schleiermacher admits only with regard to this syllogism, that the Divine decree of justification acquires the form of a judgment, of a declaration, in the realization of the conversion of the individual. Irrespective of that, in the general apprehension of the Divine decree we cannot distinguish between thought and deed, and so the declarative act disappears in the creative. The thought of justification, that practical characteristic feature of evangelical Christendom, is thus in part explained as a mere phenomenon of the religious self-consciousness, and partly reared in an objective manner upon an assumption which was expressly

repudiated by the leaders of the Reformation. This last point will come before us yet once more in another connexion.

68. Important as it is on the whole, that Schleiermacher has traced back the distinctive peculiarity of Christianity to redemption through Christ, his doctrine of redemption is nevertheless not of such a nature as to be epoch-making. It lies in the line taken up by Abelard, and finds more modern anticipations in Töllner and Tieftrunk; and any modification of its meaning in accordance with the analogy of the æsthetic kind of spiritual influences may have suited the culture of Schleiermacher's age, but can by no means be allowed to pass for an essential improvement. Rather does the change of meaning assigned to justification by faith, which is intimately connected therewith, seem to indicate that the moral strictness of the believer's self-judgment is by no means placed on a secure footing by this doctrine. The attempt (which Schleiermacher seemed to make in his doctrine of Christ's priestly office) to combine with Abelard's type of doctrine regard to what in general terms may be designated as Anselm's type, was not fully carried out. If now it shall appear that, in reference to these doctrines, many theologians go in Schleiermacher's track, I would not have it supposed, after what has already been remarked (p. 441), that this fact is to be understood as implying that these theologians constitute Schleiermacher's school. But, at all events, as the claim to possess the "genuine spirit of Schleiermacher" is ventilated by others, I should be accompanied in the further prosecution of my task down through the latest period of German theology, by the fear that I had left certain obscurities unremoved, were I to omit a plain declaration of my view of the relations in which the various theological parties of the last fifty years stand to the *Glaubenslehre*.

For this is the treatise with which we have to deal; theological schools are ever formed only through principles of systematic theology; and the theological spirit of the man must be ascertained chiefly from this work. Now it cannot be overlooked that, in so far as Schleiermacher was a scientific personality, the central point for him lay in the interests of philosophical ethics, and that he set his hand to the task of the *Glaubenslehre*, so specifically theological as it was, only because his official position in life gave him at the outset occasion to give

expression to his personal piety in a public and universally valid way. When it is recognised accordingly that Schleiermacher makes an epoch in Ethics, and that in dialectics he has given a characteristic counterpoise to the course of speculative philosophy, his high importance for theology also is secured. And this importance remains unquestioned even though we were compelled to assert that the *Glaubenslehre* is simply a leading cause of the theological confusion that at present prevails; and that too not merely according to the way in which men have used or misused it, but even according to its very essence. When I see how Strauss and Kliefoth¹ push their roots into the *Glaubenslehre*, and how the intermediate groups of theologians contend about the genuine spirit of Schleiermacher, an inevitable presumption is raised that the work does not possess the qualities on which a sound theological development might have been built, and that the value which current opinion assigns to it arises from all sorts of persistent self-deception.

If we judge the work not merely by its actual contents, but also by the task it proposes to itself, it presents two pairs of

¹ The specific influence which Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* exercised upon D. F. Strauss, I assume as well known. A singular evidence of the fact is the circumstance that even Braniss (*Ueber Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre; ein kritischer Versuch*, 1824, p. 147 sq.) developed from Schleiermacher's philosophical premisses the same speculative view which Strauss subsequently took up, in order to show that the former do not harmonize with the christological tendency of the *Glaubenslehre*. In like manner it is in accordance with Schleiermacherian ideas, aided in some degree by the formulæ of Hegel, that Kliefoth (*Einleitung in die Dogmengeschichte*, 1839, pp. 20, 21) shows how Christian doctrine and Ethic arise as the common work and possession of the fellowship of believers, how in that way they no longer pertain to the individual, but have come to be objective historical things (!); how by Church government and Church legislation they come to be creed and law, to which the individual consciousness ought to subject itself in order to mould itself thereupon; how the Church-organism that thus comes into being has its *purpose* in the Christian culture of the individual; its *goal* and its *norm* in creed and law; how accordingly, in the outward existence of the Church, the unity of the Christian spirit gives itself reality. This deduction accords only with the definition of Dogmatics, as the exhibition of the doctrine of the Church,—a view set up by Schleiermacher, and never before maintained by any one. On the other hand, the view of the Church's development-process as a progressive incarnation of God (p. 14) is suggested in the *Glaubenslehre*, sec. 100, 2; sec. 120, 2. Kliefoth's agreement with Mühler on this point is also not casual, in so far as the latter's treatise *Ueber die Einheit in der Kirche* (1825) adheres as closely to the Schleiermacherian formulæ as it foreshadows Kliefoth's view of thought. That people do not yet discern in Kliefoth's *Einleitung in die Dogmengeschichte* a counterpart of equal greatness to Strauss's *Leben Jesu*, which preceded it by only a few years, is a fault that I should like by these remarks to remedy.

distinctive features, each pair forming an antithesis. The *Glaubenslehre* professes to set forth as historical science the doctrine current in the Evangelical Church; while yet it is not symbolic, but, by regard had to partial departures from the general persuasion, and in accordance with the individuality of him who sets it forth, follows the intention of correcting the ordinary doctrine. On the other hand, the *Glaubenslehre* is carried through as a setting-forth of the devout frames of the spirit, as these are recognised in their reference to the Redeemer as something given, not as something rationally to be deduced; while yet in the devout consciousness (connected with the antithesis between sin and redemption) is at the same time authenticated a consciousness of God and the world, which indeed is indifferent to the specifically Christian movements of the Spirit, but yet is regarded as contained in each one of these. Schleiermacher was able to carry out his work only because he kept up his own direct personal persuasion that in neither of these antitheses is a contradiction to be found. Still he has not succeeded in communicating this persuasion to any one else; nay, rather it has long ceased to be a secret that the numerous contradictions in his work are in part merely hushed up in an artificial way, and in part reveal themselves in the preponderance over all that distinguishes the Christian religion, of a particular philosophical view and an individual tendency of the Spirit; and, specially, that the thought of Christ's archetypal character, which guarantees the redemption character of the Christian religion, cannot be brought into agreement with that fundamental view of the universe which is expressed in the idea of God's omnipotence. However powerfully, therefore, this work has drawn and moved men's spirits, it does not admit of doubt that the more energetic souls have made use of the one or the other pole of the fundamental propositions brought together in the work as *points d'appui* for utterly heterogeneous developments of theology, and that the others, who persevere in the middle course contemplated by Schleiermacher, have indeed appropriated to themselves many of his ideas, but yet at the same time have adopted very diverse bases for systematic theology. So far, therefore, as Strauss and Kliefoth are concerned, Schleiermacher offers a standpoint they have already surmounted; both have spent all their share in his inheritance in acquiring

their own sovereign domains. The intermediate group, on the other hand, in which professedly the genuine exercise of the Schleiermacherian spirit is kept up, has, to begin with, received only legacies from his heritage. His spiritual property, so far as it was expressed in his *Glaubenslehre*, has been broken up into fragments, because from its very nature it could not be kept together by any one.

As for the doctrines of Redemption, Reconciliation, and Justification, the type of doctrine held by Schleiermacher recurs in theologians of the subsequent period, who in all other respects stand generally tolerably far apart from each other. The criterion, however, by which their dependence on Schleiermacher is known, is the elaboration of the thought of the reconciliation of men by the Divine love displayed in Christ, along with repudiation of the forensic notion of a reconciling influence of Christ with God. A few individuals only get so far as to connect with this Abelard's other point of view,—that Christ in virtue of His obedience is our representative before God. But almost all those whose doctrine coincides with that of Schleiermacher in the way just stated, diverge from him herein, that they seek to set forth reconciliation or the forgiveness of sins as Christ's decisive operation, and in this remain true both to the tendency of the apostle Paul and to the explicit traditions of Protestantism. As however they regard Christ primarily as God's representative to men, they give to the divine nature of Christ a share in His redemptive work in a way that specifically distinguishes their view, and which orthodoxy failed to find (p. 259).

The first group of theologians that falls to be considered is that of the biblical supra-naturalists of Storr's school—viz., Steudel and Klaiber. The fact that Steudel,¹ even in the doctrines before us, expressly disputes Schleiermacher's views, does not militate against a certain relationship between them, in which the younger is a follower of the elder. Among Steudel's hostile observations (pp. 284-287) there are some which are obviously misunderstandings, particularly the objection that Schleiermacher resolves Christ's redeeming power into that of the community. Other points taken exception to by Steudel,—the physical (or, as Steudel calls it, magical) repre-

¹ *Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-protestantischen Kirche*, 1834.

sensation of Christ's attractive power, the purely negative conception of sin, the abandonment of the Christian notion of God, have been censured by me also. Steudel's divergence from Schleiermacher certainly has reference also to the specific definition of Christ's task, which he in agreement with Storr regards as consisting in the removal of the punishments due on account of sin, and not directly in redemption from sin as a fact (pp. 248-267). But by the punishments of sin he understands (duly taking into account the suggestions of the New Testament) guilt in so far as it alienates man from God; and therefore the stricter designation of Christ's saving work is the forgiveness of sins—i.e., the assurance that in spite of our sinfulness, which always comes up to our remembrance as guilt, there is no longer any obstacle on God's side to our closing with Him or to our beatification. To this end he maintains that Christ's suffering and death are efficacious as part of His *vocation*, of course on condition that we appropriate the Divine gift by faith, so that not till faith is found does the reconciliation of men actually take place. The death of Christ now is the specific instrumental cause of the forgiveness of sins in two respects—the first, because it is an ordinance and a specific proof of that unconditionally abiding love of God, in token of which He, though devoid of all personal guilt, was given up to the lot of sinners; the second, because it has the value of a sacrifice to God who graciously accepted the life of Christ as surrendered to Him in death. Here it is plain that the effect upon God of Christ's obedience—the point conveyed in the doctrine of Christ's priestly office—is recognised by Steudel as a necessary part of the doctrine. While, accordingly, he discerns, on the one hand, in the Manifestation of Christ, as in His suffering and dying, an exhibition of God's love to men, he, at the same time, views Christ's obedience even to the cross as an exhibition to God of human nature made perfect in sinlessness; and maintains that, without this, reconciliation is not guaranteed. For if we desire to regard ourselves as objects of the Divine good pleasure, we need to be assured of this value to God of Christ's obedience, which supplies the *germ of life* to us who stand in faith. "As those who have appropriated to themselves the righteousness of Christ, men appear in the sight of the Holy One as righteous."

This train of thought, which certainly is not presented by Steudel in so concatenated a form, seems to diverge from Schleiermacher just in proportion as it must be allowed to Steudel's credit that he is the first that has rightly defined the idea of forgiveness of sins, to the effect that guilt, which cannot be forgotten, and which therefore cannot at all be annihilated, only ceases to be any longer an obstacle to the restored relation with God. At the same time, too, he gives intelligible expression to the significance of the sacrifice of Christ, although he denies its penal value for God. But the necessity for this formula for the purpose proposed, is not so clear as its connexion with the expressions of the New Testament. This criticism receives characteristic confirmation in the view taken by Steudel of justification by faith. For that view bears the mark of Schleiermacher as distinctly as the transition to Schleiermacherianism evinces itself already in the idea of the life-germ which Christ's obedience is for believers. Justification is referred to faith because, in the sight of God, man never passes save for what he inwardly is. But in faith he recognises the adjustment of his relation with God to be a pure work of grace, and he stands in inseparable love to Christ, whose image he strives to reproduce in himself in humility and trustfulness. "Accordingly, what lies at the foundation of the sentence of justification on God's part is in man the openness of his spirit to the reception of that grace which works only as sanctifying, and which when more closely viewed is the life of Christ appropriated to ourselves as an element of life" (pp. 359-364). This conclusion seems an echo of Osiander, but diverges from him in so far as it is not the Divine nature but the human perfection of Christ that supplies the middle term for the value of faith towards justification. Steudel's view lies rather in the direction of Schleiermacher; and his exceptions to the latter justify one in asking how this transference of the life of Christ to believers is to be explained. Steudel here (p. 287) sets up against the "magical" attractive power, "the power of thankful love, which by faith transforms us into partners of Christ." This is the factor to which Abelard had attributed the reconciling efficacy of God's love to us revealed in the death of Christ. For, eliciting this counter love, however, it is utterly indifferent whether Christ's obedience be

viewed in the light of a special value that it has for God. If so, the necessity of *this* thought to the establishment of the forgiveness is not shown. Or this bearing of Christ's obedience upon God is held fast as the archetypal ground of our peace with God, in which case his significance as life-germ in believers can be understood only by Schleiermacher's rule, which Steudel rejects, that all power attracts masses, or that an æsthetic reflection of Christ's peace with God manifests itself in the believer, while at the same time the experience of the love of God in Christ as an ethical motive directs our will toward God.

Klaiber's full exegetic and dogmatic exhibition of the "New Testament doctrine of sin and redemption"¹ resolves itself more directly into the Schleiermacherian type of doctrine. He pursues the fundamental proposition that as God's love and holiness are revealed and communicated as a unity in the person of Christ, so also the receiving and the enjoying of God's forgiving love on the part of man is not to be separated from the receiving and enjoying of the sanctifying powers that are given in the life and death of Christ. The denial of the form of doctrine traditionally accepted in the Church, which Klaiber makes, thus does not limit itself to a negation of the forensic idea of satisfaction, but applies also to the separate treatment of reconciliation on its objective and on its subjective side. He prefers to represent it as a continuity, just as Schleiermacher's idea of redemption includes along with it regeneration and sanctification also (p. 467). For the rest, in explaining the significance of Christ, he distinguishes the two sides; *first*, the exhibition of the objective relation, *scil.*, between the love and holiness of God and sinful humanity; *secondly*, the exhibition of the human relations in so far as their hitherto sinful shape is removed and a new shaping of them instituted. This second view, however, has not the force of an exhibition of the human relations towards God in the schema of the high-priestly office, but has reference entirely to influences bearing upon men. Thus also it corresponds only to Schleiermacher's view of redemption, as the participation of the sinless perfection

¹ In the *Studien der evangelischen Geistlichkeit Württembergs*, edited by him (vii. 2, viii. 1, 2, 1834-35); published as a separate work in 1836. It is a reconstruction of his earlier work: *Die Lehre von der Versöhnung und der Rechtfertigung des Menschen. Ein philosophisch-exegetischer Versuch*, 1823.

of Jesus, which denotes the peculiar in-being of God in Him. Klaiber's distinction thus diverges from Schleiermacher's schema only in that, following the concrete biblical idea of God, he marks off the active revelation of God in the person of Christ, and the human archetypal character of the latter as distinct from one another; but this procedure has no important influence, for the effects of the two points of view cannot be separated from one another. Klaiber certainly adheres to the biblical standard, in so far as he at least directly ranks the remission of guilt above the actual removal of sin, and he further supplements Abelard's chief point of view by declining to recognise in Christ any revelation of the love of God, save in connexion with that holiness of God which excludes sin. But he will have the two Divine attributes to be regarded in their oneness, not in their opposition, which Church tradition seeks to reconcile by means of the idea of satisfaction.

The death of Christ then is the revelation of the love of God which forgives and delivers from the misery of sin; for that love was the prime motive of His mission into the world, and forms the contents of the whole conduct of His life, reaching its climax in His suffering and death. The death of Christ, moreover, is a revelation of the Divine holiness, which loathes sin and connects misery with it, in so far as Christ with triumphant success withstood the sin that assailed Him; and that too not for Himself alone, but also "with the purpose and the result of the implanting and imitation of the same disposition and power in man by means of faith" (viii. 1, p. 70). This positive imitation of Christ in faith, as a principle of the new life, is made use of to explain all the salutary effects which in the New Testament are associated with the death of Christ. The law which Klaiber, like Schleiermacher (p. 478), regards not as the expression of the absolute will of God, but as a relative ordinance occasioned by sin, and which brings the pressure of constraint to bear upon the sinner; this law and its curse are taken away by Christ in so far as He in His death terminated His voluntarily undertaken relation to the law, and the believer has ideally endured death along with Christ. The meaning of Christ's sin-offering Klaiber explains to be that Christ in His fellow-feeling with the sin of others surrendered to death, *i.e.*, to annihilation that side of His life which in other men through

their separation from God had become a source of sin ; and that by His resurrection, which is inseparable from that death, He opened up the beginning of new life to those who believe in Him. In this Klaiber has again taken up a line of thought that is frequent with Luther, but at the same time justifies the remark made above (p. 202), that the victory over sin which Christ gained for Himself by His moral constancy, has general significance only on condition of subjective imitation of His moral conduct. When once this point of view is suffered by Klaiber to fall out of sight, and the penal value of the death of Christ cannot be evaded, the idea of a penal example comes in (viii. 1, p. 149), that God could not have showed His hatred of sin in a stronger way or in a way that would be more convincing to the human spirit than by surrendering His Son to the pains which men suffer on account of sin. The last feature I shall mention is that justification is designated by Klaiber also as the judgment passed on the new life-germ implanted by faith (viii. 2, p. 100). I cannot concur in all the commendation that Baur (p. 649) bestows even on the exegetical part of this work. Its exegesis lacks every fixed guiding principle, and the dogmatic question is not solved at all. It is possible to excuse this, by saying that only a biblico-theological representation, and not a dogmatic one, is aimed at. But these limits are not adhered to, when Klaiber declares that redemption, as it is exhibited in the New Testament, consists in a real communication of life, and not in the efficacy of the example of Christ. This is a dogmatic dilemma, the solution of which cannot be put off in any such way as that which Klaiber attempts, in saying that in the New Testament the manner of this communication is not strictly described but only associated with faith as its condition (viii. 2, p. 111). Nay, in the course that his delineation takes, everything can be deduced from the schema of example ; and "life-fellowship" is an expression taken, not from the New Testament, but from Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre*. I may add that it is an expression which, in the work now under review, plays its role as a mysterious phrase ; just as too often this has been the case in other quarters.

The group of theologians which by means of the *theologische Studien u. Kritiken* has for not a short time held a conspicuous place in Germany, and which I would designate as the group

of nineteenth-century Melancthonians, has C. J. Nitzsch and Lücke as its dogmatic representatives.¹ In the doctrines before us, however, the latter falls far short of the first in clearness of construction; so that I may simply assert the fact that Lücke as well as Nitzsch retains the Schleiermacherian type. Nitzsch, then, acknowledges the schema of the three offices, distinguishing as he does in the entire life of Christ, so far as He is Redeemer, the testimony, the reconciliation, and the formation of a community, so that His speaking as well as His doing and suffering is operative towards all the three functions; and the founding of His kingdom "was also a sort of condition of His prophetic and priestly activity." The entire life of Jesus means that the new Divine joint-life lives into the Adamitic life and appropriates it to itself by suffering. Redemption, as bestowal of life, since it cannot be of a magical nature, is effected by *enlightenment*. It includes justification and sanctification as liberation from guilt and liberation from sin. This is the frame on which Schleiermacher's delineation is worked out, within which, of course, certain divergences are pointed out. Such a divergence appears in that Nitzsch, like Steudel and Klaiber, recognises the central point of redemption in the reconciliation of sinners, in the forgiveness of sins or the removal of guilt. This operation takes place upon man (like every other real determination) in accordance with his nature;

¹ Nitzsch: *System der christlichen Lehre*, 1828, 6th Ed. 1851. Lücke: *Grundriss der evangelischen Dogmatik* (printed for private circulation), 1845. The respect for Schleiermacher, which is kept up in this and cognate circles, is not carried so far as to entitle these theologians to the name of Schleiermacherians. On the other hand, I do not think I do them any injustice, I believe I merely vindicate their rights, when I designate them as Melancthonians. Melancthon is regarded by them as the theologian who was at once churchly, and at the same time dogmatically liberal and friendly to union; and the Augsburg Confession is to them at once a church standard, and the fundamental type of their dogma (compare a very characteristic utterance by Nitzsch in the *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1833, p. 929). Just as in the sixteenth century, Lutheranism has risen up over this Melancthonism,—and for this the latter is not altogether to be absolved from blame. For it has not made itself master of the central tasks of theology, but has allowed its problems to be set for it by its adversaries for the most part. It has spent its chief strength in polemics, particularly against the *Leben Jesu* of Strauss, and has failed to see the danger of a Lutheranism like that of Kliefoth. With all its valuable "studies and criticisms" it has never associated the purpose or the power to make a school; it has invariably refused to hold science as high as churchliness, and thus has paved the way for that churchliness on the high places of which but slight regard is paid to the "*Mediation Theology*."

but anything which has to be wrought upon a community must proceed from a personal beginning which embodies and appropriates in itself the new commonwealth. The accomplishment of this purpose is not connected with the doctrine, but with the *entire impression produced by* the leading personality. But as in this case the task has to do with a recalcitrant race sunk in sin, the continuance of Christ's holy love in suffering even unto death is necessary, in order that sin may be finished in Him. For without this it could not be recognised as such, and much less could it be forgiven. Therefore is the showing forth of His love even unto death the ground of our reconciliation, the ground of the forgiveness of sin that could not otherwise be brought home at all. The last active cause of this train is indeed that in Christ's love to men, displayed in the form of His obedience toward God, the grace of God is revealed. As God's representative He discloses God's gracious purpose of forgiveness. If, in this apprehension of the *reconciliation of the world*, Abelard's fundamental thought is reproduced, Nitzsch tries to be as fair to the Church tradition as Schleiermacher and Steudel had sought to be. He sets about explaining Christ's passion, in so far as that represents men before God, as a ground of the *expiation* of sin. As special aids towards the solution of this problem, Nitzsch had at his command the thoughts that the priestly office is conditioned by the kingly, and that Christ, as the Founder of the Christian fellowship, represents it in Himself; but he makes no use of either. It happens to him as to Schleiermacher, that, in rejecting the forensic way of filling out the schema of the priestly office, he loses hold of the schema itself, and constructs a train of thought in which Christ is exhibited not as the representative of men, but again as the representative of God. In His working upon men He effects their vivification; but this takes place in sinners, when sin is judged, punished, destroyed, and so forgiven in repentance. Thus Christ is the propitiation for sin, not in a direct sense, but indirectly in eliciting conversion! The rhetorical manner in which Nitzsch goes to work is an obstacle not merely to the solution but even to the statement of the problem; and although this analysis shows how fruitful were the thoughts that lay to his hand, he has not succeeded in giving dialectic effect to them.

Nitzsch set forth the doctrine of justification¹ against Möhler in the old Protestant sense, and at the same time rejected the view of J. A. H. Tittmann of Leipzig,² that justification is more properly understood as a change in the nature of man. But in his "*System*" he follows Schleiermacher in the formula that regeneration is made up of justification and conversion; the former as change in feeling of relation to God, the latter as change of will. Now, though it is a matter of course in the Protestant system of doctrine, that God regards as righteous no one whom He does not also convert and sanctify, the question still presents itself, Which process comes before the other and conditions it? Here also Nitzsch states the view that justification is the *first* element. But the method, which he has borrowed from Schleiermacher, of considering these relations according to their subjective appearance without keeping firm hold of their connexion with the doctrine of objective reconciliation, leads to the result that the relation between the two acts is represented in the reverse order. Faith, as trust in reconciliation by Christ, according to him, justifies only in proportion as it opens the spirit to the converting and sanctifying activity of the Redeemer. In these vacillating declarations we see how ill-omened it is to reproduce a doctrinal system derived from tradition when the technical ideas which lie at its foundation have changed. The Lutheran theologians of the seventeenth century found no insuperable difficulty in making *regeneratio* as *donatio fidei* precede justification merely as a formal determination of the soul without regarding the real change of the will as included in the notion. Then the priority of *justificatio* to *communicatio spiritus sancti* or of *renovatio* in the individual life of man was taught (p. 279). But Nitzsch and those who think with him are of the very intelligible

¹ *Eine protestantische Beantwortung der Symbolik Möhler's*, 1835.

² *Programma de summis principiis confessionis Augustanæ*, 1830. The definition of justification in this tract runs as follows (Nitzsch: *System*, p. 138): Est igitur justificatio beneficium Dei quo homines miseriæ peccati obnoxii *cum nature statum* consequuntur, ut a Deo probari (pro justis haberi) et gratiam Dei æternamque salutem *merito Christi* capessere possint. This is not Catholic; neither is it Osiandrian; it is primarily a misuse of the technical *usus loquendi*. For if the state of grace is determined by Christ's merit, the *justificatio* which is indicated as its previous condition means what the old divines called *regeneratio*, but in this instance not merely as *donatio fidei*, but as real life-fellowship with Christ. This view, as we shall see later, is one that had been anticipated in the early pietistic school.

opinion that there is no such thing as formal determinateness where the corresponding contents are not found. Attempting, accordingly, to solve the problems before us on the schema of the Lutheran tradition, they entangle themselves in the contradiction that justification must be prior to conversion, and yet can be conceived only as arising from conversion. So that Nietzsche's view after all really amounts to what Tittmann held. Here it may be observed that on this point some acquaintance with Reformed theology might have been useful, attention to which was already suggested by the tendency to evangelical union. But can we be surprised that the Lutheran tradition of the seventeenth century now overruns the Church when even the divines who favoured the union, in so far as they had any connexions at all with the past reaching beyond Schleiermacher, made themselves acquainted only with the Lutheran doctrine, and when at the same time the barrenness that then prevailed in dogmatic theology was shown by the diffusion of compendia of the old Lutheran Dogmatic?

The theosophic character of Rothe's theology¹ conditions his view of the Person and Work of Christ; in this connexion, however, in the proper doctrine of the work of redemption, there occurs a complexus of ethical notions. The second Adam (in whom, in virtue of his normal, *i.e.*, good and holy development into Spirit, God really indwells, so that in the religious and moral development of Christ man becomes God just as much as God becomes man) conveys in His whole life a revelation of God's essence. On the other hand, His entire life as human takes its form from His *vocation* to be the Redeemer of natural sinful humanity, *i.e.*, to destroy sin's power over them and in them. To this purpose now it belongs that as Mediator He is the link that forms an actual vital connexion between God and sinful humanity. He does so, on the one hand, by perfecting into absolute union His fellowship with God—His religious task: on the other hand, by dedicating Himself in unconditioned love to humanity—His moral task. In both these respects He must advance to perfect voluntary self-

¹ *Theologische Ethik*, Zweiter Band, 1845, p. 279 sq. The new edition of the work, which was interrupted by the death of the author, presents in the two first volumes changes of view; but in the third volume edited by Holzmann there is no new elaboration of the doctrine of redemption; the text of the first edition is merely reproduced.

sacrifice, *i.e.*, to the surrender of His sentient life. For as His place in the world draws down the hostility of sin precisely on Himself, and involves Him in battle with the kingdom of darkness, He could keep Himself pure from temptations, and carry out His obedience to God, who was arranging His lot, only by proving His love to sinners, even unto the surrender of Himself to death. But in relation to sinful humanity Christ is not only God's revealer, He is its representative. For being appointed to be the Head or Central Individual of the renewed spiritual humanity which He is to develop out of the old sinful race, His suffering and dying subserve that end, in so far as in them He has secured the victory over sin not merely for His own person, but also for sinful humanity and in its room. The perfecting of Christ into absolute oneness with God, and to be the Head of the world of intelligences, which was accomplished in His resurrection and exaltation, is not, of course, the actual removal of sin in the old race. But as all the individuals of the new spiritual race meet in His individuality in One Person, He in history appropriates them to Himself by His Holy Spirit, and thus accomplishes at once their redemption from sin, and their actual exaltation as well as also the completion of the Incarnation of God, and the solution of the problem of creation. In this sphere now (that is, in the *applicatio gratiae*) it is obvious that not merely the fact but also the guilt of sin must be taken away in order that Redemption may correspond to its idea. But God cannot forgive where, as matter of fact, there is no separation from sin; and, on the other hand, this last presupposes forgiveness. This antinomy¹ is thus solved. God, for the sake of the sinner who is to be redeemed, as well as for His own sake, anticipates a forgiveness of sins, in which, indeed, the reaction of the holiness of God against sin is implied as the active commencement of the actual removal of sin from the personal life. This expiation of sin includes in itself the needed pledge for the future in the case in which we enter into personal and living fellowship with the Redeemer. As far as He is Redeemer in His relation to God as well as to men, so far is He also the means of propitiation for the sins of humanity. If

¹ For which Rothe finds support in Ebrard (as above, p. 303); he might have given his treatment of the subject greater weight by appealing to Kant! (See above, p. 413.)

we leave out of sight the theosophic arabesques of this presentation, all its characteristic features are to be found in Klaiber and Nitzsch,—both the indication of a train of thought that exclusively dwells upon the line of relation from God to man, and also his making propitiation to depend on the real and positive living fellowship of the individual with Christ. The idea also that the second Adam is the central individual is indeed something new in this way of putting it; yet it also has been hinted at by Nitzsch. But if, remembering the analogous idea in the dogmatic theology of the Reformed Church, we were to expect to find Christ under this title viewed as men's representative *before God*, such a connexion of ideas lies altogether beyond Rothe's sphere of vision. If, finally, we might think that so far as Christ's life-calling is thought of under ethical forms, His redeeming efficacy could be entirely referred also to the pattern He gave, as is the case in Klaiber's writings, Rothe, nevertheless, gives a peculiar character to the life-fellowship he insists on, by the theosophic background of his entire view of the universe.

Though there can be no sharper contrast than that between Rothe's objective and theosophic speculation and Rückert's subjective and critical procedure,¹ the two, nevertheless, not only go chronologically together, but also coincide herein, that they develop essentially the same view of redemption by Christ on the ground of what may be demanded or expected from redemption in accordance with the needs of sinful man. At the same time we are directly reminded of the procedure of Kant and of Tieftrunk, when Rückert postulates the idea of redemption to solve the contradiction between sin and the order of the universe, and that on the conditions that the removal of actual sin be regarded as an act of freedom, and that it be looked for from God in faith, who, as the Idea of the Good, and as the Law of the world, secures even for the sinful race its destination to Good. These two conditions of redemption, however, hold good only when redemption on God's side appears not as the working of omnipotence, but as the prompting of freedom. Redemption itself, moreover, has to do not merely with the removal of guilt, but also with the removal of sin from the will; guilt ceasing of itself when this last takes place. As, finally, it is laid down

¹ *Theologie*, 2 Bände. 1851.

that God exercises that influence partly by means of His revelation, partly by the training of men, history accordingly embodies in the *life* of Christ the revelation of God, which is the most perfect possible to men. That life was an uninterrupted living in God, because Christ at every moment willed that Idea which rules the world ; and, therefore, it was at the same time an abiding self-manifestation of God as the Idea of the Good, which with reference to sinful humanity is saving love. His action is the organ whereby these contents of His Person were revealed. But, in so far as our historical information upon Christ's life comes short of the clearness we desire, His voluntary death is so clearly marked as the highest deed of His life for the purpose of redemption, that from it His inmost being plainly shines forth to all susceptible observers. But as the action and voluntary dying of Christ reveals God's holy will, His life also at the same time is the realization of Godlike humanity. But that which, proceeding as it did from Christ's free determination, is the deed of highest love and the evidence of oneness with God—the sacrifice of His own Self, namely, for the salvation of others—is at the same time the highest *beauty*. The effect it produces is the awakening of love in those who are susceptible to it. But in the person we love, it is his ideality we love ; in the Person of Christ, it is the idea of the Good itself. "But where Christ's death on the cross awakens love to Him, that love slays sin." All true love awakens also shame that one is unideal in comparison with the beloved person ; by shame in the presence of the sinless Christ is called forth the struggle against sin in those who turn their love to Him. All love finally awakens effort after union ; this is impossible where there exists a separating opposition ; love to Christ, therefore, is the motive of earnest striving after release from sin. This influence of the crucified Christ in awakening counter love depends, however, just as much upon the *human* actuality of His life as upon its *divine* elevation. For without the former condition that faith in the *possibility* of assimilation to Christ would not exist, which makes counter love work towards its purpose, the removal of sin. But faith in Christ has its value as directing the life to that idea of the good which is presented and operates in Him, this faith is imputed by God as righteousness, because by it man grafts himself into the Divine order of the Good.

While this almost identical reproduction of Abelard's line of thought is distinguished by a psychological analysis of the utmost strictness of the love which is awakened by Christ, there at last appears in Alexander Schweizer's¹ presentation of the same thought, a historical statement as to who the thinker was in whose track all the men from Töllner onwards moved, apparently without knowing whom they followed. Schweizer is, of all the theologians of the present, the one who most deliberately has adopted Schleiermacher's points of view and the Schleiermacherian method. But the idea upon which the epoch-making importance of that divine rests,—the idea, namely, that all individual spirit-life is rightly understood only in all-sided relation to the community, finds even in this disciple only a very interrupted currency; nay, as a pre-supposition of the doctrine of redemption, it is only hinted at rather than allowed to exercise a real influence. For though the specifically Christian knowledge of God as the Father is referred to His revelation of Himself in the new life, and in the kingdom of heaven,² and though also the redeeming activity of Christ is made to consist in His life-giving communication of the religion of redemption, yet the entire contents of this thought are set forth only in application to the individual subject.³ Doubtless Schleiermacher himself made the same departure from his own fundamental thought (see above, p. 475). But Schweizer keeps to the traces of his great predecessor herein, that he starts from the principle that redemption and the Person of the Redeemer entirely correspond. For this reason the contents of the Person are determined entirely according to His redeeming activity, and according to the qualities which are needed to explain the latter. In this department Schweizer lays it down against Strauss that the Person of Christ is indispensable to the explanation of the phenomena of the Christian religion, which take their rise with Him; that these were not merely occasioned by Him; and that they could not possibly have existed apart from Him, and could not be reached by satisfactory deduction simply from the idea as such. For on such a foundation only a religion of law

¹ *Christl. Glaubenslehre nach protestantischen Grundsätzen*. First part of the second volume (1869), comp. p. 190.

² As above, vol. i. 360 *sqq.*

³ Vol. ii. p. 114 *sqq.*

could be built; it could not furnish the adequate basis for a religion of redemption. The personal fellowship with God, which, in general terms, is the form of this religion, assumes rather that Christ is and continues to be the central personality or the life-giving medium of religious life; the common doctrine of His personal oneness with the Father continuing to be indispensable. He is, at the same time, the perfect revelation of God, the Word of God, and also the genuine ideal of humanity, not indeed immediately for all the ramifications of life, but mediately in the principle which supplies in the religious completeness and perfection of His life the standard of moral activity in all its branches. The inmost life of His Person is His *Vocation* as Mediator and Redeemer, and from that His suffering also and His death became for Him morally necessary. His sinlessness also (which even if it is not at once established historically by the fact that He Himself lays claim to it, is so by the fact that His biography is free from every trace of repentance) is to be referred to His carrying out of His vocation. For redeeming love is the kernel of His personality;—redeeming love which, humanly viewed, appears as the highest attribute of God in Christ, and which expresses His whole being in its disposition and its activity. In these leading features Schweizer reproduces, in a more concrete style, the Christology of Schleiermacher, elaborated by means of ethical ideas, grounded on the Christian idea of God. If there is any defect that one has reason to complain of, it is that he does not carry far enough the ethical normation of the intuition of Christ; particularly, that His importance as central personality (which is recognised in His vocation) is not measured by reference to the thought of the kingdom of God, and is apprehended apart from that idea and also apart from the relation between the love of God and the kingdom of God.

Schweizer defines redemption by Christ very much in the terms supplied by Schleiermacher, but with the well-known modification that reconciliation with God is ranked before liberation from sin and before sanctification. These effects appear subjectively in the religion of redemption, for objective redemption consists just in the communication of that subjective function.¹ As far as the book has advanced at present

¹ This suggests J. H. Scholten: *Dogmaticæ Christianæ initia*; *Par*

the question regarding the kind of the above-mentioned results remains unanswered, for this falls to be treated under the doctrine of the Holy Ghost. Christ's work, Schweizer holds, can have no bearing upon God, to produce a change in Him, —not even in the office of High Priest. For this function also bears upon men, to help them, and to bring them before God in an acceptable way; and it is only in so far as Christ leads us and goes before us therein, that He assumes any attitude towards God. What Christ does, then, He works as the embodiment of God's loving will towards men, and, in fact, His obedience in His calling is the form in which this is shown. The ransom also which Christ has effected, having in death endured the curse of the law, is no satisfaction given to the wrath of God; but it is our redemption from the religion of the law, the negative side of the positive awakening in us of confidence towards God's love; for this confidence is what is contained in the religion of redemption. So far is Christ from having given a vicarious satisfaction, that it is incumbent even upon the redeemed man, in recognising God's right to punish, to complete the expiation of his sins by penitence, by self-condemnation. While this feature recalls Nietzsche, a thought on the other hand, which had been touched upon by Steudel, comes into a clearness that it had never before attained. As Schweizer had not succeeded in his interpretation of the priestly office in entirely setting aside the reference of Christ's work to God, he comes back in another place (as above, p. 134) to the position that, as Christ by the perfect offering of His obedience in His calling earns the complacent approval of God, and as He experienced the misery of human sin more deeply than we, He assumes a vicarious and even satisfactory character as security for those who are His; that His power to save develops itself in them into growing victory; and that He thus makes them to be objects of the Divine complacency. But Schweizer is just maintaining the line taken by Abelard when he adds this consideration as an appendix, as our own reflection—to which, as it seems, there is no counterpart in any purpose of Christ, as indeed even our redemption from the religion of the law was

Materialis, p. 59. Scholten, however, limits the significance of Christ to the fact that he is the archetype of true religion: while this thought with Schweizer is subordinated to the other one, that He is bearer of the perfect revelation.

accomplished by means of Christ's accursed death only in so far as Christians, by this proof of the contradiction between Christ and the Judaism that remained faithful to the law, have gained a conviction of the mutual incongruity of the two. Schweizer protests against the idea that his own view of redemption by Christ sets forth merely a change of subjective standpoint, and is therefore unsatisfactory from the religious point of view. I am very far from passing such a judgment upon it; but I find his elucidation to be theologically unsatisfactory, because, just as was intentionally the case with Rückert, it regards Christ, and particularly the fact of His death, only as the *occasion* for Christians having confidence in God as a Father, casting off the religion of the law, and recognising in Christ the pledge of their acceptance with God. This objection seems, I admit, to apply also to Abelard's doctrine. But his thought offers as a counterpoise to the seeming contingency of the reciprocal relation of God's love and the love of men, the consideration that it is on God's chosen ones that the act of reconciliation takes awakening effect.

Schweizer, with justice, condemns the undervaluing of Abelard's doctrine as compared with that of Anselm, to which the representatives of modern orthodoxy assign a value that has never been given to it in any previous age. In fact as a vehicle of religious life and feeling, it is only Abelard's thought that can be directly accepted,—not Anselm's theory. With respect to this, I may point out to those admirers of the latter who abhor the former as rationalistic, that so decided a representative of modern Moravian Pietism as Madame von Krüdener moved wholly in Abelard's line of thought. She was wont, as a contemporaneous observer bears witness,¹ to express herself to the effect that the essence of the gospel of Jesus Christ is love to the crucified One. In the great sacrificial death of Christ lay, as she put it, the fountain of Divine love. Only by counter love to Him could we share in forgiveness of sins and reconciliation with God. From this love to God, she maintained, springs that living faith which cannot for a moment doubt the promise of God.

¹ See *Frau von Krüdener, Ein Zeitgemälde*. Berne, 1868, p. 196.

CHAPTER X.

THE COURSE OF PIETISM TILL THE REPRISTINATION OF LUTHERAN ORTHODOXY.

69. It is all the more improper to regard Schleiermacher as the leader of the theology of the nineteenth century, because alongside of the isolated results of his continued influence we find two compact schools quite heterogeneous to his—the school of Pietistic orthodoxy and that of philosophic radicalism. For these do not deduce their origin from Schleiermacher, though they may have taken some hints from him. The Pietistic-orthodox school seems in its roots to be connected with Schleiermacher, for they both have their origin in the Moravian brotherhood. On closer consideration, however, it becomes manifest that Schleiermacher's doctrine of salvation is of another stamp than that which modern Pietism has taken from the Moravians. We enter upon a region that has hitherto been but little explored, in taking in hand to determine the theological influences of Pietism as a whole, and its influence upon the doctrines before us in particular. For this reason regard to chronology must be subordinated to the attainment of a way of arranging the subject that shall follow those positive points of view which are determined by distinguishing the various forms and gradations of Pietism. If we consider the goal which has been reached in the repristination of Lutheran orthodoxy, the Pietistic origin of that movement cannot be doubted, and is easy to prove. But this is the region of that modern Pietism within the Church, which as such does not date further back than the year 1817, and which has little in common with the older Pietism which arose with Spener. This last connects effort after personal sanctity, in withdrawing from the world as entirely as possible, with a peculiar and individually attained assurance of salvation, and aims at or secures both in closer union with like-minded persons who continue to be more or

less indifferent to the Church forms of fellowship. (See above, p. 330.) Now herein lies the difficulty of historically mastering this field, that this religious and moral life in its very nature withdraws from publicity, and that therefore the theological literature which accompanies it, and the controversies which are carried on, assume a remoter relation to the praxis of the party than is usual in other cases, and really throw very little light upon it. Nay, we must doubt whether the method of individual assurance of salvation, which originally constitutes the problem of the older Pietism, has more occupied the "quiet in the land" than has their effort after sanctity, and to keep themselves unspotted from the world. For very distinct proofs are to be met with that in these circles the assurance of salvation has gradually come to be subordinated to sanctity, and made to depend on it.

For this reason the method of penitential exercise, by which the Pietists of Halle met the proper and original problem of Pietism, and that too in accord with the dogmatic premisses of Lutheranism, was after all only an episode in the history of that school. When it was only attempted, as was the case in the earliest Pietism, to realize the precepts enjoined in the Lutheran doctrine of *pœnitentia*, in order thereby to gain the assurance that the faith which has been attained is a right one, such a tendency essentially points the attention to attainments of the past. This is also the case in so far as that inner experience was sought in the form of intellectual reflection, and of the determinations of the will regulated thereby. For this reason the theology of the school of Halle adheres with the utmost strictness to the line of Lutheran tradition, although the attention devoted in a preponderant measure to the *praxis pietatis* also prevented dogmatic theology from being handled with scholastic precision, and gave no security for the maintenance of correct doctrinal notions. J. A. Freylinghausen's unusually widely circulated *Grundlegung der Theologie* (1703 :—I have before me the 14th edition, 1774) follows the Lutheran type of doctrine throughout, yet gives it in so popular and diluted a form that the book comes up more to what might be expected of a catechism than to what is required in a scientific system. In it all the doctrines are accompanied by observations on the

duties they establish and the comfort they convey; hereby it is indicated that they assert their value not as a systematic knowledge of the truth but merely as individual incitements to the praxis of piety. So far as the doctrines of Reconciliation and Justification are concerned, the first is maintained in this Pietistic system of doctrine in a thoroughly orthodox form; but the second has to submit to a modification, which Löscher indeed has reprimanded as a departure from the true faith,¹ but which arises only from the circumstance that the Pietists aimed at a practically gained and individual conviction of justification, which had rather been repudiated by orthodox teachers.

Freylinghausen, in the first instance, defines justification quite correctly as meaning that God gives and imputes to the true penitent and believer the righteousness of Christ, and for the sake of that righteousness forgives his sins and remits their punishment. In so far as on man's side faith is the cause of justification, it is not regarded as a virtue but as God's work in man. But, indeed, only those become real partakers of justification who in honest repentance die to sin, and by faith seek and appropriate its forgiveness in the blood of Christ, with renunciation of all worthiness and righteousness of their own. Believers can be assured of their justification inasmuch as, *following the order of repentance and of faith*, it is based upon the worth of the Mediator. This *active wrestling* of faith with God to gain assurance of justification, which is asserted and required by Antony and Joachim Lange in language more distinct, is found by Löscher to be liable to the objection that something is included as a ground of salvation which belongs only to its *ordering*. For in orthodox Lutheranism, faith, to which justification is referred, had been posited as a passive form, and not as an active power (p. 280). The witness of the Holy Ghost to adoption and justification, as a witness of Divine authority, was sharply distinguished from merely moral assurance as an opinion arising from human conjecture. For, as Gerhard shows against Bellarmin,² that witness is distinguished from any arbitrary emotion of the soul, in that it never occurs *extra*

¹ Compare Von Engelhardt: *Valentin Ernst Löscher nach seinem Leben und Wirken* (1853), pp. 179, 215.

² *Loc. Theol.* xvii. Ed. Cotta; tom. vii. p. 107 sq.

verbum Dei. The inner witness invariably finds place only in so far as, in the first instance, the Holy Ghost makes Himself felt in the promise of grace preached and heard; in this view of Rom. viii. 16 it is implied that the human spirit stands in a relation of mere passivity to the Divine. But should the other interpretation (which is preferred by the Reformers) hold good, that in the invocation of God by His name of Father the Divine Spirit works in alliance with the human, and that accordingly the pacification of our conscience, earnestness in prayer, striving after virtue, and patience in misfortune evince our adoption as children of God, all this is explicable only from that first synthesis in which the Divine Spirit shows itself active, and the human spirit is passive. The case of hypocritical faith does not set aside the general trustworthiness of that Divine testimony; were it otherwise we should be compelled to doubt our own actual humanity, because there are such things as ghosts in human shape. But now the preached word contains the promise of grace *in general*, and thus the witness of the Holy Ghost that is active therein *cannot appropriate in a particular manner* the assurance of our being in a state of grace. Gerhard's answer to this objection betrays the weak side of the orthodox view. For in it the two thoughts of the revelation of the Word and of the witness of the Spirit are separated; and by appealing to the expressed assurance of salvation of a Job, a Paul, a John, Gerhard ventures only to assert it to be *possible* that believers should be assured of their standing in faith and of their sonship.¹ And when he bases this assertion particularly upon Paul's exhortation (2 Cor. xiii. 5) to examine ourselves whether we be in the faith, the psychological basis of the theory he intends to establish is shown to be inadequate. In no case can the human spirit be conceived to be thoroughly and exclusively passive; otherwise it is thought of as an object of mechanical movement apart from its essential and distinctive feature of self-consciousness. But if a determinateness prior to the self-consciousness is to be regarded as belonging to the human spirit, the spirit must yet appropriate to itself that

¹ *L. c.*, p. 109: *Credientes in Christum non solum in genere sciunt præparatam esse electis vitæ æternæ hæreditatem, sed etiam in specie sciunt, sibi eam esse præparatam; illud norunt ex revelatione verbi, hoc vero ex interno Spiritus Sancti testimonio. . . . Utique ergo vere credentes scire possunt an sint in fide et an Christus in ipsis habitet.*

determinateness in self-consciousness. If, therefore, the influence of the Holy Spirit is to be directly represented as the cause of the human self-consciousness that corresponds to it, this can yet be represented as actual only under the form of the last, and in accordance with the conditions of its activity. Or if the witness of the Holy Spirit is to be included in the general proclamation of salvation, then as witness for any one subject it holds good only in virtue of a syllogism which the subjective self-consciousness draws out according to its own particular experiences. As Gerhard himself cannot escape these impressions, he has in his character as the defender of orthodoxy prepared the way precisely for the practical application which was finally enunciated in principle by the Pietists. These last would have it that the question whether the general promise of justification through Christ applies to the individual subject or no can be decided only by the completeness of his repentance and the liveliness of his faith. And since for the rest they recognised with all correctness this objective vehicle for the reception of justification, they did not in theory at all depart from orthodoxy, and they exercised repentance as the Lutheran dogmatic prescribed. If, notwithstanding this, Löscher was puzzled by the practical physiognomy of Pietism, we shall have to conclude therefrom that the distinction of repentance into remorse, arising from the law, and faith arising from the general promise, constitutes in religious and moral respects the weakest side of the Lutheran system. And this is beyond all doubt by what has been said above (p. 183).

This Halle Pietism, the praxis of penitential exercise, has not continued to exercise any public or at all regulative influence in the Evangelical Church of the nineteenth century. In the first beginning of the "awakening," such a tendency may have run in an under current; but the refutation devoted to this method by Hengstenberg in the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* for 1840 met no actual want of the time, but perhaps only served the purpose of masking that other modern Pietism for which he just at that time held it seasonable to seek to gain dominion over the Evangelical Church. The modern Pietism within the Church does not descend directly from the old separatistic movement. The positive peculiarity of the latter—perfectionism, as the orthodox polemical divines expressed themselves

—that earnest and retiring striving after sanctity which characterized “the quiet in the land,” is not to be found in modern Pietism, at least in so far as it has come into publicity as a party and exercised influence upon theology and the Church. The literary influences which proceeded from members of the older school, such as Lavater and Jung-Stilling, were also so conditioned by their opposition to the Illumination, that they rested not so much upon the ethical speciality as upon the general and positively Christian basis of Pietism. From Methodism, too, modern Pietism has received into itself only casual and by no means specific impressions. On the contrary it confessedly takes colour from the Moravian Brotherhood,¹ and demonstrably descends from it through definite persons. Thus it is possible fully and rightly to ascertain its distinctive features. Zinzendorf separates himself from the whole previous history of evangelical Christianity hereby, that he appropriated the latter as an object of phantasy, and as a motive of feeling deliberately introverted, i.e. of sentimentality. Sentimentality expresses that other tendency of culture of illumination which in the previous century became current in conjunction with the morality of common sense. Before that mood, under the influence of the intellectual “illumination,” took a position of indifference to Christianity, it corresponded with the traditional preponderance of the positively Christian system that such a man as Zinzendorf brought to bear upon this material the plenitude of his power of imagination, and connected with it

¹ Tholuck in Herzog's *Realencyklopädie*, xi. p. 662: “It cannot be said that the new awakening has gone back to the Pietism of Halle or taken colour from it;—rather may we say that it wears the colour of the Moravian Brotherhood, to the influence of which many declared themselves to be indebted for their new life, as also the circles influenced by Schleiermacher retained some sympathies for the Moravians. Yet in certain lineaments it also coincides with the former Pietism of Halle, as, for example, in the strict separation between the world and the children of God, the withdrawal from worldly enjoyment and sociality, not so much from science and art. The new party has had a public organ from the year 1827 in the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*. Without looking down with contempt upon the brethren in their conventicle dress, this new Pietism exchanged this garb for the *costume of society*, and Ruge saw himself compelled to distinguish amongst the Pietists the ordinary and the *perfumed*.” I add the remark that the brethren in conventicle dress are those Pietists who associate with the effort after sanctity in their ascetic withdrawal from the world an interest in mystic and theosophic culture.

his introverted love for the sentimental. On the whole, the representation of religion in the phantasy is nothing abnormal, for it is the earliest agency in the objective presentation and communication of religion, and at every epoch in the development of Christianity there can clearly be discerned an intensification of the phantasy, and the appropriation by that faculty of new motives. But what in this fashion has been gained in any particular period was always, before Zinzendorf, fixed in the intellectual forms of public doctrine or the social rule of a monkish order. To Zinzendorf, on the other hand, the tendency to such a course is altogether unknown. Nay, as he himself regarded the phantasy not as the elementary organ of religion but as the chief one which gives it all its value, he sought to make sure that the religious feelings of his followers should have the advantage of what he had himself acquired, by arranging the order of worship and the social constitution of his society, with the deliberate intention that a definite manner of feeling and of looking at things might always be kept alive.

There are in the Christian Church one man and one society to whom Zinzendorf and the Moravian Brotherhood, comparatively speaking, bear a resemblance. They are Ignatius Loyola and the order of the Jesuits. In the Spaniard, just as in Zinzendorf, awakening is the result of an enthusiastic and gushing excitement of the phantasy, and maintains itself in the sentimental mood of chivalrous devotion to the Holy Virgin. The founder of the order of the Jesuits, moreover, in the so-called *exercitia spiritualia S. Ignatii*, has devised a characteristic schooling of the faculty of imagination, in order to dispose the spirits of men in a manner corresponding to the nature of this society; and wherever patterns of peculiar piety are to be detected in the modern saints of the Roman Catholic Church, saturated as it is with Jesuitism, sentimentality is their fundamental feature. But of course the relation between the constitution of the society and the common fantastic sentimental piety is inverted on the Catholic and the evangelical side respectively, in accordance with the respective characters of the two phenomena. For the constitution of the Moravian Brotherhood is designed only as a means for the maintenance of pious intuitions and of a certain frame of feelings in its members. The methodical excitement of the phantasy, on the other hand,

in the Jesuit exercises, only serves to make the spirits compliant to the intellectual machinery of the political purposes of the Society of Jesus. The order of the Jesuits, in intention, defends the catholic, universal, political claims of the Romish Church; but precisely by this may it be discerned to be the representative of the real particularism of the Romish Church and a witness against its catholicity. The Moravian Brotherhood, which by reducing to indifference the confessional differences of the evangelical churches, assumes to itself a certain character of evangelical catholicity, by no means conceals its particularism on the other hand, when, after its own style, it promises peace of mind only to men of peculiar spiritual and religious wants. Thus it unmistakeably assumes the type of a sect which, in certain circumstances (as, for example, in Livonia), it has even evinced in aggression against the Church. On the whole, however, such a designation appropriately belongs to the Moravian Brotherhood as such, in a sense that conveys no reproach, so far namely as it intentionally confines its task to definite psychological conditions of religious agreement.

Modern Pietism, on the other hand, is the form in which the piety which bears the stamp of the Moravian Brotherhood seeks to become authoritative within the evangelical Church of Germany and at the same time to control its theology. According to the peculiarity of the Moravian Brotherhood that we have described, it is conceded that the awakening which began to spread visibly some time about the year 1817,¹ consisted chiefly in an excitement of phantasy and of introverted feeling by the ideas of reconciliation and justification in Christ, and that this was brought about in smaller circles of society, which, however, did not stand in a negative attitude towards the Church forms of Christianity, but sought rather to cultivate them as much as possible. From the positive doctrinal tradition that prevailed in the Moravian Brotherhood, from the fact that public teaching in the Church at that time was for the most part rationalistic, from the influence of the rising culture of the Romantic school, and, finally, in view of the standing

¹ The contemporaneous awakening in the Reformed Church of Geneva, which, in the actual circumstances there, led to separation, is instructive. Compare Goltz: *Die reformirte Kirche Genf's im 19^{ten} Jahrhundert*, 1862.

peculiarity of the evangelical Church of Germany, may be gathered the special marks and conditions of the position taken up by this Pietism within the Church. Zinzendorf, in his appropriation of the traditional doctrinal idea by the fancy had, in one direction, violently distorted its structure by raising into prominence his pet ideas, and in another direction had far overstepped its limits in approximating to Separatists and Mystics. On the other hand, his collaborateurs and successors, particularly the "sober and judicious" Spangenberg, succeeded, while remaining wholly faithful to the essential ideas of Zinzendorf and those that exercised living power, in making the doctrine of the Moravian Brotherhood conform as much as possible with the orthodoxy of the Lutheran Church, so that in the present century the theology of the founder has come to be almost less known in the brotherhood itself than outside its limits.¹ Hence, the awakening within the Evangelical Church of Germany, which proceeded from the Moravian Brotherhood, connected itself with the main features of the Lutheran doctrinal system. But now, as the chief interest of this church was always expressed in theology, while the proper organization of the congregations was neglected, the awakening not only immediately placed itself in opposition to the rationalism prevailing in the pulpits, but, on the whole, sought after and attained, as its main object, a theological change in the state of doctrine. Rationalism was that culture from which, in the awakening, men withdrew themselves. In this awakening men did not experience a conversion out of the acute life of sin to a life in moral duty, but the transition from the low intellectuality of the Illuminist effort after virtue to the positively Christian view of the entire universe, the connexion of which laid hold of the phantasy and feeling of the awakened, and the dignity of which laid hold of the determination of their will, and that too all the more powerfully as they were met by something new and unexpected. For though they might perhaps know the formal outlines of the orthodox system from the polemic which rationalism had conducted against the point of particular doctrines of orthodoxy, this could only deepen the impression produced by a living and systematic biblical repre-

¹ This is the judgment of H. Plitt: *Zinzendorf's Theologie*, vol. i., preface, pp. 11, 12.

sentation of the doctrine of God's grace, on men in whom the romantic culture of the time had developed the necessary capacity of æsthetic appreciation. It is hardly necessary to remind the reader how much the æsthetic sense for the historical appreciation of remote circles of culture had been developed and diffused by the so-called Romancists, how, in particular, all possible forms of the history of religion, which had been alien and unintelligible to the Illumination, were brought within the reach of the imaginative faculty and commended to the interest of humanity. This extension of historical view by the romance school proved beneficial also to the view of Christianity derived from biblical sources, and, at the same time, to the knowledge of the reciprocal relation between the New and the Old Testament. Such theological discoveries are set forth with peculiar freshness in, for example, Stier's *Andeutungen für gläubiges Schriftverständnis*,¹ because they serve at once to promote æsthetic and religious satisfaction. But just in proportion as this was the case did the particularistic and sectarian accompaniment of this tendency evince itself, on the one hand, in indifference or disinclination to the worldly literature, which was the spiritual substance of the general culture of the period, and on the other hand, in rejection of the claims which reason makes on theology, in order that the latter may show itself as a science; by this I mean historical criticism of the Bible records, grammatical strictness in their interpretation, systematic interest in all necessary branches of theological culture, particularly in Christian ethics and in Church history. I can follow with real sympathy the upward flight of the awakening, and disregard many exaggerated features, which, as Stier's biography shows, connect themselves with it from the outset; but the sectarian character of this religious and theological movement, the leaning to a narrow social circle conditioned by social standing, explain perfectly why the theology, which was propagated in this party, never, as a rule, grew beyond dilettantism. The historical sense, which without any doubt is what originally conditioned this theology, never raised itself above the immaturity of the Romantic school; it dissipated itself in all sorts of obsolete and at bottom unhistorical hobbies in the sphere of Old Testament

¹ "Hints for a believing understanding of the Scriptures."

history ; but as it never rose to a comprehensive understanding of the history of the Christian Church and doctrine, it renounced its own proper purification and completion. When we gather from the preface to John Fr. von Meyer's *Inbegriff der christlichen Glaubenslehre* that it is absolutely of no value to know what all theologians in all time have thought, and that all that is necessary is to possess the key of the Holy Ghost in order to understand Scripture ; this is to be regarded as a confession of the party in which this theological dilettante passes as a master. But the Holy Spirit is not an acquisition of individual enthusiasm,—He is the Spirit of God in the Church, and He cannot be claimed as the strength and as the standard of our theological knowledge, unless we maintain our insight into the primal form of Christianity in reciprocal relation with a comprehensive understanding of the history of the Church and its doctrine. That, moreover, the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* came to be not only the organ for the practical aims of the party, but also the dominant and central point of its theological culture, at once shows right clearly that the party was doomed to fall ere it had produced results of value. For this *Kirchenzeitung* is of such a character that it could not but incapacitate its followers for all earnest and systematic theological work, and cause them to cease to have any respect for it.

70. Before, however, this institution began its fatal career, before the "awakening" allied itself in it with the interests of all sorts of theological reaction, modern Pietism exhibited a certain liberality precisely with reference to the doctrine of reconciliation, which it presented in more than one shape that bore a heterodox stamp. I must omit taking special notice of Zinzendorf's notions of the doctrine. Plitt, in the above-cited book, distinguishes between an original and sound doctrine, taught by the founder of the brotherhood, and a corruption thereof, dating no further back than 1742. This is an assertion with regard to which I cannot pronounce an opinion, but at least there is no need for any repetition of those orthodox trains of thought which Plitt has set forth in the first volume of his work, and which Spangenberg defends in the *Idea fidei fratrum* ; while, on the other hand, Zinzendorf's fanciful contemplations of Christ in His passion fall specifically outside of

the compass of my task. One circumstance, however, merits attention,—that in Zinzendorf as well as in other forerunners of modern Pietism, the elementary representations of the patristic period are resuscitated just in proportion as the devout fancy applied itself to clothing positively Christian ideas in lively images. Zinzendorf accordingly again took it upon him to bring Christ's redemption into relation with the power of Satan, whose claim to all mankind is assumed to be recognised by God. The expressions indeed that Plitt quotes (as above, pp. 297-300), are of such a nature that I am unable to get any intelligibly connected meaning out of them. Lavater, Jung-Stilling, and Hamann, on the other hand, following the type of Hilary of Poitiers (p. 8), explain upon the analogy of a chemico-physiological process the redemption of the human race viewed as a natural unit;¹ whence also Schleiermacher's

¹ Stier: *Andeutungen für gläubiges Schriftverständnis*, ii. pp. 63, 64, quotes the following passages from one of Lavater's letters (in Pfenninger's *Repertorium*, ii. 1. p. 139): "By the inoculation, if I may so speak, of this new quantum of religiousness and morality, and of physical vital energy, the archæus of the whole race has again attained to such force, impetus, and vigour, that now once more, like a tree laden with glorious fruits, it can again grow up into the skies.—Sin is ignorance and sickness. When the ignorance and *materia peccans* are taken away, wrong and punishment are at an end. All sin is sin by reason of its hurtfulness. If the harm of sin is taken away, then sin is taken away. To forgive sin and to render innocuous sin, which in itself is harmful, or to make good the harm it has done, are one and the same thing. The grace of God is the antidote for the poison of sin. Christ is the antidote of sin, purifier, atonement. To purify and atone for are identical; so are to quicken and to bestow grace."—Jung-Stilling: *Heimweh* (4ter Theil, in the 5th vol. of the *Sämml. Schriften*, p. 68): "The Logos whereby the Infinite One communicates Himself to finite reasonable Being, quickened one organ in this body (of humanity that had lapsed into corruption, death, decay) that yet remained sound, and allied Himself inseparably with it. Of this organ He made a fountain of life, and caused the Spirit of divine love to operate throughout the whole dead mass. But thereby the resistance of the power of death grew more intense, there arose a violent struggle in the body like a high fever; the organ already designated was itself affected by suppuration; but just thereby did it recover and come to be the Head, the life-source of a new moral Person, namely, of the regenerate humanity or the spiritual body of Christ. The Redeemer united that divine spirit of love with His own human spirit, and thus assimilated it with human nature, and made it invincible; brought it about that by His holy living, suffering, dying, and rising again, He overcame the Whole power of death which reigned in the entire body of humanity. Every member that frankly yields itself to the operation of the Spirit of Christ is made whole, and becomes an organ of His body.—Now do I understand the sinner's reconciliation with God. As long as a member in this body corporate continues to derive no vital power from the Head, so long is it sick and an object of loathing in the eyes of God: but according as it is operated on by that Spirit it grows

similar comparisons (p. 468) receive a measure of explanation. The "awakening," however, with its keener theological interest immediately advanced to the now prevailing preference for Anselm's theory, and, while thus unfurling the banner of Scholasticism, handed over to oblivion those patristic reminiscences of its forerunners.

Notwithstanding this, Tholuck and Stier, who are the most brilliant representatives of the theology of the awakening, display each in his own way a remarkable independence towards the juristic feature of orthodoxy, by which the new school was so much attracted. We do the former no injustice when we presume that in his *Lehre von der Sünde und vom Versöhner* (1823) he has not hesitated in part to adopt suggestions from Schleiermacher; but the hints which he gives for the doctrine of reconciliation¹ proceed upon the schema of the high-priestly office, which the other was not able to hold fast (p. 483). The priestly office is that of mediation between man and God. It embraces everything that Christ was in this life in His new manhood, which is identical with the Godhead; and the prophetic office, as an exhibition of the person of Jesus in speech, can, he maintains, be easily subsumed under the other. Could not the kingly office also be included under the priestly, or shown to be a presupposition of it? Christ's priestly work is no other than the fulfilment of the righteousness demanded by the law; the active obedience is everything; but in order to be able to yield it, "it was needful that He should not shun any hard thing that His entrance into the human race brought along with it." Having taken upon Himself that which in human nature is the wages of sin, having experienced in Himself the enmity of sin to all that is good, having in supreme love had a

always liker to the Divine nature, and consequently by degrees is reconciled with it."—Hamann: *Fliegender Brief an Niemand den Kundbaren* (in vol. vii. of Roth's edition of his *Schriften*, p. 117):—"He whose conviction rests upon the word and deed of a Man who as God of the living, and not of the dead, after a triumph of right and might over the most universal law of nature, has brought to light a universal elixir of immortality against the sting of death, and from the carrion and bones of the despot and destroyer has derived meat and sweetness for *nutrimentum spiritus*; in order that peace on earth to the satisfaction of entire humanity might be prepared by the rejection of a wicked and adulterous generation, and the reception of the lost son procured as the latest prelude to the most glorious and most terrible resurrection, and the completion of the universe unto glory in the highest."

¹ *Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. Versöhner*, 3rd ed. (1830), p. 93 sqq.

fellow-feeling of the misery of sin in the world, His action was passion, and His passion the highest act. Could not this correct view of the life and passion of Christ, as fulfilment of the universal law, be put on a firmer footing by means of the notion of Christ's vocation, which is the true expression of that will of God which was the meat of the Son? As in this obedience He took death upon Himself, death was for Christ the condition of His own beatification and glorification, with the design that those should enter into righteousness and life who by faith come into fellowship with Him. This new humanity, made one with Christ, has (as glorified) been declared by God from all eternity to be righteous; but as what God speaks is His Will, and what He wills is deed, to be declared righteous means to be made righteous, and the annihilation of sin is included in its forgiveness. This line of thought also recalls Schleiermacher (p. 492), but its application is freed from a multitude of objections which otherwise surround this point of doctrine, because the concrete idea of God lies under it. Christ's prestation of righteousness, recognised in His life and Passion, makes it possible to Tholuck to adopt the proposition that God is reconciled through Christ, that satisfaction has been given to His justice. But it cannot very well be concealed that this proposition has quite another meaning than that which it has in the forensic theories of the atonement. This impression is deepened by Tholuck himself, when he briefly develops the hypotheses of Anselm, Thomas, and Grotius; but why do we miss in this series the criminal-law theory of Lutheran and Reformed divines? and if, on the other hand, concern is expressed lest, by the complete setting aside of juridical forms of representation, the kernel of the leading ideas of Scripture should receive injury, would not a contrasting of Tholuck's own view with the orthodox theory of punishment bring into clearest light the purely *ethical* meaning of the former, and its removal from juristic spheres of vision? This and other instrumentalities have not been employed by Tholuck toward the full unfolding of the point of view indicated in his book, which in design is ascetic rather than scholastic; I must not, however, conceal the fact that these hints contain in themselves an element of truth, which, with fine tact, has been kept unharmed by foreign additions.

In comparison with Tholuck, Stier's essays proceed upon studies that are even historically imperfect, for he directs his investigation to the question of the significance of Christ's death alone as distinguished from His active life. This difference from Tholuck is probably to be explained from the fact that in his autodidactic efforts Stier stood aloof from the influence of Schleiermacher. In brief succession he has elaborated two outlines of the doctrine of reconciliation, which are not mutually complementary, as Stier gives out, but entirely exclude one another.¹ He begins with a denial of the juridical doctrine of satisfaction more decisive than anything that has been written (that is, in this line of presentation) since Faustus Socinus.² If God's love or grace must be regarded as the ground of the plan of salvation that remains always the same and unchangeable, if we are gratuitously redeemed, and as by a gift, then this attitude of God cannot be called forth by a satisfaction on Christ's part, which would include in itself a valid claim of right on our part. If then God forgives sins, he does not punish them either in the person of the sinner or in the person of another in his room. If, on the other hand, the justice of God demands punishment for infinite guilt, then only the annihilation of sinners would be the full satisfaction which God could exact for Himself. The passion of Christ, on the other hand, can have been no punishment, because it is only the conviction of having offended God that can make a pain become a punishment; but Christ was always assured within Himself of the love of God, precisely on account of His death. And if we concede that God accepted the passion of Christ as a fully sufficient punishment, then this half-renunciation of God's claim of right really admits the entire invalidity of the claim. Finally, the imputation of Christ's legal obedience cannot be maintained,—in the first place, because neither guilt nor merit admits of transference; in the second place, because on such a presupposition the bestowal of grace would be by

¹ *Andeutungen für gläubiges Schriftverständnis*. 1ste Sammlung (1824), pp. 379-403; 2te Sammlung (1828, otherwise known as *Beiträge zur biblischen Theologie*), pp. 24-116.

² I may add, that Lavater also with all distinctness declares that doctrine to be unbiblical and nonsensical. (*Briefe über die Schriftlehre von unserer Veröhnung mit Gott durch Christum* (1793) in Gesenher's edition of his *Nachgelassene Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 84 sqq.). Menken's similar view will be noticed afterwards.

merit and not gratuitously. In the Bible too there is no word either of a punishment which is an end in itself, or of reconciliation of God by Christ, or of the reference of God's wrath to Him. According to Scripture, the necessity of Christ's suffering and dying does not arise in God but in men. For Scripture is altogether silent upon the deep things of the eternally hidden God, while it sets forth His revelation to us and in us. If now, as Stier in his first sketch argues at length, Christ is the bearer of God's love and grace, then it was needful at the same time to overcome in sinners the impression of the wrath of God which stood as an obstacle in the way of *recognition* of eternal grace. For God's mercy and justice are not opposed to one another in God Himself, but only in the consciousness of the sinner. In order that this opposition may be done away, it is needed that God's forgiving love should be combined with clear proof of His serious displeasure against sin. Now, in Christ, we have no mere ratification of the love of God, as neologians think; but, at the same time, an equally serious ratification of His wrath, and a *threatening view* of what awaits us if we do not surrender ourselves to such love.

Christ is thus a *penal example* in His death.¹ And, indeed, Stier does not any longer, like the half-orthodox opponents of the Illumination, place this view in combination with that of the penal satisfaction (p. 381), but in conscious opposition to it. This, however, is the point in defence of which Stier undertook his second copious dissertation. But while admitting the error of his previous deduction, he yet excuses it by citation of the coincident declarations of men of a similar tendency, partly Germans, partly English,² which enable us to see how widely diffused the idea has come to be among the very persons who, as defenders of positive Christianity, opposed themselves to the Illumination. What Stier suggests in room of the theory of Grotius, is Luther's thought (adopted also by Klaiber) that Christ in His death overcame sin in so far as He had to do with it. As Christ, according to Rom. viii. 3, was born in the likeness of sinful flesh, He assumed to Himself for the good of men, and as their representative, weakness or liability to be tempted to sin, as a consequence of sin compatible with His

¹ Baur (p. 668) has entirely ignored this issue of Stier's presentation.

² *Zweite Sammlung*, p. 47 sq.

own divinity and personal sinlessness. He accordingly experienced in Himself temptation in the form of allurements to the omission of what is good, specially in the impulse towards self-preservation. In order then to withstand this temptation, and in it the obstructing influence of human sin in its totality, so far as He was accessible thereto, it was requisite for Christ to submit Himself to the lot of death and to renounce self-preservation. This eventful struggle of life with death, the conditions of which are stated with delicate observation, is, according to him, the regeneration of the corrupt creature-basis of sinful humanity. "The connexion of engraftment between the spirit of God and our flesh is restored again when the Son of God, in our flesh and blood, overcomes the might of death and destruction, and its powers to impede; and His humanity allied to us is transfigured thereby into a blood of the spirit, flesh, and life, which we can enjoy, by partaking of which we again acquire life in ourselves, and in unction with which we acquire the power to sustain and labour after the great and indispensable process of the new-birth of our nature." In this view, just as is the case with Luther, Christ's struggle with sin is characterized only as the maintenance of His own individual purity. If, however, the renovation of the human race is deduced in a really intelligible way, and not merely asserted in the phrase of the new-birth of the creature-basis of humanity, then instead of Christ's death it is rather His resurrection that comes into central prominence. But the universal significance of the death of Christ where this is presupposed, arises only in so far as faith in Him is awakened, and in that faith, the condemnation of sin completed by imitation of His death, *i.e.*, by repentance and patient endurance of all the sufferings with which we are visited. "Thus our entering into Christ's death for us, with discerning and appropriating faith, is at the same time our entering into His resurrection for us. This faith, which once for all takes possession of us, makes us to be in our conscience righteous before God; for it is the living root that guarantees our perfect sanctification as long as we abide in it, and by it strive to be ever more intimately one with Christ in His death and life."

71. Stier's doctrine of reconciliation, both in its negative and positive interests, is maintained by others also, who descend

from the older Pietismi, and who take up again Luther's thought of the vanquishing of sin by Christ in such a way that for the first time it loses that stamp of casualness which it appears to have both with Stier and with Klaiber. Here the school of John Albert Bengel comes to be considered.¹ It rests upon the orthodox doctrine of the Divine inspiration of the whole Bible. But in this proposition was contained more than was utilized by the orthodox school in the use it made of Scripture. That school only required that the *dicta probantia* of Scripture which were needed for the theological system should be clothed with Divine authority. For Scripture, although it was affirmed to be the single source of the system, was yet as matter of fact employed only as the supplementary norm of a system that had been propagated in tradition; and the surplus of ideas which Scripture offered remained in the background. It is easy to see that the importance of Scripture as the source of revelation, as a divinely-inspired whole, could not fail at length to take its effect within evangelical theology. Pietism, in Bengel's case, gave an impulse to the employment of this thought, in so far as in that circle the use of the Bible for purposes of edification rose to a much higher pitch, as in fact did the use of all ascetic instrumentalities which had indeed previously held a place in the Church, but had not been applied with the same conscientiousness as Pietism bestowed upon them. If piety required to draw nourishment from all parts of the Bible because it is throughout inspired by God, Bengel inferred on the same grounds that even the recondite and scattered chronological data of Scripture have an emphatic value, and point not merely to a material, but also at the same time to a chronological, order in the Divine economy in the human race. The emphasis which was presumed to lie upon all historical particulars had led other thinkers, who started from the same premisses, to an allegorical interpretation of Scriptura. Bengel, on the contrary, was led by it upon the path of apocalyptic computation of time. This, however, is only the elementary form in which he made the concatenation of historical revelation as such to be the task of theology. The Cocceians had already offered

¹ Compare H. von der Goltz: *Die theologische Bedeutung Bengel's und seiner Schule* in the *Jahrb. für deutsche Theol.* vi. (1861), p. 460-506. Diestel: *Geschichte des alten Testaments in der christl. Kirche*, 698 sq.

the germ of this idea; but that school, the indirect influence of which on Bengel is very probable, had still employed it in the service of the orthodox system.¹ Bengel, however, takes up the historical task as such. But at the same time he lays hold of the Bible immediately as the source of a theological system; and herein lies his error. His expression in the *Ordo temporum*, xi. 13: "We must not regard Holy Scripture as books of sayings and examples, but as an incomparable statement of the Divine economy in dealing with the human race from the beginning down to the end of all things through all the ages of the world; as a *beauteous, magnificent, concatenated system*,"² lays down as identical two characteristics which in their very nature cannot co-exist. Bengel has unquestionably undeniable merit in assigning to the thought of the kingdom of God its constitutive importance towards the understanding of revelation and the "training of the human race" contemplated therein. But his prevalent leaning to eschatology, which prevented him from discovering the full ethical contents of this thought, was connected with the very casual circumstance that the barely canonical Apocalypse of John closes the series of the books of the Bible, while the Pentateuch opens with the narrative of the creation of the world. But, however the pretended biblical system of Bengel is carried out in detail, it of necessity comes into collision with popular Lutheranism inasmuch as reconciliation through Christ and justification by faith take the position of *media* under the dominating thought of the kingdom of God, and no longer can keep their place as the main thing or as the sum and substance of Christian doctrine. This conviction was reached, even before Bengel, in the pietism which concentrates itself on personal sanctity; but it was at least strengthened by the theological influence of Bengel upon the followers of the pietistic tendency.³ But conversely from

¹ Compare Diestel: as above, pp. 528, 533.

² Quoted by Von der Goltz: as above, p. 472.

³ In a letter (quoted by Gildemeister: *Leben und Wirken von Menken*, i. p. 134), Menken thus expresses himself, "If we but speak scripturally of Jesus Christ as the Author and Finisher of our faith, as the Son of man made perfect by trial, of the kingdom of the Messiah in so far as we mean thereby a particular Divine Theocracy, of the kingdom of God in so far as it will extend itself over the whole universe, of the glory of the future world, of heaven and of hell, we find ourselves, strange to say, speaking something that is new to everybody. With spiritual indiscretion the doctrine of the atonement has been raised into one-sided prominence in com-

the fact that the field of view opened up by Bengel was in the main cosmical in its character, there arises a risk of lowering and losing sight of the ethical nature of Christianity, and so of resolving it into a commingling of the spirit with nature,—a tendency that of necessity runs off into a confusion between revealed religion and science, which is no better than what occurred in the use of the Bible made by the old school.

I cannot here pause to discuss how far Fr. Christopher Oetinger has fallen into that peril; but that he has not altogether escaped it is proved hereby that "life" is his highest idea, a notion which is indifferent to the antithesis between spirit and nature. However alien many isolated features in the theosophic language and thought of that deep-thinking man may be to me, I am very ready to admit that the magnificent independence of his Biblical combinations has something of exaltation in it even to him who can neither altogether agree with them nor regard imitation of such a pattern as commendable.¹ The notion of life which, as the notion under which God is regarded, dominates Oetinger's whole view of the universe, lies at the root also of the way in which redemption by Christ is conceived of by him. For Christ as the Person to whom God has granted to have life in Himself, who as the Logos from all eternity contains in Himself the original forms of things, in His Mediatorship shows Himself to be the Prince and Centre of life for humanity. The chief point of His saving activity consists indeed in the discharge of His kingly and priestly office since His resurrection; for in His state of exaltation He is a quickening spirit, as which He brings back all to God, and imparts to humanity a glorification which did not originally belong to it in the first creation. But now the

parison with the doctrine of Scripture as a whole; in a certain sense it has been always and alone the theme of consideration. If this doctrine had been treated in a more Scriptural way, men would have been led by it to further advances; but it has often been separated from all others and treated in a manner contrary to Scripture. . . . Christ for us,—this in all text-books is everything; but why so little or absolutely nothing of Christ in us who is the hope of glory? Grace and gift have been separated. Forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake is preached, but not liberation from sin by the quickening Spirit of Christ. In all this there is deficiency and patchwork." This was written more than seventy years ago; and now—?

¹ In the following notice I follow Auberlen: *Die Theosophie F. Ch. Oetinger's nach ihren Grundzügen* (1848). I have compared also the *Theologia ex idea vias deducta* in Hamberger's translation (1852).

thought that Christ's resurrection, as a new and real birth for Him, should at the same time be the ground of the regeneration of our souls, and the ground of our sanctification and righteousness is presented by Oetinger by means of the intermediate idea of a "new, real, and physical vital power" proceeding from Christ—an idea which he uses with all the less hesitation, because his ideas of spirit and of body intentionally interpenetrate one another, while the analogous statements of Lavater and Jung-Stilling are hardly so conditioned.

Christ now attained to the state of exaltation in such a way that He earned it for Himself. Although Oetinger recognises for the incarnation of the Logos the schema of the *communicatio idiomatum*, and not that of *κένωσις*, he yet so distinctly lays emphasis upon Christ's human development, and His moral progress from the *status psychicus* to exaltation, that his interpretation of the life of Christ, more than anything else, is dominated by the ethical point of view, which in this regard leads him to be on the side of the Reformed school. Although, moreover, he occasionally does not object to interpret the death of Christ in the quite orthodox sense, to the effect that Christ as liberator of His brethren had to endure the wrath of God, and surrender His life as a ransom in order to redeem them from the rigour of the law, and that He thus had to give satisfaction to the holiness of God in order to fulfil all righteousness, yet His own reflection leads Him in another direction. Christ's positive fulfilment of the law has its foundation in the requirement of the law, not for God's sake, but in order to establish in the human race moral order in the place of disorder, and thereby at once to overcome the power of evil, and also to rebut Satan's charges against men. Victory over the evil in human nature is also the result which Christ attained against Satan's temptations. And His death as completion of His obedience and His fulfilment of the law as completion of His self-sanctification are, at the same time, the acme of His victory over Satan. The application of the thought of sacrifice also begins with a recognition of the reference of Christ's death to God, but passes over into its reference to men for whom Christ has kindled the fire of the Holy Ghost in order to sanctify them. Finally, by Christ's subjection to the wrath of God there is no such thing expressed as what the orthodox doctrine

teaches. For by that wrath Oetinger understands, indeed, in the first instance, God's displeasure against sin, but at the same time (like Jacob Böhme) the condition of the creature which provokes God's displeasure, in other words, the connexion of sin and evil; and in this sense Christ endured the wrath of God. The moral mode of contemplation, which is devoted to the life of Christ, dominates also the interpretation of that struggle with Satan which extends throughout the life of Christ. But the thought that Christ's victory over evil was completed precisely in His death, departs from this point of view, and veers round to a physical and alchemistic manner of delineation, which, generally speaking, I am not able to follow, and a verbal reproduction of which could be of no use to anybody. I mention only that the communication of the Spirit by Christ, and the flowing of His blood from His body are treated as identical, and that hence is deduced the significance of the Lord's Supper, not merely as imparting spiritual invigoration, but at the same time as laying the foundation for the powers of bodily immortality.

But, however much Oetinger's trains of thought vacillate between spiritualism and materialism, it still demands explanation why this view (stated with manifold variations by Luther after Augustine, and subsequently taken up by Jacob Böhme), which regards the death of Christ as at bottom the vanquishing of death and the devil, should have met with wide acceptance in the circles of Pietism. For Augustine, as for Luther, the thought has hardly any special soteriological value, but only a value cosmical and theocratic; but for Böhme and Oetinger this value has to be combined with a specially soteriological one. In the rhetorical antitheses, in which Augustine expands the thought that Christ by His death has brought life into humanity, that by His death He has overcome death in general, he always sets before his mind's eye only images of the opposite circumstances of humanity as a whole, and the question never rises to the contemplation of the individual's need of salvation. So in like manner the phantastic picturing, which that thought receives at Luther's hands with all the colouring of mythic tradition, bears no relation to his main religious problem,—how the forgiveness of sins is to be gained. For this last, when all is said, is to be found only in a par-

ticular relation to the love of God in Christ, and to the satisfaction which the latter made to the Father. But in the case of Böhme we are led to expect to find that that idea was recommended to him not by its cosmic dimensions alone, but by its directer relation to the task of sanctification which originally parted that theosophic separatist from the popular churchism of his time. But by this also, as we shall find, it was recommended to the similarly disposed Pietism of the period. For as from this view of the passion of Christ there is no direct line that leads to the establishment of the abolition of the guilt of sin, the conquest of sin through Christ stands in a relation of correspondence to the chief task of the "quiet in the land"—the task of conquering sin within themselves by means of sanctification.¹

Accordingly, Oetinger's apprehension of justification is by no means orthodox, rather in certain respects is it Arminian. For him it consists herein—that to him in whom the Spirit has the upperhand the future perfection which gradually and slowly is to be wrought in him by the Holy Ghost is imputed by God as already present, and that to each one according to his nature and degree, so that to every one his faith is imputed unto righteousness.² In like manner Stier also makes justification depend on regeneration (p. 529); the same view has been already shown to be that of Steudel, Klaiber, Rothe (pp. 497, 501, 506), as it has also been shown that Schleiermacher and Nitzsch (pp. 492, 504) were not quite successful in their endeavours to keep clear of it. This fact in the "modern theology" has been observed by Schneckenburger;³ and he has sought to understand it as a renewal of the old Reformed theory brought about through the mediation of Schleiermacher. I have already shown the untenableness of this assumption (above, pp. 192, 273), and the fact is to be explained rather as follows:—The old Protestant assertion of the priority of justification to regeneration entirely corresponds to the reference of Christ's satisfaction

¹ Consequently Stier, though socially he belongs to the modern and Moravian Pietism, really in virtue of his Reconciliation doctrine attaches himself theologically to the older Pietism. We are pointed to the same conclusion by the already quoted expression made use of by him (p. 421) regarding the relation between moral effort and the consciousness of grace.

² Compare Auberlen: as above, p. 311.

³ *Comparative Dogmatik*, ii. p. 40 seq.

and merit to God, and to the way in which they are ranked before the *applicatio gratiæ*. But when, in Abelard's schema, Christ's prestations in living and dying are directly referred to men, or when, particularly, they perfect and render further possible the victory over sin in the human race, then of necessity the active imitation of Christ in the believer precedes his justification by God. Generally speaking, these modern theologians guard themselves against adopting the Arminian view of the matter so unaffectedly as Oetinger does. But the divergence of *this Pietistic theory of justification by faith* from the orthodox doctrine of the two evangelical confessions cannot be mistaken. And indeed I may apply this title to the view of Schleiermacher also, and of those followers of him whom I have mentioned, who certainly have all imbibed the influences of Pietism.

The orthodox opponents of the older Pietism were not very far wrong when they believed that what they called Perfectionism threatened, by depreciation of the value of the means of grace, to lessen the traditionary significance of the doctrine of reconciliation and justification.¹ The previous history of Gottfried Menken's doctrine of reconciliation proves that in those circles people showed themselves accessible to the influence, not merely of a mystic like Dippel, but even of Faustus Socinus, and so were alienated from the Church doctrine of satisfaction, manifestly because in both was found an anticipation of the movement towards practical perfection. For Joh. Gerhard Hasenkamp (Rector of Duisburg, ob. 1777), in whose suggestions Menken's doctrine ultimately has its root, has admitted that it was under the influence of Dippel and Socinus that he was led to his flat denial of the doctrine in question.² It was entirely in the bosom of the older Pietism that Menken himself came to base his theological culture exclusively on the Bible; it was not till later that he became acquainted with Bengel's writings, and attached himself to him as the leader of the same tendency. His treatise, *Ueber die eherne Schlange*

¹ Compare Von Engelhardt: as above, p. 170 *sqq.*, 207 *sqq.*

² Compare the paper in the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* (1830), Nos. 30, 31, 70-73; (1831), Nos. 38-41: *Versuch zur Scheidung von Wahrheit und Irrthum in einer unter den Gläubigen verbreiteten Lehre vom Reiche Gottes*,—a specimen, I may add, of dogmatic fanaticism, which, according to M. Göbel (*Herzog's Realencyk.* ix. p. 338), is from the pen of William Steiger.

*und das symbolische Verhältniss derselben zu der Person und Geschichte Jesu Christi*¹ (1812, 2d Ed. 1829), to which I may confine myself almost entirely in exhibiting his teachings, also partakes of that character (hardly ever laid aside by any writer of the school) which leaves us uncertain whether it is intended merely for edification or for a scientific demonstration ; and it shows, moreover, that in emphatic and typological use of the Old Testament the latter outvies orthodoxy itself. The brazen serpent which Moses lifted up on the pole, is, according to him, a figure of the devil, in so far as he is vanquished by Christ on the cross ; it is accordingly the prophetic symbol of this idea of reconciliation. Reconciliation cannot consist in the pacification of the *infinite* wrath of God against the *finite* sin of men by a punishment in correspondence with that wrath, so that it still should continue to exist against the eternally reprobate. For on such a theory wrath would still triumph over love. Neither does the history in Genesis offer any hint of such a wrath on God's part, representing as it does fallen man as objects of His loving concern ; and Christ does not testify that God is angry with the world unto death, but He Himself loves the world and is come to appease the wrath of God by His life. That men are by nature children of wrath is boldly twisted into the meaning that they are subjects of sinful passion.² For the fundamental notion of God is love ; and His holiness, which originally means His sublimity, His separation from sin, means, in its connexion with the history of redemption, His gracious condescension.³ In this sense Menken is, so far as I can make out, the first who coins the phrase, now so common, of "holy love." From it alone is Christ's work of redemption intelligible. And in fact Menken more distinctly and thoroughly than Oetinger regards the incarnation of the Logos as a laying-aside of all Divine nature, and a participation of human nature as that is at present constituted after Adam's fall.⁴ This

¹ "On the Brazen Serpent and its symbolical reference to the Person and History of Jesus Christ."

² *Gedanken über Epheser*, 2, 3 ; in Menken's *Schriften*, vol. vii. p. 275.

³ *Anleitung zum eigenen Unterricht in den Wahrheiten der heiligen Schrift*. As above : vol. vi. p. 48 *sqq.*

⁴ This idea comes from Dippel and other Mystics, who even affirm that there was actual sin in Christ. Compare *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* (1838), No. 62. Similar but plainly nonsensical is the view of the sect-founder Edward Irving. Compare *Evang. Kirchenz.* (1837), No. 55.

statement being made entirely with a view to what is to be exhibited as the meaning of redemption, Menken affirms, on the other hand, that the positive sinful disposition in Christ never became active or effective. Following the traditionary false interpretation of tempting lust (James i. 13-15), as wicked lust, and drawing a false distinction between the outer and inner conditions of temptation, he asserts that no man overcomes a temptation without sinning, but that Christ, having withstood temptations without sin, did not, properly speaking, undergo temptations but only trials and probations! Christ, accordingly, in the form of sinful flesh, having not only kept Himself pure from all actual sin but also in the sorest trial, when deprived of God's help, evinced the Divineness of His disposition and the perfectness of His demeanour, *has thereby in His own Person made human nature sinless*. He has thereby quite compensated for human sin, and earned for the human race a new relation with God, forgiveness of sins, communication of the Holy Ghost, and the hope of the kingdom of God. But by what necessity is this series of effects connected with the other assumed fact? As it is not till His exaltation that Christ, in virtue of the perfecting of His own Person, becomes the Head and Saviour of His race, His power to vanquish universal sin depends, as is the case with Oetinger and with Stier, primarily on His resurrection, of which death is only the negative prerequisite. The leaning of this doctrine away from orthodoxy, and its old Pietistic character, are shown, moreover, herein, that with Menken what is of first importance is the actual taking-away of sin from men. "Guilt is the less important; sin is the weightier and deeper. With the remission of guilt the evil and ruin of sin is not taken away, the unholy fountain is not dried up, but continues to produce ever new guilt." But though this result can only be attained through the believer's own continued repentance, yet faith in Christ constitutes his *worthiness* to attain forgiveness of sins on account of Christ's righteousness.¹

I bring this theory of Redemption and Justification into comparison with the orthodox doctrine only by way of historical elucidation, not with the view to criticise or pass judgment upon Menken. For the Lutheran orthodoxy is still always

¹ See as above: vol. vi. p. 220.

exposed to the objection which has already been pointed out (p. 172), against the contrasted connexion of justification and regeneration or renewal by the Holy Ghost. What necessity is there that God should not first forgive to any one his sins without in the next place bestowing His Spirit for the vanquishing of sin? Who can be surprised that the older Pietism gave up this connexion of thoughts, and deemed the removal of guilt to be the less important in comparison with the extirpation of moral evil, when the history of the Church had shown that all the offers of forgiveness of sins which are made in preaching, absolution, sacraments, were so far from leading to the renewal of the Christian life? Even though Menken's theory exhibits very weak sides just when it is confronted with the Bible, that polemic directed against it is very naïve, which has no other ground to stand upon than the orthodox notional schemata, and is altogether wanting in insight into the historical conditions which regulate changes of view.¹

If I bring forward J. Chr. K. Hofmann's doctrine of Reconciliation immediately after that of Menken, I wish at the outset to guard myself against the possibility of my being supposed to intend thereby to imitate the procedure of Thomasius,² his colleague, who places the two together as if they coincided in the highest possible degree, without emphasizing any of the characteristic differences between the later and the earlier writer, and without developing his knowledge of the history of dogma so far as to gain insight into the conditions and relative justice of the theological tendency that is common to both. For, undoubtedly, Hofmann as well as Menken belongs to the school of Bengel.³ And indeed the exclusive Biblicism which Bengel prescribes evinces itself very significantly in the case of Hofmann, in the manner in which he represents to himself that systematic theology for which he takes in hand to lead "Scrip-

¹ This applies to a criticism passed in the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, 1837-38.—*Geschichtliches aus der Veröhnungs- und Genußthuungslehre*, Art. iii. Without expressed adherence to Menken, his assumption of the sinfulness of Christ's human nature is reproduced, as well as the corresponding doctrine of reconciliation (although with modifications that do not increase its clearness) by Gericke: *Die Wirkungen des Todes Jesu in Beziehung auf seine eigene Person*; in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1843, p. 261 *seq.* Compare against him O. F. A. Münchmeyer., *ib.* 1845, p. 319 *seq.*

² *Christi Person und Werk*; iii. 2. pp. 127-140.

³ Compare Diestel, as above, p. 704.

tural proof." In particular, there are two sentences from the introduction to the *Schriftbeweis*, by the examination of which I purpose to exhibit at once Hofmann's specific theological position, and my own distance from it, and thus hope to secure objectivity as much as possible for the account I shall subsequently give. "The systematic theologian," says Hofmann, "has to express Christianity as a present fact, and as it is his own proper possession; which, on the other hand, will be Christianity just in proportion as he is personally united through Christ to God in the Church." I must say that this definition could not be further removed from stating what is the specific mark of a theologian; for it applies equally well to the preacher and to the writer of Church hymns; or rather it does not apply strictly even to these. "In order that the fact of Christianity which is expressed in the short fundamental formula of personal fellowship between God and mankind through the mediation of Jesus Christ may come to have its manifold contents exhibited, thinking within it is needed. No ideas which have originated outside of it can be allowed to have any determining influence upon its unfolding of itself. An actual relation is the object of our thinking, in which, and not about which, we think." If I can get any meaning out of these sentences, it is that Hofmann knows of nothing except biblical theology. For the discomposing exhortation "to think within the fact," I can understand in the circumstances only as meaning that by the aid of the imaginative powers we have to adapt ourselves to that way of apprehending revelation which we find in Jesus and the sacred writers, and to reproduce this under its peculiar conditions. Hofmann accordingly will seek to find a necessary concatenation in revelation only in the direction expressed in Luke xxiv. 26, 27; but he will reject every *scientific* inquiry into a necessary concatenation between revelation and the necessary idea of God, and the necessary view of the world and human history, because this idea of necessity has arisen outside of the fact of Christianity. I, on the other hand, am convinced that the science of systematic theology, however much it has materially to be based upon biblical theology rightly understood, can be developed only from the problem which Hofmann sets aside. The manner, accordingly, in which Hofmann sets about his work, that

expression of "thinking within a fact," which, to say the least, is a clumsy one, and the very naïve statement of motives in the last of the sentences quoted,—as if an "actual relation" if rightly realized was not fitted to be thought about, *i.e.*, to have its general truth and necessity investigated,—betray to me that separatism in scientific culture which corresponds to the home of the school of Bengel, to wit, separatistic Pietism. Hofmann's epistemological theory, so far as it is denoted in the sentences quoted, stands upon the same *niveau* as Oetinger's theory of spirit; and his regardlessness of all that is proper in a definition shows right clearly that the theologian has need of ideas which have arisen outside of the fact of Christianity, and which, even though they be only logical, will yet have a determining influence upon the *theological* presentation of Christianity. Of course this error may be excused from the circumstance that the above-indicated task of systematic theology has not been openly recognised since the Reformation, and was carried out in the scholastic divinity of the Middle Ages only in an indirect and imperfect way. In Protestantism, systematic theology was meant to be just biblical theology; and the investigation of the universal necessity of its propositions was always only casually insisted upon in the form of Polemics. The biblical character of the orthodox theology, however, was perplexed by notions which "had arisen outside of the fact of Christianity," and which were already incorporated in its dogmas. Now, Hofmann might easily find in his own neighbourhood occasions for restoring to its rights biblical theology regarded as an interpretation of Scripture by itself; in their opposition to the repristination of Lutheran dogmatic, his principle and the work he has done have to me a value that I very willingly acknowledge. But this circumstance cannot prevent me from raising my voice against the pretended principles of systematic theology exhibited by Hofmann, as against an uncalled-for curtailment of the business of theology in general. For it admits of being easily shown that the biblico-theological results reached by Hofmann, so far as they are correct, have their peculiar convincing power for the refutation of his opponents only in virtue of being founded in the manner I have indicated upon universal scientific notions.

The literary controversy provoked by Hofmann's *Schrift-*

beweis,¹ has put beyond all doubt the divergence of his doctrine of reconciliation from Lutheran orthodoxy; but his negation of its principles has quite another value than the opposition of Menken and Stier. These two argue from general, moral, and legal considerations against the well-known leading features of the doctrine of satisfaction, exactly as Faustus Socinus does. Hofmann's analogous negative judgments, on the other hand, flow from his comprehensive historical estimate of Christ, which has rendered his theological view possible to him. Nor is his merit in this respect any way lessened when I show that the following determinations arrived at by him, leaving out of account their Trinitarian back-ground, are in harmony with Schleiermacher, and may be supposed to betoken his influence. For, assuming his own peculiar Trinitarian premisses, Hofmann maintains (1.) that the self-determination of Jesus to become the Mediator of perfect love-fellowship between God and men is the self-determination of God as archetypal end of the universe to become man, so that in His incarnation the relation that previously subsisted within God comes to be the historical relation between God and the man Jesus, and finds its completion in the integrity of the latter unto His death. Herein the archetypal character of the Person and entire life of Christ for the contemplated fellowship between God and humanity is recognised. (2.) What of the hostility of sin and of Satan Christ experienced in His suffering unto death is His own prestation in virtue of the freedom with which He submitted Himself thereto. Thus His passion is subsumed under His action. And, in fact, (3.) His entire activity is the obedience in His calling as the God-appointed Mediator of salvation. The contemplation of Christ's life as a unity is here apprehended in a notion which Schleiermacher (p. 484) hints at almost casually, and which, previous to Hofmann, had been merely

¹ I make use of the first edition of this work (2 parts, 1852-1855). Compare particularly the second part; *1te Abtheilung*, p. 212 *seq.*, 332 *seq.* The modifications of his view which he made in consequence of adverse criticism, and which are incorporated with the second edition (1858), are first stated in the *Schutzschriften für eine neue Weise alte Wahrheit zu lehren*, 1. 2. (1856-7). Compare also *Begründete Abweisung eines nicht begründeten Vorwurfs* (*Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, 1856, Feb. and March). Upon the controversy compare C. Weizsäcker: *Um was handelt es sich in dem Streite über die Versöhnungslehre?* In the *Jahrb. deutsche Theol.* iii. (1858) pp. 154-188.

repeated, but not explained, by Stendel and Rothe, and it is from this idea that Hofmann's denial of the orthodox doctrine flows as a necessary consequence, in the following points:—(1.) What Christ has done as His own calling most strictly proper to Himself, He cannot have done in the room of others who were not obliged to this. (2.) If in life it was His own special vocation that He fulfilled, then He did not thereby fulfil the law in general, nor accordingly did He do so in the place of others. (3.) If His passion belongs to the discharge of His calling, then it is not a vicarious endurance of punishment on behalf of others. Hofmann accompanies the denial of the orthodox doctrine, which he bases on these reasons, with the general reflexions that the arithmetical (juristic) equation which it aims at between what God requires of humanity on the one hand, and Christ's prestations on the other, is never gained, and thus seems actually to oppose the object in view when the notion of reconciliation is set forth. Further, that thereby an appearance is imparted to the grace of God, as if God first required to be paid ere He could be gracious. Finally, that herein there is no point of attachment for living faith to lay hold of—a remark which agrees with that which I have made, that Anselm's theory is no direct vehicle for piety (p. 512).

In Hofmann's apprehension of the matter, accordingly, Christ's life, which manifested itself in obedience in His calling even unto death, is itself the atonement, in so far as therein God, who was angry with sinful humanity, uninterruptedly carried out His loving fellowship with the sinless member of humanity, and in so far as Christ experienced this, not for Himself, but in His character as destined to be the beginner of renewed humanity. Hofmann's view thus distinguishes itself in very essential features from that of Oetinger and Menken. These last subordinate Christ's life of righteousness unto death as a means to the negative purpose of conquest over sin, and therefore do not find, till they arrive at the resurrection, any point with which to connect the positive reconstruction of humanity. But on this account also, Luther's analogous expressions do not cover Hofmann's view, although he calls them to remembrance in his second vindication, in order to satisfy himself that he belongs to the Lutheran confession. Indubitably that positive

interpretation of Christ's life in accordance with His calling, which approaches Schleiermacher just in proportion as it is not in harmony with Menken, is accompanied by a peculiar view of the value of Christ's passion. Hofmann in fact discerns "in the life of Christ the active exercise not merely of God's love towards humanity, but also of His hatred against sin, seeing that the creative beginning of the new relation between God and humanity has not been brought about without a corresponding termination of that which had previously existed and was determined by sin. This termination begins herewith, that the Beginner of a new humanity develops His life under that conditionality of human nature which is imposed by sin, finds its continuation when He, the righteous One, exercises a vocation-activity against sin, and attains completion when He submits Himself to what the enmity of sin against God imposes on Him." "The utmost that the Mediator of salvation could suffer and perform having first come to be realized in His suffering and dying, or rather, He (as we read in p. 212) having permitted sin, regarded as hostility to the work of salvation, to pass over Him *till it was exhausted*," accordingly "God's relation which had been determined by sin passed over into an end which was at once in correspondence with Himself and with the Divine decree of love, and thus *made up for sin*" (p. 334).

I cannot avoid making the confession that, in view of these sentences, I am in the very unusual position of agreeing with Philippi,¹ to the effect that this connexion of thoughts, literally taken, is absolutely unintelligible. Thus much is clear, that if the God-derived life of Christ is sinless, and if it is the specific beginning of new humanity, then sin as a principle pervading human fellowship is taken away, and that herein God's loving will can at the same time be recognised as hatred against sin, though this phrase, "hatred of sin," hardly has a biblical ring. It is, moreover, intelligible to me that Christ's life is presented as a vehicle of God's counteraction against sin, in so far as sin is rebuked by Christ's word and conduct, and (as temptation) is repelled from Him by the exercise of His will. But how God's hatred against sin should directly show itself in Christ's liability

¹ *Herr Dr. von Hofmann gegenüber der lutherischen Versöhnungs- und Rechtfertigungslehre*, p. 47.

to suffering, and in His actual suffering and death, without the aid of the usual orthodox doctrine which is repudiated by Hofmann, is a question which it passes my reason to answer. Not more convincing is the assertion that in the death of Christ the enmity of sin to the *work of redemption* was exhausted. For all the persecutions the Church has suffered, all the martyrdoms, have not yet exhausted the hostility of sin to the work of redemption, even when we limit this idea, as Hofmann would have us to do, to the contemplation of Christ's life. Only upon Christ *personally* could this enmity inflict nothing more than death. Hence however it is very far from following as a consequence that, in the new relation between God and humanity as represented by Christ, sin has come to a conclusion. The meaning of the fact is at most this: that Christ, in his vocation-obedience with a view to the establishment of the kingdom of God, surmounted all temptation that arose, through suffering, even the temptation to despair of the love of God, and that He gave no place to sin in His will, His desires, His disposition. If, now, Hofmann's expression about the active exercise of God's hatred against sin, which, according to him, was displayed in Christ's liability to suffering and in His actual passion, has to be resolved into this, that Christ victoriously withstood the temptations involved in these circumstances, then Hofmann has fallen into a violent metonymy. But I am driven to suppose so since Hofmann, in his "First Vindication" (pp. 8, 9), does not deal otherwise with the idea of the wrath of God, which he now, out of complaisance to those of his own party, also applies to Christ. "Christ exchanged His Divine blessedness for subjection to the wrath of God *against mankind*, and to the power of Satan *over mankind*, in order so to complete His obedience that the wrath of God should bring Him to the utmost distress that could befall Him; and in order so to experience in Himself *the fruits of sin* that the last and utmost agony of His passion was also the completion of His obedience." Hofmann is very far from hereby gliding into the orthodox schema of the idea of penal satisfaction. For even his adoption of the idea of expiation of sin has not in this "Vindication" the customary meaning. Christ's obedience rather, according to him, expiates sin as the counter-prestation against the sin of Adam in so far as He brought to a conclusion

well-pleasing to God the wrong relation to God which originated therein, and so compensated for sin, becoming the beginner of new sinless humanity.¹ So also the wrath of God *against humanity*, to which Christ submitted Himself, is not to be understood of the experience of the Divine act exercised on Christ Himself, but only of the experience of the *evil which is humanity is the result of the wrath of God*. If accordingly the metonymy of Böhme and Oetinger presents itself here, my respect for Hofmann compels me to conjecture that this key also might admit of application to the above delineated train of thought; although I am of opinion that theological science can dispense with the support of metonymies.

Accordingly in Hofmann's view the atonement is Christ's obedience in His calling fulfilled even unto death. "Not merely by Him but in Him are we reconciled; hence also rightly to discern His Person and His history is the right discernment of our reconciliation." "He is not a separate Person near yet outside humanity, who has given what humanity ought to have given, but the Son of man in whom humanity has its second Adam."² And the humanity of Christ is the Church, as we are told in the sixth chapter of the *Lehrjahre* of the *Schriftbeweis*. By this line of thought Hofmann goes as much beyond Schleiermacher as beyond the sphere of vision of his Church party and of those who until now have been his theological opponents. But hereby he has laid down the theme of the scientific doctrine of reconciliation, for he has rightly determined its religious connexion. Hereby finally has a Lutheran for once broken the ban of Melancthonian tradition and renounced the remissness which has always prevented the due apprehension of the problem. If we, the members of the Christian Church, are to believe that God in Christ has reconciled us, the Christian Church, with Himself, then in the Mediator of reconciliation must be combined not merely the love of God that reconciles, but at the same time the humanity that is to be reconciled, the humanity of the new Adam. But now from this Hofmann further infers that justification is identical with reconciliation.³ In the righteousness of Christ (the

¹ Just as Schleiermacher (p. 481) adopted the idea of satisfaction in the sense that Christ did what was sufficient to procure redemption.

² *Erste Schutzschrift*, pp. 19, 20.

³ In the *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus u. Kirche* (1856), p. 188.

new) humanity is with God an object of complacency. In the Person of Christ is contained that assurance of the forgiveness of sins for men as a whole which the individual in faith applies to himself without the mediation of an intellectual process, inasmuch as by the Holy Ghost he is disposed to belong to the new humanity that springs up in Christ.

This line of thought had indeed already been elaborated by the Reformed divines. But Hofmann has undoubtedly discovered it for himself; for the exclusiveness of the theologians who desire to be specifically Lutheran is generally wont to show itself in the greatest possible ignorance of the Reformed theology.¹ He has discovered the purely religious expression for the idea of reconciliation in the path of Biblical theology, according to the obligation, which he recognises, to regard the Bible as the *source* of theology. But the opposition of his orthodox opponents has its root herein, that they make use of the Bible as a *supplementary norm* for a traditional system, while at the same time by Luther's or by their own similar religious needs it is at the outset fixed what they must find in the Bible in order to maintain their soul's peace.² In short, between the contending parties there subsists the opposition between the Biblical theology of the school of Bengel and the partial use of Scripture which orthodoxy makes; but not, as Weizsäcker supposes,³ the opposition between speculative and experimental theology. For, as I have shown, it is equally certain, on the one hand, that theological speculation, *i.e.* properly theoretical and scientific theology lies beyond Hofmann's sphere of vision, and, on the other hand, that precisely the biblico-theological results which he has reached call in their present form for theoretical work. They consist of a series of assertions, the mutual relation of which is not yet shown to be necessary and alone true, when they are simply based upon exegesis, however sound that exegesis itself may be. In order

¹ Otherwise Philippi (as above, p. 12) would assuredly not have contented himself with raising against Hofmann's view of justification the objection that "Scripture and the Church have never so spoken," but he would have cried out against the Reformed taint in this distinction between the justification of the whole and of individuals.

² Compare Philippi as above, p. 56; Thomasius: *Das Bekenntniss der lutherischen Lehre von der Versöhnung und die Versöhnungslehre Hofmann's*, p. 104. On the other side, see Hofmann: *Zweite Schutzschrift*, p. 91 *sqq.*

³ As above, p. 173.

to reach a higher result we must advance to what Hofmann prohibits; in fact we must think *about* the matter. I should imagine that only in the connexion of Systematic theology can the problem of the justification of the totality and of the individual be fully solved, and that it is not satisfactorily adjusted by biblico-theological delineations. For Philippi is wrong when he says¹ that Hofmann changes justification from a forensic act into an ethical process. We might surely conjecture from Hofmann's descent from the school of Bengel, or as Philippi expresses it, from his harmony with Schleiermacher in other respects, that his notion of justification would be of an old Pietistic texture. But in this very point his divergence from the beaten path enables him to maintain the Lutheran attitude at which he aims. For the thought of the justification of the entire race demands that justification be conceived of in the form of a Divine sentence. Still in the trains of thought that are proper to biblical theology, this proposition is accompanied by the conclusion that it is faith as a moral demeanour that is regarded by God as righteousness.² How far this last thought can be brought into harmony with the other can only be ascertained by means of a dialectical procedure, which in its nature belongs to theoretical theology. While believing that in this matter I have vindicated my opposition to Hofmann's view, I would still hope that in doing so I have treated his purpose and his conclusions fairly—more fairly than his former opponents, who stand nearer to him and yet much further off.

72. The school of Bengel, as represented by the thinkers whom we have passed under review, renounced the thought of Christ's penal satisfaction. But that thought was rejected as a rule by all sections of the positive theology of Germany, with more or less distinctness up to the fourth decade of the present century—by Schleiermacher as well as by the biblical supra-naturalists of the school of Storr,—Steudel and Klaiber—by the modern Melancthonians such as Nitzsch and Lücke; finally, by the representatives of modern Pietism, such as Tholuck and Stier. And it is only in quite a different camp—in Marheineke, that it finds currency—a currency, however, which has not been maintained in the school. But since the

¹ As above, p. 50 *sqq.*

² *Schriftbeweis*, i. pp. 560, 563.

date just named, it has again found theological defenders within the school of Bengel. Probably indeed the Württemberg preachers of the old Pietistic stamp, who belong to that school, have since then invariably held the doctrine of Christ's penal satisfaction. At the same time, the return to this thought on the part of the theologians of this school is far from meaning a direct return to the doctrinal tradition of Lutheranism. Rather does John Fr. von Meyer¹ at the outset assign to that thought quite other premisses and references than he found in the orthodox tradition. As we have seen, this last operated with the ideas of God's justice and eternal law in such a way that the habituality of this relation of God to sinful humanity was ranked above the actuality of His grace, and that satisfaction by Christ (which was regarded as necessary) appeared as a material rather than a personal pacification of God. For when it was taught that the wrath of God had to be endured and appeased by Christ, that wrath was understood (in accordance with a change of meaning in the word, received from the church fathers, and corresponding to their abstract fundamental conception of God) to be not so much an acute personal affection, as the operation of His habitual penal justice.² In opposition to this, and in harmony with the religious attitude which is common to the older Pietism and to the Illumination, Meyer establishes the personality of God, who is the ground of salvation, by means of the predicates of love and holiness. The latter, however, is regarded by him not merely as condescending grace (as Menken teaches), but at the same time also as the ground of God's hatred and wrath *against sin*, while the sinner is an object of God's compassion. In this Meyer undoubtedly has the Bible on his side more than Menken has. But he clothes the material of the biblical intuition of the wrath of God in a

¹ *Inbegriff der christl. Glaubenslehre*, 1832.

² Gerhard: *Loci theol.* (ed. Cotta) tom. iii. p. 176.—Scriptura ἀνθρωποπαθὲς tantum Deo iram tribuit, notatur enim vindictæ divinæ effectus, non turbulentus Dei affectus.—Ira dupliciter considerari potest (1.) *materialiter*, quo respectu definitur sanguinis aut calor, qui circa cor est, fervor et ebullitio; (2.) *formaliter*, quo respectu definitur appetitus doloris vicissim adversario inferendi. Neutro autem modo proprie Deo tribui potest ira. Non priore, quia corporalis ista motio in incorporea Dei essentia locum non habet. Non posteriore, quia Deus, utpote immutabilis ἀπαθὴς dolorem aut tristitiam pati nequit, et proinde appetitus doloris vicissim inferendi in eo non habet locum.

form which shows an indubitable dependence on Jacob Böhme, although the view itself goes back to Luther (p. 201). "The zeal for what is good, which belongs to God, is wrath, the consuming *fire of love* against the opposite quality of sinners. The expression of God's holiness in the fire of wrath has its ground in the Being of God, but is foreign thereto, considered in itself. *To speak in a physical way*, the wrath of God is the repelling principle, His love the attractive; both are one, and again concur in the attraction which alone is eternal. But as long as the love of God cannot attract the creature with his will, *that same love* abides on him *as wrath*, like a cloud which the warm rays of the sun only compact and cannot dissipate." We might now expect, according to these principles, to find Christ exhibited as an offering to the wrath of God in the room of sinners; but circumstances are not quite favourable to this deduction. By Meyer's account, wrath, as the opposite of compassion, falls not upon the sinner but upon sin. This conception of a love that has no outlet does not coincide with that of penal justice, which visits the sinner in person, or his representative; it betokens merely that a reconciliation is needed, not of God but of men. For "to take away from the creature the cause of the expression of wrath (in other words, sin as a fact) is equivalent to reconciling the creature with eternal love" (as above, p. 174).

Thus although Meyer in the first instance moves on in this line, in which he had Oetinger and Menken as forerunners, he yet diverges into the inference already stated, which markedly distinguishes him from Menken. But he agrees with both in regarding the proper crisis towards reconciliation (of men) as lying in Christ's exaltation, which to Him is the reward of that obedience which was complete even unto death, and at the same time, the cause which makes it possible for the rays of His glorified Spirit-life to flow into believers, quicken them inwardly and outwardly from sin and death, really justify them in their sanctification, and present them as justified children of God according to the spirit of holiness. But, besides this, Meyer, diverging from these cognate thinkers, refers Christ's passion and death (which belong to His perfect obedience) particularly to the annihilation and slaying of sin, inasmuch as in it is contained "propitiation to the law," and "a doing away

of wrath by love in a lawful way," since Christ, though He could not have been condemned to all the everlasting and accursed consequences of the first sin, did in sympathy with the sins of all ages taste the pains of hell upon the cross. Those formulæ are not so clear as could be wished, especially as the idea of wrath, which has been indicated above, is not confronted with them. And even if the Lutheran shaping of the doctrine were attained by Meyer, he yet stands far removed from that verification of the thought of Christ's penal satisfaction in the religious experience, which Lutheranism makes. For the Lutherans satisfy themselves of the trueness of that thought, in the assurance of freedom from guilt and eternal punishment; Meyer, on the other hand, discerns in the death of Christ an exercise of the Divine penal justice, that accords with the analogous experience when "we are crucified with Him" (as above, p. 186);—and this is thoroughly Pietistic.¹ But along with this it is very worthy of notice that Meyer, in seeking to take his bearings entirely by the help of Scripture, comes to adopt principles that belong to the Reformed doctrine. That Christ in His exaltation received the reward of His obedience is indeed so clearly stated by Paul, that the unscripturalness of the Lutheran dogmatic in the denial of this truth is beyond a doubt. Hence, in the recognition of this fact, Meyer, Menken, Oetinger, Storr (p. 385), who are purely biblical theologians, fall in with the Reformed doctrine. Of similar import is Meyer's assertion that Christ's descent into hell means His consummated death, His deepest humiliation; as also the thought that we must regard Christ in His agony in the garden as in connexion with the whole of humanity as its *Head and Representative*, wherein again Hofmann coincides with him. And this is not mere chance. For with reference to justification also, Meyer (as above, p. 217) expresses himself in agreement with Hofmann and also precisely in that two-sided

¹ Compare Philippi (as above, p. 56): "He who takes away from me the atoning blood of the Son of God, paid as a ransom to the wrath of God, who takes away the satisfaction of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, vicariously given to the penal justice of God, who hereby takes away justification or forgiveness of sins only by faith in the merits of this my Surety and Mediator, who takes away the imputation of the righteousness of Jesus Christ, takes away Christianity altogether so far as I am concerned. I might then just as well have adhered to the religion of my ancestors, the seed of Abraham after the flesh." Who now is the exemplary Christian, Meyer or Philippi?

way which is unavoidable to purely biblical theology. On the one side there results in conversion, "that justification which not only is established in Christ for all the world, and potentially present, and which is now really appropriated to this penitent sinner;" on the other hand, "his repentance and his faith in the merit of Christ are imputed to him as righteousness, *i.e.*, he is so regarded as if he had never sinned, but rather, like Christ, had from the beginning satisfied God's law." And it is again Reformed (p. 272) when Meyer, after the first conversion and justification by imputation, expects one that shall always go deeper, in other words, that the influences of sanctification shall be discerned.

Should it be thought desirable that the doctrine of reconciliation should combine the idea of Christ's penal satisfaction with Abelard's fundamental thought, J. Tobias Beck¹ has met this requirement as fully as possible. For what has already (see above, p. 259) been regarded as a defect in the orthodox doctrine,—that it does not in accordance with the Divine nature of Christ regard His personal prestations in His life and in His death as a revelation of the Divine grace, but interprets them only as satisfaction and merit in the room of men,—is brought by Beck in his doctrine into prominence. And in fact, not only does he carry out Abelard's thought in such a way as at the same time to include the view (peculiar to the older Pietism) of the conquest of sin in the life and death of Christ, he also determines our intuition of the Mediator's Person, and of the relation of His Work to His Person with a completeness previously unknown. (1.) As Christ in His eternal existence in the Godhead is of one essence with the Father, He accordingly, as the equal of God, represents the love of God in complete living reality. (2.) As He, being the eternally predestined Head of God's kingdom, is the ground and purpose of the creation of the universe in general, and the standard of the moral destiny of men, so in like manner in His human individuality, in virtue of His liability to temptation, is He a member and representative of the human race; and in virtue of His obedience in His vocation, is Representative and supreme Head of spiritual humanity in accordance with its destiny. (3.) As His faithful obedience was

¹ *Die christl. Lehrwissenschaft nach den biblischen Urkunden.* Part I. 1841.

the completion of His personal perfection, it was at the same time the actual fulfilment of His mediatorial calling to join Himself to sinful humanity and appropriate it to Himself. (4.) As His faithful obedience excludes all actual sin in Him, while love, on the other hand, has to prove itself by making itself serviceable to sinful men, He accordingly permitted evil to come upon Him as suffering; and as in obedience suffering and doing are one and the same, He vanquished sin in the completion of His obedience unto death, convinced it of its demerit in His patience under suffering and in the surrender of His life to the gracious will of God, glorified the love of the Father. His entire attitude in His death has the character of grace. (5.) While His self-surrender unto death attracts eternal vital power as a good of revelation to men, and emancipates from earthly flesh the fulness of life that was operative in Him, He becomes by His resurrection efficient to the unfolding of His life-treasure, which, as Head of His church, He imparts in the outpouring of His Spirit. This train of thought connects itself both by its general character and by its issue with Oetinger, Menken, Stier, and Meyer; while the assignation to the positive thought of a revelation of the Divine love in Christ's entire obedience, of a higher value than belongs to the negation of sin, falls in with Hofmann's view. It cannot be denied that there arises an incongruity in form between this conclusion and the express value assigned to the Person of Christ, since His obedience in His vocation is after all limited to His representing the love of God, while His place as Representative and Head of spiritual humanity or of the Church is not at the same time vindicated as is done by Hofmann. Beck rather reverts to the Lutheran representation of the case, according to which Christ becomes Head of the Church only in His exaltation; for he regards the communication of the Spirit as the positive mediatorial influence whereto the completion of His mediatorial task in the individual life of Christ stands related only as a preliminary preparation. This, indeed, is inconsistent with Beck's obvious intention; but that could have been rightly carried out only if the same substance of Christ's vocation-obedience had been conceived at once as a representation of God's love to men, and as a representation before God of the humanity that was to be reconciled.

But Beck does not let the matter rest with the complete conviction and conquest of sin by the obedience of Christ in His vocation. For as sin is a real disturbance of the vital power of the Divine will, and brings upon the sinner the reaction of God's wrath, death and the curse, there was necessary, for the attainment of the purpose of redeeming love, a mediation whereby "love comes into harmony with the consequence of wrath in holiness, their common focus." Justice is the presentation of the harmony of God's will as it displays itself in the world; particularly of His wrath and of His love towards the sinner. This justice forms the basis of the law of the moral world, and maintains the right of that law by rewards and punishments. If now, in place of the old order that had been destroyed by sin, a new one is to be introduced, then justice must exercise itself on the one hand in punishing, and on the other in rewarding. In correspondence with this come in, on the one hand, the satisfactory merit of the Mediator, and on the other hand, the law of faith, according to which they are made righteous who are the Mediator's. Thus God's wrath reconciles itself with His love through the judicial propitiation of His wrath unto the removal of the enmity of sin. Not merely does reconciliation presuppose propitiation, it includes it in itself; for not merely does God accept the propitiation, He Himself institutes it. And as the reconciliation of mankind *in corpore* holds good, the entire reconciling grace of the Mediator must be presented as really Divine, just as much as it must be received by humanity as its corporate life of love whence the individual's achievement of grace is first to be deduced. Here we may forbear from showing how these postulates are maintained in connexion with the interpretation of Christ's passion and death as a penal satisfaction. On the other hand, it is only in this connexion that the above-mentioned (No. 2) threefold quality of Christ as representative of God and also of sinful humanity is made use of; and Beck's view coincides with that of Hofmann, at least in so far as he makes out reconciliation to be directly contained in the Person of Christ, which perfects itself in vocation-obedience.

But the idea of Christ's penal satisfaction, by the assumption of which Beck is distinguished from Hofmann, is placed by him in a peculiar connexion, in consequence of which this approximation to the Lutheran doctrine is compensated for by

an important departure therefrom in the idea of justification. Lutheran orthodoxy bases only the penal satisfaction of Christ on the justice of God; the justification of believers, on the other hand, it bases on His grace. The former accordingly has a real, the latter an imputed character. Beck bases both in the Divine justice, which has a real character whether it be punitive or rewarding. Hence it follows that Christ's expiation of sin brings with it a continuous judgment thereupon in the life of the believer, and that the restoration of right in the Person of the Mediator lays the foundation for the *righteous-making* of the believer as a real endowment of humanity. Beck considers, just as Meyer does (p. 551), that the propitiatory value of the death of Christ is mirrored in the crucifixion of the sins of the believer, and not in the non-imputation of the guilt of sin and its punishment.¹ As in this the prevailing interest of Pietism—actual holiness—makes its appearance, Beck also does not satisfy himself with the Lutheran thought of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, but infers from it that union therewith through the spirit of the Mediator which takes place in faith. For the taking away of guilt—without which the sinner would still be a sinner and unjustified—first comes in when with the faith (which is the condition of all else) there is constituted a righteousness which, though not infused ready-made, has become a living law. In accordance with this, sanctification is the continuation of justification; and the cleansing of the conscience, which takes away guilt, must evince itself in the realization of purification from sins, as a getting rid of sin, as a redemption from sin that manifests itself in the conduct. This, as has been said, is entirely in harmony with the older Pietism; and at most, it is in the confidence with which he exegetically defends this meaning of justification that Beck rises above the similar views of his predecessors. Amidst the many points of contact, however, between Beck and Hof-

¹ As above, p. 553: "As condemning sin in the Mediator and rewarding His righteousness, justice in Him organizes itself as the new law of faith in Him, whence again its condemning power passes over all flesh, delivering sin over to death, so that man either dies to it or in it; in the first case receiving the full reward of life in and according to the newly-formed righteousness; in the other case, receiving the full punishment of death in and according to his increasing lawlessness. By both means combined, the Divine justice terminates in the complete organization of a world, freed from all disorder, that mirrors the justice of God."

mann, this also ought to be remembered, that the former so thoroughly repudiates the forensic meaning of justification because he does not complete, with the requisite strictness, the common contemplation of the reconciliation and justification of renewed humanity or of the Church in the Person of Christ. In the Person of Christ the reconciliation between God and *humanity* can be seen and understood; but in Christ grace is not at the outset, as we are told above (p. 535), *an actual gift to humanity*, but an *ideal* one. This determination on God's part, however, can only be thought of, as Hofmann supposes, in the form of a Divine judgment.

What is questionable in this *Christliche Lehrwissenschaft* is the very wide sense in which the word "science" is applied to Christian doctrine. If it were not for the many strange words, the work would in no respect differ from a second-rate sermon, for clear fixing of ideas and adequacy of definition are as much wanting as theoretic proof. As regards this, Beck takes the same attitude of hostility as Hofmann does, thinking with Bengel that he may reconstruct the system of thought contained in the Bible purely by exegesis and intuition. This kind of theology moreover is deliberately isolated from any history of theology—and that too not merely in so far as this last is a special science, but also in so far as it presents the connexion of the religious ideas that regulate the Church. In carrying out his doctrine of justification (which has been shown (above, p. 536) to be conditioned by Pietism) Beck takes an attitude of perfect indifference to the fact that the Reformation was dominated by this idea in the form in which it is rejected by him; he neither raises nor answers the question what religious interest connects itself therewith, or how that interest stands related to that which he himself has at heart. It is indeed his intention merely to exhibit the "Science of Christian Doctrine" "according to the Bible originals," and these obviously are indifferent to the Reformation of the sixteenth century; and he thus seems to escape the objection which has just been made. But the authors of the original New Testament documents are not indifferent to the development of the Church to her perfection; the Reformation has its value in a specific effort after the perfecting of the Church; the nonchalance which Pietism displays towards the departure of a certain

form of doctrine from the religious intention of the Reformers, and its general indifference to the history of the Church and its doctrinal development stand therefore after that may be said in a wrong¹ relation to that universal impulse which proceeds from the original records of Christianity. To the majority of the works in dogmatic theology which have been produced in these days, but above all to this *Christliche Lehrwissenschaft* may be applied the saying of the Prophet, "they all look to their own way;" for which reason the many-sided stimulus to a fruitful reconstruction of theology which it affords has been utterly inoperative so far as the Church is concerned. But the Biblical theology which has sprung from the lap of separatistic Pietism is determined to assert itself just in this fashion, and therefore theoretical form and every reference to the history of theology are alike excluded.

73. Our consideration of the school of Bengel has led us to the conclusion that the older Pietism, which through it exercises an important influence on the theology of the present, partly remains disaffected towards the orthodox thought of Christ's penal satisfaction, and partly defends it from a motive quite different from that which makes it precious to Lutheranism; and thus this school is far from giving to the thought that sharp definition in point of form which it formerly received. The transition, on the part of the modern Pietism, to the orthodox doctrinal form has accordingly no direct or necessary connexion with these phenomena, even though John Fr. von Meyer has attained to a position of special authority in those circles. That transition, speaking generally, is connected with the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* and with the name of Hengstenberg, who was its editor for almost forty-two years. If the character of the "awakening" and of the modern Pietism, which has passed over from the Moravian Brotherhood into the Evangelical Church of Germany, has been rightly stated, then Hengstenberg was little fitted by his mental constitution to participate in that religious tendency. Without vigour or originality of fancy, without delicacy of feeling, he brought bald intelligence and tenacity of will as his leading endowments into the circle of the "awakened." He was therefore able to make its interests his own only by making an unctuous copiousness of typical language take the place of real play of

fancy, and by substituting, in place of feeling, a spirit of stubborn contention for everything which, in the varying course of years, seemed to offer the prospect of advancing the interests of the party. He guided that party to a place of rule in the Church by associating it with the interests of political stagnation and reaction. Now, the pretended Churchliness of the learned gentlemen who conducted the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* led them in the special circumstances to a repristination of the Lutheran dogmatic, particularly in the doctrines of reconciliation and justification. For, formally regarded, the tendency of Lutheran orthodoxy to seek before everything else, or rather at the cost of everything else, the assurance of reconciliation and justification through Christ, corresponds to the style of Moravian piety in which they moved; while the older Pietism opposes itself to both in its striving after personal sanctity. It is therefore very significant that Menken's doctrine of reconciliation was disputed by Steiger so early as in 1830 and once more in 1837—and that too not merely on account of its christological postulate. In this we are to recognise nothing else than the separation between Pietism in "the costume of society" and Pietism in "conventicle-garb" (to avail myself of Tholuck's pregnant expression). If, accordingly, modern Pietism, in order to evince its Churchliness, even planted its foot on the neck of its older ally, there could not be any subsequent hesitation on the part of the *Kirchenzeitung* as to whether the Lutheran or Reformed Dogmatic should be adopted. For, although the editor was of Reformed origin, he was as ignorant of the Reformed dogmatic as any of his theological contemporaries; and all that was known about it, viz., that it was based on the doctrine of predestination, repelled those out-and-out moderns who in this respect could not deny that they were children of the Illumination. If we further take into account that even the theological defenders of the Union were as far as possible from thinking of the Reformed dogmatic—Schweizer was absolutely the first who in 1844 rediscovered it—it was a matter of course that the Moravian "awakening" should seek its dogmatic confirmation and its exclusive Churchly stamp precisely in the restoration of Lutheran tradition, long before Hengstenberg, from reasons of ecclesiastical politics, renounced the Union, under the shelter of which how-

ever modern Pietism had developed itself into a notable factor in the Church.

The writer of the dissertation *Geschichtliches aus der Veröhnungs- und Genugthuungslehre*,¹ which specially refers to Anselm, Grotius, Menken, and incidentally also to Socinus, Thomas, Duns, De Wette, has interspersed his own positive views as polemical purposes demanded. But as he himself neither aims at a historical understanding of the course of the doctrine of reconciliation, nor has attained anything of the kind in his broken and mangled presentation of the material—a presentation which is given in the usual petulant tone,—what here falls to our lot is simply to characterize his view in so far as from it the theological tendency which the *Kirchenzeitung* adopts may be gathered. For so far as the attitude of this scholar is determined by history, he asserts the substantial agreement of Anselm's doctrine with the Bible; and although he himself allows it to be formally incomplete, he yet is of opinion that the opponents or "enemies" of that doctrine, in disputing it, take offence at Christ Himself! Hereby is the new dogmatism characteristically inaugurated; the recognition of Anselm's schema of Christ's satisfaction to God is proclaimed to be the indispensable condition of Christianity; the theoretical instrumentality is ranked along with the ground and the purpose of religion as equal in value to them. Then his objections to Menken resolve themselves into this, that the assurance of forgiveness of sins which corresponds to the penal satisfaction of Christ does not receive decisive weight from him. At the same time, the man recognises that the "orthodox dogmatic writers of our Church" have systematically separated sanctification too much from justification, and kept too much in the background what is common to both; it is according to him a merit of the modern period, particularly of Schleiermacher, to contemplate the representative attitude of Christ towards humanity, upon which justification and sanctification rest, more in the totality of His life and in the significance of His humiliation and incarnation taken as a whole. In his own name he affirms, with this purpose, that the Son of *God* being made *man* under-

¹ *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, 1834, 37, 38. Baur's conjecture (as above, p. 679) that Sartorius was its author, has since been denied by that writer (*Lehre von der heiligen Liebe*, ii. p. 70).

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took the abolition of the guilt of human sin as well as of its consequences; that He did this in human nature, yes, as human nature; namely human nature itself was delivered from sin in Him. If now this eagerness to make some progress is far from betraying a single clear thought, the learned author becomes more intelligible when he has to deal with the reproduction of the Lutheran tradition; but, as if he were ashamed of the modesty of his task, he embellishes his delineations with exaggerations of the most serious kind. "Sin is negation of God Himself. The relation of God to sin is an absolute one; it is His relation to the negation of Himself. The idea of punishment enters in along with this relation by the will of God. As soon as man falls into sin he of necessity becomes subject to ruin and death. The power of God which asserts itself, which at the same time is the outflow of His will, is, when thought of as an internal state having relation to sin, His wrath. To man his own conversion is absolutely impossible; because the absolute relation (which is one of destruction) must fulfil itself in him in accordance with eternal right. If the relation of destruction is to be done away, then not only must sin clear off its guilt, it must itself be abolished so far as men are concerned. Man as sinner is incapable of this; therefore," etc. This theology assuredly needed its admixture of pathetic strength of faith and of ingenious straining after new thoughts, in order to divest itself of the feeling of its own meagreness, and to impose upon its readers (whose power of judging, however, was at the same time impaired by having mere theological fragments presented to it in many-coloured variety). Thus while this dissertation did not deserve to be noticed even for a moment, so far as its direct bearings on theological science and its history are concerned, it is yet significant as a symptom of the tone and of the theological pretensions which the learned conductors of the *Kirchenzeitung* were able to diffuse in the circles of the clergy; symptoms of the mental atmosphere which finally disposed people to accept the bald repristination of thoughts long ago superannuated.

The same pretension to progress with which this reactionary tendency began its career is, so far as the doctrine of Christ's penal satisfaction is concerned, to be observed also in a treatise

by K. F. Göschel,¹ which the contributor to the *Kirchenzeitung*, whom we have just been criticising, characterizes with high commendation as the deeply thought-out production of a talented jurist. It is in the forms of the Hegelian dialectic that this jurist places his notions of law at the disposal of theology—which last, as the science of the absolute spirit, he regards both as the summit and the foundation of all knowledge and science. It is moreover the juristic notion of punishment which he intends to develop; and this he proposes to do in accordance with Scripture—which is regarded as the source of all knowledge—Scripture which he designs to interpret, not after the wont of many “dear Christians,” merely by reference to single passages, but by the aid of the very Spirit which is its author. In accordance with this the opposition asserted in the ordinary doctrine between justice and grace, punishment and forgiveness, is denied. Punishment, according to him, is not an evil simply; and the pardon of a criminal or the quashing of a process leaves the criminal to appear a criminal after all, or does not make the accused person appear as innocent. Punishment, he thinks, does not mean merely the restoration of objective right as against subjective arbitrariness; it denotes also the adjustment between right and the subjective will, so that “at last hearts as it were fall in sincerely and of themselves with the right.” In this course of events the right itself exhibits itself as grace, as an outflow of love, and punishment as a ground of forgiveness; for “crime is forgiven precisely by punishment.” In correspondence with this is the appeal to the conduct of a human judge. While he has to exercise penal justice as an outflow of love towards the sinner, he must sympathize with the condemned, both to cheer him and to quicken his conscience. But what is exhibited among men very imperfectly in these respects, is seen in archetypal perfection in God, whose conduct is the ground of the derivative ordinance of men. For the God-man, who in His *essence* is one with God the Father, the punishing Judge, as well as with sinful humanity,—“for He is humanity wholly, which the individual in consequence of his apostasy is only in

¹ *Das Strafrecht u. die christliche Lehre von der Satisfaction. Zerstreute Blätter aus den Hand- und Hülfssachen eines Juristen.* Part i. (1832) pp. 468-494.

part,"—but by His *Person* is distinguished from both, carries out the punishment of universal sin, by that rule, to forgiveness. Now, we might expect to find the comparison carried out to the result that the *God-man*, as condemning judge, sympathizes with the humanity which he punishes, but that the *God-man* gives effect to this sympathetic disposition by taking this punishment vicariously upon Himself. This formula, however, is not framed by Göschel,—plainly because history is inconsistent with it. For Christ has not as judge visited mankind with evils as punishments. Rather is this function avowedly relegated to the future, although by the premisses it required to be traced, as the first and main thing, in the historical appearance of the *God-man*. Göschel thus does not, as might have been expected, frame his formula in accordance with the identity of the *God-man* with God and with humanity in His *essence*, but in accordance with His *personal* distinctness from both. "By His *distinctness* from the Person of the *judge*, who in essence is like Him, His penal suffering is for Him actual and cardinal suffering; wherefore it *appears* as vicarious satisfaction, in consequence of the personal *distinctness* between the suffering and the *guilty persons*; but *essentially* it is not vicarious, for in His essence He is one with the guilty; in fact, He is the essence which He represents more completely than is the individual whom He represents." The second sentence of the formula, in spite of the prefatory remark about the *appearance* which His suffering produces, is carried up to an identity in essence with humanity. By this we know that the first sentence is wrong; for in it the point is the identity in essence of the *God-man* with the Divine Judge and His *sympathetic* suffering when punishment is imposed; the notion of penal suffering, which is introduced in place of this, has no ground whatever in the first sentence of the formula.

By this violation of logic, Göschel has disguised the incongruence of his theory with the historical appearance of the *God-man*. But his premisses also, respecting the relation between punishment and forgiveness, contradict his purpose. For what he unfolds is not the juristic but the *pædagogic* idea of punishment. This last form of punishment is based directly upon love; the justice which it embodies evinces love, "as we know from the very nursery" (as above, p. 483); forgiveness

is of course implied in this idea of punishment ; by it naughtiness is forgiven. But to say that by criminal punishment *crime is forgiven*, as Göschel phrases it, betokens the confusion that pervades his line of thought ; and legal punishment is legal punishment, his assumption to the contrary notwithstanding, even when it is as far as may be from bringing the criminal to recognise his moral guilt and the justness of the evil with which he is visited ; in this last purpose therefore it is not the essential feature of criminal but of pædagogic punishment that is expressed. In like manner also to demand sympathy as an essential condition of penal visitation, holds good only with regard to pædagogic chastisement ; but in criminal justice this disposition of the judge comes in only incidentally, and has no influence upon the discharge of his function. In pædagogic penal justice, however, a vicarious representation of the guilty by the innocent has as little place as in criminal law. Rather if it stand firmly established that in that sphere forgiveness is brought about precisely by means of punishment, then the purpose of bringing back the mind to righteousness in general would be missed in the vicarious penal suffering of another ; or if, at all events, in an exceptional case, a punishment that by oversight has overtaken an innocent person seems to be pædagogically operative upon the guilty party, in that case it falls, "as we know from the nursery," under the category of *penal example*. Göschel, accordingly, if he had logically judged of Christ's penal satisfaction in harmony with his premisses, would neither have reached nor found it necessary to reach the conclusion of assigning such a value to Christ's passion, but would merely have found himself occupying the same standing-ground with Grotius.

The same tendency to divest the thought of Christ's penal satisfaction of its juristic restriction and to deepen it ethically, is manifested by Ernest Sartorius.¹ Of course, as might be expected from his identification with *Evang. Kirchenzeitung*, in intention he adheres to the thought. But it is to be

¹ *Die Lehre von der heiligen Liebe. Part ii. Von der versöhnenden Liebe*, 1844. The track of Sartorius is followed more or less plainly by H. Martensen : *Christliche Dogmatik* (1849). From the Danish in 1850. W. F. Gess : *Drei Abhandlungen über die Versöhnung in the Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.* ii., iii., iv., 1857-59. Herm. Plitt : *Evangelische Glaubenslehre nach Schrift u. Erfahrung*. Two vols. 1863-64.

questioned whether by interpreting Christ's entire obedience as an offering, and by his notion of expiation he realizes his intention of defending the juristic element in the old doctrine, and incorporating it with his own view. To begin, the preference given to the idea of sacrifice and the little concern shown for juristic precision in the use of the notion of satisfaction, reminds of Limborch (p. 316). But then Sartorius recedes from Lutheranism in the assertion that Christ's sacrifice corresponds not to a law of works but to the eternal law of love and self-denial, so that he expressly declines to maintain a quantitative equivalence between the suffering of Christ and the punishment that humanity had incurred by reason of sin. For, says he, what we are considering is redemption not from punishment but from *guilt*.¹ This last is the real original punishment of sin, and we can be made free from all other punishments only on the assumption of our being entirely clear of the relation of guilt. But for this purpose a positive satisfaction by fulfilment of the law is needful,—a satisfaction which God as the Reconciler has provided for by the mission of the sinless God-man, and in such a way that He Himself is reconciled by the entire obedience of the latter, by the sacrifice of His full self-denial. For as sacrifice has its full value not in an objective material prestation, but in personal surrender to God, the true destination of sacrifice is realized (sin being presupposed) in voluntary endurance of the sufferings which are imposed as punishments. To the sinner, indeed, this willingness is not in itself possible, and therefore it is not every one who can produce this propitiatory prestation either for himself or for others. But Christ attains unto it, being as the Sinless One at the same time the Head of human society, and as the Obedient and Righteous One bearing, in His compassionateness towards men, sympathy with their suffering which is the reward of sin. Thus by His perfect love in obedience to the law He made propitiation for sin in suffering and dying, and God, having accepted this sacrifice, has forgiven its guilt to humanity as represented by Christ.

There are two points in this line of thought which are new and run counter to the Lutheran tradition. The notion of law is ethically and not legally conceived, and the notion of propi-

¹ Here Tieftunk's distinction comes in (see above, p. 422).

tiation is separated from that of punishment. But this being the case, the notion required to be defined positively also; and though this is omitted by the theologians before us, we are yet helped to an understanding of their view by the remark that to propitiate, if it does not mean "to pay the penalty," means only to "establish peace." But if now, according to Sartorius, *self-denying voluntary* suffering of Divine punishment is the very idea of propitiatory sacrifice, then the proof that the notion of propitiation has place in a given case is not first found in an operation proceeding beyond this act itself, but is already given in a reflex operation of that act upon the sensitivity of the subject. The voluntary endurance of evils puts the subject in peace with the evils themselves, changes the feeling of pain that they occasion into a sort of pleasure, substitutes for their penal quality the meaning of Divine discipline, that is to say, relative benefaction. If now, Christ's loving and patient submission to the sufferings which have for sinners the force of punishment operates with propitiatory efficacy, this has at first sight no other meaning than what is conveyed by Schleiermacher (p. 470) under the name of Reconciliation through Christ, to the effect that, while He "communicates His own good,"¹ He reconciles those who are His to the evils that befall them, that is, to the whole divinely-planned ordering of their life. This agreement between the two is shown further herein, that Sartorius (as above, p. 68), like Schleiermacher (p. 480), discerns the satisfactory efficacy of Christ's High-priestly activity in the merciful love whereby He *on our behalf* has descended from the throne of God to the deepest humiliation; in other words, the direction of the priestly work is towards us, not towards God. But when, over and above this, the analogy with orthodoxy is maintained by the thought that the prestation in question is directed towards the reconciliation of God Himself, whereby also peace between God and men is secured, Sartorius again glides into a similarity to Limborch. The fulfilment of the law of love by Christ as representative of humanity—such a restoration of the moral order of the world makes it possible to God to bring in an unimpeded loving intercourse with believers. Christ's propitiation is then an extraordinary prestation, to which He was not bound for

¹ Sartorius: as above, p. 62.

His part, and so in virtue of its voluntariness constitutes His merit.¹ If, moreover, God, in consideration thereof, forgives men their guilt, while, as we have seen, the *necessity* that belongs to legal procedure is excluded from the whole connexion of ideas, we can only think of a free determination of God, which Sartorius expresses by saying that Christ's sacrifice in its perfection was *accepted* by the Father (as above, p. 75). The material interpretation of Christ's merit as propitiation, certainly, was one never made by Limborch. Sartorius, however, in the formal arrangement of his notions as clearly approximates to the model of Limborch as he avoids the Lutheran schema. It is worthy of notice how the intention ethically to deepen the idea of penal satisfaction, properly speaking, fails to carry Göschel beyond Grotius, and brings Sartorius into close proximity to Limborch.

The full and frank repristination of the doctrinal tradition of Lutheranism first made its appearance in literature in 1850, in the period of intense political and ecclesiastical reaction. In fact, through Thomasius it reached its climax in Philippi's *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*.² The former of these still departs in one or two respects from the correct reproduction of the opinions of the fathers of his Church, adopting some things from Sartorius. These "not unimportant vacillations" draw from Philippi the judgment that "even here a sure and full measure of Church knowledge appears to have been not yet perfectly attained." With regard to Philippi himself, however, Hofmann³ observes, that a man whose systematic activity in theology consists in stringing together traditionary sentences in a traditionary form undoubtedly runs no great risk of making mistakes. It is a pity that Hofmann has not noticed how Philippi, in his tract against him, makes a trip of a kind quite surprising, in interpreting the significance of Christ's death to be that of a penal example.⁴ However, as Thomasius and Philippi

¹ This last expression is of my selection, as the sentence in which it occurs is an inference of my own, drawn in order clearly to exhibit the range of the view of Sartorius.

² Thomasius: *Christi Person u. Werk*, Part III. Div. i., 1859. Philippi: *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, Part IV. sec. ii., 1863.

³ *Erste Schutzschrift*, p. 2.

⁴ As above, pp. 41, 42. The point to be urged is not so much that Christ has done and suffered what we ought to have done and suffered, but rather that the inviolable supremacy and the unqualified authority of the infinite

alike intend to reproduce the Lutheran doctrine of reconciliation and justification, and as the slight departures made by the former have already been catalogued by the latter (as above, p. 234); as, moreover, I have already, in the sixth chapter, brought forward and investigated the Lutheran doctrine and the peculiar character that of right belongs to it, I am so happily situated as to be able to spare myself the trouble of presenting the doctrinal views of the theologians of Erlangen and Rostock. Only two remarks force themselves upon me.

Firstly, they both develop the connexion of the Lutheran doctrine of reconciliation on the basis of the postulates which the individual religious need lays down, while Thomasius always makes use of subjective experience as an allowable ground of knowledge of truths of dogmatic theology. This is thoroughly modern; and is fitted seriously to compromise the objectivity of doctrine. Must the religious experience of these two gentlemen pass within the Church as the normal? Already (above, p. 555) it has been shown that the penal value of the death of Christ (which is postulated by both as that annulment of the law's condemnation of the sinner which the case requires) is judged in the religious experience of others only by the standard of the penal value of the believer's daily repentance. Are von Meyer and Beck on that account to be pronounced unworthy of full communion in the Evangelical Church? Or if a believer, from his readiness patiently to bear for Christ's sake the evils that befall him, accepts indeed in the meaning of Sartorius the propitiatory value of the death of Christ, but denies its penal value, has he no title to do so within the Evangelical Church? Or finally, if with Hofmann one comes to the conclusion that in the juristic equation between Christ's prestations and our liability nothing is held forth of which living faith may take hold, is one *eo ipso* excommunicated from the Lutheran Church? Who is audacious enough to proscribe in the Church even indirectly these religious standpoints? He who regards his own individual experience of a conscience crushed by the law, and of the pacification of his conscience by the penal satisfaction of Christ as the normal standpoint in the Lutheran Church, must at least not appeal to the fact

holiness of God, which had been absolutely negatived by sin, had to be brought to absolute currency and recognition.

that Luther himself counts upon the universal validity of his own experiences in that direction. For the postulate has been proved by the Church's history of 300 years to have no universal validity, because in its very nature it can indeed call a sect into existence, but is not adapted for exclusively defining and limiting the piety that is possible and warrantable within the Church. Therefore I doubt whether a doctrine of faith so founded on individual religious experience has a churchly character. It is however in the relation of the party to the school of Bengel that we are to seek the circumstances which, beyond question, gave immediate occasion to this subjective way of establishing a would-be churchly theology. The latter school has brought the new orthodoxy to the proof that it can no longer profess to be the biblical theology which exhausts Scripture as the source of theology; nay, if the problem which the old school took in hand is worked out, the result is not the repristination of the doctrinal conceptions of Lutheranism. But the frank admission of what is actually the case with orthodoxy—that in it a system of belief reached by tradition subsequently proves its dogmas by the *dicta probantia* of Scripture as a norm,—would contravene a recognised principle of Reformation theology. All theological truths were accordingly, to begin with, postulated from the religious experience, and thereafter are proved, well or ill, from Scripture. But hereby the descent of modern Lutheranism from the Pietistic awakening is again made plain.

Secondly, with regard to the form of presentation, the distance which separates both these divines from the older ones, as well as their share in the impulses which have affected systematic theology since the time of Schleiermacher, is shown in their exclusion of that scientific aim which is followed by the old orthodox divines—the aim at clearness and completeness in their definitions, and at syllogistic refutation of their opponents. Dogmatic theology *takes the narrative form*, and its opponents at once place themselves in the wrong when they depart from Lutheranism. Then along with this, to eke out the dogmatic text, there is incorporated (as has become customary since the period of Rationalism) a notice of the history of dogma. Rationalism occupied itself with this in order to show how doctrines suffer change; both Lutherans intend that hereby the continuity

of the orthodox doctrine should be recognised. That there exists in our age in Germany a flourishing *science* of history cannot certainly be conjectured from their chronicle of the history of dogma which, in particular, is so incomplete in the case in hand that the change and the reason of the change which the older Pietism produced in the doctrines of reconciliation and justification are left entirely unelucidated, while the religious motives which were operative in the Illumination—motives which play around the dissolution of the traditionary doctrine of the atonement, although indeed they reach no goal—are not so much as dreamt of. "Every man looked to his own way" holds good here also; but we cannot expect anything else from this party, because, religiously viewed, it takes up the standpoint of Moravian Pietism, which in its nature is sectarian, and churchly only in appearance.

That precisely in the doctrine of justification there occur unsolved problems both speculative and practical is strikingly proved by the way in which Hengstenberg has finished off by swinging round to the side of the older Pietism.¹ It is a peculiar Nemesis that this man, by the impression which his departure from Lutheran tradition produced alike on friend and foe, saw himself compelled to remember that the old leaders of Lutheranism had hardly ever appealed to the confessional documents, while he himself hardly ever makes use of any other standard—that the principle of stability is essentially objectionable—that every scribe who is truly instructed must bring forth out of his treasure first new and then old things. His position was not very favourable for adding that his activity had from the beginning been regulated by these principles, when everybody could bear witness to the contrary. There lay a self-deception also at least in his claim to have said something new in his assertion that faith is developed and relatively perfected by active and fruitful love, and that degrees of justification correspond to the degrees of faith. But this self-deception was based simply on ignorance of the fact that Reformed theologians,² and that John Fr. von

¹ *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, 1866, Nos. 93, 94 (a paper on the Epistle of James;) 1867, Nos. 23-26 (the woman that was a sinner, Luke vii. 36-50); Nos. 47, 48.

² Schneckenburger: *Comparative Dogmatik*; ii. p. 73. Compare above, p. 273, note 1.

Meyer (p. 552), have said the same thing. Was it then perhaps also a self-deception on Hengstenberg's part that for forty years he had understood the passage in Luke vii. as meaning that the amount of subjective love regulates the objective amount of the appropriated forgiveness of sins (1867, p. 299)? No, on this point I believe we may accept his assurance; and this I hold to be the most important part of the matter. For in the case before us, personal interest in the establishment of his assertions outweighs the purely objective interest. The exegetical proof which Hengstenberg leads in favour of his view is very indifferent; it is as sophistical as might be expected from its author; the number of the reasons must as always make up for their badness, and to attempt a dogmatic construction, or the necessary dialectical harmonizing of the view with the Lutheran doctrine, exceeded the powers of the editor of the *Kirchenzeitung*. But I believe that on this point Hengstenberg from the very first was of the old Pietistic view; for this corresponds to his mental constitution, as already described, to his pre-eminent strength of will and his jejune intelligence. I have no doubt therefore of the truth of his confessions in the second of the papers I have referred to, but this very fact forces us to the conclusion that the tendency of the man's public activity and his personal religious inclination were not coincident. Publicly he did everything to consolidate into dogmatic Lutheranism the religious fluidity of the modern Pietistic party which he swayed; and when all is done, he declares, in justification of the old Pietistic view he has all along been cherishing,—the view that the forgiveness of sins is conditioned by the amount of sanctification,—that merely to repristinate Lutheranism would deeply lower the Church, because in the present deficiency of the corresponding premisses, the *terrores conscientiae*, the doctrine of justification would be abused as a cheap way of clearing scores with the holiness of the law. Plainly, however, he was guided in the choice of a path for his public action by the dread lest in his personal leaning to the old Pietistic effort after sanctity he might fall into any analogy with Rationalism (1867, p. 271). For this reason he mastered himself and joined the Moravian type of Pietism, which was heterogeneous to him; and in order that the disposition to Rationalism might not awake in his soul, he

restlessly pursued a life-task, which, properly speaking, was alien to him with ever-growing grasping eagerness; he did not suffer the leaning towards free thinking (which he confesses himself to have felt, and with truth) to manifest itself outwardly, since the path he had entered upon of necessity pledged him to stability, repristination, reaction. Thus his fate clung to him; and when at last laying hold of a casual opportunity he discloses with bold frankness the long suppressed secret of his heart, he had of course to experience how the "world," here in the shape of various church parties, is wont to visit such surprises. It is not my business to inquire into the blame attachable in this connexion. I believe that I have only exercised justice towards a man who has been always personally quite unknown to me in attempting to explain the contrast between his profession and his public action. I am led in the matter purely by the interest that lies in the fact that Hengstenberg in person proves that the contradiction between the old Pietism and Lutheranism has not yet been removed.¹

74. The work that has been devoted, since Schleiermacher, to the doctrine of reconciliation displays an incredible want of co-operation on the part of theologians; so much so that memory is unequal to the task of mastering all the variations, even of views which follow only one type. This is the result partly of mutual indifference, partly of the separatistic influence produced by the various forms of Pietism, partly of the almost complete absence of theological discipline. At the same time, in the alternation of opinions, there come forward several peculiar thoughts which theologians, with more or less of unanimity, agree in accepting, and which consequently may be regarded as forming in a sense the fruit of later theology. For (1.) there is thorough unanimity on the point that reconcilia-

¹ He says (*Evang. Kirch.* 1867, p. 271): "It is one of the greatest problems of the present time rightly to remedy the mischief which Pietism sought to remedy in a wrong way (i.e., by ranking sanctification before justification); and every attempt in this direction ought, if it spring from an earnest honest spirit and eager study of Holy Scripture, to be received with loving sympathy instead of being repelled with harsh charges of heresy." This is a correct view of the case, though Hengstenberg had no right to give the closing admonition,—see only, for example, how in his paper on the Epistle of James, at the very time when he is insisting upon the active exercise of love, he vents the most malicious insinuations against the "Mediation-theology."

tion is deduced from the love of God. And even where reconciliation through Christ is presented in accordance with Anselm's schema, care is taken not to rank the justice of God before His love; with this intention it happens that the word holiness is often substituted for justice. Even the restorers of the Lutheran dogmatic guard themselves in accordance with this against the idea maintained by orthodoxy, that by Christ's satisfaction God was brought round from wrath to grace. Of course it remains to be seen afterwards whether this intended correction has actually been accomplished. But the very intention to make God's love the supreme principle of reconciliation through Christ, at once shows that it is Luther who is followed, and not Melancthon, the latter of whom, properly speaking, was the founder of Lutheran orthodoxy on this point. It was the Illumination theology, however, that gave the first impulse towards regress to Luther's view. (2.) While the old orthodoxy took the love of God into account towards reconciliation only in so far as it derived therefrom the mission of Christ and the imputation of His merit, the manifestation of that love as ground of reconciliation is extended throughout the whole life and passion of Christ, not merely by Schleiermacher's followers, but also by Beck and Hofmann. (3.) The vicarious representation of men before God, in so far as it is discerned in Christ's life and passion, is almost throughout founded on the assertion that Christ even *in statu exinanitionis* was the Head of humanity, of new humanity or of the Church; an idea which dominates the maturest presentation of the doctrine of reconciliation in the Reformed theology, and which can be traced back through Thomas up to Bernard. (4.) Partially also the connexion of Christ's suffering and doing is apprehended in the idea of His vocation, whereby it is rendered possible to conceive His prestation at once as dutiful and as operative for men, while the idea of the merit of Christ never reappears at all. (5.) One section of those who again take up the thought of penal satisfaction do so in such a way that the juristic meaning of the thought is rectified by means of the ethical thought of propitiation; and though this is brought into some measure of clearness only by Sartorius, yet his presentation of the point, viewed in connexion with the fact that even Thomasius and Philippi take up the same thought,

opens up the hope that the doctrine of reconciliation shall find its due adjustment in some other idea of law than that of legal code. (6.) The reproduction by Beck and Hofmann of the New Testament intuitions affords the prospect of the establishment, as a principle, of the identity of reconciliation and justification,—an identity which was long ago apprehended by the Reformed divines, and even by Melancthon when he looked at the matter from the religious side; the prospect therefore arises of the settlement of the controversy between the old Pietism and the new as to the priority of regeneration or justification. These are, as I have said, elements which open up, to any attempt at a theoretical reconstruction of the doctrine that shall proceed upon them, the prospect of meeting with sympathy from the present tendencies in theology. But these thoughts are far enough from having the value of established results, partly because they are not clearly defined, partly because they are not proved, partly because they take their bearings only by biblical theology, partly because they are brought forward in vague connexion with heterogeneous traditions.

At the same time the tendency to an ethical view of Christ's prestations in their bearing on God, which has been hinted at by Tholuck (p. 526), and evinced by Sartorius, in one respect at least (p. 565) has been exemplified with no small degree of precision by Schenkel also.¹ He distinguishes between reconciliation and redemption, holding that, by the former, humanity as such is transported back into fellowship with God, while by the latter the individual appropriation of the results of reconciliation takes place, and that in such a way that amongst these results justification is the special subjective realization of reconciliation itself. Here Schenkel recognises the problem found out by Hofmann. Now, while Christ is the Bearer of Reconciliation, Schenkel repudiates the exclusive truth of Abelard's view no less than the assumption of penal satisfaction. Of course he recognises with Abelard, that in reconciliation God imparts Himself; but God not only reconciles humanity with Himself, He reconciles Himself with humanity. His wrath against *sin*, which is presupposed along with His

¹ *Die christliche Dogmatik vom Standpunkte des Gewissens aus dargestellt*, vol. ii. Div. ii., 1859.

love towards *sinner*s, awaits removal, while the communication of life in Christ accomplishes itself in the form of a deed that works salvation to *humanity*, which in Christ is restored to be the perfect image of God. Thereby the interpretation of Christ's work in its bearing on God comes to have importance for the idea of reconciliation. For in the idea of sacrifice, which constitutes the middle term, the revelation of God's reconciling love coincides with the self-abnegation of man. While now Christ in His self-abnegation carries His whole life through even unto death as the perfect life in the image of God, while in doing this He has subdued sin for Himself, and thereby condemned it in general, He has at the same time inlived the *Divine* redeeming power into the humanity which He represents, and at the same time given in *God's presence* the pledge of a sinless humanity. It is obvious that the character of this statement, which in essential points is in agreement with Hofmann, is throughout determined by ethical conditions; at the same time it can be clearly seen in it that, properly speaking, it has fixed the problem only with the help of what are doubtless biblical ideas, but that the law, in accordance with which this connexion is discerned to be true, has not yet been expressed.

Kahn¹ gives expression to quite another tendency. In his opinion only that presentation of doctrine treats Scripture fairly, which proves the necessity of sacrifice as well as of punishment and of obedience in the death of Christ. Dogmatic, he maintains, must guard itself against elevating one of these ideas to the dignity of sole authority, and in the opposite procedure lies the error which each in his own way, the Arminians, the old school, and again Hofmann, have fallen into. If in this statement the programme of the Lutheran theology that contemplates scientific progress is to be recognised, then surely in order to the completion of the "historical" character of this Lutheran dogmatic, it ought to be added that the proposed task has already been carried out by one Lutheran theologian with a high degree of circumspection and formal care, and at the same time with that objectivity of bearing which becomes orthodoxy. That theologian is Ludwig Schöber-

¹ *Die lutherische Dogmatik, historisch-genetisch dargestellt*, vol. iii. (1868), p. 401.

lein.¹ He regards reconciliation as the restoration of the sinner to the rights of the kingdom of God, and under this point of view comes upon the old problem how God's love, the ultimate cause, stands related to God's justice in reconciliation. But here he does not think fit to approve of the formulæ of the old school, which thinks of them as in contradiction with each other, or gives the justice the first rank; rather does he prefer that justice should be regarded as an immanent factor of love. For love is the essence of God, the purpose of self-communication, which, in relation to the humanity that is His image, is realized by the incarnation of God unto the deification of humanity in the kingdom of God. But as love presupposes and includes respect—the recognition of the independent personality of the other—God's love includes in itself justice, in which His will to communicate Himself is regulated by the receptivity and worthiness of the other party, and eventually limits itself thereby. This is shown in relation to sinful humanity. The breach of loving fellowship, and the guilt of this iniquity is of infinite moment on account of the dignity of God's legal ordinance which is set at naught. Wherefore also the love of God can exercise only its function of justice in the conscience's sentence of condemnation and in the imposition of evils as punishment, which in itself results in everlasting condemnation. At the same time this infliction is not inconsistent with the love of God, for it proves God's respect for the personal independence of men, and the wrath in which God's penal justice finds its characteristic expression is to be conceived of only as a metastasis of love—as God's active love-pangs on account of sin. The curse, therefore, which the wrath of God has poured out upon the natural and personal life in calamities and death is at the same time an evidence that the love of God has not abandoned men. As God loves men He sympathizes with their sufferings under the curse, and in this sympathy is founded His

¹ See the Article *Versöhnung* in Herzog's *Realencyklopädie*, xvii. (1863) pp. 87-143. Compare his essay *Ueber die christliche Versöhnungslehre*; *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1845, pp. 267-318. In his interpretation of the notion of justification Schöberlein follows the Pietistic schema, and adopts also the view that has been traced in von Meyer and Beck of the correspondence between the penal value of individual repentance and the penal satisfaction of Christ, (*Ueber das Verhältniss der persönlichen Gemeinschaft mit Christo zur Erleuchtung, Rechtfertigung, Heiligung*; *Stud. u. Krit.*, 1847, p. 45 sq.)

grace ; in this sense His wrath is eternally atoned in His pity, and the pangs of His love are, by His purpose of grace, taken up into the unity of blessed joy in humanity. For God eternally loves mankind in His image, the Son of God. This ideal relation, which makes the incarnation of the Son to be necessary, is realized by Him as Head of humanity by the discharge of His life-calling, in which He carries out His personal destiny into a free and independent action. And as love is the principle of His life, that principle runs its course in the twofold aspect of love to God and of love to men, in obedience to the Father and in sympathy with sinners. Under both conditions His life is, above all, the self-revelation of God's love towards sinful humanity. Under this head falls also His passion upon which out of love He entered, because evil conditions the whole life of man, because the power of Satan that assails him can only be overcome by patience in suffering, and because it was only His own suffering that could develop full sympathy with the depths of human sin.

But this destiny, to wit, of revealing the love of God, does not exhaust the value of the life and passion of Christ : that life and that passion have also a double bearing on God Himself. For just as His relation to humanity becomes operative under the graduated points of view of justice and complete love, the life and suffering of Christ serve for the expiation of sin and the reconciliation of humanity with God. Since, then, Christ represents humanity as its Head, He is qualified for that vicarious satisfaction which is demanded by the relation to God's justice which actually subsists. By His active righteousness accordingly, He presents the humanity He represents as well-pleasing before God ; as substitute He has borne in His passion the consequences of God's curse even to the horror of the Divine wrath, to the endurance of which His sympathy extended. But as His passion had no place outside of His active obedience, it follows that He not merely materially bore the punishment of the sinful world, but also as innocent expiated the sin of the world. Hereby is the legal process of the Divine love against sinful humanity rendered inoperative, and man is at the same time redeemed from the power of Satan. For the law whereby the Divine love, keeping the ground of respect, exercised against sinful humanity its right to punish has exhausted that right in visiting the innocent

with unmerited punishment; the merit of His obedience is thus the ground of His justification in the eye of the law which is implied in His resurrection, and the ground of the exemption of the humanity that pertains to the Head from God's former legal ordinance of mere respect. As, moreover, Satan, in the sphere of God's revelation of wrath, exercised over sinners a right of might that had been permitted to him by God, this also ceased with the disannulling of God's right to punish. But this train of thought, in which Christ's active and passive satisfaction has been explained from the juridical point of view, does not exhaust the truth: it has "only a relative warrant in the eye of faith and of science." Were we to stop here, then "we should be making a mere transition stage into the goal itself, and be clinging to the mere form and seeming of the Divine life, without understanding from its proper essence the propitiation of sin." There results accordingly "the task of rather developing this legal process immediately from love itself, and not merely from respect, which is but the first stage of love, for the latter constitutes the *true* principle of the kingdom of God." From this point of view Christ's passion must be conceived as sacrifice. Sacrifice, according to its idea, is the voluntary prestation of self-denial to God, conditioned by the feeling of sin and of penal desert, and which therefore strives at the restoration of the personal fellowship with God which had been lost by sin. But inasmuch as sacrifice includes at the same time the juridical meaning of satisfaction for sin, it completes itself by surrender to death. These marks attach to Christ's suffering and death in so far as He voluntarily undertook it for God's sake, and at the same time in sympathy for the world of sinners as their Head. While thus He has made all humanity an offering in Himself, the formation of a love-fellowship with God is realized; and not this alone, but the love-fellowship of God with man has *principaliter* become operative; the same act, accordingly, which is the ground of the reconciliation of man with God, perfects also God's reconciliation with us. Finally, the resurrection, which constitutes Christ's justification from the law, is at the same time the condition under which he becomes active as intercessory High Priest, applying reconciliation to men, whereby the kingdom of God is realized.

CHAPTER XI.

THE IDEA OF RECONCILIATION ACCORDING TO THE SPECULATIVE SCHOOL.

75. THE claim made by the German speculative philosophy of this century, to leave nothing further to be desired in the interpretation of Christianity and its idea of reconciliation, is very intelligibly set forth in the disquisition by Baur which follows. (See as above, pp. 688-691.) He concedes that Schleiermacher gave its absolute expression to the notion of reconciliation when he exhibited, in life-fellowship with Christ, the abiding effect of the unity of the Divine and the human that was realized in Him, of the identity of the absolute powerfulness of the God-consciousness with the Being of God in Him ; and in such a way that the individual enjoys his consciousness of the redemption thus brought about only as a member of the fellowship of the redeemed. But this process of reconciliation, he goes on to say, is yet apprehended only in its purely historical and subjective significance, but not at the same time as objectively divine. The Church doctrine of satisfaction, he says, has its deep significance in its tendency to ground the subjective consciousness of reconciliation in an adjustment of God with Himself ; and herein lies its mysterious and fascinating power. Although the manner in which this thought has been traditionally expressed may be unsatisfying and repelling, its modern repristination nevertheless at once shows that, as matter of fact, its leading tendency is relatively a right one. "Only when God, *in the reconciliation of man, reconciles Himself with Himself*, only when the subjective spirit becomes one with the objective, and the finite with the absolute, is man truly and absolutely reconciled." Schleiermacher fails to come up to this requirement, in so far as the God, in whom he grounds reconciliation through Christ, is shut up within Himself ; for

in that case He would still continue to be always strange to men. If hereby the needfulness of the correction which has been hinted at is made obvious, we yet require, in making that correction, to conserve in another regard that factor of objectivity gained by Schleiermacher, to wit, "the procuring of the redemptive activity of Christ which bears upon individuals by means of the fellowship established by Him, in so far as only that can be regarded as an objective truth which, in the *historical consciousness of humanity*, in the *natural coherence of that fellowship of the species* whereby the individual is upheld and determined, is in a position to assert itself in its objectivity." It seems as if Baur in this sentence introduced, as equivalent magnitudes, three things which nevertheless require to be widely distinguished, both quantitatively and qualitatively—the Christian Church, humanity as bearer of a historical consciousness, humanity as a natural genus. The following sentence, however, lets us see that he knows how to appreciate the difference at least between the first magnitude and the other two. For what he had attributed to Schleiermacher as a "factor of objectivity"—that the consciousness of redemption is conditioned by the redemption-fellowship—immediately afterwards is viewed by him only in the sphere of the subjective consciousness, inasmuch as the joint consciousness of the redemption-fellowship to which the individual belongs is held to be only the extended consciousness of the subject. "Hence the problem can only be so to adjust with one another the two factors—historical and speculative—whereby the subjective spirit is to coalesce into unity with the objective spirit, that in both the living movement of the absolute spirit is revealed." Unless this sentence be altogether unconnected with that which precedes it, Baur by it excludes from the reconciliation-process the individual's consciousness of reconciliation within the Christian Church as something indifferent, and substitutes for it humanity as a natural genus which, as bearer of its historical consciousness, is a subjective spirit, but in speculative knowledge so coalesces with the objective spirit that in it the self-development of the absolute spirit comes at once to subjective consciousness and objective completion. If the idea of reconciliation finds its perfected expression in this schema, Schleiermacher, without a doubt, in every respect falls short of

the appointed goal. This is the case not merely inasmuch as the thought of an inner process in God is foreign to him, but also in respect of the attitude of the individual to every grade of human fellowship. He acknowledges indeed, just as Baur does, that the individual is "upheld and determined" by society, but at the same time he maintains that in himself the individual constitutes a peculiar centre of force, which again efficiently reacts upon every fellowship within which he stands. This universal rule regulates also the value of the individual's life-fellowship with Christ, and of that subjective consciousness thereof which one must have in the Church of Christ. We shall inquire whether the vaunted shelving of this factor of the idea of reconciliation really helps to a richer development.

With a view to this, it may be called to mind that, according to Dilthey's convincing proofs,¹ the view of the universe which dominates the speculative efforts of Schelling and Hegel originates with Goethe. The poetical power of intellectual intuition with which the philosopher Schelling sets forth the parallel double unfolding of the absolute in nature and the spirit's history, has its original prototype in the scientific effort of the great poet to comprehend the universe as the graduated scale of all those orders of life into which nature differentiates itself with a view to the enjoyment of itself. It cannot be questioned what enrichment of the spirit's manner of contemplation, and what fertilization of the intellectual life was gained by the educated classes of the German nation from this train of thought; nor can it be disputed that the intellectual horizon of the Illumination was successfully overstepped for the first time by means of this co-operation of aesthetic and scientific impulses. Nor yet can it be doubted that this view of the universe, in so far as it promoted a taste for history, brought an appreciative attention to bear upon Christianity. But that the specific peculiarity of Christianity could be exhausted by the speculative philosophy must *a priori* be doubted; for the schemata in which, in the first instance, Schelling's construction of the course of the universe moved—the opposition of the real and the ideal, of being and knowing, of the infinite and the finite—were far too abstract and comprehensive to be able to arrive at what, in the strictest sense, is the problem of the

¹ *Leben Schleiermachers*'s, i. p. 168 sqq.

Christian religion. Schleiermacher has certainly defined Christianity with historical correctness to the effect that it is the monotheistic mode of belief pertaining to the teleological school of piety, in which everything is brought into relation with the redemption accomplished by Jesus. In other words, this means that life in this religion moves in reciprocal relation between the ethical task of the kingdom of God and the religious assurance of redemption; and this implies that as the ethical normation of life necessarily has its ground in the *historical* Founder of the kingdom of God, so also the religious equipment of life is indispensably connected with Him, and the ethical conditionality of social effort and faith is precisely what guarantees the development of the individual's peculiarity, and therewith the development of blessedness in the Christian fellowship.

In the *Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen Studiums* (1803),¹ Schelling has assigned to theology and to Christianity a position in the highest degree distinguished. Philosophy is the science of the Absolute, regarded as the identity of the real and ideal, and of the ideal opposition of these unities, while the objective knowledge of the absolute Being, in so far as its immediate object is given in history as the ideal product of the Divine activity, belongs to theology. While thus theology, as the true centre in which philosophy becomes objective, consists mainly in speculative ideas, it is altogether the highest synthesis of philosophical and historical knowledge. For Christianity is not merely in general a tradition like all religion; its fundamental character is the intuition of the universe as history, as a moral kingdom. For in contradistinction from heathenism, where the infinite is contemplated in the finite, and so itself becomes finite in a multitude of shapes that stand side by side in space, Christianity goes to the infinite in itself, and therefore discerns it in the series of historical figures in which the Divine reveals itself only in a transient way, the fleeting apparition of which is held fast only by faith, but can never be transmuted into an absolute present. In this mode of contemplation of the world as history, every particular factor of time comes to be a revelation of a particular side of God. While now philosophy recognises absolute identity be-

¹ "Lectures on the Method of Academic Study," cf. Lectures, 7, 8, 9.

tween nature and history, the same antithesis recurs also in the Christian view of the universe as history. The old world represents the nature-side of history inasmuch as the prevailing idea in it is the Being of the Infinite in the Finite. Above this the authentic shaping of history in Christianity is elevated by the idea of the Incarnation of God, which has not the heathenish meaning of deifying the finite, but the opposite one, that Christ offers to God the Finite in His own person, and thereby works reconciliation. As He was appointed thereto indeed from all eternity, yet passes by as a phenomenon in time, Christianity as history is founded upon that spirit which carries back the Finite to the Infinite. Reconciliation of the Finite that had fallen away from God by His own birth into Finitude, is the first thought of Christianity; and the completion of its entire view of the universe and its history is contained in the idea of the Trinity. In it the Son of God is the Finite itself (as that exists in the eternal intuition of God), which makes its appearance as a God who suffers and is subject to the inflictions of time, who, in the climax of His manifestation in Christ, closes the world of Finitude, and opens up that of Infinitude or of the dominion of the Spirit. The man Christ is the acme of the Incarnation of God, and so far also its beginning, for before Him no one revealed the Infinite in such a way as could continue to work among his successors as members of his body. But the incarnation of God in Christ is falsely viewed when it is viewed as an isolated, temporal, empirical fact. For as an Individual, Christ is a Person fully conceivable from the standpoint of Judaism, particularly of Essenism; and God, who is eternally outside of all time, cannot have become anything then. The incarnation of God, accordingly, is an incarnation from eternity; and when this idea is referred to Christ, He has in relation to it only the significance of a *symbol*. Christianity thus already existed previous to, and outside of, Christianity, in the religion of India, in the Greek mysteries, in the Orphic poetry, and in the philosophy of Plato. While the necessity of the Idea of Christianity results herefrom, it becomes at the same time clear that in this respect no absolute (he means qualitative) oppositions exist. And therefore the historical construction of Christianity cannot be separated in thought from the religious construction of all history, or rather it must issue in the

solution of this last problem. The spirit of the new era advances with obvious consistency to the annihilation of all purely finite forms, and it is religion to recognise it in this also. In accordance with this law the state (which religion in Christianity had more or less attained) of being a universal and public life must have been a transitory one, for it exhibited as realized only a portion of the purposes of the spirit of the universe. This holds good of all Church-organizations, not excepting that of Protestantism; nor can it be doubted that even morality is no distinguishing feature of Christianity; for the sake of one or two ethical precepts, such as that of love of one's neighbour, etc., it would never have existed in the world and in history. But the determining characteristics of Christianity which extend themselves to an unlimited time, may be clearly enough recognised in poetry and in philosophy. The former needs religion as the highest, yea, the sole possibility of poetical reconciliation also, the latter by means of a truly speculative standpoint has regained the standpoint of religion as well, and paved the way for the regeneration of esoteric Christianity as well as for the proclamation of the absolute gospel.

If Christianity is the contemplation of the universe as history, but in such a way that in its dogmas the eternal relations of the Infinite and the Finite are symbolically and obliquely expressed, and in the appreciation of the epoch-making figure of its Founder as the incarnate God, the eternal ideas are narrowed within the incogitable limits of a phenomenon cognisable by the senses; then it is very natural that in the last resort Christianity can assert its validity only as a standard of poetical justice, and as the leaven of a philosophy which itself is the play of the poetical faculty of imagination. That Christianity contains the intuition of a moral kingdom only in the degree in which it is at the same time the motive that impels the will to the realization of that kingdom, that it is not a historical series of phenomena running their course in time without these being drawn together in space also into a conscious fellowship of will—that in virtue of these conditions it represents a reality of the spirit-life which does not end in poetry and poetical philosophy, has been allowed to pass unobserved in this historical construction. And what value attaches to the allusions to the reconciliation of the Finite and

the Infinite if this real practical significance of Christianity is entirely ignored? The Christian idea of reconciliation lies far removed from that field of vision, wherein the alternation of phenomena implied in the idea of Finitude is interpreted to be the reconciliation of the Finite with God and the proper truth of Christ's personal sacrifice to God. For the conviction of this reconciliation, which, according to Schelling, should prevail in the kingdom of Infinitude or of spirit, which is derived from Christ, can be expressed only in the language of Mephistopheles,—*Alles, was entsteht, ist werth dass es zu Grunde geht!*¹ Viewed in itself, accordingly, this "historical construction" of Christianity in the Lectures on the Method of Academical Study is simply comical. For the connexion of Schelling's own subsequent development, however, it is worthy of notice that he still recognises this work in his *Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809).² In spite of the distance between the idea of God expressed in this later treatise and that of his earlier work, in spite of the precisely contrary view of the incarnation of God, this recognition is calculated to show that the mythology of Böhme, to which Schelling gave himself up, is not a correction but a completion of the Identity-philosophy.³ For the connexion of the speculative theology which followed, however, it is yet more significant that the contrast drawn by Schelling between the eternal incarnation of God and that made in the Person of Christ became the starting-point for the criticism of Strauss.

J. G. Fichte's *Anweisung zum seligen Leben* (1806), betrays, as is well known, the influence of Schelling, in so far as the objective idea of God is recognised as that of the universal and in-itself-indifferent Being. But Fichte's original standpoint is at the same time adhered to, inasmuch as the universe is

¹ "All that arises deserves to come to an end."

² "Philosophical researches into the nature of human freedom." In his *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. i. p. 461.

³ The *Philosophie der Offenbarung* in fact carries out to its consequences the idea of God set forth in the researches on freedom. As in these the incarnation of God in Christ was recognised, so in the first-mentioned work the church tradition regarding Christ's sacrifice—to wit, the idea of penal satisfaction—is appropriated, whereby the discord of potences in God required to be removed (*Sämmtl. Werke*, 2d Div., vol. iv. p. 79). I do not understand this mythology; yet nevertheless believe that it is very superfluous here to investigate more strictly the interlacement of this church tradition with the metaphysic of Schelling.

deduced as multiplicity and diversity immediately from our knowing, which indeed (since the Divine Being embraces all) is really the being of God. The act in which knowing reflects upon itself produces the universe as multiplicity, for that act attains clearness not only in the oneness of knowing but also in the specialness and separateness of this and that. So far the universe is incongruous with the one Divine Being and Existence, and so also incongruous with knowing in the highest sense; and for truth and for happiness it is all-important that in thinking we should reach the unity of Being, and renouncing every degree of imaginary personal independence, that we should reach in love to God this standpoint of the blessed life. Regarded as a philosophical and religious theory this train of thought, as Baur (as above, p. 693) justly remarks, has closest affinity with Scotus Erigena. But for this very reason it stands altogether disconnected with the Christian thought of reconciliation, but maintains only the same analogy with it which Mysticism displays (see above, p. 106). Fichte, indeed, has introduced his view into the interpretation of the prologue of the Gospel according to John, as being the right expression of the self-consciousness of Jesus. That insight into the absolute oneness of human existence with the Divine (which Jesus never had), shows, according to Fichte, that He was that Logos of God which is God. For the existence of God, outside of which nothing Is, is consciousness; by consciousness the world is; and by this knowledge as it was in Jesus is the riddle of the world and of human life solved, in so far as He knew Himself to be one with God. Herewith it is only the Christological problem that is aimed at. Fichte certainly proceeds to argue that all those who since Jesus have come to be united with God, have attained this goal only in following Jesus and in dependence on Him. But even this assertion cannot be looked upon as a substitute for the doctrine of reconciliation,—for two reasons: In the first place, not merely does he declare himself against the usual doctrine that Christ made atonement for sin to an angry God; he also interprets the expression that Christ *taketh away* the sins of the world, as meaning that He took away and abolished the whole delusion of sin as well as dread of the injured Deity, that this imagined difficulty in the way of transmutation to Jesus and to God has disappeared.

But moreover Fichte recognises it as the only normal fact, that in the imitation of Christ the thoughtful knowledge of the oneness of all things in God is completed; but he denies that this resting upon Christ is an indispensable condition of the attainment of that end. "Only the metaphysical, and by no means the historical, makes blessed—the latter makes us intelligent only." If now one is really united with God, and incorporated into Him, it is indifferent what the path may have been by which this has been arrived at; and Jesus Himself, were He to return to the world, would be content were He only to find Christianity actually prevailing in the spirits of men; whether men praised or overlooked His merit must be indifferent to *Him* who did not seek His own honour, but the honour of Him who had sent Him. While Baur finds here (p. 709) a depreciation of the value of the historical and positive in Christianity, he is at the same time of opinion that Christianity had been acknowledged by Schelling in its true significance. This opinion is confuted by what has been said above. Christianity outside of its historical setting, which Schelling recognises in consequence of his doctrine of the incarnation of God in the eternal sense, and Fichte's radical alteration of Christianity into a philosophy, fail to do justice to the historical conditionality and limitation of Christianity just in proportion as the two philosophers are unconcerned about the practical and ethical design of this religion.

Daub's *Theologumena* (1806), however, appear to meet remarkably well Baur's demand for the speculative construction of the doctrine of reconciliation.¹ For this exhibition of the doctrine of God is of such a nature that the idea of reconciliation or satisfaction is at the outset taken up into the inmost relations of the Divine Essence. In the Being of God (which at the same time is His thought of Himself, His idea) are necessarily contained the attributes of aseity, eternity, self-sufficiency. He is thus the Being of whom, in whom, for whom, God exists. But herein is at the same time expressed His idea as of one who is of, in, and for God. In the former view God is thought as the Father, in the latter as the Son. The attributes of God the Son (which correspond to those of God the Father)

¹ With regard to what follows, compare Strauss: *Charakteristiken u. Kritiken* (the papers on Schleiermacher and Daub), p. 82 *eqq.*

are to create, preserve, and (in these activities) to *give satisfaction*. This knowledge of God as the Son is obtained from the analogy of this idea with the universe and the conditions of its existence. For as the universe produces itself, maintains itself, and therein gives satisfaction to itself, but yet has this power from God only, it mirrors God in its exercise of activity, *i.e.* God as the Son, who, although distinguished from the Father, yet is one with Him in the reflection of His attributes upon Him. This use of the notion of satisfaction has not indeed, in the first instance, any direct bearing on the thought of reconciliation; for satisfaction betokens merely the active correlate of the substantial self-sufficiency of God, which in the oneness of the Divine essence, mediated by self-distinction, is identical with the *αὐραπκία* of God Himself. But the relation which must subsist between God as the Son and the world is fixed by Daub by means of notions which throw another light also upon that attribute of God as the Son.

In the *Theologumena* two points of view neutralize one another in forming an estimate of the universe. On the one side it is said that the universe, so far as the eternal reason makes itself objective therein, is not distinct from God the Son, its creator; but in so far as it falls under the senses and is distinct from God, it is as good as nothing. On the other side there is attributed to the universe an unwarranted but also inexplicable effort to become independent and to fall away from God, in so far as it is engaged in a process of Becoming. If now, in the first view of the universe (which is a Spinozistic one), is implied an exhortation to the human cognitive faculty to regard that world which seems to exist apart from God as null and beingless, there results from the second (which is borrowed from Schelling's *Philosophie und Religion*, 1804) a necessity arising from the nature of God for annihilating the effort of the Finite after independence. But what is made by this expression to appear as a practical task in time, or as law of the universe for the human cognitive faculty, yet holds good only because in it the eternal harmony of the relations in God is mirrored. For so far as the world is anything, it is identical with God the Son. But in this sense He has the functions not merely of creating and preserving but also of giving satisfaction; and this, when the false independence of the *finite* world

is compared with its eternal *existence*, takes the form of the function of *reconciliation*. The Divine nature in the Son is reconciling inasmuch as it pledges the identity of the world with God, and that by its sacrifice and annihilation, in view of its effort after independence and its apostasy. *Conspicua autem est natura mundi reconciliata in rerum omnium et singularum interitu, obitu, morte* (p. 75). Herein Daub has given expression to that law of reconciliation which it was not difficult to discern even in Schelling's earlier hints (p. 584). Only the circumstances of an identical conclusion are somewhat different in the two cases. Schelling's thought admitted of being carried out to this expression because he took the Son of God, whose historical function is reconciliation, to be the principle of the Finite as a whole, which must be brought back to the Infinite in order to unity in the view of the universe. Daub conversely has taken the Son of God as the principle of satisfaction or harmony in the Godhead. If now the finitude of the universe, which in respect of its infinity is identical with the Son of God, was conceived as a mark of the false and so guilty independence of the universe, it followed at once on this condition that the name of reconciliation is to be applied to the annihilation of all that is finite. The deeper cause of this combination made by Daub appears, however, to lie in the connexion with the Christian religion of the two views of the universe, which are alternately insisted on by him. The Christian religion is based upon the idea of reconciliation; on the other side Daub carries out the religious view of the universe with a harshness that is equalled only by Spinoza, to the discernment of the nothingness of the universe (which admits of being distinguished from God). Consequently the experimental law of the annihilation of that finite, which has no right to be, passes with him as the reconciliation of the universe with God whereby its identity with God on the side of its actuality, and thereby the harmony and self-sufficiency of God were set up as the highest religious idea.¹ Accordingly

¹ *Theologumena*, p. 75: *Rerum interitus, dum docet, vanam esse ipsarum naturam, quippe quas evanescunt omnes, ea simul valet dignitate et auctoritate ut significet singulas quasque principio illi reconciliatas esse, cui suam, quatenus est divina, debent et acceptam referunt naturam. Principem contra naturæ Dei reconciliatricis et Dei reconciliantis indicem ac testem habemus religionem, vitæ omni tempore superioris fontem æternum, cujus hancce virtutem et majestatem infra contemplabimur.*

the way in which the destruction of the finite is explained away by Daub into the idea of reconciliation has in a certain degree the meaning that the assertion (made by the understanding) of the actuality of the finite is harmonized with the philosophically necessary negation thereof; and, at the same time, that the Christian religion as the religion of reconciliation can be identified with Spinoza's view of the universe.

Although accordingly here, as in the case of Schelling, the idea of reconciliation is explained away into a cosmological law, it finds yet another application for the reason that the *Theologumena* are intended to present not a philosophical cosmology but the contents of the Christian religion. This is the reason why humanity, as the correlate of religion, is distinguished from the universe, of which in all other respects it forms a part, and why reconciliation for it does not consist simply in natural downfall as it does for other natural things. For the human race is that portion of the universe in which the universe has command of itself, is self-conscious and self-known. Thus the human race is impelled by the universe, in which it stands by birth, to become conscious of itself, to distinguish itself from itself, and to compare itself with itself; but hereby is it at the same time infected with the effort of the universe after independence as by an epidemic that necessarily extends to all portions of the universe, and is entangled in apostasy from God. In so far as, along with the universe, it has its origin from God, the human race is faultless and perfect. As accordingly the creating and sustaining nature of God, and the nature of the world as an object of Divine creation and preservation, are betokened by the symbol of the angels who, in conjunction with the eternal Being, enjoy a life of bliss, so, on the other hand, that propensity of the world to selfishness, whereby it becomes naught and vain, and which it conveys to the human race also, is fittingly figured forth by the notion of the prince of the evil spirits who, blinded with arrogance, incites to revolt. In this is not involved the assertion that the unwarranted tendency of the world towards independence is in itself full-blown sin; for, so far as the human race is concerned, reconciliation is not consummated in annihilation or death as a natural event. Referring to Schelling, Daub (p. 434) maintains that the highest goal of spirits is not that

they should absolutely cease to be in themselves, but that this being-in-themselves should cease to be a negation for them. Blessedness for men thus consists in the religious consciousness which is indifferent to death and the fear of death, but also to life and the desire to live; by religion they ought, whether they live or die, to be freed from the nothingness of things and elevated to the discernment of absolute necessity. At the same time this definition of the purpose of religion makes it more clear that the ideas of the unwarrantable finitude of the world and of sin always threaten to overpass the distinction of grade that is designed to be drawn, and to coalesce. For this distinction of grade, which corresponds to the express distinction of level between the universe and humanity, its self-conscious portion, is not securely placed by the recognition of moral freedom; and therefore, on the one hand, the attribute of guilt cannot be maintained in relation to sin, and, on the other, that attribute always intrudes itself unintentionally where it has no right to be—into our view of the effort of the universe after independence.

The distinction of grade between the unconscious universe and the self-conscious human race is accordingly made good herein—that the same magnitude, which to the universe is reconciliation, *i.e.* the ground of the abolition of its finitude, comes in as religion so far as man is concerned. For if religion is to men the power that reconciles and at the same time spiritually creates and upholds, it is nothing different from the Son of God. Religion, in the first instance, is not subjective piety, nor yet objective ordinances of worship, but an absolute idea; so far as the eternal reconciliation of the human race is expressed in it, it is identical with the reconciling Being of God Himself, *i.e.* with God the Son. In relation to men it is subjective and objective, and divides itself into various kinds; but in the absolute religion of Christianity religion as the absolute idea comes into consciousness. And in fact this is contained in the thought of Christ as the Reconciler of the human race. But now, while Daub presents religion as an absolute idea under the title *de expiatione*, he develops no other thought than what is expressed in the relation of the notion of reconciliation to the world. Religion, as correlate of the human race, has thus only the meaning that the eternal state of reconciliation

of the universe with God comes, through God, into the consciousness of the human race, which belongs to the universe, as its self-conscious portion. This issue is also quite intelligible if, after the manner of Spinoza, blessedness is made to consist in liberation from individual sense of life and effort (*qui beantur, a se suaque indole et natura liberantur*, p. 249), and in the recognition of unconditional necessity. For the removal of selfishness and independence is the eternal reconciliation of the world with God through God as Son. Therefore, in this examination of religion, it is always only the eternal reconciliation of the universe that is spoken of—a reconciliation which also is the ground of its creation, maintenance, and guidance by God. From this it results that the completion of reconciliation in time, spoken of in the records of Christianity, only means that men at some definite time required to apprehend the truth that through God the universe is eternally reconciled with God. The offering of the universe to God which is implied in the eternal satisfaction of the Son to the Father, and the thought of which is expressed in the active and passive vicarious satisfaction of Christ, thus means to the Christian religious consciousness nothing but that universal law of the transitoriness of the finite which subserves the purpose that the eternal identity of the true world with God be inculcated and experienced in the blessed indifference of men to living or dying. In particular, Daub takes in hand to change the meaning of the traditionary functions of the active and passive obedience of Christ, and apply them to the relation within the Godhead of the Son's satisfaction to the Father, in so far as this relation of the Son, who is identical with the eternally actual world, and who represents it, guarantees the eternal doing-away of its finitude. That is to say, the active obedience is only another expression for the absolute reality in which the Son stands related to the Father, and thereby brings the true universe into relation to Him also. This is at the same time the Divine love to the universe and to the human race. The *passive* satisfaction is only another expression for absolute freedom, inasmuch as he who by absolute will is determined by himself, suffers absolutely. Now, the absolute freedom of the Son, which is identical with His reality, accomplishes itself in this, that He refuses to be the principle of the universe apart from God. His

identity with the world thus secures to it its true freedom, for He frees it from itself (i.e. from its effort after independence). But, if now the active exercise of His freedom and reality in this respect is absolute suffering, then the eternal leading-back of the world through the Son to God is achieved in the form of passive satisfaction, for which, it must be admitted, the application of the figure of *mors voluntaria* continues unintelligible. This passive satisfaction is the meaning of God's *mercy*. The doing and suffering of God as the Son—which He yields in the room of the universe—betoken finally His obedience, whereby He, in reconciling the world, subordinates Himself to God the Father.

This then is what is contained in religion as an absolute idea. In accordance herewith, its subjective and objective references to men are determined as *pietas* and as *cultus Dei publicus*. For piety is the knowing and honouring of God, but the contents of that knowledge are, as above specified, that we are eternally reconciled by God, and by His love and mercy made blessed; that by Him we are truly created, i.e., placed in the enjoyment of Divine freedom, and by Him sustained and guided in accordance with His providence. Piety is elicited by objective religion or the public worship of God, the common prevalence of which constitutes the kingdom of God. Hereto belongs the incarnation of God as a form of God's kingship, the training of men in the way of God's prophetic activity, and the public setting-apart of men by their consecration and by the sacraments in the way of His priestly activity. This distribution of the material, by altering the meaning of the traditional forms of the Christian doctrine of salvation, means nothing else than that the consciousness of the eternal state of reconciliation of the *universe* is elicited. And the thought of God's incarnation has quite the same meaning. The validity of that thought is based upon the assumption that the Divine nature, as being the identity of the real and the ideal, finds an analogy in human nature regarded as the indifference of the universe and reason. That indifference is in childhood presented as an undisturbed state of innocence; in mature old age as a free, re-discovered norm in wisdom. What herein is laid down as possible—the union of the Divine and human natures in innocence and wisdom—is immediately laid down as necessary, and

from eternity actual in the Son of God ; but at the same time as actual in the Person of Christ, in whom we are conscious of that eternal relation, so as to accomplish our adoption as children of God, and whose piety and obedience we imitate so as to consecrate ourselves to God.

In so far as this circle of thoughts (which rests directly on Schelling) touches upon the historical limitation of the idea of reconciliation, it is under the guidance of a Kantian principle ; and from that it becomes intelligible. When Schelling denied that the Incarnation of God may be thought of as an empirical fact in time (p. 582), he followed Kant's dictum that God is out of time ; and the correlate thought that the incarnation of God is eternal, has only the negative meaning that it is *not temporal*,—that the thought is an idea. Now Daub's similar declaration is indeed so conditioned that the historical figure of Christ and the notion of the Son who reconciles the world with God and the idea of religion always glide into each other ; the tendency however of this procedure is clear enough—that it finds its right expression when we conclude in Tiefttrunk's formula (p. 424) adopted by Schelling also, that the God-manhood of Christ and His reconciling obedience are for Daub symbols of the timeless and so eternal relation, within the Godhead, of God to the universe and of the universe to God. It may certainly be added that the vacillating way in which, throughout the *Theologumena*, the eternal relations of the Divine Being and the biblico-historical utterances regarding Christ are brought to bear on one another, is partly attributable to the fact that Daub has not availed himself of that formula. But Baur's objection, that Daub has not allowed the historical side of reconciliation to come to its rights as well as the metaphysical (as above, p. 708) finds its explanation when hereby the analogy of Daub to Kant's standpoint is made to appear. For the rest, however, the discussion of the thought of reconciliation as a cosmological problem falls far below the field of vision occupied by Kant ; and as Baur justly compares with Scotus Erigena the lucubrations of Fichte and Daub, this speculation reverts to a pattern which has not yet attained to the formal apprehension of reconciliation as an ethical idea.

Here it ought to be remembered that while these instaurators of the philosophical theology of the nineteenth century ally

themselves with Scotus Erigena without knowing it, the talented instaurators of modern Pietism (p. 524) lay hold of those equally elementary forms of representation for the conception of reconciliation which pertain to the patristic period. What is implied in these manifestations is aversion to the Illumination, the narrow individual interest of which was exchanged for a view of reconciliation of the utmost possible universality. But as only a physical or even cosmical interpretation of the idea was gained, men lost the ability to rectify and inwardly to overcome that restriction of the thought which it had experienced in the Illumination. For the effort displayed by this last school to bring together the Christian thought of reconciliation with the conciliation of men to the evils of earthly life considered as Divine punishments, is not only entirely justifiable, but in fact betrays an originality of religious perception which we ought not to overlook on account of the defective solution of the problem reached by it. If it is true that want teaches to pray, then one ought to pay very attentive heed to the fact that contentment in the midst of evils is the most immediate and the direct proof that the Spirit has been reconciled with the providence of God. Now, though the Illumination formula, that all evils as penal visitations of God are means of amelioration, has already been shown to be uncertain by the fact that men at the same time lost hold of the principle for determining how evils are to be recognised as divine punishments (p. 360), it is yet impossible to regard the magniloquent interpretations of the Christian idea of reconciliation, which are given either by the talented Pietists or by the first representatives of philosophical speculation, as having even so much as understood the religious and moral needs of the preponderant mass of their contemporaries. The premisses of a right answer to the religious and moral question on which the Illumination turned are indeed supplied by Kant and by Schleiermacher—by Kant in his sharpening of the consciousness of personal guilt by the absolute notion of the moral law (p. 394); by Schleiermacher, in referring evils to the fact of the actual joint-guilt of the human race (p. 463). Compared with this sphere of vision the interpretations of the doctrine of reconciliation which are set up by the Pietistic as well as the speculative antipodes of the Illumination, are seen to be just as unpractical as they are

speculatively unsatisfactory. Can it be wondered at that the Illumination has propagated itself as it has done, or developed itself into an entire indifference towards Christianity, when what gave itself out to be the highest culture gave up all feeling for its religious need, and simply ignored it; and when the renovation of the Church-tradition in the doctrine of reconciliation showed itself equally indifferent to the problem which had emerged from the previous collapse of that tradition in the eighteenth century?

76. By Hegel¹ the Christian religion is regarded as the perfect religion, the idea of religion realized. Religion is the self-consciousness of God which He has in a finite consciousness distinct from Himself, which *in itself* is the consciousness of God, but also is so *for itself*, knowing its identity with God. In this mediation God is Spirit; *i.e.*, if the finite consciousness knows God in so far as God knows Himself in it, then God is Spirit in the community which honours God. And in fact hereby is the Christian community denoted, in which self-subsistent oneness of the divine and human natures is so realized that the Divine idea comes to be appropriated in the way of individuality. The specific contents of the Christian religion, which, from this point of view, are at the same time recognised to be the highest philosophical knowledge, have been developed by Hegel under the formula of the doctrine of the Trinity, so that the kingdom of the Father represents the eternal idea of God as abstract, the kingdom of the Son the idea of God as differentiated from itself in the universe and the finite consciousness of man, the kingdom of the Spirit the idea of God in its concrete fulfilment. Just as in the doctrine of the old Church the reservation is made that the thought of the Father, *the idea that through itself is real*, embraces the whole. And, in so far as this reservation comes up in the course of the doctrinal presentation, there result echoes of Daub's manner of viewing the subject. But with Hegel another apprehension of the matter is the prevailing one. Although the metaphysical definition of God as the Father is, that the notion of God is real through itself, that He

¹ Compare *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion* (2d ed. 1840), part second, from p. 191 onwards. The lectures date from the years 1821 to 1831.

is the absolute idea, that He is spirit, that He in His eternal self-distinction (while as eternal love He knows Himself in the other), is identical with Himself, yet is it established that God, apart from any relation to the universe, is first apprehended as the abstract idea which is not yet posited in its reality. For the reality of the idea is its revelation through the universe to the finite spirit; and completed revelation—in other words, the concrete reality of God—is given in the spirit of the Christian Church when the finite spirit knows itself to be one with God, or conversely, when God Himself in the absolute knowledge of the finite spirit is manifest to Himself and identical with Himself. The idea of God as spirit is thus “the living process whereby the self-subsistent unity of Divine and human nature is elicited *for itself*.” The alternation between the former point of view, which is, properly speaking, Schelling’s, and the latter, which is properly Hegelian, evinces itself always in the vacillating meaning of the phrase *In itself*, which denotes at one time the eternal actuality of the idea that holds good in God, at another time the possibility (founded in God) of the unification or reconciliation of Divine and human being. In a quite analogous way does the use of the word eternity vary, sometimes being made to mean the negation of time as an attribute of the idea of God; at other times denoting the totality of endless time as attribute of God’s revelation.

This inner insecurity of the Hegelian view of the universe comes to light particularly in his delineation of the kingdom of the Son, because here those conditions re-assert themselves by which Daub’s circle of thought was unbounded. If it belongs to the absolute idea to posit itself, as distinguished from itself, as the Son, this distinction is taken up into the identity of the idea with itself no less eternally. The full distinction consists indeed herein, that the things distinguished have a diverse destiny; that accordingly the Son, whom God distinguishes from Himself, and in Whom He distinguishes Himself from Himself, possesses independence and freedom. But according to the self-subsistent identity which still continues to hold good, it follows from this, only that the Son, as the universe, *appears* as something actual outside of God. “The truth of the universe is only its ideality, not that it should have genuine actuality.” “The being of the universe is this—to have a

moment of being; but to do away with this separation or parting from God, *to be only this* to return to its origin." But this cannot be understood otherwise than as meaning that the actuality of the finite world as such is mere *seeming*, and must be denied in accordance with the identity that is laid down in the eternal idea. But, on the other hand, Hegel thinks it necessary, for the sake of the reality of the idea, to take seriously the independent actuality of the universe as what is distinguished from God. In this view he apprehends it in common with Jacob Böhme, as resulting from an apostasy from God. Herein results the distinction of the universe from the eternal Son of God, who perseveres in identity with the Father. But here again the other consideration obtrudes itself: while the finite universe divides itself into the world of nature and the world of finite spirit, only the latter as knowledge has a relation to God. Nature thus comes into relation with God only in accordance with its relation to man and not for itself. In divergence from Schelling, and with approximation to Fichte, it is accordingly asserted that the universe possesses that sort of independence only in the judgment of the finite spirit; in God Himself that is only the vanishing element of the phenomenon. In disagreement with Daub, therefore, the idea of reconciliation is restricted to the return of the finite spirit to God, but not brought to bear upon the universe as a whole. But now, since without any occasion the self-distinction, which God is said to have accomplished in positing the world, is posited as logical contrariety, yea, as contradiction, as that which must not be, the finite quality of the spirit, its life of instinct is posited as at once good *in itself*, and as bad because it ought not to continue as it is in its immediate naturalness. The same logical contradiction emerges, moreover, in the doctrine that knowledge, reflexion on self, as the legend of the fall is intended to show, is the fountain of evil, and yet at the same time the ground of reconciliation.

This self-contradiction, which the finite spirit experiences with infinite pain, demands to be resolved in reconciliation. This last implies two things: "There must arise in the subject the consciousness that this opposition (contradiction) is not *in itself*, that truth is the state in which this opposition is taken away; then when it has been taken away *in itself*, according

to truth, the subject as such can attain unto peace in its self-activity." The latter subjective activity must presuppose the resolution of that contradiction in God, *i.e.* the self-subsistent unity of the divine and human nature in God, as the idea of the absolute spirit subsisting in and for itself must be recognised to be the *possibility* of reconciliation. But the actuality of reconciliation is not achieved in this general act of knowledge; for not every one is fitted thereto without special culture. If now it is all-important that the absolute idea should be universally accessible or *certain* to the immediate consciousness, then must the unity of Divine and human nature be seen and experienced in the form of sensible intuition, external existence. This unity must be exhibited to the consciousness in the appearance in time of an individual as the Son of God. The deduction of the necessity of the historical Person of Christ and of His value as the Son of God is by no means guided either by the question of metaphysical possibility or by regard to the full compass of the self-consciousness of the God-man as expressed by Himself. The judgment that Christ is the God-man is founded rather only upon the need for a finite mode of representation felt by the men who are to be reconciled. Hegel neither considers whether the eternity of God admits of incarnation in time, nor does he pay any regard to the fact that the man Christ Himself, on His own behalf, declared His specific oneness with God. Rather is this individual posited as a divine nature by faith; in Him is the oneness of the divine and human natures brought to the consciousness of man,—thus always in relation to a judgment of the finite spirit who has not yet been raised to the absolute idea. Hegel, moreover, suggests as a requisite which he finds to be met in Christ, that the chief contents of His doctrine should be general and abstract; he therefore by no means brings the idea of the kingdom of God as the kingdom of reconciliation into relation to Christ's dominant position as the proper founder and Head of the kingdom of God, and as the specific reconciler. Neither does he pay any regard to the purpose of Christ in His voluntary and obedient dying at the outset to destroy all appearance of the annihilation of His Person and Work, but leaves this judgment, which goes against the outward seeming and catches sight of glorification in the

annihilation of life, to the faith of the Church. All this arises from the fact that Hegel too sets before us in the figure of the God-man only a *symbol* of the universal truth that the divine and the human nature in themselves, according to the divine actuality, are eternally one. And on this point there is left no possibility of mistake even if between times it is again asserted that the idea comes into actuality by this individual; so that those who should attain to the kingdom of God can do so only by means of that one individual; or that the faith which discerns in Christ the God-man is the consciousness of the truth or of that which God is in and for Himself. What is, properly speaking, decisive is to be found accordingly in the line of representation which sets forth that the Church receives from the death of Christ the impression of His glorification, but this connects itself with the resurrection, of which death is only the condition. Herein accordingly Hegel approximates to the similar views of Oetinger (p. 533) and other adherents of the school of Bengel; and in so far as the *actual* reconciliation of the individual demands that conversion and surrender of the natural will which, as imitation of the self-abnegation of Christ, recognises that postulate of the idea of God-manhood on the validity of which Hegel insists—so far as this view is urged, the same thought was contemporaneously maintained by Klaiber (p. 501) and others.

This representation of Hegel's course of thought does not show that the normal adjustment (announced by Baur) between the speculative and the historical element of the idea of reconciliation has been accomplished by him. For, after all, the historical element is, without a doubt, expressed in the faith of the Christian Church in the God-manhood of Christ; accordingly it does not come by the rights which belong to it when to this faith is attributed only the position of a subjectively necessary symbol, but no objective necessity arising from the idea of God. On the other hand, if the process of the Divine life is grounded upon the self-distinction of God and upon the resumption of that into identity with Himself, and if reconciliation is included in the idea of God as an expression of the latter element, then the reconciliation of the finite spirit with God is not covered by this schema. For the world which, including the finite spirit, is deduced from an apostasy from

God is hereby not set forth as the counterpart of God in which He distinguishes Himself from Himself in such a way that in itself (in actuality) it is identical with Him. Hegel only deludes himself with this conception, allowing the ideas of distinction, opposition, contradiction, to interchange at will with each other in characterizing the relation of the world to God. If, finally, the members of the Christian Church, in the knowledge of the self-subsistent (thus possible and suitable) oneness of the divine and human spirit, find the presupposition under which their will undertakes, in correspondence with Christ as a type, to break their self-seeking, and reconcile itself with God, there comes into consideration, with regard to the *will*, a factor upon which the logical elaboration of the idea of God in the revelation of God did not reckon. For the will is the pledge of a self-consciousness which exerts itself exclusively within itself, in which accordingly a man is not conscious that therein another—even God Himself—is specifically conscious of Himself. If now the Christian idea of reconciliation always and entirely refers to a contrariety or rather contradiction between the Divine and human will, the inadequacy to the problem of Hegel's elaboration of it is obvious.

I may refrain from going more fully into Marheineke's¹ doctrine of reconciliation. For his doctrine of Christ's Person and redeeming Work is, indeed, saturated with the forms of the Hegelian notions, but it is essentially orthodox. It shows itself to be so in the first edition also of his "Christian Dogmatic," which is still entirely free from the influence of Hegel, so that one sees that the formulæ of the philosophical notions are merely accommodated to the orthodox tradition, at least in the above-mentioned doctrines, and that the converse task has not been undertaken—a remodelling of the Christian material of thought in accordance with the principles of the Hegelian philosophy. Only it deserves to be specially mentioned that Marheineke was the first to give expression to a thought which has found utterance in a multitude of theologians of the most diverse schools, and which, as I have repeatedly had occasion to mention, had already found more correct expression in the Reformed doctrine,—namely, that Christ is the representative

¹ *Die Grundlehren der christlichen Dogmatik als Wissenschaft*, 2d and entirely new edition (1827). The first edition is dated 1819.

of humanity, inasmuch as he is humanity itself, and presents that which is alike in all individuals united in Himself (sec. 398). The deduction, indeed, passes away from the sequence of the doctrine of satisfaction to the application of example. For if Christ, according to Marheineke, suffers for all, it is not in order that the others may not suffer and die any longer; but that in Him the suffering and dying of all may concentrate itself, and that they may learn only how to suffer and die as He did.

The consequence of Hegel's philosophy of religion, and at the same time of that philosophical view of the universe with which Schleiermacher in the *Glaubenslehre* had connected the recognition of the specific dignity of Christ only in an artificial or violent way, has been drawn by Strauss in the closing dissertation of his first "Life of Jesus" (1835).¹ But this further development rather led back to the line originally taken by Schelling. For if we give up the specific God-manhood of Christ, because really it was not proved and did not admit of being proved from the principles of Hegel, and if, therefore, we set aside the accommodation Hegel made in that respect to the need of finite knowledge,—then the Church of the Holy (Christian) Spirit seems in the first instance as the organ of the absolute divine self-consciousness, as the subject of the incarnation of God, to elevate itself above the natural connexion of the race. That Strauss, while attaching himself to Hegel, should yet never have taken this possibility into consideration, befits the rhetorical violence with which he hastens to a close in the concluding dissertation. But it is also easily understood why his fancy soared over this stopping-place, which logical regard to Hegel's line of deduction could not have avoided recognising. For just as the specific dignity of the founder of the Christian Church fell away, so also did the security disappear for the specific difference of degree between the fellowship of the Christian religion and all previous grades of culture and religion. The incarnation of God was then of necessity referred to the advancing progress in culture of all humanity, and thus as eternal and all-comprehensive set over

¹ With the proof, given above, that Hegel has grounded the judgment of faith, concerning the value of Christ's Person, not metaphysically in the idea of God but only phenomenally in the need of finite knowledge, compare Strauss: *Streitschriften* (1841), Heft 3, p. 76 sqq.

against the view which regarded it as an isolated individual fact. With the formula of the Incarnation of God from all eternity Schelling's expression is simply resumed (p. 582). In the genus, says Strauss, the course of the development of which is blameless and sinless (for impurity always attaches only to the individual), there is produced from the negation of its naturalness an ever higher spiritual life, from the removal of its finitude as a personal, national, world-spirit arises its oneness with the infinite spirit of heaven. Thus is this God-man also recognised under the attributes of dying, resurrection, and ascension; and by faith in Him is man made just before God, *i.e.*, by the quickening of the idea of humanity in Him, and by the negation of naturalness and sensuousness expressed therein, the individual becomes partaker of the divine-human life of the genus.

This surrogate of the idea of reconciliation required to be taken note of; the criticism of it, however, would lead us deeper into the whole controverted christological question than suits my present purpose. I therefore simply make the remark that Strauss himself has long ago rejected the phrase of his closing dissertation, "this Christ;" and that it is not his *Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk* (1864) but his *Glaubenslehre* (1841) that for the first time gives up any standpoint which might be called philosophical. As Schwarz¹ justly judges, Spinozism and Deistic moralism, the former in cosmology, the latter in anthropology, divide between them the positive contents of the dogmatic of Strauss, without so much as even an attempt being made to bring together these two contrarities into inward unity. But in the *Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk* nature is deistically treated according to an inviolable necessity, while freedom is at the same time regarded as the form of the spirit-life; but then as the thought of God is rendered inoperative, we want that adjustment of these principles which Deism offers. The closing dissertation of 1835, accordingly, as this result shows, was for its celebrated author the transition into non-theology, not to say atheism; and that because under the guise of philosophy it pursues in rhetorical tones an altogether fanciful course of procedure. And herein is this dissertation quite of a piece with the original poetical philosophizing of

¹ *Das Wesen der Religion* (1847), Part ii. p. 165.

Schelling. Its fundamental mistake in the question before us lies quite on the surface herein that the negative and affirmative judgments regarding the incarnation—however immediately they follow upon each other—yet require two separate notions of eternity. God, according to Schelling, is not man exclusively in Christ, because He is timeless, because, according to Kant, eternity is the negation of time. Of quite analogous import is the formula of Strauss, that it is not the nature of an idea to discharge its fulness into one individual being; for the idea is the negation of individualness. But the affirmative judgment common to both—that God accomplishes His incarnation from eternity through the entire human race is based upon the Socinian notion of eternity as being the whole of beginningless and endless time. It is difficult to contend with such dialectic, especially when it is accompanied with the pretension of absolute knowledge.

It is upon the ground of the Hegelian idea of God that Biedermann¹ opens up the prospect of another conclusion regarding the Person of Christ. For the self-revelation of God which includes in itself three unseparated factors (which yet admit of being distinguished by us as distinct steps) is, first, the positing of the world as a natural process outside of God; second, self-revelation to the finite spirit in the world; third, the self-realization of absolute being in the finite spirit in the arena of the world. But this third step is gained when the self-consciousness of the finite spirit is realized by the absoluteness of the Spirit as absolute religious self-consciousness or as the love-fellowship, in which God appears in the relation of Father of men,—men, as children of God. Herein is the religious principle of Christianity expressed. And it is submitted to a moral judgment to say that the significance of Christ for Christianity as a whole is no external and accidental one, but rather inner and abiding. The former would be the case if the principle had consisted merely of a new doctrine taught by Jesus, or if its entrance upon the stage of history had received only a mediate impulse from the Person of Jesus. But the personal life of Jesus was the first self-realization of that principle into a personality pertaining to the history of the world; and this fact is the fountain-head of the activity of this

¹ *Christliche Dogmatik* (1869).

principle in history; Jesus as the historical revelation of the redemption-principle is the historical Redeemer (secs. 718, 799, 800, 815).¹ As Biedermann in reference to this contents himself with proposing problems, he has accordingly only hinted at the way in which he understands redemption by Christ. In this regard he understands by the Person of Christ the prototype (holding its place for all time in the history of the universe) that guarantees the activity of the redemption-principle (sec. 816), in accordance wherewith the absoluteness of the Spirit becomes the religious self-consciousness of man, and also evinces itself in him as the power which is able to take away the contradiction between the natural ego and its destiny, and also as the active principle of continuing dominion over nature, and the glorification of natural humanity into a kingdom of God (secs. 831, 832, 835). By this, he thinks, is expressed what is meant by the three offices of Christ. I find now that this train of thought does not overpass the limits of Socinianism. But it appears to me that if Biedermann (as properly might have been expected of him) had regulated his historical presentation of the doctrine of the Church by reference to the Reformed and not to the Lutheran tradition, he would have found opportunity, by means of the strict reciprocity of relation between the redeeming work of Christ and the notion of the Church, which is insisted on by Reformed divines and has been rediscovered by many moderns, for teaching a doctrine of a different sort. In this respect Weisse² establishes points of view of a complementary sort, bringing forward into prominence that the goal of Christ's life-calling was the building-up of His disciples into a Church of believers, that accordingly He could accomplish the manifestation of His moral majesty only in the death to which He yielded Himself with free consent in pursuit of His calling to bring about the establishment of the new covenant. But as these remarks take the form only of historical reflection, Weisse associates with them with special preference the idea (embraced by him) which Augustine and Luther

¹ As Biedermann in this goes directly in the teeth of an expression by Strauss (*Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte*, p. 214), his position approximates what has been brought forward above (p. 509), as conspicuous in Schweizer's *Christliche Glaubenslehre*.

² *Philosophische Dogmatik oder Philosophie des Christenthums*, vol. iii. (1862), pp. 342, 396, 351.

held (see above, p. 202), that the death of Christ has the meaning of victory over sin and death. But all this is not brought into scientific shape—rather is the suitability of such a mode of treatment of the last point expressly denied. At all events, these functions of redemption are not brought into any necessary relation to the speculative Christology of Weisse; they do not require, therefore, to be more thoroughly gone into.

Baur, in siding with Strauss in his *Geschichte der christlichen Lehre von der Versöhnung*, has declared that he does not thereby intend to assert that the Christology and reconciliation-doctrine of the latter offer the final and in every way satisfactory solution of the problem. He believes, on the other hand, that he has clearly shown how the dogma, by the immanent agitation of its idea, is pushed on from one form to another, until at last the latest theory attaches itself as a new link in the chain of the momenta of its development. In the negative character that attaches to every representation lies, according to him, the impulse to an always advancing progress; the march of the Spirit goes forwards only; and what once has been recognised in its negative character remains for ever a vanquished and eliminated factor. I may now appeal to the delineation of the history of the doctrines of reconciliation and justification, which here closes, to test whether or not this belief in the progress of knowledge in a direct line is one to which we are of necessity driven by facts. At all events, the last link recognised by my predecessor in the history unfolded by him—and that too by a follower of the speculative theology itself—has been so surpassed that an older position has again been taken up.

THE END.





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